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This thesis investigates relations between five Russian energy companies – RAO 
UES/Inter RAO (electricity), Minatom/Rosatom (nuclear energy), Lukoil (oil), Transneft 
(oil pipelines) and Gazprom (gas) – and the Russian t te from 1992 to 2012, with 
particular regard to state–company interaction over Russian foreign policy and companies’ 
activities in the post-Soviet region. The argument is that, due to the institutional legacies of 
the Soviet system, state–company interaction over foreign policy and energy operations 
abroad was part of their interaction over the Russian tate’s institutional development. The 
study is based on the conceptual framework of social rders developed by North, Wallis 
and Weingast (NWW). State–company relations are seen to vary according to their 
informality and formality, and how closely the companies, and their rent streams, are tied 
to the state and the ruling coalition, or regime.  
The thesis concludes that the institutions that structure companies’ relations with the 
Russian state at home make them more or less available as foreign policy tools. In 
particular, domestic state–company relations influece the companies’ role in maintaining 
post-Soviet energy dependence on Russia. The thesis ighlights the energy companies’ 
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1.1  Aim and scope 
Russia’s international position today is built on eergy. Energy resources, especially 
international oil and gas supplies, make up the fundaments for Russia’s position as a great 
power in international relations and provide the revenue for military and nuclear power 
projection. Russia’s return to great power politics during Vladimir Putin’s presidency 
initially surprised the West, which had in the 1990s become accustomed to a more 
compliant Russia with little capacity to spare for global affairs. For the post-Soviet states, 
however, Russia never really went away. It remained a great power in the region, above all 
in the regional economy. This position supported Russia’s foreign policy and underpinned 
its return as a great power in international affairs. Energy was the central pillar of Russia’s 
position in the post-Soviet region. The break-up of the Soviet Union left Russia with few 
tools to influence the other post-Soviet states, but energy was a crucial exception.  
Russia’s current position in the region did not spring from nowhere. The legacy of an 
integrated Soviet energy complex, dominated by Russia, opened the possibility of using 
energy as a tool of Russian influence in the post-Sviet space. As this thesis will show, the 
subsequent development of Russia’s energy complex has been intertwined with the 
development of the current Russian state. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian state’s ability to respond, act and influence i  the economy was reduced. Deprived 
of Soviet hierarchical mechanisms, and without the indirect institutions of an established 
market economy, the new Russian state established institutions on paper that worked only 
when underpinned by personal, informal agreements. Such was the basis of the gradual 




Russian energy companies closer together also in the post-Soviet period. While this is 
often observed, the evolution of this process is rarely unpicked and analysed. The aim of 
this thesis is to fill that gap. Here, it is argued that the Russian state and Russian energy 
companies participated in the development of both Russian foreign policy and Russian 
energy operations in the post-Soviet region, because thi  was part of their interaction in the 
overall institutional development of the Russian state.  
1.2  Research questions and analytical aims 
This thesis is about the role of five large Russian energy companies in Russian foreign 
policy in the post-Soviet states, from January 1992 to March 2012. The companies 
emerged from the Soviet energy complex, an essential cog in the giant superstructure of 
the Soviet economy. They were legacies of Soviet ministr es that gradually transformed 
themselves into business units. Their continued operations amidst the upheaval of Russia’s 
market reforms made them central to maintaining domestic political stability. They were, 
essentially, organisations closely related to the sate. But while energy companies emerged 
out of state structures in the early 1990s, by the 2000s they were distinguishable as 
companies, even though they differed in their distance from state structures. Close state–
company relations in the early 1990s implied personal a d informal relations, and a lack of 
clearly defined boundaries between state and company. But state–company relations were 
also conflict-ridden. Often there was little or no state control over companies that formally 
belonged in the hierarchy of state organisations. I the 2000s, even when ties were close, 
interaction between the state and the companies took place between more clearly defined 




In the period under study, the Russian state went through a transformation from a fragile 
state, with little capability to uphold stable institutions and predictable practices, to an 
increasingly cohesive organisation with more clearly delineated institutions and interests. 
The energy companies were integral to this development. By interacting with the energy 
companies, the state could respond to demands and ad pt to a wider range of tasks. So how 
did relations between the energy companies and the s ate change? State–company 
relations, their gradual change and growing institutionalisation, come under scrutiny here. 
It is argued that changing state–company relations required mutual adaptation on both 
sides. As a consequence, it will also be possible to understand how the state itself changed 
from the moribund, all-encompassing, late-Soviet sta e, incapable of responding forcefully 
to, let alone shaping, developments in the economy, to a more active and flexible state with 
differentiated institutional frameworks for different sectors. The companies in the same 
period changed from Soviet enterprises wielding control only over the processes of 
production, to vertically integrated companies with command over input, production, 
marketing and profits. In return for state and regime support, they shared their rents, or 
economic profits, with the state and wider Russian society, through taxation and other 
channels. 
Mutual adaptation between the Russian state and companies resonated across the post-
Soviet region. A considerable part of my analysis i of the energy companies’ operations in 
the post-Soviet states. The companies formed Russia’s rel tions with the other post-Soviet 




states, conceptualised in Russia from 1992 as the ‘near abroad’,1 before the foreign policy 
of the Russian state had been formed. To the Russian state, their operations opened a 
window for Russian influence over post-Soviet states when few, if any, other tools were 
available. How did the companies’ relations with the Russian state change as regards, on 
the one hand, company activity in the post-Soviet state , and, on the other, Russian foreign 
policy towards the post-Soviet states? This part of the analysis aims to shed light on the 
changing state–company relations on the level of the post-Soviet region. This will yield 
insights into the changing capacity of the Russian state to formulate foreign policy and 
institutionalise implementation. The energy sector gave the state some important foreign 
policy tools. 
In this thesis, state–company relations between five energy companies and the Russian 
state are investigated, with particular emphasis on the role of Russian energy companies in 
policy towards post-Soviet states. As a general observation, one may note how, with the 
notable exception of transit relations, the post-Soviet states were initially slow in 
advancing demands and attaching conditions to the op rations of Russian energy 
companies on their territories. Energy dependence on Russia affected how post-Soviet 
states responded to Russian policies, and therefore the ffectiveness of energy as a Russian 
policy tool. I will show how energy dependence (Table 1.2) among the post-Soviet states 
opened investment and acquisition possibilities for Russian energy companies and widened 
the range of policy options for Russia. But the aim here is not to explain outcomes in 
bilateral relations. The foreign policies of the other post-Soviet states are included only 
where they contribute to the understanding of state–company relations in Russia.  
                                                          
1 The term ‘near abroad’ was used by Russian analysts already in 1992 (Light, 1996, p.91 fn.23), but it 
became associated with Andrei Kozyrev in 1993 as Russia tried to indicate a zone of interests in the post-




1.3  Levels of analysis 
This analysis is carried out on three levels: the company level, the level of the Russian 
state and the international level. At the company level, the importance of state support or 
privileges, or the absence of such, for company development, is assessed. At the level of 
the Russian state, sector development for the respective energy industry and the 
importance of the energy companies to the Russian eco omy in the overall political 
stability of the state will be analysed. At the international level, government support for 
company operations in the post-Soviet region, and company support for Russian foreign 
policy, are discussed. 
State–company relations are investigated at all three levels of analysis. They are tied 
together by a discussion of how changes in state–company relations at one level affected 
changes at the others. For example, in light of mutual adaptation, changes in state–
company relations, e.g. at Russian state level, mayhave led companies to adapt their 
strategies in the post-Soviet region. This study views state–company relations at the 
national and international levels as a two-level game in its own right, where companies 
pursued their interests, and politicians maximised their hold on power, in interaction at 
both levels (Putnam, 1988, p.434). Top representatives of the Russian state also sought to 
maximise opportunities in the post-Soviet region and minimise adverse consequences of 
international developments. 
1.4  Approaches to state–company relations  
The relationship between energy companies and the stat  i  conceptualised as access to and 
participation in institutional and policy development on both sides. By access, I mean the 




and top politicians, the political elite, and by participation, to influence government 
policymaking and sector development. From the standpoint of the state and regime, it is 
participation in company development and an opportunity to influence company strategies, 
including foreign operations. Access and participation take place in formal and informal 
organisations, like patronage networks, and in formal and institutionalised channels of 
influence.  
At all levels, the aim is to trace the evolving relations between the state and the companies 
as a process of mutual adaptation. Accordingly, when assessing state support at company 
level, this is seen to reflect the general capacity of the Russian state to support more 
complex economic organisations, here companies, with less direct ties to the government. 
However, it is also relevant to see the companies’ r ponse, their adaptation to the 
changing state. On occasion, company managements used state relations to initiate change. 
More often company managements resisted the state. Wh n discussing sector development 
at the Russian state level, the aim is to investigate the participation of the companies in 
forming their institutional environment, the state itself. The development of the Russian 
state in this way becomes a process that can be trac d through the development of access 
and participation at all levels. 
State–company relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was one 
of several arenas in which the elite struggle for pwer influenced the future shape of the 
Russian state. The mutual adaptation process between th  state and the companies was not 
a neat process of negotiation between two clearly delineated sides. In the elite struggle, the 
fragmented state was also a tool. Control of the state was the ultimate weapon against an 




the use of the state as a tool to advance the economic r political interests of one 
organisation against the others. Weak state organisations could be employed as fronts for 
business interests, stronger state organisations could mpete with other organisations for 
influence. State organisations, or new private organisations with close informal ties to state 
organisations, were also available for hire and protection. As the saying went, ‘the red roof 
is the tallest and most influential’ (Vylegzhanina, 2000).2 As I will show here, in the 
2000s, control of state organisations was consolidated within the elite. The mutual 
adaptation process was then more concerned with defining the terms and limits of access 
and participation in institutional development.  
1.5  The development of the state and state–company relations 
Against this background, to understand the development of state–company relations is also 
to study a centrifugal process, whereby companies emerged out of state structures. The 
process of mutual adaptation was to set the boundaries of the state and companies, and the 
institutions that guided their interaction. To understand this process, it is important to 
remember that an energy company emerging out of a Soviet branch ministry in the early 
1990s was a very different entity from a vertically integrated corporation3 in the 2010s, 
irrespective of ownership and control. As regards the state, the instruments it had available 
changed. The crisis of the Russian state in the early 1990s meant that its ability to structure 
the economic and regulatory environment of both state-owned and private companies was 
different from two decades later. Over the period un er study here, the state fashioned 
tools better suited to its requirements and made them more efficient. This reflects in turn 
                                                          
2 ‘Roof’ means protection, the ‘red roof’ in this case is the militsiya (police). This was alternatively referred 
to as a ‘blue roof’ or ‘mentovskaya krysha’ – ‘cop roof’.  
3 Vertical integration refers to the degree to which a company is in control, normally through ownership, of 




the capacity of the state to structure the environme t by finding and applying instruments, 
that is, to implement, compel and coerce.  
The Russian reality in the early 1990s was almost the opposite of institutional stability, 
predictability and transparent implementation. Soviet institutions were eroding, and had 
anyway been created for the planned Soviet economy. In the late Soviet period, the 
Communist Party was a partly predictable giver and non-transparent ultimate enforcer of 
rules. Gorbachev’s sidelining of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during 
perestroika, and the decreasing legitimacy of the Party after the failed coup of August 
1991, led to institutional erosion and state fragmentation. The Soviet economy by 1990 had 
a ‘systemic vacuum’ at its heart:  
 
The old planning system has broken down but has not been dismantled; 
meanwhile, the structures vital to the functioning of a market have yet to be 
put in place. (IMF et al., 1990, p.1) 
 
The systemic vacuum left the state a nominal force in segments of the economy at the 
break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. The reforms introduced by the new 
Russian government in early 1992 were meant to create private ownership in a market 
economy. However, as old Soviet institutions were still not dismantled, the result until the 
new Constitution was put in place in late 1993 was two sets of institutions existing side by 
side in two overlapping but incomplete state system. The chaos of reforms in 1992–3 
further weakened the capacity of the state to regulate the economy. The rules of the game 
were contradictory and in flux, with only a weak rule of law. Private interests and informal 




financial crisis in 1998, elite disunity and government policies exacerbated Russia’s 
problems, leading to a debt default (Easter, 2012, p.138-142). In comparison, government 
policies, once established, quite successfully met th  2008 international financial crisis 
(Easter, 2012, p.146-150). These are the milestones f the development of the Russian 
state.  
Changes in the state went hand in hand with changes in the economy. When extracting 
resources from the economy, and when seeking to maintain societal stability, the Russian 
state needs to interact with Russian companies. Companies rely on the state for their very 
existence, while the state relies on companies to create economic resources which it can 
then extract. Accordingly, state regulation of the economy includes overall support for the 
existence of companies, fundamentally the basic institutions of property rights and contract 
enforcement and institutions that extract resources, like taxation. In addition, states can and 
do organise sectors or companies directly by regulating market or supply conditions, 
through for example monopolies. A state with the basic capacity to support organisations 
outside its immediate reach would at least temporarily enforce and protect some contracts 
and property rights, extract resources from companies ot just by owning them, but also 
through the less direct method of taxation, and regulate market access for at least some 
companies. More permanent and complete protection of property rights, transparent and 
predictable taxation and less direct extraction, and open access to markets for companies, 
would be the case in a state with a more advanced capacity to support complex economic 
organisations outside its immediate reach (North et al., 2009, p.11-12). In this way, the 
development of state–company relations reflects the capacity of the state to uphold 
increasingly complex economic organisations (North et al., 2009, p.47). Without protection 




pursue close relations with the state in order to operate and survive. However, even where 
property rights are weakly protected and companies and state organisations are very 
closely related, the state may be more or less responsive to companies’ demands for 
predictable policies or support in their operations abroad.  
State capabilities are not uniform across sectors. One can easily imagine that the state 
responds differently to demands for changes to the institutional framework from one 
energy sector to another. Likewise, capabilities are likely to develop unevenly among state 
organisations. For example, a branch ministry may be capable of delivering clarifications 
and lower-level decisions, while strategic issues and demands that require coordination 
between state organisations remain unresolved.  
In the energy sphere, state–company relations take place both in the domestic sphere and 
abroad. A starting point for this thesis is that the Soviet Union left Russia in control of an 
overwhelming share of its energy complex, including i frastructure for energy transport 
and distribution. Institutional changes in Russia’s energy sectors therefore had 
consequences for the post-Soviet region. Still, when the Russian state interacted with 
Russian companies at the post-Soviet level, much of this interaction was structured by 
foreign policy and trade institutions, such as export duties or support for Russian 
businesses abroad. The pattern of access and partici tion in state–business relations at this 
level therefore differed from that inside Russia. At home, institutions like taxation, licences 
and production permits and quotas structured state–company relations. State–company 
relations abroad also reflected the general development of Russian policy towards the post-
Soviet states, for example, by placing more emphasis on companies as tools of Russian 




(CIS), faltered in the first half of the 1990s. Economic relations were given high priority at 
the time, in the Strategic Course, a policy document intended to guide relations with CIS 
states from 1995 (Decree No 940, 1995). In domestic Russian politics, the social 
obligations, formalised and informal, of the companies towards their employees and 
especially towards wider society, can be seen as a substitute for welfare provision by the 
state. In a situation where property rights are weak, accepting obligations in lieu of the 
state is a way of ensuring continued protection of pr perty. Some of the obligations of 
Russian companies extended across post-Soviet borders. In this way, elites outside state 
organisations participated in national development as a joint project with the state. In 
return, they reduced their vulnerability to predation from the state. 
The elite struggle for control over the future of the Russian state took place also in state–
company relations, as control of state companies translated into control of the Russian 
state. In the 1990s, financial and operational control over Gazprom in particular was 
almost equal to control of the Russian state through the state budget. Added to this was the 
capacity to raise informal contributions through energy companies. Informal contributions, 
while of considerable value, were different from formal taxation. In the 1990s, the 
government found it difficult to extract formal taxes in full, not least from Gazprom. But 
President Yeltsin could nevertheless rely on Gazprom t  forward ad hoc contributions to, 
or indirectly support, political campaigns, or step u  to the plate in national emergencies 
such as the 1998 financial collapse. The larger the company, and the greater its potential as 
a source of rents, the more central an object it was likely to become in elite conflicts for 
control also of the state. With at least a temporary agreement within the elite on a coalition 




modifications of the institutional framework in a way that maximised rents, either to the 
state, to the companies, or both. 
In consequence, my analysis of access, participation and mutual adaptation is a means to 
an end, the aim being to explore whether, and how, state organisations used the companies 
as their tools, at home and abroad. Alternatively, company managements may have resisted 
on behalf of their companies.  
Resistance is related to a broader occurrence: autonomy from the state in companies that 
were formally state owned. Extensive autonomy reducs opportunities for state access and 
participation. It was both an effect and cause of the state’s weakness, during the downward 
spiral of state capacity in the early 1990s. The relatively rapid weakening of the Soviet 
state during the break-up of the Union left the new Russian state so weak that it lost real, as 
opposed to nominal, control of state companies and e terprises, including those later 
integrated into the companies under study here. Extensive autonomy was a consequence of 
the systemic vacuum in the late Soviet period. As the system eroded from within, existing 
channels of access and participation were disrupted without new ones emerging, and 
companies became insulated from the state. The clos and informal personal relations that 
we will see between some company heads and top repres ntatives of the state were in 
periods the only relations between the state and the company. Activities in post-Soviet 
states are particularly interesting in this regard, s one may expect them to be particularly 
prone to operate beyond the reach of Russian state organisations, including foreign 
policymaking ones.  
Increasing autonomy can be a logical response to state weakness by a company’s 




withdrawal is a logical response from a company management that would otherwise easily 
be removed in a conflict. In such periods, companies may have refrained from attempting 
to gain access and involvement. They may even have de loped into a state within the 
state. This happens when a company sets its own rules and attempts to create institutions 
outside the channels of access to and participation with the state, to bypass the state’s 
institutional framework. If this succeeds, the company effectively sets the rules of the 
game, and can operate beyond the reach of an impotent state apparatus. The development 
of extensive autonomy from the state is best seen as a downward spiral of fragmentation 
and incapacitation on the part of the state, in contrast to an upward spiral of institutional 
development.   
1.6  The Soviet institutional legacy 
The Soviet economy is usefully seen as a single structu e, giant but centralised. Soviet 
enterprises were not firms in the Western sense (Adachi, 2010, p.32-36), but production 
units in the corporation USSR Inc. (Hanson, 2003, p.9-13). The transformation of 
institutions, here defined as the rules of the game devised by humans but constraining 
human interaction (North, 1990, p.4), was a slow and u even process. Soviet institutions 
were in many cases carried over into each post-Soviet state. These institutional remnants of 
the past continued to function in new circumstances and made Soviet-type rules and 
procedures available also to the new governments and new companies. In this study, they 
are called institutional legacies. Legacies are here seen to have passed from the Soviet 
Union to post-Soviet Russia as an inheritance, sometimes in slightly modified form, to 
become the basis for further institutional and organis tional development. My view of 
legacies as institutional continuity is accordingly less inclusive, with a more modest legacy 




kinds, over a longer period of time (Huskey, 2014, p.111; Kotkin and Beissinger, 2014, 
p.12).  
In this study, the legacies of USSR Inc. matter in three ways. The first concerns 
institutional autonomy and property relations, especially the emergence of companies from 
the Soviet, and later the Russian state. Gradually, from the late Soviet years (1987–90) to 
the mid-1990s, organisations that had been part of the giant Soviet superstructure became 
tangibly distinct units within a Russian economy undergoing reform. Other parts of the 
superstructure were torn away in the break-up and became the property of other post-
Soviet states. The companies studied here began their post-Soviet life at the level of USSR 
branch ministries – the Ministry of the Gas Industry, he Ministry for Medium Machine-
Building. As Russian companies they remained in control of a considerable part of their 
Soviet-period industrial sector. They were formally closely associated with state 
organisations. In practice, too, close formal and iformal relations between state 
organisations and the companies existed on and off for much of the period under study. 
Over the two decades following the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, the overall 
direction was away from USSR Inc. in a centrifugal process, and towards 
institutionalisation of formally more distant ties between the state and the companies.  
In the early 1990s, the economic organisations emerging out of USSR Inc. were only 
beginning to exist as distinct from the state. In this they differed from companies created 
from scratch in the new market economy. Some, like Lukoil and to some extent Gazprom, 
were more easily discernible among the new old companies, but exactly where the dividing 
line was could not be easily determined in the early period (1991–3). Others, like Minatom 




organisations, but not clearly delineated. All companies, and state organisations in charge 
of the institutional framework, had a mix of economic interests, some connected to the 
state, and some concerned with private gain. This further complicated delineation between 
state and company.  
So USSR, Inc. left a legacy that affected the degree to which organisations, here seen as 
the players in the game (North, 1990, p.4-5), could be distinguished from one another. 
There was a visible lack of distinction between economic organisations, like enterprises 
and production associations, and state organisations like ministries. In the planned 
economy, enterprises were subordinate to ministries. The separation of economic 
organisations from one another into state-owned and privately owned structures, for 
example, was a lengthy process. The state level was not clearly differentiated and 
separated from the company level for much of the 1990s. The separation process 
proceeded unevenly across industries. The blurring of the state and company side persisted 
for some time in all companies, with Lukoil being separated first (1993) and Rosatom last 
(2007). In much of the 1990s and 2000s, the dividing li e between core state organisations, 
state companies, and partially state-owned companies remained blurred and their 
responsibilities diffuse. 
The second legacy of USSR, Inc. was the institutional framework itself. Gazprom, RAO 
UES, Transneft and Rosatom survived relatively intact and unreformed to the mid-1990s. 
They survived as infrastructural monopolies in their r spective sectors. This meant that 
while the Russian state in 1992 embarked on a transformation that would eventually turn 
the economy into a partial market economy, the institutional structure inside and around 




turned them more (Gazprom) or less (Transneft) intocompanies, but their relations with 
the state were based on their status as monopolies and on informal rent-sharing. Again, we 
are reminded of the changes in the energy companies as organisations over the period 
under study, and the differences in the way the state structured their environment over 
time. The energy sector’s institutional framework remained in many respects a legacy of 
the late Soviet period, with gradually introduced modifications. The companies were 
therefore capable of influencing state policies to an extent not seen in many other sectors, 
possibly apart from the defence industry. 
A third legacy was the institutions that structured ties with the other post-Soviet states. 
USSR Inc. extended throughout the entire Union, and linked enterprises by sector across 
internal boundaries (Bradshaw, 2008, p.194). The energy sector, with pipelines and power 
grids criss-crossing internal borders, was a physical, infrastructural expression of the 
Soviet Union. Due to the way in which transport grids were concentrated in Russia, energy 
companies were left with more of the Soviet production and transportation chains under 
their own control than were other companies. Their insecure and partial consolidation went 
beyond what could be achieved in other economic sectors. They consolidated their 
operations in Russia, but they were large and forceul ntities also in the post-Soviet 
context. As much of the old physical structure was intact, maintaining or renewing ties 
with the other post-Soviet states was feasible, and the institutions that structured bilateral 
ties persisted or changed little at first. The monopoly legacy, expressed physically through 
extensive infrastructure, made energy companies, by virtue of their institutions, potential 
tools in policy towards the ‘near abroad’, the post-Soviet states. When post-Soviet trade 
collapsed, energy was less affected than other sector  (Table 1.1.). The companies under 




Soviet states, because most of the latter remained dependent on cheap energy from Russia, 
or on passage through Russia to the now open global markets. 
1.7  A gap in our understanding of Russian foreign policy 
Energy often attracts considerable attention in post-2000 studies of Russian foreign policy, 
especially where the post-Soviet states are concerned. Indeed, energy is considered an 
important source of a ‘re-assertive’ foreign policy (Allison, 2004) in the region, 
particularly in broadly realist analyses of Russian foreign policy (Donaldson and Nogee, 
2009, p.194-195), and of Russia as a great power (Jonson, 2004, p.99-103; Nygren, 2007, 
p.113-119; Oldberg, 2007, p.26-27; Mankoff, 2009, p.241-292). Also scholars of Russian 
energy policy highlight the political use of energy, particularly gas, in foreign policy 
(Stern, 2005, p.102-104; Pirani, 2009a, p.5-8).  
Some see it as a cyclical phenomenon, like oil prices. Economists Clifford Gaddy and 
Barry Ickes remark, for example, on the link between r source abundance in the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s or Russia in the 2000s and expansionism in foreign policy (Gaddy and 
Ickes, 2010a, p.283-284). But in the 21st century, energy has been seen specifically as the 
basis of Russia’s rise as an ‘energy power’ (Finon and Locatelli, 2008), a ‘key pillar of 
[Russia’s] international influence’ (Sherr, 2013, p.66), which is not enough, according to 
some scholars, to make Russia an ‘energy superpower’ (Goldthau, 2008; Rutland, 2008). 
But if Russia is not an energy superpower, few state  would match the description. The 
sources of Russia’s energy power are often quoted as the rising oil prices from 1999–2000 
and Russia’s resulting energy wealth, combined with the return of state control in the oil 




one-dimensional a view (Goldthau, 2008; Rutland, 2008). Converting oil wealth into 
influence was never so simple (Rutland, 2008), nor always the only priority.  
One important base of Russia’s foreign energy policy, the relationship between the Russian 
state and the companies in that sector, is however rar ly investigated in studies of Russian 
foreign policy. From a realist perspective, it is a n tural assumption that Russian energy 
companies, when operating abroad, are very close to the Russian government (Leijonhielm 
and Larsson, 2004; Liuhto, 2010; Oldberg, 2011). To realists, energy is often a soft power 
weapon. Whether a ‘commodity tool’ (Leijonhielm and Larsson, 2004, p.140) or the ‘most 
potent tool’ (Oldberg, 2011, p.49), when seen from the theoretical position of offensive 
realism, Russian energy companies are reduced to extended arms of the Russian 
government. While differentiating between Russian companies and general foreign policy, 
analyses rarely make the differentiation explicit (Sherr, 2013) or explore it (Perovic, 2006). 
This failure reflects the general statist dispositin within realism, where foreign policy 
decisions are made on the basis of the national interest, without much regard to domestic 
cost. It ties in neatly with assumptions in the economics literature about the division 
between politics and the economy. Russian foreign energy policy, in this approach, 
becomes either dominated by geopolitics, or profit maximising, but cannot be both.  
Still, the foreign operations of Russian energy companies are often reduced to a politics vs. 
economics frame. If they are not profit-oriented, they are tools of foreign policy, and vice 
versa. Scholars with a more liberalist view of inter ational relations, like students of 
international political economy, tend to emphasise the business rationale in Russian energy 
companies’ operations abroad and therefore note a conflict with the Russian government’s 




autonomously by the state. The political resonance, and use, of Russian energy companies’ 
activities is seen then as external, almost unrelated to the companies themselves. But it 
remains difficult to ignore the foreign policy relevance of Russian energy companies 
within the post-Soviet region. Energy scholars tend to solve this dilemma by noting the 
political setting of energy trade in the post-Soviet region, while focusing on supply and 
demand (Pirani, 2009b).  
Attempts to move beyond the common (geo)politics vs. (business) profits understanding of 
Russia’s energy interactions with its counterparties do not interrogate the domestic bases of 
Russian policy (Kuzemko et al., 2012), or, when they do, they refrain from linking the 
national level with the global (Aalto, 2012). Therefor , even as analyses may uncover a 
gap between company strategy and foreign policy, the links to domestic politics fall 
outside investigation (Poussenkova, 2012), or companies’ actions are seen as subversion of 
the soft power weapon ‘from below’ (Stulberg, 2007, p.167). 
So the links between state–company relations at home, and the role these companies play 
in foreign policymaking, remain underexplored. One reason for this investigatory deficit 
may be the persistence of the politics vs. economics frame. This makes it easy to see the 
trumping of economic goals (profit) by political goals (influence) as an indication of the 
balance of power tipping somehow from business to state. And there investigation all too 
often ends.  
Some exceptions exist. Peter Rutland offered an early analysis, arguing that energy 
companies seemed to play a ‘dominant role in formulating and actually implementing’ 
Russian foreign policy in the region (Rutland, 1999, p.185). ‘Informal bargaining’, he 




difficult to ‘say where domestic politics end and “foreign policy” begins’ (p.184). His 
analysis was primarily based on oil companies, but also referred to Gazprom. Tor Bukkvoll 
considered the oil and gas lobby as part of Putin’s winning coalition at home, and a central 
supporter of Putin’s strategic partnership with the West after 9/11 (Bukkvoll, 2003). 
Margarita Balmaceda (2012) demonstrates the need to move beyond both political and 
economic explanations of Russian energy policy, arguing that there is a complex 
interrelationship between the two (p.153). She proposes that a company like Gazprom 
accumulates ‘convertible points’ with the Russian state in both the foreign and domestic 
realm. These ‘points’ can later be translated (‘converted’) into advantages for the company 
(Balmaceda, 2012, p.143). The relationship is more f rmalised in the oil sector than in gas 
(Balmaceda, 2013, p.61-89). Based on analyses of Russia’s use of subsidies in gas trade 
with Europe, Stacy Closson offers new insights into geopolitical influence, monopoly 
maintenance and personal gain as potential, interrelated explanations of Russian gas trade 
policy (Closson, 2014). These analyses bring us within range of an understanding of the 
complex relations between the state and energy companies across the domestic and foreign 
policy spheres. But the study of Russian energy companies abroad has still not been 
integrated with the well-established discussion on the characteristics of state–business 
relations in Russia and their relation to the development of Russian politics, economy, and 
the Russian state itself. The aim of this thesis is to help filling this gap, to integrate our 
understanding of the energy sphere in Russia’s political development with policy in the 
post-Soviet region. 
1.8  Energy and Russia’s political development in the literature 
The importance of energy to the Russian economy is well established (e.g. Gaddy and 




development, however, it has been used in two types of explanations. First, resource 
abundance is included in explanations of outcomes in terms of political system, understood 
in comparative politics terms. This is an extension of the literature on the ‘resource curse’ 
(Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999; 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; 
Ross, 2012), by which resource abundance, and oil wealth in particular, in and of itself 
constitutes a problem for development and therefore f  democratisation. State–business 
relations in the energy sphere are, due to energy’s central position in the economy, seen to 
influence political regime type. State–business relations in the energy sphere have 
accordingly been seen to contribute towards derailing democracy (Fish, 2005) or creating a 
‘crony capitalism’4 that varies, with changes in oil price, like a pendulum swinging in a 
vicious circle (Gel'man, 2012).  
Other authors have contended that the particularities of Russia’s political development are 
due less to resource revenue as such. As regards overall political development, Susanne 
Wengle draws attention to how market making in the case of Russian electricity reform 
was also state capacity building (Wengle, 2012; 2014). Structural reform was a process 
that strengthened the central state at the expense of s ctor insiders and regional governors 
(Wengle, 2012, p.454). In contrast, authors who study Russia’s political development 
relating to hydrocarbon revenue streams see Russia’s pecific system for managing 
resource revenues and channelling them into the rest of the economy as an obstacle for 
development. Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2010) take a political institutions 
approach to how considerations of power maximisation among leaders result in different 
types of petroleum ownership, and how these then shape institutions, specifically fiscal 
regimes. They conclude that indirect resource management speeds the development of 
                                                          




institutions and organisational capacity in a state. Direct management, through state 
ownership, lets the state access rents directly, but its capacity does not develop as much 
and the state by necessity acquires a greater role in managing the economy (Luong and 
Weinthal, 2010, p.121-180). Gaddy and Ickes have a similar point of departure, but come 
from a new institutional economics background and see the rent management system as the 
main institutional framework that organises state–business ties in the energy sphere 
(Gaddy and Ickes, 2010a, p.292). They draw attention to informal rent sharing, and argue 
that it gives political leaders more discretion to redistribute rents according to their 
preferences. In turn, this requires the deliberate weakening of property rights (Gaddy and 
Ickes, 2005, p.571). Resource streams, accordingly, bind the state and the companies 
together. They, too, argue that informality hinders development in both companies and the 
state.  
1.9  State–company relations and institutional development in Russia 
Here, the emphasis is not on political system outcomes. This thesis will build on some of 
the insights from the literature just referred to to understand how state–company relations 
changed over time as the state and the companies participated in institutional development. 
This makes it a study of how power arrangements result in institutional outcomes. But in 
contrast to Luong and Weinthal (2010), this is a study of processes of gradual change in 
state–company relations rather than specific institutions as outcomes. Here, as power 
arrangements evolve, institutions are modified. This is not a study of one institution as an 
organising principle, unlike that of Gaddy and Ickes (2005; 2010a). The perspective is 
wider institutional development in a political economy, and how this development spilled 
over into, and even involved, foreign relations. I will show how institutional change and 




This study builds on the conceptual framework of social orders, developed by Douglass 
North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW) (2009). Although NWW’s framework has 
clearly appealed to scholars of Russia (e.g. Orekhovskii, 2012; Zweynert, 2012; Paneyakh, 
2013; Zudin, 2013b; 2013a; Yakovlev, 2014), to my knowledge only one comprehensive 
analysis to date applies the framework rigorously to Russia (Connolly, 2013). Further 
insights can be gained by building on these experiences and applying the NWW 
framework to state–company relations in post-Soviet Russia. Other studies have applied 
NWW to political development in other states (North et al., 2013), but not included the 
international level in their analyses. Another contribution of this thesis lies in its efforts to 
develop a comparative political economy approach, based on NWW, extendable moreover 
to foreign relations. The conceptual framework is detailed in the theory chapter. 
1.10  Aims, objectives, and research design  
This study traces the development of institutions in a central sector of Russia’s political 
economy, the energy sector. Considering the Soviet institutional legacies and the way in 
which they encompassed the post-Soviet region, this institutional development also 
involved foreign policy in the post-Soviet region. 
Accordingly, the aims of this thesis are to analyse the changing relations of the Russian 
state and Russian energy companies in the post-Soviet period, with a particular emphasis 
on the role of these relations in Russia’s institutional development, and to relate the 
analysis to Russia’s foreign policy and the companies’ operations in the post-Soviet region. 
In order to achieve these aims, I will analyse the relations between the state and five 
energy companies regarding  




• Companies’ influence on government policymaking and sector development, 
including on policies relevant for their foreign operations; 
• State and regime participation in company development and opportunities to 
influence company strategies, including their foreign operations development; 
• Their formality and informality, regularity and irregularity/resistance, and 
indications of power relations among state and company actors, especially in 
operations and policy development in the post-Soviet region; 
• Formal and informal extraction of rents from economic activity in companies, and 
formal and informal sharing of rents with representatives of the state and the 
regime. 
I will relate the findings on state–company relations to overall institutional development in 
the Russian state, discussing in particular the extnt to which  
• The state–company relationship changed over time 
• The state had, in different time periods,  
o the capacity to enforce and protect property rights impersonally and equally; 
o the capacity to extract resources through formal taxation; 
• The state used the companies as tools of domestic and/or foreign policy; 
• The state, and through it, the companies, were usedby a regime for informal rent 
extraction; 
• The companies pursued informal relations, including informal rent sharing, taking 





• Formal and/or informal institutions of state–company relations in domestic politics 
and policymaking influenced or extended to bilateral relations and foreign policy in 
the post-Soviet region; 
• There were similarities and differences between the cases, especially 
similarities/differences in 
o Formal and informal institutions that structured the relationships,  
o How close or distant the companies were to the stat, and/or to the regime, 
o The use or not of the company as a tool of the state in domestic and/or 
foreign policy. 
To pursue these objectives, I pose three main research questions. First, how did relations 
between energy companies and the Russian state change in the period under study? Second 
and third, how did these relations change more specifically as regards company activity in 
the post-Soviet states on the one hand, and Russian foreign policy towards the post-Soviet 
states, on the other?  
1.10.1  The cases in this study 
The five companies studied here, RAO UES/Inter RAO, Minatom/Rosatom, Lukoil, 
Transneft and Gazprom, have different relations with the state, and are natural units of 
investigation. Where Gazprom is visible and active in its relations with post-Soviet states, 
often with political overtones, Lukoil’s post-Soviet operations have fewer political 
overtones. Their respective ties with the state at home differ substantially. By including 
non-gas and oil companies, it is possible to better understand, and identify, the institutional 
characteristics of state–company relations and overall development. It is also possible, with 




foreign operations. This leads in turn to a comprehensive understanding of the potential 
flexibility of the state in institutional development at home and development of policy 
towards the post-Soviet states.  
The analysis concentrates on interaction between company managements and state 
organisations. Access and participation at this level are the most important parts of state–
company interaction. Top level interaction facilitates wider interaction between state and 
company. Care is taken to maintain a diachronic, not a synchronic, approach, emphasising 
change over time, rather than a detailed study of variety at any given time. 
The highlighted period is from January 1992 to March 2012. The energy companies of 
today evolved from the late Soviet period, and thisbackground is included. The beginning 
of reforms, under a new government, in the new post-S viet Russian state, is an 
appropriate starting point for the analysis.  March 2012 concluded an election cycle, with 
Vladimir Putin again becoming Russian president. This is a fitting endpoint to the period 
under analysis. A few key developments after March 2012 are included. 
In the case chapters, the two decades under study are subdivided into shorter periods, and 
they organise the analysis. For each period, state–company relations at home are discussed 
first, followed by a discussion of state–company relations as regards foreign operations and 
foreign policy. The time periods roughly correspond across the case chapters, determined 
by the milestones in Russia’s post-Soviet history: the challenges of survival in the early 
1990s; the 1998 financial crisis; the new political oalition around Vladimir Putin from 
2000; the Yukos affair in 2003; the end of Putin’s second presidential period in 2007–8. 




country, sometimes by groups of states, since host country governments impose different 
conditions on foreign energy companies.  
General findings across cases and time are discussed in the concluding chapter. In 
particular, the conclusion discusses findings on the development of the state’s capacity to 
structure the economy and to pursue and implement foreign energy policy. 
1.10.2  Case selection 
The cases in this study were selected because they are comparable, while varying 
significantly in their relations with the state (Ragin et al., 1996, p.752). They are energy 
companies operating in the post-Soviet region; their relations with the state were based 
originally on the legacy of Soviet institutions, and they contribute resource rents to the 
Russian economy. Among them, one (Lukoil) stands out as different from the rest, with its 
more distant and formal relations with the state, its private ownership, and less 
involvement as a tool in Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region (Ragin et al., 
1996, p.756). The other cases also differ in their relations with the Russian state at home 
and abroad, but much less than in Lukoil’s case, and are therefore approached as similar 
cases. They illuminate the range of relations with the state that serve to make a company 
more available as a foreign policy tool.  
Gazprom is the most typical of the state’s tools at home and abroad, and is invariably 
included in studies of Russia’s relations with post-Soviet states. By comparing it with the 
largely similar cases of RAO UES (electricity), Minatom/Rosatom (nuclear energy) and 
Transneft (oil pipeline transport), and the different case of Lukoil (oil production), it is 
possible to investigate the central institutions in a Russian energy company’s relations with 




possible to show that while Russian oil and gas companies were particularly important to 
the Russian state due to the resource rents they represented, the general mechanisms of 
state–company relations, and the institutions that m de companies available as tools of the 
state, existed across a wider variety of energy sectors. In that respect, this study differs 
from most of the other studies that have cast light on Russian energy companies’ relations 
with the state (recently e.g. Luong and Weinthal, 2010; Gustafson, 2012; Victor and 
Sayfer, 2012; Frye, 2014). With a single or two-case study, or an industry-specific one, it 
would have been more difficult to go beyond fuel-specific state–business relations and 
contribute to our understanding of Russia’s general institutional development.  
Two important energy sectors are not included here. The only Russian hydropower 
company, Rusgidro, was established as a 100 percent subsidiary of RAO UES in 2004 and 
developed operations outside Russia in 2011–12. It therefore falls outside the scope of this 
study. And second, the coal industry in Russia is partially integrated with the steel 
industry. In the experience of this author, the potential of this sector to be used as an 
instrument of foreign policy is arguably smaller than that of the sectors investigated here 
(Opdahl, 2004). A renewed assessment for this thesis has not significantly altered this 
conclusion. Coal mining and the steel industry in Russia are far more labour intensive and 
less profitable than oil production. Considerations of domestic political stability and 
foreign production or market access are significantly different from those of any of the 
cases here.  
1.10.3  Formality and informality 
State–company relations have a formal as well as an informal side. They are structured by 




and participation occur in diverse settings. The formal, perhaps regular, settings can be 
traced in the research process and included in the analysis. Others are singular or even 
spontaneous events occurring on the sidelines of formal events, or merely informal, and 
largely off the public record. This thesis is the work of an outsider, tracing past events. The 
sources I have used refer typically to formal relations, and the quality and type of sources 
vary. Due to the paucity of sources and their variable quality informal state–company 
relations cannot be grasped and analysed to the same extent as formal relations. 
Nevertheless, changes to formal institutions will often be preceded by changes in the 
informal constraints, and changes to formal institutions will be preceded by informal 
discussions and consultations. Formality, informality, and the methodological challenges 
posed by informality are discussed further in the next chapter, which introduces the central 
concepts of this thesis. The theory chapter is followed by the case chapters and the 
conclusion. The state of the sources for each case is discussed in Appendix 2. Tables and 






The Introduction outlined the three main research questions as (1) How did relations 
between the energy companies and the Russian state ch nge in the period under study? (2) 
How did these relations change more specifically as regards company activity in the post-
Soviet states (3) and as regards Russian foreign policy t wards the post-Soviet states? 
Some introductory reflections on key issues were also offered. This chapter provides the 
theoretical foundations to that approach.  
2.1  Institutions, organisations and their place in political change 
Institutions can be defined as the ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction’ (North, 1990, p.3). This means that state–company relations are here 
understood to be constrained, or structured, by institutions, but also facilitated by them. 
When representatives of the state and companies intract, they do so not altogether 
randomly, but according to formal and informal rules of their ‘game’, meaning their 
interaction. Moreover, this thesis holds that their range of options in interaction is also 
constrained by the institutional framework (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.940). Actors are 
likely to follow more or less established conventios, also when deciding on their goals. 
Institutions affect the range of available and desirable aims. This study is placed within the 
perspective on institutions that is known as historcal institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992). The discussion of Soviet institutional legacies in the Introduction shows how 
existing institutions constrained and enabled, and affected actors’ range of options, in post-
Soviet Russia, making change more likely to occur in some directions rather than others. 




In the analysis, we will see how institutions constrain state–company interaction even at 
the highest level, even when the rules are not formalised in writing. This resonates well in 
Russia, where the limited range of options for individual choice can be striking, 
particularly in the elite (Ledeneva, 2013, p.242). ‘Elite’ is here used in a conventional way, 
to delineate the rulers of Russian society and the economy, the governing elite, from the 
ruled, the population. It does not suggest strong cohesiveness among elite actors.  
Actors are here seen to be both individuals and organisations. Organisations are groups of 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve obj ctives (North, 1990, p.5), but they 
cannot be the only players in the game here. Individual agency has been important in state–
company relations in Russia, and in Russian politics n general. In the period under study, 
individuals sometimes acted according to their personal strategies, which could be 
inconsistent with the formally declared aims of theorganisations they claimed to represent. 
This happened in all the cases here except Lukoil in the 1990s. This requires a view of 
actors that includes both individuals and organisations. In the analysis chapters, care will 
be taken to distinguish between individuals acting o  their own and as representatives of 
organisations.  
When approaching change and continuity in state–company relations, the terrain becomes 
more complicated. By seeing representatives of the s ate and companies as constrained by 
institutions, I presume there exists an institutional structure for their interaction. Change in 
state–company relations is institutional change, continuity is institutional continuity. But 
how is change possible at all, if actors are constrained by institutions that shape the playing 
field, the game itself, and their range of options i  it? Here I note that while institutions 




effects of choices made are ‘real but […] also constrained’ (Nielsen et al., 1995, p.4). 
Actors may choose to introduce radical change.  
Most obviously, radical change occurs as a result of ex genous shocks. The financial crisis 
of 1998 was one such shock to the institutional framework of the Russian state and Russian 
state–business relations. Actors responded by changing the institutions of state–company 
interaction in a number of ways, affecting most notably taxation. Arguably, the reforms of 
1992 also subjected institutions to exogenous shocks. The changes in the state’s role in the 
economy were introduced by new actors, reform economists in the government, who 
intended to replace existing formal institutions in state–enterprise5 relations. But the effects 
of reform were closer to those of exogenous shocks to existing informal institutions among 
established state–enterprise relationships. Relying on North’s view of institutional change I 
hold that the formal rules ‘changed overnight’ by decree, but the informal constraints of 
state–enterprise interaction were ‘much more impervious to deliberate policies’ (North, 
1990, p.6). 
But institutional change can also be institutional breakdown caused by actors’ failure to 
respond to challenges. In changed circumstances, thy disregard established institutions, 
which cease to act as constraints. Institutions no lo ger ‘make sense’ due to a loss of 
credibility, or may have decayed in the face of institutional competition (Offe, 1995, p.59-
60). The boundaries between institutions failing to make sense and institutional decay are 
blurred, as the fate of the Russian state’s monopoly on violence in the 1990s illustrates. 
One may ask if the monopoly on violence failed to make sense because it failed to meet 
challenges from protection rackets internal and external to state organisations, or whether it 
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just failed ‘manifestly’ (Offe, 1995, p.60) to constrain violent behaviour due to the 
preceding collapse of the Soviet Union. Qualitative decay and institutions that fail to make 
sense as constraints for actors are common components of institutional deterioration and 
breakdown.  
Most of the time, however, institutional change is incremental. Even discontinuous change 
is ‘never completely discontinuous’ (North, 1990, p.6). There are elements of institutional 
continuity even during periods of visible change. This was the case in the years 
immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some constraints 
naturally lost their significance and relevance as circumstances changed. But the actors 
moulded other constraints to fit in their new environment.  
In this thesis, institutional changes and continuites are seen as part of a continuous process 
of erosion, breakdown, and evolution: institutional dynamism (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 
p.16). This is again not a pre-determined process, but rather a process in which historically 
specific circumstances constrain actors’ options. Their choices, or inaction, when facing 
their options, result in institutional dynamism. Their choices also constrain, or enable, 
future options for development (Connolly, 2013, p.18)  State–company relations in the 
energy sphere in Russia changed substantially between 1992 and 2012. The process of 
change during that time was however often incremental, with elements of continuity and 
stability, as actors adapted institutions to changing circumstances and challenges.  
Thelen and Steinmo propose four sources of institutional dynamism. All can be illustrated 
by examples from (post-)Soviet Russia. Dynamic institutional evolution can be a result of 
institutional transformation, whereby previously less important institutions assume a 




transport by pipeline in the Soviet Union was a natural formality in the command economy 
until perestroika legislation allowed enterprises to make profits (1987) and relaxed the 
monopoly on foreign trade (1988) (Gustafson, 2012, p.41-47). This was followed by a 
struggle for control over suddenly lucrative oil export opportunities, an unintended 
consequence of Gorbachev’s reforms. Second, institutional evolution happens when old 
institutions are harnessed to new ends (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.16), as in the 1990s 
when the Russian government discovered that the monopoly on oil pipeline transport, 
controlled by Transneft, could be useful as a means of exerting control in the oil sector. A 
third source of institutional dynamism is the adaptation by actors of their goals within 
existing institutions as a response to exogenous change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.17). 
The rising price of oil and gas in the early 2000s meant that Transneft acquired the 
financial instruments to construct new oil pipelines, and the company could successfully 
protect its pipeline monopoly, with government support, from potential domestic 
challengers and become a more forceful foreign policy tool. And finally, actors adjust their 
strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992, p.17). This happens in circumstances of rapid institutional crisis and change, often 
seen as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ whereby institutional stability is ‘punctuated’ by a 
period of crisis and abrupt change (Krasner, 1984). The emergence of Gazprom as an 
autonomous organisation with a monopoly on gas export can be seen as a consequence of 
the adjustment of its founders, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Rem Vyakhirev, to the rapidly 
changing circumstances and the opportunities the monop ly now offered to profit from gas 
export.  
These short excursions into institutional persistence in the Russian energy sphere 




constrained by existing institutions. However, they are also uncertain about the future (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996, p.951). As there is an element of self-interest among political actors, 
they will try to maximise outcomes in their favour, even within the limited range of options 
that an institutional framework is here seen to offer them. In times of crisis and 
institutional breakdown, actors’ uncertainty comes to the fore, while the institutional 
framework can constrain and enable in new ways. Actors can respond to crises and modify 
existing institutions according to at least two strategies. They can become biased towards 
the status quo (Fernandez and Rodrik cited in Shepsle, 2006, p.1036) or towards only 
slight modifications in status quo. As institutions reduce uncertainty in interaction (North, 
1990, p.6), maintaining them as stable as possible is a logical response from actors, 
perhaps none the more so than in rapidly changing environments. Another strategy is more 
radical. The examples of Gazprom (ch. 7) and Transneft (ch. 6) illustrate how institutions 
persist and survive in uncertain times also because they benefit powerful actors, who adapt 
institutions to their own aims as far as convention allows. Crisis can enable change based 
on self-interest. Some actors are more likely to recognise such opportunities for change. 
The most powerful actors are often those that are less uncertain than the rest, that is, it is 
the insiders closest to the existing institutional fr mework who can modify it to their best 
current advantage during crises. Crisis enables some actors more than others. This reminds 
us that contingency (Connolly, 2013, p.19-20) is an integral element of institutional 
dynamism. In periods of crisis, as constraints loosen, there may be a wider range of 
opportunities available to actors.   
2.2  Institutional formality and informality in Russia 
In studies of Russian state–business relations, the distinction between formality and 




easily becomes a superficial organisational mapping of state entities. It is often observed 
that informal relations and constraints trump formal distinctions and institutions. The 
methodological challenges of grasping how this happens are nevertheless considerable. In 
the 1990s, the discussion on formality and informality sometimes tied in with a strict 
division of politics and economics, where formal market institutions in the Russian 
economy were seen as subverted by informal politics (Hellman, 1998, p.204-205; Åslund, 
1999, p.64-68; Hellman et al., 2000). Alternatively, authors who rejected a strict divide 
between politics and the economy would emphasise the importance of informality, 
reciprocity, and integration in the Russian elite (P regudov et al., 1999, p.290; Frye, 2002). 
In the 2000s, informality became central to many approaches. 
From 2000, Putin’s efforts to strengthen the vertical of power and maintain ‘equidistance’ 
with the ‘oligarchs’,6 which resulted in selective treatment of business representatives, 
were taken as confirmation that formal rules remained subordinate to informal and 
personal relations. Several authors have integrated selective rule application into quite 
different analyses of the Russian system. Within a political economy approach, formal and 
informal rules work against each other (Robinson, 2011, p.437-438). Some argue that the 
formal order has been hollowed out altogether, leaving a state defined by ‘network-based 
governance’ (Kononenko and Moshes, 2011). Other scholars are more optimistic on the 
state’s behalf, but still note its empty façades. Sakwa argues that this is a binary political 
order in perpetual tension between an informal ‘administrative regime’ and a formal 
‘constitutional state’ (Sakwa, 2010, p.190). Informal practice dominates by preying on the 
formal order. This happens when para-constitutional organisations like the seven federal 
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districts are established to enforce and enhance imple entation of existing institutions 
(Sakwa, 2010, p.194). They subvert the spirit, but not the letter, of the formal constitutional 
order and its established institutional framework. The formal power vested in state organs 
is undermined by the power of informal decision-making and enforcement. Some of their 
formal and informal ‘standard operating procedures’ (Hall, 1986, p.19) are taken over by 
different and more powerful organisations outside the constitutional framework. The State 
Duma (hereafter the Duma) and Federation Council in this perspective possess less real 
veto power in the 2000s than the 1990s. The formal constitutional order does not 
disappear, and can possibly again be filled with real power to make decisions. By 
disappearing altogether, the formal constitutional state would deprive the informal 
administrative regime of its protective shield and render it meaningless and exposed. Both 
the formal and the informal are institutional contexts offered by the Russian state to actors, 
an argument which will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
A strict differentiation between formality and informality presents us with a challenge 
when studying state–company relations. Informal practice and formal rule application take 
place among the same actors (organisations), often th  very same people, perhaps in the 
same settings. So, in relations between state and business organisations, the 
complementarity of formality and informality seems ore fundamental to interaction than 
the tension. Henry Hale, writing from a comparative politics perspective, emphasises the 
combination of ‘formal and informal presidential power to coordinate business support’ 
(Hale, 2010, p.38). Informality functions as an extension, elaboration and modification of 
formality (North, 1990, p.40). Also in Alena Ledeneva’s ethnographic study of Russian 
governance through power networks, to which she refrs collectively as Sistema, the 




there is a fundamental tension wherever formal rules are applied only to punish the 
(informally) disloyal (Robinson, 2011, p.438), both the formal and informal rules are here 
seen as parts of one system.  
2.3  Formality and informality in institutional development 
The discussion of formality and informality in Russia points us towards another insight. 
Informal interaction enables a personal aspect, individual treatment according to principles 
of power. Formal rules applied rigorously are, under a modern constitution like Russia’s, 
impersonal and therefore do not discriminate according to rank or power. But when applied 
selectively, formal rules are in Russia used to reproduce differences in power and a system 
where power and the personal matters (Ledeneva, 2013, p.242-243). Networks place 
opaque constraints on any leader who relies on themo govern (Monaghan, 2012), because 
of the need to sustain the ruling coalition and maintain informal rent sharing. The 
emergence of impersonality, the constant codification, modification and specialisation in 
institutions that are essential to institutional development are therefore impeded. The 
balance between informality and formality can be sen as related to overall institutional 
development in Russia, and it shifts during the period under discussion here.  
This is discussed in the literature on institutions in the Russian oil and gas sectors. Luong 
and Weinthal show how the outcome of domestic private ownership in the oil sector in 
Russia in the 1990s, exceptional in the global context, contributed towards a strong fiscal 
regime before 2005 (2010, p.121-180). They contrast thi  with the gas sector, where 




protection for its monopoly in return for implicit taxes7 (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.169-
172). Luong and Weinthal present a strong case for the existence of linkages between 
formal institutions that regulate state–company relations: formal and widely dispersed rent 
sharing (through taxation); and the development of financially healthy companies, in the 
Russian oil sector before 2005. The opposite set of linkages, in the case of Gazprom, 
facilitated informal rent sharing, and burdened the company with quasi-fiscal activities8 
like subsidised prices. Naturally, quasi-fiscal activities impede the development of 
financially robust companies and harm the state’s financial health (Luong and Weinthal, 
2010, p.54-55; 175-180). But implicit taxes and other quasi-fiscal activities enable state 
leaders to distribute rents informally within the elite and thereby dispense patronage. In 
effect, when a state manages resource revenue indirctly, by taxing private companies, this 
contributes to the development of institutions and organisational capacity in the state. 
Therefore, market making is also a process of developing state capacity (Wengle, 2012). 
Direct management, through state ownership, lets the s ate access rents directly, but state 
capacity does not develop as much and the state by necessity acquires a greater role in 
managing the economy.  
Luong and Weinthal also argue that state leaders prfer state ownership and direct control, 
because they can then maximise sovereignty and control revenue directly. A state-
controlled company like Rosneft, or Gazprom, is not always under real state control, but in 
making the initial choice, state leaders see state ownership and control as the more 
attractive option than ceding control to others. However, state leaders can retain ownership 
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and control only when they are strong enough not to share with alternative claimants to 
state power (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.302), and lea ers’ hold on power depends on 
dispensing the required amount of patronage (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.303). So when 
state leaders face losing their support base by retaining state ownership and control in the 
energy sector, they choose to share ownership and co trol with alternative claimants to 
power, and create private domestic companies (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.321). In their 
analysis, property is only seen in terms of state or private ownership, with or without direct 
control by the state. There is no discussion of howwell property rights are upheld. 
Firmly upheld property rights are, however, not a given. Property rights as an institution 
constrain differently depending on political context. In Russia, informality matters. This 
key point is raised by the new institutional economics. Like Luong and Weinthal, Gaddy 
and Ickes see Russia’s problem not in the rents, but in the institutions that organise the 
state’s ability to access and manage rent streams. They see the rent management system as 
the main institutional framework organising state–business ties in the energy sphere 
(Gaddy and Ickes, 2010b, p.292). Gaddy and Ickes also make the case that informal rent 
sharing gives the state more discretion to redistribu e rents according to political 
preferences, that is, to dispense patronage. However, they point out, this in turn requires 
the deliberate weakening of property rights (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, p.571). Resource 
streams, accordingly, bind the state and the companies together. There is a contrast 
between informal rents and informal institutions, and formal rents (extracted through 
taxation) and formal institutions. Informality again hinders development in both companies 




2.4  Institutional development in a limited access order 
In the wider context, I see informality, discretionary patronage, and their persistence, as 
part of a pattern of social organisation, a social order where rents produced in the economy 
work directly to secure stability in the political system (North et al., 2009, p.1; 30). Russia 
is here seen as one of many states where access to valuable resources and activities, as the 
formation of significant political and economic organisations, is a restricted privilege. In 
turn, the privileged form a ruling coalition and control the state. When forming the ruling 
coalition, the privileged also commit to managing violence among themselves and in wider 
society, and thereby avoid all-out wars (North et al., 2009, p.18-20). The rents they can 
access, and limit others from accessing, by remaining committed to the ruling coalition, are 
their rewards for keeping the internal and societal peace. This is how a limited access order 
works. 
It has to be noted here that limited access orders are seen as different from open access 
orders (North et al., 2013, p.21-25). In open access orders, there is open access to the 
formation of political and economic organisations. Violence is subject to political control, 
and constrained by powerful institutions. Institutions like property rights are guaranteed 
and upheld by the state. Economic activity is subject to real competition. Rents, therefore, 
are dispersed throughout society in a transparent manner and not according to personal 
discretion within the elite. 
The tension between informality and formality is part of the limited access order. 





the predominance of social relationships organized along personal lines, 
including privileges, social hierarchies, laws that are enforced unequally, 
insecure property rights, and a pervasive sense that not all individuals were 
created or are equal. (North et al., 2009, p.12) 
 
Formal institutions exist and constrain interaction. Where they come into conflict with 
privilege, they are subordinated to a social imperative whereby stability and privilege 
should be upheld. Therefore, institutions constrain differently in a limited access order, 
compared to an open access order (North et al., 2009, p.15).   
Zudin (2013b; 2013a) has developed the social order framework further as regards the 
development of institutions and organisations in a limited access order. The development 
of a limited access order is understood as a maturing process from a fragile to a basic and 
mature state (North et al., 2009, p.21). Importantly, in a limited access order, any division 
into ‘state’ and ‘private’ organisations is conditional and non-distinct (Zudin, 2013b, p.16). 
As the limited access order develops from fragile to basic and mature, state organisations 
become more specialised. The depth of specialisation among the organisations of state 
administration, the private economy and politics indicates the level of development in a 
limited access order (Zudin, 2013b, p.17). When they ar  fully autonomous of each other, 
it is an open access order. But as long as it is limited, as in Russia, relations between the 
ruling coalition (regime) and the state indicate thlevel of social order development. In a 
fragile limited access order, the ruling coalition substitutes for the state. In a mature limited 
access order, the ruling coalition represents the sate (Zudin, 2013b, p.17). During the 
change from a fragile to a mature order, institutions become more important for 
interrelations within the elite. Intra-elite relations develop from constant and personal 




increasingly enforced impersonally, regardless of privilege. Organisations, both proto-state 
and proto-private, turn less and less personal and depend less directly on their 
representatives (Zudin, 2013b, p.17). But as state organisations develop in tandem with 
non-state organisations, institutional development depends on the development of power 
relations within the ruling coalition – meaning that the level of state development depends 
on the regime. I return to this point later in this chapter. 
For the purpose of my analysis, I will look for changes in specialisation among 
administrative, political and private economic organis tions. I will follow the balance 
between formality and informality in the institutional frameworks surrounding companies, 
and possible differentiation in these frameworks. In particular, I will look for indications of 
a stronger role for the state, decreasing informality in state–company relations in favour of 
formality.  
2.5  Resource rents and the Russian economy 
Against this background, rents are a crucial part of elations between the Russian state and 
energy companies. They secure the existing social order. So to understand state–company 
relations, I need a basic understanding of how informal rent sharing came to be important 
and how it operates in Russia.  
The socialist system was characterised by soft budget constraints and cross-subsidisation 
between sectors (Cooper, 2013, p.56). Cheap energy was a considerable source of cross-
subsidies, waste and inefficiency.9 In addition to the general inefficiency of the planned 
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economy, the Soviet economy also developed sectors and plants that would not have 
existed, persisted, or expanded, in absence of cheap energy. When the Soviet Union began 
exporting oil and gas to Europe and international mrkets in the late 1960s, the resulting 
rents were used to alleviate the effects of, and expand production in, inefficient sectors of 
the economy (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010b, p.293). The energy subsidy and other types of 
energy rent reinforced and magnified the structural specificities of the Soviet economy. 
These system-altering effects of energy rents addicte  the economy to cheap energy 
(Gaddy and Ickes, 2010b, p.293). Interruption or withdrawal of rents would incur political 
costs that could disrupt the entire system.  
Gaddy and Ickes argue that rent addiction is  
 
an imperative to allocate rents to maintain and expand specific production 
sectors of the economy, notably those that the Russian economy inherited 
from its Soviet predecessor. (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010b, p.293)  
 
By the 1990s, this imperative was significant for Russia’s limited access order. Rent 
extraction and distribution secured stability in the ruling coalition and was integral to the 
management of violence. Importantly for my discussion, the energy subsidy that in the 
Soviet period had been transferred by the centre was from the early 1990s dispensed by 
(some of) the energy companies under study here, esp cially Gazprom and RAO UES. The 
rents generated by oil and gas sales to international markets became ever more important to 
the Russian economy as a whole, as production in other sectors collapsed. Rent was 
channelled through taxation, especially of the oil sector, but also, significantly, through 




division of rents from barter goods and illegal export. Across the economy, the income 
from oil and gas exports generated and supported infficient production. This continued 
because the anticipated costs of withdrawal, like job losses and discontinued social benefit 
provision on a mass scale leading to popular unrest and elite upheaval, and a possible 
renegotiation of the ruling coalition, were seen as unacceptable by the elite. The companies 
studied here were integral to the social order. 
Following Gaddy and Ickes, rents in the case of oil and gas in Russia are here defined as 
surplus obtained from oil and gas production, that is, economic profit (Gaddy and Ickes, 
2005, p.560-561). Rent then equals  
 
revenues minus economic, or opportunity, costs (including depreciation of 
fixed assets and a “normal” return of capital). (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, 
p.560)  
 
Calculating rent according to this definition is complicated. As noted above, nominal costs 
are inflated in Russia by excess extraction costs and informal taxes like bribes, while 
revenues are deflated by price subsidies. Excess cost , informal taxes and price subsidies 
have to be included with formal taxes and formal after-tax profits when calculating the 
surplus from oil and gas extraction (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, p.561). The surplus, that is, 
the rent, accordingly comes in many forms: excess costs, informal tax, price subsidies, 
formal tax, and formal profit. Excess extraction costs are claimed by producers, 
subcontractors and suppliers, but also by individual employees on inflated staff rosters. 
Insofar as staff numbers are inflated by the dispenation of (mandatory) favours to top elite 




taxation. General price subsidies relieve consumers and industrial sectors of part of their 
energy spending in the short term, while engendering inefficiencies in the longer term 
(Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.39-40). Informal taxes are often couched in the language of 
voluntary contributions, but are no less mandatory f  energy companies than formal taxes. 
They are essential for continued operation. Bribes, inflated corporate spending on social 
services and healthcare, politically recommended corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
spending (Guriev and Tsyvinskii, 2011), culture and sports and philanthropy can all 
function as informal taxes. CSR programmes, generous healthcare provisions and spending 
on sports relieve the state and regional budgets of the burden of public services, or 
contribute towards achieving developmental goals set by the government. In this sense, the 
companies studied here can be seen as being at the messy fringes of the Russian state 
(Flinders, 2006, p.229). A state with a limited access order by definition has messy fringes. 
Finally, after-tax profits are generally distributed among owners (shareholders), which in 
the cases studied here include the Russian state. All these types of rent are relevant here.  
The effects of the rent flow were not just economic. The rent flow shaped the political 
landscape. The 1998 crisis further increased the Russian state budget’s dependence on oil 
and gas rents. In 1996, energy represented 44 percent of Russia’s non-CIS trade and 
minerals, iron and steel another 21 percent, by value in US$ (Freinkman et al., 2004, p.64). 
In 2000, the corresponding numbers were 54.6 and 16.7 percent, respectively (Freinkman 
et al., 2004, p.64). The increasing oil price from 1999–2000 (Graph 2.1) exacerbated this 
tendency (Graph 2.2). Revenue from oil and gas exports f llowed the oil price, while the 




This form of rent distribution is not isolated to Russia, but was a feature of the Soviet 
system. In the Soviet period, the abundant flow of cheap energy was mostly directed from 
Russia to the other republics. Inherited energy dependence (Table 1.2) and rent claimants 
across the post-Soviet region contributed to a demand for Russia’s presence in the energy 
sectors of other states, because close relations with Russia could mitigate the economic and 
political effects of energy independence. Russian companies were central components of 
this Russian presence, and the rents from their post-S viet operations were in turn 
channelled into their rent streams. 
2.6  The shape of elite interaction across the politics-economy divide 
In the Introduction, it was noted how a reduction of state–company relations in the Russian 
energy sector to that of a frame of politics vs. the economy closes potential avenues of 
investigation of Russian foreign policy. I will now briefly reiterate that point but with 
regard to the Russian state at home. In the 2000s, Putin’s policy of strengthening the state 
seemed to imply a break with the 1990s and a shift in power from business leaders to the 
state. After all, the links between the state and the private sector, and companies in general, 
were no longer so blurred. When approached as a two-sided state–business relationship, it 
was conceptualised as a replacement of ‘state capture’ by ‘business capture’ (Yakovlev, 
2006; Sakwa, 2008, p.189). This did not take into account the extent to which company10 
managers acquiesced, even if without enthusiasm, to the new balance between state and 
business actors. Stable and predictable policies were advantageous also to them. ‘Business 
capture’ and ‘state(-led) capitalism’ emphasised their collective powerlessness and 
underestimated their individual participation in the new configuration. As argued by Neil 
                                                          
10 I prefer the term ‘company’ because Soviet enterprises, and initially post-Soviet companies, were not firms 
with full control of their business functions as in a market economy. Post-Soviet companies needed 




Robinson, such terms can easily inflate the break between the 1990s and 2000s so often 
emphasised by Putin (Robinson, 2011, p.438). The idea that a neat delineation could be 
made between ‘the state’ and ‘business’ was not a good guide to the markedly 
differentiated, personal exchanges that still took place among top politicians and 
businessmen. In this respect, while the 1990s and the 2000s displayed different personal 
exchanges among top politicians and businessmen, thy were just as significant in both 
decades. At the top, there was still no arm’s-length, impersonal relationship between 
political leaders and top company leaders. Rents still flowed according to the demands of 
stability and patronage, requiring individual approaches to companies’ property rights in 
return. I therefore prefer to see actors here in terms other than simply ‘state’ and 
‘business’.  
In the rich literature on intra-elite interaction in Russia, the integration of politics and the 
economy is a key point of departure. There is considerable continuity here with the 
literature on late Soviet policymaking and clientelism in the Soviet system (Hough and 
Fainsod, 1979; Almond and Roselle, 1990; Willerton, 1992). Also for the post-Soviet 
period, there exist several studies of reciprocal relations and shared interests among 
company managers and politicians, to the extent of rendering the two sides to the 
relationship indistinguishable. To some, the 1990s saw a broad and informal elite 
consensus, an ‘oligarchic corporatism’ aiming to maxi ise rents among elites (Peregudov 
et al., 1999, p.290). Others emphasised the strong elements of exchange across various 
elite levels (Frye, 2002). At lower levels, fragmentation and loose networks were likely 
just as prevalent as stable exchange relations (Lehmbruch, 1999; 2001), but the top elite 
level seemed more integrated. This could be seen as mutual dependence, or ‘oligarchic 




level where the central state apparatus consisted of clans (Wedel, 2001, p.17). In an 
extreme interpretation, Russia under ‘clan capitalism’ was seen as ruled by hierarchical 
clans that could be separated into ‘top clans’ (operating at top level), sectoral clans, 
regional clans and criminal clans (Kosals, 2007, p.77). The term ‘clan’ in particular 
suggested a degree of coherence, and a pyramid-like structure, within elite groups that did 
not correspond to actually quite fluid and variable int ractions between state and company 
representatives (Ledeneva, 2013, p.34-35).  
These are strong synchronous interpretations of elite interactions in Russia, with much 
insight into patronage networks. They are, however, less useful as guides to change over 
time and the overall workings of the state. This drawback obtains even in the strongest of 
the recent network-based analyses (Ledeneva, 2006; 2 13). Nevertheless, they offer 
valuable insight into the informal institutions tha structure state–company relations. Here, 
interactions are expected to be less coherent, morefluid, and above all, variable from case 
to case and over time. I expect to find a loose system of multiple actors bound more by 
convention than by strict hierarchy, even as the formal hierarchy also guides interactions, 
especially those between the president, his administration, and other parts of the top elite.  
2.7  Energy companies as concessions 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the conventions of discretionary elite interaction uphold 
informal rent sharing and thereby maintain political stability, but they also inhibit the 
development of robust, formalised institutions of state–company interaction. This is part of 
the limited access order. As regards Russia, Gerald E ster’s concept of ‘concessions 
capitalism’ (Easter, 2008; 2012) offers a succinct analysis of how economic development 




Russian economy, which can be seen as an ‘upstairs’ o the ‘downstairs’ of the politically 
insignificant small and medium sized enterprises in the private sector (Easter, 2012, p.169).  
Energy resources and monopolies are instances of such concessions. Former Soviet 
ministries and large enterprises in the energy sphere were retained largely intact, or 
partially retained and reconstituted through a serie  of presidential decrees in 1992. 
Nuclear energy was not subjected to privatisation. In July 1992, the oil, gas and electricity 
sectors were explicitly exempted from privatisation. In November, the gas and electricity 
sectors were reorganised into shareholding companies controlled by the state. Structural 
reform in these two sectors was delayed repeatedly in the 1990s. The Soviet oil sector had 
disintegrated in the Gorbachev period and been subjected to considerable 
commercialisation by insiders (Gustafson, 2012, ch.3). Another November decree 
legalised the process and allowed privatisation in o l production, processing and 
distribution (Decree No 1403, 1992). The same decree exempted oil and oil product 
pipeline transport from restructuring and privatisation.  
Legislation for the energy sectors was formed in a wider process that established a division 
between state and private ownership. The large gas, electricity, nuclear and oil transport 
monopolies remained nominally in state hands, but with considerable scope for a de facto 
erosion of state participation. While most energy companies belonged to the state in a 
formal sense, not all were managed directly by the state. Some were farmed out to 
privileged members of the elite, or at the very least, to supporters of the ruling coalition. 
Regulation of these companies was subject to the discret on of high-level state actors 




subsequently changed, but the companies remained fun amentally supportive of the 
regime.  
When concessions were handed out under Yeltsin, they were not fully protected as private 
property. Boundaries remained blurred. With unsettled and unclear ownership and control 
in energy companies, their managers had good reason to invest in relational capital and 
share the rents (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, p.571). By keeping the rent flowing through their 
companies while the future organisation of entire sectors was unknown, managers and 
owners made themselves and their companies indispensable in the Russian social order. 
This meant that managers, state actors and wider sections of the elite and population had 
stakes in maintaining the status quo with regard to ownership and monopolies. Energy 
became, and remained, a truly political business. This recalls the way in which big 
economic organisations in a limited access order ar ‘necessarily also political ones’ 
(North et al., 2009, p.268-269). Moreover, relations between state and companies, whether 
state- or privately owned, were structured by patronage ties that bound members of the 
elite to each other across any nominal divisions betwe n the state and the private (Fish, 
2005, p.166-167; Zudin, 2013b, p.19). As I will show, this lack of differentiation between 
state and private interests occurred also in companies nominally controlled and owned by 
the state. Formal ownership diverged from de facto control. However, while managers’ 
actual control of companies moved them beyond the formal institutional framework and 
made it appear irrelevant, their control was secured by informal rent sharing in return for 
political support.  
Privileged access to concessions still depended on personal relations within the ruling 




of the state under Putin meant that concessions managers were called back into state 
service (Easter, 2012, p.170). By state service, I h re mean revenue – not just formal taxes 
that benefit society as a whole, but also the famili r, quasi-fiscal activities (Luong and 
Weinthal, 2010, p.134) or informal rents (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, p.565-567) that include 
broad, selective rent sharing through price subsidie , nformal taxes like bribes and 
selected charity, and excess costs in staffing, transport and infrastructure. All these were 
maintained and some expanded in the 2000s, but they were also tied more closely to the 
ruling coalition. 
This has profound implications for state–company relations in the energy sphere. For the 
purposes of this study, the starting point for a definition of the state is that the state and the 
companies are not fully autonomous. I have rejected an a priori separation of politics and 
economics, and now I pursue this thread logically to see the Russian state as possessing 
limited autonomy from society, yet remaining a source of power for a regime. In the 
process, I consider also the question of which instruments the state offers the regime.  
2.8  Towards a definition of the state 
Comparative political scientists have drawn attention o the weakness of both the Russian 
state and Russian society (Roberts and Sherlock, 1999; Sperling, 2000, quoted in Easter, 
2012, p.12 fn. 18; Easter, 2002). Russia has been s as an ‘incapable’ state that ‘operated 
in an institutional void’ (Easter, 2012, p.12). Disconnected and disorganised state and 
societal actors, including business, therefore fell back on the well-known practice of 
patron-client relationships (Easter, 2012, p.12). Economists have often seen the 
combination of weak society and strong state as a ‘predatory state’ (Hedlund, 1999, p.324-




even ‘competing kleptocracies’ (Hedlund, 1999, p.329). While a ‘weak state/strong 
business’ view and the ‘strong state/weak business’ view both distinguish between state 
and business actors, the ‘weak state/weak society’ view emphasises instead the integration 
of politics and the economy to the detriment of development in both state and society.  
In the energy sector, the weak state, weak society ombination has been seen to produce a 
‘rentier oligarchy’, which enriches itself at the exp nse of everyone else (Luong, 2000, 
p.38-40). In the 1990s, enrichment led less to unity i  the elite than to fragmentation. The 
state fragmented into constituent sectors and regions, with energy remaining closely linked 
to central state organisations. The fruits of enrichment, the rents, were not, however, all 
siphoned off, but distributed through informal rent sharing. Selected sections of society 
received ‘trickle-down income’ from the ‘oil-dependent economy’ (Ledeneva, 2013, 
p.278). This is possible where patronage networks structure interactions between the elite 
and the general population. In return, elites could re y on ‘political machines’ (Hale, 2010, 
p.35-37) that delivered votes and stabilised the wider population.  
The weak state/weak society pattern of post-socialism is accordingly a specific one. State 
and society are linked through informal institutions, patronage networks, which extract 
rents from some companies, in various ways, and distribute rents to various claimants in 
the elite and wider population. When we look at theRussian state in terms of the 
institutional context it provides for actors (Hay and Lister, 2006, p.10-11), my argument is 
that the constraints of patronage networks are interli k d with and embedded in the 
formally articulated institutional context of the state. This means that the state cannot act 
autonomously of the elite, but remains in an ambivalent relation to it. Patronage and the 




There is an imperative for state actors to protect the privileged extraction of rents, and this 
is why there are opaque constraints on those who rely on networks to govern (p. 38). 
But the state is not only institutional context. States are also defined by their power, which 
is exercised by state organisations according to an institutional framework. And here I rely 
on a statist position. I see state power as consisti g of despotic and infrastructural power. 
Despotic power refers to the range of actions that state organisations can undertake without 
routine negotiation with society, in effect, policymaking (Mann, 2012 (1993), p.59). This, 
in turn, reflects the extent to which state organistions are enabled, through the institutional 
framework, to realise state autonomy. Infrastructural power is the institutional capacity of a 
state to ‘penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions’, in effect, 
implementation (Mann, 2012 (1993), p.59). Based on Ma n, I see the Russian state in the 
1990s as lower in both despotic and infrastructural power than in the Soviet period. In the 
2000s, both despotic and infrastructural power increased.  
When Putin came to power, he subordinated the fragmented public sector and its 
constituent political machines to himself and his supporting coalition (Gaddy and Ickes, 
2005, p.571; Hale, 2010, p.35-37). Regional governors, the major challengers of the central 
state in the 1990s, were weakened as state organisatio s and economic sectors were 
modernised (Wengle, 2012, p.449-450). This strengthened the infrastructural capacity and 
despotic powers of the state. However, Putin then exercised state autonomy in a partisan 
way, turning the state’s increased policymaking powers to the advantage of the ruling 
coalition. This was particularly visible in his selective approach to enforcement in the 
energy sector. The potential to develop a measure of state autonomy vis-à-vis the ruling 




therefore less need for state organisations to engage in routine negotiations with the elite 
when shaping policy. With greater despotic power, the ruling coalition, the regime, could 
rule through the state. But the result for the state was that it was now a hostage to the ruling 
coalition. This is the paradox of a limited access order: the state can enforce contracts 
among companies as an impersonal third party where privileges are unaffected. When it 
comes to relations within the top elite, including concessions, enforcement is based on 
privilege and carried out by the ruling coalition, the regime (North et al., 2009, p.18-20). 
Where the regime is concerned, the state is partial. 
But the subordination of fragmented political machines to one regime also strengthened the 
infrastructural power of the state. State actors now gained easier access to resources that 
were previously subject to negotiation with heads of sectors, regions, and companies. 
Increased despotic power led to an increase in infrastructural power. Where the state’s 
reach ended, it could compel energy companies to fund services and thereby substitute for 
state organisations. The state could penetrate its t rritory and energy sectors to a greater 
extent and more effectively. Institutional frameworks were now upheld and implemented 
to a greater extent.  
2.9  States and regimes 
This means that while a wide variety of contemporary states may appear to offer somewhat 
similar institutional frameworks for state–company i teraction, the informal conventions of 
a limited access order reflect a different logic from that of an open access order. The 
institutional framework constrains according to the social order’s logic. This has been 
noted by scholars with a comparative politics perspctive on contemporary Russia, who 




hybrid regime (Diamond, 2002) and a competitive authori arian regime (Levitsky and 
Way, 2002; 2010), one of a large group of regimes with democratic and autocratic 
elements. In such regimes, political leaders can trslate access to economic resources into 
advantages or control in the political sphere, for example, through an ‘ability to selectively 
direct vast resources of material wealth and power outside the formal institutional 
channels’ (Hale, 2005, p.138).  
In turn, this ‘discretionary economic power’ undermines formal democratic procedures, 
like elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.66-67), by ‘skewing the playing field’ (Levitsky 
and Way, 2012, p.30). This suggests the likelihood f incumbents employing state power 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.56-61) for their own advntage, that is, the stabilisation and 
perpetuation of their position and, thereby, of the political regime. These authors implicitly 
see authoritarian state institutions and organisations as different from democratic ones. I 
prefer to see this difference as a difference of social order. The immediate access of 
political leaders to economic resources in a limited access order, and the role that 
privileges and personal connections play in providing both political and economic power, 
are the keys to understanding why institutions constrain differently. If the net is cast wider, 
to compare not politics but political economies, it is possible to compare authoritarian and 
democratic institutions. The difference between them comes through less in terms of 
design differences, but more in terms of implementation. The institutional framework 
around Russian energy companies may resemble those of its peers in many other states, 
including democratic and autocratic regimes. But in Russia (and other states), institutions 
like property rights are implemented differently, in a social order context in which 




From the literature on political outcomes, I take away a distinction between state and the 
regime, understood here as a more or less cohesive coll ctive of the incumbent and 
coalition in control of the state. The regime is only i  possession (albeit perhaps not fully) 
of the state. It is not equal to the state. The regim  employs the state apparatus for its own 
ends (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005, p.571 esp. fn. 525; Sakwa, 2010, p.194), and the selective 
rent distribution may certainly resemble a ‘kleptocracy’ (Dawisha, 2011). But this is only 
one side of the social order. This is also the arrangement that upholds stability and 
manages violence. The stability may be temporary and drive the economy to stagnation, 
but the alternative, short of a painfully negotiated change of regime, remains more 
widespread and uncontrollable violence.  
2.10  State capacity and authoritarian durability 
All the same, the regime does prey on the state. This point is raised by Lucan Way, who 
counts state power as one of the sources of authoritarian capacity (Way, 2005, p.235). He 
sees authoritarian state power as fundamentally different from the powers of a democratic 
state, while I rely instead on the concept of social order. How can I then approach the 
relationship between states and regimes? Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner argue, in a 
discussion of authoritarian durability, that ‘state power is the strongest institutional 
foundation for authoritarian regimes’ staying power’ (Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.16). They 
see state infrastructural power, as defined above, as very helpful to autocrats. Regime 
actors can deploy state infrastructural power through a set of infrastructural mechanisms, 
in order to enhance authoritarian durability (Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.19). The 
infrastructure is the state’s, but the regime deploys it to its own ends and, over time, shapes 
it. Slater and Fenner outline four mechanisms as particularly helpful for autocrats (Slater 




capacity, which autocrats can use to coerce rivals. Second, mechanisms of resource 
extraction can be used to maintain the power advantage over society (Slater and Fenner, 
2011, p.21). I here see these mechanisms as working both through formal taxation and 
informal rent management. Third, the mechanisms that register the population can be 
employed to monitor the population and target suppression, accommodation and 
negotiation with groups (Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.21-22). And fourth, state infrastructure 
is used to cultivate dependence in the elite and wider population, giving them a stake in the 
status quo. Regimes can use dependence (on jobs, incomes, services and possibilities for a 
better life) to enhance stability (Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.22-23). The better the command 
of state organisations over state infrastructure, rsource extraction, monitoring, 
accommodation and negotiation, and the more it cultivates dependence, the more state 
capacity increases.  
So autocrats and their supporting coalition shape these mechanisms, and the institutional 
frameworks that enable state organisations to enact them, to their needs. Regimes will 
strengthen the state, and weaken it, according to the imperative to remain in power by 
managing violence and distributing access to rents. 
For state–company relations, this means that companies differ not just in their relationships 
to the state, structured by ownership, state hierarchy (ministry), or private ownership, but 
also according to their relationship to the regime. They all have a place in the rent 
distribution system that supports the ruling coalition. Their institutional contexts are also 
shaped by their rent-sharing responsibilities and privileges. Or, put differently, it matters to 
companies who is in control of the Russian state. Their continued existence, as they are 




beyond the duration of the current coalition. So the mutual dependence between top 
members of the ruling coalition in charge of the state, and company managers aligned with 
the coalition, is an asymmetric one. Company managers know that a war of all against all 
is a likely alternative to the status quo. Even when the regime relegates them to the status 
of junior partners, they still prefer the status quo (Yakovlev, 2014, p.16). A reduction in 
rent aggravates tension within the elite (Yakovlev, 2014, p.14), but company managers are 
loath to embark on a risky renegotiation of the ruling coalition. The asymmetric power 
relations within the ruling coalition, a result of the regime’s use of state power as a source 
of strength, are therefore powerful supports for the status quo. The lack of restructuring 
and renewal in Russia after 2004 (Aleksashenko, 2014), and the unanimous support of top 
company managers for Putin’s policy towards Ukraine a d the annexation of Crimea in 
2014 underline how much they all depend on stability. This support remained in place as 
oil prices were halved and the costs of economic and foreign policies under Putin became 
apparent. 
But state capacity and regime stability ultimately a so depend on the company managers. 
This is not just because they manage and channel the rent streams to the ruling coalition. It 
is also because they represent state infrastructural power in two of the three other meanings 
outlined here. Due to the Soviet legacy infrastructure, they extend into the post-Soviet 
region. They can be employed to coerce rivals at home r exert pressure on governments of 
other states through the cultivation of dependence on their services. In this sense, I see 
them as tools of the state. To very different degres, they are at the regime’s disposal. 
Sometimes, this is negotiated access, at other times, it is direct. Their institutional contexts 




2.11  The theoretical framework, summed up 
This thesis starts from the premise that institutions structure the environment for actors. In 
a limited access order, however, institutions constrain differently than in an open access 
order. There is an imperative to uphold privileges, including the privileged extraction and 
sharing of rent, and thereby maintain stability in the ruling coalition. This leads to a 
dominance of informality and personal relations over formality and impersonal relations, in 
central parts of the institutional framework, like the rent management system and property 
rights protection. But informal institutions, informal rent sharing and weakly protected 
property rights inhibit the development of state capacity and of financially healthy 
companies. However, such a set of linkages enables th  ruling coalition to dispense 
patronage and, thereby, maintains authoritarian durability. In contrast, formal institutions, 
formal and widely dispersed rent sharing through taxation, and strongly protected and 
enforced property rights enable the development of state capacity and of financially 
healthy companies. The ruling coalition cannot on the other hand dispense patronage easily 
and readily, and authoritarian durability is therefo  weakened.  
In Russia, a resource rich state, the rent management system is a central institution that 
structures state–business relations and upholds the social order. Privileged access to 
property, and protection for property control, depend on property owners’ or 
concessionaires’ (in case of control over state-owned companies) maintaining personal 
relations with the ruling coalition, and sharing rents with it, formally and informally. To 
the extent that the ruling coalition compels company leaders to rely on personal relations 
and informal rent sharing with state actors to protect managers’ control or ownership over 





The ruling coalition, here called the regime, is in charge of the state and its institutional 
development. In turn, the regime also preys on the s ate by using the institutional context it 
provides and its power mechanisms, for enrichment and to remain in power. To enhance 
authoritarian durability, the regime uses the state’s infrastructure for coercion, resource 
extraction, registration and monitoring of the population, and to cultivate dependence on 
the state and the regime. When access to property, here companies, also includes access to 
state infrastructure, companies can be used as toolof the state. However, because a 
regime in a limited access order uses the state to r main in power, the same compan(ies) 
can also be used as tools of the regime. 
The relationship between the state, the regime and the company can extend beyond the 
state’s borders. In the case of Russia and the post-Soviet region this is first and foremost 
due to the continued existence of contiguous infrastructure for energy supply and transport. 
Other post-Soviet states were to a considerable extnt dependent on this infrastructure, 
controlled directly or indirectly by Russian energy companies, to access energy, but also to 
access markets for energy resources under their own c ntrol. Inherited energy dependence 
on Russia turned Russian companies into potential tools of the Russian state also in 
relation to the post-Soviet region. To the extent that the Russian state controlled or 
influenced energy companies’ access to business activity (operations) in the post-Soviet 
region, the relationship between Russian energy companies and the Russian state extended 
into the post-Soviet region. In this way, the Russian state, and the regime in possession of 
it, could extract resources, coerce and cultivate dependence on the Russian state in the 




2.12  Operationalisation 
To apply this conceptual framework to the cases, I rely on the three main research 
questions that introduced this chapter: (1) How did relations between energy companies 
and the Russian state change in the period under study? (2) How did these relations change 
as regards company activity in the post-Soviet state , and (3) as regards Russian foreign 
policy towards the post-Soviet states? 
To answer these questions, I rely on the following operational tasks and questions. First, I 
look for changes in the structure of interaction. These include formal changes to formal 
institutions, but, as discussed, this is only part of he institutional context the state offers 
companies. The structure of interaction is affected by actors’ use of access and 
participation insofar as actors adapt institutions, and their own aims and strategies within 
the institutional framework. They may grant each oter, or withhold, access to institutions 
and policymaking, and they may participate, or not participate, in institutional development 
and policymaking. By seeing this as a process of mutual adaptation, I here mean that the 
actors adapt to each other. This part of their interaction is to some extent available for 
investigation.  
Where access, participation and mutual adaptation take place, I investigate the balance 
between formality and informality in the institutional framework, especially as regards rule 
enforcement. Are there any observable linkages between direct management, informally 
extracted and distributed rents and informal bargaining for political support on the one 
hand, and indirect management, formal rents and formal bargaining over political support 
on the other? Are property rights and monopolies weakly or strongly protected, or defined 




Above all, changes in the balance between formality nd informality would be expected to 
affect the composition of rents. Are there any changes to that composition, in transparency 
surrounding rent extraction and management, or increasing institutionalisation of rent 
extraction and distribution? Considering the dependence on cheap Russian energy in the 
Soviet period, I am also interested to see whether rent extraction and distribution extend 
into the post-Soviet region. 
Second, I need to relate changes in the structure of state–company interaction to Russia’s 
evolving social order. A limited access order evolving from a rather basic to a more mature 
state would be expected to display increasing specialisation and institutionalisation among 
organisations, and a growing emphasis on rights that are upheld impersonally as opposed 
to privileges that are upheld individually. The state would be expected to grow stronger as 
the ruling coalition changed from being the state to being a representative of the state. So I 
start by asking whether the importance of privileges changes over time. Are there any 
indications of a greater degree of impersonally enforced rights in state–company 
interaction? Are there any conflicts between formal institutional frameworks on the one 
hand and concessions and privileges on the other? In the event of such conflicts, are they 
resolved differently at different times? Is it possible to observe differentiation between 
state and private interests in rent extraction and distribution? 
On institutionalisation, I look for growing regularity and indications of routine and 
certainty, as opposed to personal contact and possibly uncertainty, in state–company 
interaction. Just as importantly, I ask whether organisations grow increasingly specialised? 
And lastly, does the role of the state, as distinct from the regime, grow stronger or weaker 




My third set of questions concerns power relations. Mutual adaptation among actors also 
reflects asymmetric power relations within the ruling coalition, with top state actors 
achieving greater autonomy and, in consequence, greater despotic power. I am here 
interested in the asymmetric dependence of companies o  the regime, and changes to these 
relationships.  
The final set of questions for analysis concerns the content of interaction. When I see the 
companies as state infrastructure and potential instruments, are there any differences over 
time in how they are used by the regime? Are they used to stabilise the regime? Do they 
cultivate dependence on the state, and/or are they us d as means of coercion? If they 
cultivate dependence on Russia, is dependence used as a coercive mechanism? If they are 
used as tools in the post-Soviet region, are they us d directly as constituents of a regime, or 
is their use negotiated? Is it possible to make any inferences on any possible relation 
between the assumed direct state access to resource after 2000 and changes in foreign 
policy? 
And lastly, it has to be kept in mind that changes in the structure of interaction, the 
evolving social order, power relations and the content of interaction are not expected to 
conform to any idea of progress. I do not expect any li ear development towards 
increasing formality, institutionalisation, specialis tion, more rights and less privilege, a 
stronger state and a weaker regime, more indirect use of companies as tools, etc. While 
some of the questions that guide my analysis are formulated in such terms, changes can 
occur in both directions. While Russia in 2012 was very different from Russia in 1992, 




2.13  This investigation as a qualitative inquiry 
The subject matter of this thesis lends itself easily to qualitative methods, being complex, 
detailed, and bounded in time and space (Ragin et al., 1996, p.750). On this basis, an 
inductive approach recommended itself. I found current theories and concepts 
underdeveloped, and with insufficient explanatory power when approaching state–business 
relations in Russia, and particularly when observing the resonance of these relations across 
the post-Soviet region. I developed an initial theoretical position based on the literature on 
Russian energy operations in the post-Soviet region. This was that overall relations 
between the Russian state and Russian companies, at that research stage conceptualised as 
different varieties of (vaguely corporatist) policy networks, influenced policy formation for 
the post-Soviet region. This position was later revis d, as summarised in 2.11. In contrast 
with much of the contemporary literature, the starting propositions were that Russian 
energy companies aimed both to make profits and to fur her Russian foreign policy, and 
that companies were likely to differ in their balance between profits and politics.  
I decided at an early stage of the research process to tudy cases of energy companies’ 
interaction with Russian state actors. The rationale for choosing companies as case units 
was based on the initial theoretical position, which suggested comparing companies. In the 
course of the investigation, I abandoned the idea of clear balance obtaining between 
politics and profits as of little value to our understanding of both Russian domestic politics 
and foreign policy, and to the analysis of the cases. It did not survive my familiarisation 
with the field and the contexts with which interview es themselves saw themselves 
involved. Instead, politics and profits were intertwined, and politics affected profits. 
Moreover, when I approached the first interviews with an aim of concentrating on state-




the history of state–company ties. This history extended further backwards than I had 
anticipated, even as I was already rather familiar with contemporary Russia. Historical and 
contextual sensitivity (Silverman, 2005, p.84) demanded a revision of the design to include 
change and continuity over a longer period.  
The observable difference between companies persistd and warranted systematic analysis. 
Identifying, applying and developing the most useful analytical categories (Pope et al., 
2000, p.114) then became a major task in the research process. The definition of cases 
moved from ‘cases as companies that interact with the state’ to ‘cases as state–company 
interaction’, and the starting point of the investiga on was moved back in time from 1999 
to 1992.  
Systematic data analysis also yielded an emphasis, from the companies’ point of view, on 
the centrality of relations with the top Russian lead rship, both government and 
presidency. The concept that first emerged as a clear finding in the data was ‘monopoly’, 
with a contrast in private ownership. There seemed to be a difference in relations with state 
organisations between companies that held some sort of monopoly at home and those that 
did not. For the companies that held monopolies, it was important to retain it. In this way, 
the iteration that takes place during a qualitative research process (Spencer et al., 2003, 
p.212) led the investigation towards an even greate emphasis on institutions. Relying on 
historical institutionalism in a study of institutions in state–company interaction in their 
own setting (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.12-13) became then a natural choice, also in 
view of the case study design.  
To sum up, the research process was problem-driven and aimed at building a narrative. The 




yielded categories and concepts, and related them to each other. These early findings were 
interpreted in light of theory. However, the early findings also informed a search for a 
theoretical framework that could explain as much as po sible, as parsimoniously as 
possible. I then went back to the data, and searched for more complete data, to develop the 
narrative in each case according to the theoretical framework. Towards the end of the 
research process, I interrogated and modified the conceptual framework until it informed 
the analysis to such a degree that other explanations paled in comparison (Bates et al., 
1998, p.17).  
2.14  A five-case study 
As discussed in the Introduction, the choice of cases for this study was based on the view 
that it was important to include state–company relations both within and without the oil 
and gas industries, for comparison and contrast of the general phenomenon (Silverman, 
2005, p.127). While industry-specific, or fuel-specific, explanations cannot account for all 
the cases here, political and economic ones can. There are considerable interaction effects 
between natural monopolies11 (pipelines, grids, nuclear fuel) and a propensity for
(continued) state ownership and control. But by approaching the cases as cases of state–
business interaction in institutional development, it is possible to establish whether the 
informality and formality of rents and institutions, related to social order development, 
matter for domestic and foreign policy by making the companies more, or less, available as 
instruments of the state.  
Constant comparison (across cases, over time) was a path to validity in the study 
(Silverman, 2005, p.213-214). Even as findings were not expected to be applicable to 
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state–company relations in other countries, five cases studied longitudinally would make 
the findings more readily transferable and generalizab e across different sectors in Russia, 
particularly where interaction concerned foreign operations. In the course of the 
investigation, the initial assumption of a balance between politics and profits was refuted, 
and this unexpected turn of events strengthened the validity of this study (Silverman, 2005, 
p.212-213). The emphasis on institutional and social order development, and the 
development of the Russian state, which emerged, made the theoretical insights here 
relevant to other sectors and states as well.  
The breadth of cases resulted from a stratified, purposive sample strategy (initially ‘one 
company for each energy sector’), but it led to an understanding of how the companies 
share certain central characteristics as legacies of the Soviet system and were therefore 
more similar than initially expected. Essentially, they were comparable (Ragin et al., 1996, 
p.752) also for the institutions that structured their relations with the state. Eventually, they 
facilitated a more nuanced understanding of institutional similarities, and unexpected 
parallels emerged.  
Case selection also opened for the possibility that t e privately owned Lukoil would be a 
most different case in its relations with the state. This turned out as expected, thus enabling 
a contrast to be made with the other cases.  The investigation also revealed interesting 
similarities and nuances between Transneft, Minatom, RAO UES and Gazprom in their 
relations with the state. While their relations with the state at home and their instrumental 
use by the state abroad were largely similar, these r lations still differed in certain 
characteristic ways. Taking a comparative political economy approach, it made sense to 




more or less available as tools to the state. This s ows how a narrative with theory is more 
powerful than one without (Bates et al., 1998, p.236).  
2.15  Sources and data 
This investigation relies on material in newspapers, statistics from Russian official sources 
and the companies themselves, annual reports and other information from companies, 
official government documents and legislation, articles in trade journals, transcripts from 
WikiLeaks, reports issued by various international and non-Russian government 
organisations, scholarly literature, as well as interviews with company representatives, 
energy scholars and analysts (Appendix 2). Newspaper nd trade journal material, and 
interviews, were the most significant primary sources, followed by government documents 
and legislation. However, the same sources also provided considerable secondary source 
material.  
I made use of this wealth of sources mainly in two ways. First to obtain factual information 
about energy operations and foreign policy, and second to obtain an insight into mind-sets, 
policies, priorities and subjective analyses about particular episodes and processes 
(Richards, 1996, p.200). The interviews were particularly valuable for this second purpose.  
Interviews were semi-structured, guided by a flexible list of themes and possible questions 
(Richards, 1996, p.202) targeting the interviewee in question. I used broad introductory 
questions instead of confining the conversation to the pre-defined list (Rapley, 2007, p.18). 
On several occasions, valuable interview time was lost as interviewees used their superior 
position of power (Richards, 1996, p.201) and dodged questions. With the targeted 
questions, above all I tried to understand interviewe s’ analyses of energy sector and 




several interviewees about how they would divide the state’s relations with one or several 
energy sectors into periods, and possibly connect changes and distinctive periods to wider 
changes in the state and in the political economy. Depending on interviewees’ role in 
relation to a specific energy sector or company, I asked them to place the company or the 
sector in relation to the state, politically and economically (over time), and their views on 
the importance of being, for example, state owned, privately held, or in control of a 
monopoly. This was followed up with more specific questions on topics like expectation of 
support from the state, and state expectations of company loyalty. An issue raised in 
relation to foreign operations and specific policies, for example transit avoidance, was the 
extent to which interviewees saw this as national policy or company strategy. I also asked 
about the significance of top leaders and their teams. Several interviewees were frank and 
responded in depth to most of these issues, even as some were inclined to use the 
opportunity to talk about broad topics to dodge the question. The general and 
understandable exception was that company representatives were not inclined to comment 
much on company leaders. 
To sum up, during interviews I sought to have interviewees walk me through their own, 
personal analysis of state–company relations, or state–sector relations where this was more 
relevant. In addition to enriching the research process with a wide variety of subjective 
analyses, the interviews also gave me a much better and more nuanced understanding of 
mind-sets in the energy sector. A comment about how a sector, or a company, would have 
related to the state at one point, compared to later, several times pointed me towards issues 
that I had previously approached as less relevant, or understood in a different context. In 
this way, interviews played a formative role in the research process, by helping me to 




with knowledgeable insiders from the energy sphere, in Norway and Russia, I had a natural 
testing ground for the concepts and inferences occasioned by interviews. 
Several interviewees preferred me not to cite from interviews, or not to refer directly to 
issues raised during interviews. As some issues had come up in more than one interview, it 
would not be accurate, or fair on interviewees, to ci e one, but not another. This challenge 
was solved by not citing interviewees in the text. Instead, I used interviewees’ responses in 
the search for more complete written sources, like newspaper articles, that could be, and 
were, cited. Appendix 2 has more detailed information about how I conducted interviews, 
and a list of interviews.  
All factual information deriving from sources, especially newspapers, other journalistic 
material, and interviews, was treated with care. Checking and confirming information were 
a priority. Sources were compared as far as possible. Reliability was assessed for every 
source, and I made it a priority to assess individual journalists. Most sources were biased in 
some way on state–company relations, and the bias was not always easily teased out. Bias 
in newspaper reports was to some extent understood thr ugh informed reading of trade 
journals. 
Sources were collected from the Internet whenever possible, and this extended the range of 
sources considerably. Care was taken to check authorship and versions, and to retain 
copies of web pages, on paper and/or hard disk. The WikiLeaks material appeared while I 
was in the midst of assembling the data. This requir d separate assessments of reliability 
and bias as secondary source material. Discussions with colleagues and (retired) diplomats 
supported my assessments. The WikiLeaks material provided additional insights on 




Much attention is paid to formal and informal institutions in this thesis. Informal 
institutions are necessarily more difficult to study. Throughout the process of data 
collection and analysis, I have tried to remain alert to indications of informal institutions, 
informal enforcement and interaction occurring informally alongside the formal 
institutional framework. Such indications have elicited further investigation and inquiry as 






3. ELECTRICITY: RAO UES/INTER RAO  
This chapter discusses the Russian electricity monop ly (RAO UES 1992–2008) and its 
subsidiary – and in some respects successor – Inter RAO (1997–), along with the relations 
of both to the Russian state. Throughout the chapter, I will show how the Russian state and 
RAO UES/Inter RAO participated in the development of f reign policy and foreign 
electricity operations and relate this to their interaction in overall institutional 
development. The Soviet legacy, an integrated electricity sector, acted first as a channel for 
sharing Russian rents through a subsidised power supply system, where electricity was 
often not paid for. Changing state–company interaction drove institutional development at 
home, and boosted state capacity. As state capacity increased, RAO UES had better 
opportunities to expand foreign operations and its Inter RAO subsidiary. Inter RAO could 
in turn be used as a foreign policy tool. This chapter, like the ones that follow, is structured 
roughly chronologically, following state–company relations from 1992 to 2012. It is 
subdivided according to the milestones of Russian hstory in the period (p.26). For each 
period, domestic state–company interaction is discus ed first, followed by interaction 
abroad.  
3.1  The break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet legacies 
In the Soviet period, the power sector, excluding nuclear energy, was organised under the 
Ministry of Electric Power. UES was the only distributor (Patel, 2013, p.45). A Russian 
Fuel and Electricity Ministry was created in February 1991, while Minatom remained 
responsible for nuclear power generation. When the Soviet Ministry of Electric Power was 
abolished in November 1991, the Russian ministry took its place, along with its 




Vladimir Lopukhin, was appointed Fuel and Energy Minister (Gustafson, 2012, p.63-64). 
As the state hierarchy weakened, established institutions failed to constrain actors lower 
down in the hierarchy and momentum passed from the Ministry to a subordinate 
committee appointed to manage UES. This committee was headed by a former Soviet, now 
Russian, deputy minister, Anatolii Dyakov, an experienced insider in the power industry 
who had started as an electrical fitter. He was well positioned to recognise the UES, the 
grid, as the central infrastructural legacy of the Soviet Union. Reliable electricity supply 
would enable the industry to retain the status quo and maintain the institutional framework 
of interaction with any government.  
During 1992, UES re-emerged as a holding company, in three stages. In July, a presidential 
decree established privatisation procedures (Decree No 721, 1992), though electricity was 
made exempt from this process along with the rest of the fuel and energy complex in 
August (Decree No 922, 1992). Decree No 923 divided the entire power production and 
distribution system into shareholding companies (1992). In November, a final decree 
established the holding company RAO UES, supposed to include the entire electricity 
sector (Decree No 1334, 1992). At least 50 percent of RAO UES was to remain in state 
hands; the rest would be made available to private owners, including electricity industry 
employees, in stages during 1993–5. Dyakov became head of RAO UES in December and 
soon after was made Board Chairman (Museum for the History of the Northwest Power 
Industry, 2014). An opportunity arose for him with t e collapse of the old institutional 
framework to maximise sector autonomy, but also to ensure as far as possible the survival, 




3.2  Keeping afloat and muddling through 
RAO UES did not consolidate as planned. The breakdown f the central planning system 
sparked a process of regional autonomy. By 1992, this process was well underway 
(Engoian, 2006, p.3241). In the weeks between the decrees of July and August 1992, 
several regional power companies fell partially or wholly into regional authority control; in 
some places this was to reward loyal governors (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.69-71). 
While the government reformers had planned a consolidation from below, the need to 
maintain a ruling coalition with regional support was an informal, but strong counterweight 
to any deliberated policy. At the time, RAO UES contr lled 72 percent of Russian 
electricity production and 96 percent of the power transmission network (RAO UES, 
2005b; Patel, 2013, p.45). However, RAO UES held only minority stakes in nine of the 
regional subsidiaries, some of which were crucial to the general power supply (Tompson, 
2004, p.5).  
Thus the regions came to hold considerable power in the holding company RAO UES. The 
process of regional autonomy progressed apace throug out the 1990s, contributing to the 
fragmentation of the public sector and of RAO UES (Gaddy and Ickes, 2002, p.185-187). 
Power companies and power industry service companies fell into creditors’ hands for 
defaulting on real debts, or debts imagined by creativ  local managements (Berger and 
Proskurnina, 2008, p.68-70; 74-79). Yeltsin continued to hand out stakes in regional power 
companies to governors who supported his ruling coalition. The institutional framework 
gave local directors more power than the RAO UES top management, which depended on 
the goodwill of subsidiary managements. Decentralised decision-making permeated the 
ownership structure. Thirty percent of the governmet’s votes were exercised by the 




RAO UES (Decree No 1334, 1992), creating a disincentiv  for transparency. The initial 
priority of privatisation without basic restructuring maintained regional autonomy and 
impeded further reform (Gray, 1995, p.41-42), as veted interests multiplied (Tompson, 
2004, p.4-5). By late 1994, only 25 percent of RAO UES was in non-state hands (Gray, 
1995, p.39); from 1996, the state steadily reduced its stake (Table 3.3). 
The power industry continued in a semi-reformed state. The government controlled tariffs: 
they grew at only half the rate of industrial producer prices and lagged behind fuel prices 
(IEA, 2003, p.22; Tompson, 2004, p.7). The result was a negative spiral of under-
investment in power infrastructure, falling power supply reliability, and fixed capital 
depletion. By the mid-1990s, non-payments and arrears were the rule rather than the 
exception in regional power companies, which regularly threatened to declare themselves 
bankrupt (Nevezhin, 1996).  
By the mid-1990s, RAO UES had acquired a stabilising role in the Russian economy, 
while also easing much of the pressure to speed up the rocess of structural change. The 
economy was plagued by debts and non-payments due to the absence of real budget 
constraints. The problem became acute after the govrnment made it illegal to turn off 
power supply to state-owned enterprises in October 1995 (Murtazaev, 1995). RAO UES’s 
subsidiaries became the largest creditors in their respective regional economies. The 
regional electricity sector was plunged into debt, most of it owed to Gazprom and the coal 
companies, which were therefore forced to share their rents with the electricity industry. 
By the second half of 1996, electricity consumers owed the industry 71 trillion rubles in 
unpaid tariffs, while industry employees had 1.5 trillion rubles in outstanding pay 




electricity sector 8.7 trillion rubles (Nevezhin, 1996), largely offset against regional tax 
claims on the power companies. In comparison, RAO UES, the holding company, had a 
turnover of 8.9 billion rubles that year (RAO UES, 1997). Tariff collection rates fell below 
85 percent, only 15–20 percent of which was paid in cash (RAO UES, 2005b, Berger and 
Proskurnina, 2008). The rest was barter involving all kinds of goods, and other forms of 
nonmonetary payments, including promissory notes (Gaddy and Ickes, 2002, p.25).  
Barter trade and promissory exchanges created ample op ortunities for enrichment through 
a flourishing intermediary sector (Bekker, 1997; Nevezhin, 1997), which channelled rents 
to regional and federal elites. Dyakov himself established a company, RAO EEK (Edinaya 
energeticheskaya korporatsiya), which did very well as an intermediary in the promissory 
note trade (Ivanov, 1998; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 1999; Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.67). 
Unchecked by central state control, the holding company grew at the expense of its 
subsidiaries, which in turn lost much of their value. The holding company made a profit 
and paid dividends (RAO UES, 1997), while the regional power companies had to look to 
the state budget for investments (Babich, 1997). 
At the same time, the semi-reformed electricity system was useful to the state. By making 
it possible for unprofitable enterprises to survive, RAO UES stabilised many regions. 
Central state organisations, however, failed to conduct audits, let alone take an interest in 
the development of RAO UES (Babich, 1997). The state seemed impotent and RAO UES 
inaccessible. But people and factories continued as before, regardless of failing tariff 
payments. RAO UES buoyed the economy by softening budget constraints for non-
profitable companies. As long as power companies failed to pay for their own gas, RAO 




human suffering and preserved a modicum of politica st bility, but it also reduced the 
pressure to accelerate structural reform. RAO UES also channelled rents from barter trade. 
Regional economies depended on the electricity subsidy, and regional authorities depended 
on the rent streams. RAO UES’s top management joined other monopolies, especially 
Gazprom, to keep reform off the agenda (Bekker, 1997). Unlike Gazprom, RAO UES had 
no access to foreign markets that could shield it completely from the hazards of playing the 
economic stabiliser role and distributing rents through subsidies to consumers. This 
weakened the company considerably as a result. 
3.3  The trade collapse 
The Soviet Union’s power grids were not designed to operate in isolation. Systematic 
under- and overcapacity criss-crossed republican boundaries (as reflected in Table 1.2) 
(Anex, 2002, p.401). The trade in electricity in the post-Soviet region fell significantly 
after 1991. Between 1991 and 1997, Russia’s import of electricity, all from the post-Soviet 
region, decreased from 35 to 7 TWh, or by 80 percent (OECD/IEA, 2005, p.24). Russian 
exports were halved between 1991 and 2000 (exports fr m 1997 are found in Table 3.4) 
(OECD/IEA, 2005, p.24). The trade decline reflected reduced consumption. Overall 
utilisation of installed power supply capacity in the post-Soviet region fell from 61 percent 
in 1990 to 50 percent in 1994 (Gray, 1995, p.21).  
RAO UES continued to export power to the post-Soviet region. In the mind of the senior 
management, it was a technical imperative (Kommersant, 1994). Debts accumulated and 
the payment rates were low. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Georgia by 1998 owed 
RAO UES 647 million US$ (Table 3.7). In volume, export to places outside the post-




it generated 123 percent of the cash revenue (RAO UES, 1999). Barter payment and non-
payments were the general rule inside the post-Soviet region (Table 3.6). Negotiating debt-
for-equity swaps to recover debts was complicated, particularly with Kazakhstan (Stalker, 
1995b).  
Non-payments prompted RAO UES to cut off non-Russian grids in the late 1990s. The 
Ukrainian grid was cut off in 1999, and supply to Georgia reduced (Kozyrev and Gavrish, 
2001). Even Kazakhstan, whose northern regions werecompletely integrated with Russia, 
experienced reduced supply (Klasson, 2000; RAO UES, 2000). In the post-Soviet region, 
people traditionally expected a stable, abundant and accessible supply of power, almost for 
free. By 1998, most people in the region had got used to frequent, hour-long power cuts, 
breakdowns and electricity rationing. 
3.4  Reform and financial crisis 
Yeltsin’s second presidential period (1996–99) yet again prioritised reform of the natural 
monopolies. RAO UES, Gazprom, the railways and the post and telecommunications 
systems were targeted. Reformers in the new government, led by Fuel and Energy Minister 
Boris Nemtsov, drafted the decree, which was detailed on RAO UES (Decree No 426, 
1997; Gotova, 1997; Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.43-44). Reform, it was said, would 
attract investment. By 2003, the reform would have created a wholesale electricity market, 
a spot market, a market operator and a stable regulatory environment, several competing, 
fuel-based generating companies and one state-owned hydropower-based generating 
company (Kurronen, 2006; Skyner, 2010; Solanko, 2011). Payment discipline would be 
enforced, cross-subsidies abolished, the tariff system restructured (Decree No 426, 1997). 




unbundled anywhere, though the reform was modelled on similar reforms in Brazil, 
Mexico and South Africa. 
Dyakov was vehemently opposed to reform, but he had failed to understand the changing 
political context of Yeltsin’s second presidential period (Nevezhin, 1996; Bekker, 1997; 
Gotova, 1997; Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.58-59). As the new government 
reinterpreted and enforced RAO UES guidelines, Dyakov was told in early 1997 that his 
positions as top manager and Board Chairman were incompatible (Bekker, 1997). Boris 
Brevnov, a young manager and former colleague of Nemtsov’s, was hired in from outside 
the electricity sector, and appointed in March 1997. He was unprepared for the job of 
heading RAO UES, let alone reforming it (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.29-35). He 
began by ordering a comprehensive audit of RAO UES, a move boycotted by the managers 
(Wengle, 2012, p.447). This made it difficult to proceed with the reform. When Anatolii 
Chubais was given Brevnov’s job in April 1998, his predecessor had already fallen out of 
favour with his erstwhile patrons. Dyakov, on his side, had marginalised himself with his 
resistance to reform and handling of Brevnov, which included an exchange of 
compromising material between them (Ivanov, 1998). Chubais could therefore embark on 
the reform with a clean slate. 
Chubais had experience. He was deputy prime minister from 1992 to 1996 and one of 
Russia’s leading privatisation and reform advocates. He had co-authored the 1990 market 
reform programme, headed the State Property Committee (1991–1994), the Presidential 
Administration (1996–1997), served as Minister of Finance in 1997 and headed Yeltsin’s 




apparently at his own request; it was, in his opinion, a key sector (Berger and Proskurnina, 
2008, p.17-18; 23-24).  
By August 1998, when Russia defaulted on its debts and the financial crisis unfolded, the 
ground was well prepared for reform. Chubais and his team had compiled a reform manual 
(Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.36-39), and they wre determined to see it pushed 
through. A presidential decree and a compromise with Gazprom enabled them to launch a 
campaign against non-payers, in which regional companies could, and did, turn off 
electricity to non-paying power users (Decree No 889, 1998). Collection rates and the 
share of barter improved slightly in the last months of 1998, reducing informal rent streams 
somewhat (RAO UES, 1999). Throughout the entire organisation, old industry hands were 
being replaced by younger managers (Wengle, 2012, p.442).  
The RAO UES reform was unusual at the time in being pushed through by a management 
that gradually took over control of the industry. This was well understood by Chubais and 
his team (Gaidar and Chubais, 2008, p.134). After 2000, attracting investment to the sector 
was no longer controversial. Power demand was projected to rise rapidly during the post-
crisis recovery. The crisis had made export beyond the post-Soviet region competitive. The 
industry would struggle to meet this demand.12 The sheer scale of the reform caused 
repeated delays. The regions lined up against a reform designed to disempower them 
(Knyazev and Reznik, 2000; Berger and Proskurnina, 2008). Many regional power 
company managers were also unfavourably disposed to working in radically different 
conditions. The final period of reform was pushed forward from 2003 to 2004, later to 
2007–2008. When the reform legislation was passed by the Duma in February 2003, it was 
                                                          





a political victory for Chubais and his team, and for the government (Federal Law No 35, 
2003; Federal Law No 36, 2003).13 With the support of the Duma and state organisations, 
especially the Presidential Administration led by Aleksandr Voloshin (1999–2003), 
Chubais and his team enjoyed wide-ranging powers in how the reform was implemented, 
leading one observer to comment that RAO UES ‘substit t[ed] itself for the state on the 
issue of reform’ for as long as a decade (Engoian, 2006, p.3241). One interpretation would 
be that state organisations were not sufficiently supportive of reform to secure its 
irreversible completion. But, more persuasively, by farming out reform to the RAO UES 
management, the state indicated the seriousness of its commitment. The RAO UES reform 
planners seem to have learnt from other electricity reforms the importance of 
‘demonstrat[ing] the viability and robustness of the new regulation’, especially in case of 
changes in government (Newbery, 1994, p.311). Arguably, RAO UES did not so much 
substitute itself for the state as manage reform in a way that emphasised the state’s 
commitment to implementing it. The new institutional fr mework in turn obliged the state 
to enforce institutions, or face great costs in the ev nt of failing to do so (Gaidar and 
Chubais, 2008, p.138-139). 
3.5  A new approach to the post-Soviet region 
Chubais brought a new approach also to the post-Soviet region. RAO UES prioritised debt 
restructuring in 1998, and in 1999 ceased to accept barter on current payments (RAO UES, 
2000). Where old debts could not be paid in cash, exchanging debt for equity was the 
preferred strategy (RAO UES, 1999). Ukraine and non-paying customers in Kazakhstan 
were disconnected. Hard budget constraints were extnded to the post-Soviet region as 
well. 
                                                          




In 1998, RAO UES sold about two-thirds of Russia’s electricity exports (RAO UES, 1999) 
and established a subsidiary, Inter RAO, to effectuate cross-border trade (Gubenko, 2002). 
Inter RAO started up in 2000, first recovering Belarusian electricity debts and then 
facilitating transmission to Kaliningrad. Performing what was essentially a barter 
operation, it cleared electricity debts country by country. In the cases of Georgia and 
Kazakhstan, Inter RAO used unannounced blackouts as a form of pressure (Berger and 
Proskurnina, 2008, p.211-212; 216). 
Andrei Rappoport, a trusted member of RAO UES’s management, headed Inter RAO’s 
Board of Directors (Medvedeva, 2007a). The Board ha five members (until 2007), two of 
which, from 2004, represented Rosenergoatom, now a minority owner. The Board was 
largely a formality, conducting most of its business through correspondence (Kommersant, 
2008b). Important decisions were made by the RAO UES board, rather than Inter RAO’s. 
The addition of a minority owner, Rosenergoatom, does not seem to have altered this 
situation significantly. If anything, it led to even closer supervision from RAO UES. The 
formal institutional design was unaffected, with the composition of the Board the sole 
exception. Working with Chubais, Rappoport authored Inter RAO’s development and 
managed the company’s political support and media profile, effectively sidelining the 
company’s young manager, Evgenii Dod (2000–2009).  
De jure, there was no monopoly on cross-border electricity trade. The legal stipulation was 
that RAO UES organised and conducted cross-border electricity trade (Melkumyan, 2002). 
From 2001 Inter RAO was the export-import operator in a role delegated from RAO UES. 
The function could be performed on behalf of third parties, i.e. other exporters (Zvyagin, 




border trade. In 2001, Rosenergoatom planned exports t  both Georgia and Ukraine 
(Gorelov, 2001b; Rybal'chenko and Razumovskii, 2001). Instead of agreeing to effectuate 
trade for Rosenergoatom, RAO UES offered it a 15 percent stake in Inter RAO 
(Maksimov, 2001; Melkumyan, 2002). Rosenergoatom refused to accept less than 50 
(Maksimov, 2001; Melkumyan, 2002). The export-import conflict went to the Anti-
Monopoly Ministry for arbitration. Rosenergoatom settled for a 40 percent share of Inter 
RAO in mid-2002, and sought a corresponding share in electricity exports (Gorelov, 2006). 
It was not successful, apparently due to resistance from within RAO UES (Siluyanova, 
2003b). 
3.6  The new coalition 
Chubais was an old acquaintance of Putin’s from the St. Petersburg City Administration, 
and he headed Putin’s first election campaign in 2000. He was also close to Aleksei 
Kudrin, finance minister 2000–2011. Chubais combined personal political clout and 
network with formal mechanisms to drive reform forwa d. He was consistently rated as of 
one Russia’s three or four most influential businessmen (e.g. in Turanov, 2006).  
When Putin became president in 2000, he distanced himself from Chubais as he did from 
many others in an attempt to hold the so-called oligarchs at arm’s length. All the same, 
relations between Chubais and Putin remained relativ y close (Smirnov, K., 2000), and 
Chubais was not worried about his own position. When asked whether his loyalty to Putin 
protected him from arrest, he replied ‘Unlike the oligarchs … I built this power’ (‘V 
otlichie ot oligarkhov … ya stroil etu vlast’‘) (Tregubova, 2000). He identified with public 
service and the pursuit of state interests, rather an those of the business community 




Right up until 2008, Chubais and Putin are known to have met alone at least twice a year. 
Meetings with third parties, or in preparation for g oup meetings, often included an 
element of mediation. Putin on these occasions had to conciliate opposing parties, 
conciliation being one of the most important informal institutions of the presidency. This 
was especially necessary in the early 2000s when Chubais and Rem Vyakhirev or Aleksei 
Miller of Gazprom clashed on gas prices and deliveries to electricity production, and 
between Chubais and Putin’s own senior economic advisor, Andrei Illarionov, over the 
electricity reform. When Chubais and Putin met on their own, they would also discuss 
wider political concerns (Smirnov, K., 2002b; Kornysheva, 2003).  
3.7  Expansion in the post-Soviet region: Building a ‘liberal empire’ 
In 2003, RAO UES and Inter RAO embarked on a programme of expansion in the post-
Soviet electricity sector (Table 3.2). The timing was decided by events, but underpinned by 
a coherent mission statement. At the heart of the expansion project lay Chubais’s concept 
of ‘liberal empire’. In autumn 2003, just as RAO UES/Inter RAO completed this first wave 
of expansion, Chubais advocated a policy of ‘liberal empire’ in the post-Soviet region 
(Chubais, 2003; Lenta.ru, 2003). This, in his eyes, was Russia’s mission in the 21st century. 
The liberal empire would be based on economic power, used for the benefit of all the states 
in the region. He emphasised the need to support Russian culture in the post-Soviet region, 
along with freedom and human rights. Crucially, he gave the state the role of supporting 
Russian businesses abroad (Chubais, 2003). His proposals also seemed to justify RAO 




The RAO UES/Inter RAO expansion programme had three widely articulated goals: to 
profit financially from electricity trade; to stabilise power supplies14; and export power to 
countries outside the post-Soviet region. The potential markets were Romania and 
Bulgaria, Turkey and Afghanistan. Exports from Azerbaijan to Iran, and from Kyrgyzstan 
to China (Gorelov, 2004; Blagov, 2006a), were also a possibility. A fourth aim, to enable 
integration with grids outside the region, was frequ ntly mentioned. While the latter was 
one of Chubais’s pet projects, it was ultimately rejected after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Reuniting the post-Soviet electricity grids was an essential first step (Table 3.1). Inter RAO 
could then expand operations in the region (Startseva, 2003). Resynchronisation15 and 
trade improved power supplies, and investing in dilapidated assets helped further. To turn a 
profit, RAO UES used its understanding of the busine s culture to make the end customer 
pay (Crane et al., 2005, p.424-425). 
Making use of investment opportunities where Western companies had failed was one of 
Inter RAO’s two routes to expansion. The other was debt-for-equity deals that recovered 
electricity debts from the 1990s. Inter RAO leaned on the creditworthiness of RAO UES to 
acquire equity for a low price, making use of short-te m loans without collateral (Bekker, 
2003).  
3.7.1  Belarus 
Building on its good relations with Belarus, in 200–3 Inter RAO worked with the 
Belarusian company Belenergo on exports to Poland (Grib, 2003). In 2002, RAO UES 
                                                          
14 The larger the electricity grid, the more stable it is, provided it is well maintained and technologically up to 
date. Multiple sources of supply, from different fuel types, usually makes economic sense. Hours of peak
demand vary across a large grid, facilitating more rational utilisation.  
15 When electricity grids operate synchronously, their speeds and frequency match. After disconnection, they 




established a trading company, Tsentr realizatsii energii, to export power to Russia and 
Belarus (Inter RAO Lietuva, 2014). In 2003 Inter RAO was put in charge of electricity 
exports to Belarus in place of RAO UES, and the price increased by 28 percent for 2004 
(Mazaeva, 2004), in response, apparently, to governm nt pressure on RAO UES (Gorelov, 
2008b). Belarus could substitute domestic electricity for imported Russian power, but 
would incur losses (Grib, 2004). It preferred instead to buy expensive Ukrainian electricity, 
and later Lithuanian electricity. In Lithuania, however, Inter RAO was the only exporter 
with spare capacity, and Belarus was therefore forced to accept Inter RAO’s terms (Grib, 
2004; Mazaeva, 2004; Naumova and Grivach, 2004). Belarus subsequently reduced its 
overall import of power (Gorelov, 2008b). When the issue came up again in 2008, Inter 
RAO gave Belarus a more flexible contract (Gorelov, 2008b).  
3.7.2  Ukraine 
Re-synchronisation of the Russian and Ukrainian electricity grids proved problematic, 
even though Ukraine repaid its debts (Vorotynskii, 2000). It was eventually completed in 
August 2001 (Klasson, 2001). The synchronisation agreement did not regulate electricity 
trade, which would be negotiated afterwards (Stepannko and Gorelov, 2001). RAO UES 
aimed to export some power to Ukraine and to work with Ukraine on exports to Moldova. 
But Ukraine linked Russian electricity export to Mold va to Russia’s ratification of the EU 
Energy Charter Treaty, terms it would be impossible for Russia to fulfil (Stepanenko, 
2003). Ukraine was not eager to compete with Russia for the Moldovan market, where the 
South Ukraine NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) was directing its surplus (Grishkovets and 




Expansion through equity was a more promising strategy. In November 2003, RAO UES 
participated in a Russian–Ukrainian consortium thatcame close to acquiring stakes in ten 
(of 27) regional power distribution companies undergoing privatisation. The timing was 
good and the price quite low, according to one RAO UES board member, Seppo Remes. 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and President Leonid Kuchma were positive to RAO 
UES participation, and the consortium included Kuchma’s son in law, Viktor Pinchuk 
(Egorova et al., 2003; Siluyanova, 2004a). However, the consortium met with resistance 
from Ukrainian competitors (Siluyanova, 2004c) and also from Verkhovna Rada, 
Ukraine’s parliament, due to RAO UES’s participation. The privatisation process was 
delayed in December 2003, and halted in January 2004 (Butrin et al., 2003; Egorova and 
Gavrish, 2003). Dmitrii Medvedev, now head of the Russian presidential administration, 
travelled to Kyiv to support RAO UES and other Russian energy companies, like 
Gazprom, but was unable to influence the process (Zaets, 2003). One of the Russian 
businessmen in the consortium, Konstantin Grigorishin, ad his property in Ukraine 
confiscated in March 2004 (Butrin and Rudenko, 2004; Siluyanova, 2004c). 
In the event, a presidential decree established a public company, EKU, to own the regional 
companies (Mishneva et al., 2004). Chubais is alleged to have suggested this solution 
(Ivzhenko, 2005). When a possible privatisation of EKU came up in 2005, after the Orange 
Revolution, RAO UES/Inter RAO was seen as a likely bu er, in light of Chubais’s support 
for Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution (Ivzhenko, 2005). But RAO UES and Inter 





3.7.3  Moldova 
The Moldova GRES plant dominated Moldova’s electricity generation. The plant is located 
in the secessionist republic of Transnistria and controlled by its authorities in Tiraspol. Up 
to 2000, Moldova’s government in Chisinau was the formal owner. By 2000, Moldova 
GRES was operating at reduced capacity and needed modernisation and repairs estimated 
at 120 million US$ (Prikhodko, 2000).  
Inter RAO first tried to acquire control of the plant in 2000 in a joint effort with Moldova’s 
Moldelektrika and a Transnistrian company, Moldavskaya GRES (Prikhodko, 2000). They 
failed. In 2003, Tiraspol allowed privatisation in Transnistria, apparently to prevent control 
of the local economy falling into the hands of the government in Chisinau. Several large 
enterprises came under Russian control, directly or indirectly (Solov'ev, V., 2006). 
Gazprom and Inter RAO submitted a joint bid for Moldova GRES, proposing a debt-for-
equity deal (Gudim et al., 2003, p.15). Gazprom would write off Moldova’s more than 600 
million US$ gas debts, mostly incurred by Transnistria, in return for Russian investments 
in Moldova GRES. Inter RAO would manage the plant (Siluyanova, 2004a). However, an 
unknown Belgian company, St. Guidon Invest, won the tender in late 2003, paying 29 
million US$ for the plant and offering 161 million i investments (Gamova, 2004). Clearly 
a front company, St. Guidon was rumoured to be connected to the de facto government in 
Tiraspol (Suvorova, 2004; cf. Levinskii, 2005), or possibly backed by Russian money 
(Gamova, 2004; Burlak, 2005). Chisinau and Tiraspol’  tense relations complicated the 
situation further (Siluyanova, 2004a), especially as Chisinau had recently refused to sign a 




Unlike Gazprom, Inter RAO remained interested in Moldova GRES (Bruce and Yafimava, 
2009, p.174), especially because it made it possible to export electricity to Romania. RAO 
Nordic acquired 51 percent of Moldova GRES in March 2005. In August, Inter RAO 
acquired the remaining 49 percent by buying St. Guidon Invest. The estimated price for 
both deals was 85–100 million US$, giving both the Transnistrian authorities and St. 
Guidon’s owners a good share in the proceeds (Vin'kov, 2005; Grishkovets, 2008a). The 
Moldovan government was not pleased by this fa t accompli. A legal transfer required its 
prior approval. In addition, Inter RAO had been advised on the deal by Valerii Pasat, a 
former Moldovan official who had served as defence minister, head of special services and 
ambassador to Moscow (Gamova, 2007). Reportedly, Putin had recommended Pasat to 
Chubais (Kolesnikov, 2008, p.64). Following the deal, Pasat was arrested on arrival in 
Moldova and convicted in January 2006 (Solov'ev and Popov, 2007). Chubais followed up 
with a campaign against Voronin, targeting Moldova’s relations with EU governments 
(RFE/RL, 2006f; Kolesnikov, 2008, p.66-68). Whether a tool of the Russian government 
or not, Chubais assumed a foreign policy role. 
Inter RAO and the Moldovan government were now in co flict on all fronts. In November 
2005, Inter RAO cut electricity supplies from Moldova GRES to right-bank Moldova after 
Moldova refused to accept a price increase (Kiselev and Panfilova, 2005). Moldova 
imported electricity from Ukraine (Embassy Chisinau, 2007). The Moldovan government 
outlawed the transport of electricity from Moldova GRES to Romania, on account of the 
dilapidated state of the Moldovan grid (Gorelov, 2007a). The prospect of making a profit 
from Moldova GRES disappeared. RAO Nordic then sold 49 percent of Moldova GRES to 
an unknown offshore company, FREECOM, for 38 million US$ (Grishkovets, 2008a). In 




of the Moldovan grid (Gamova and Krashakov, 2006; RFE/RL, 2006f), offering Gazprom 
instead a controlling stake in the national power grid in exchange for lower gas prices until 
the end of 2009 (Reznik and Egorova, 2006b).  
Gazprom declined non-gas equity (Grib and Dar'in, 2006). The pressure worked, and in 
return for a discounted gas price from April to and i cluding July 2006, the Moldovan 
government withdrew its demand for a review of the privatisation deals in Transnistria 
(Reznik and Egorova, 2006b; Solov'ev, V., 2006), and Inter RAO retained its 51 percent 
share in Moldova GRES.  
In July 2007, the presidents of Russia and Moldova agreed on a compromise in the 
electricity conflict. It included cooperation on electricity transit to Romania, possible 
future supplies to right-bank Moldova (Embassy Chisinau, 2007) and Pasat’s release from 
prison (Gamova, 2007).  
3.7.4  Georgia 
When Inter RAO in mid-2003 acquired power generation and distribution assets in Georgia 
and Armenia, it was a major breakthrough for the company in the South Caucasus. The 
lack of control with generation and transmission in Georgia had in 2002 hampered 
electricity exports to Turkey (Klasson, 2003). After privatisation in 1998, much of 
Georgia’s electricity generation and distribution was owned by the US-based AES 
Corporation (Gularidze, 2003a; 2003b; Siluyanova, 2004a). Non-payments, generally 
around 50-60 percent across the CIS (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007, p.1042), were a serious 
problem in Georgia.  
In spring 2003, AES pulled out. Two electricity plants, Tbilisi’s distribution grid, and 50 




2003). The subsequent deal with Inter RAO became known to the Georgian public in July 
2003, four months before the general elections (Sikamova and Efimov, 2003; Siluyanova, 
2003a). The Georgian government and President Eduard Shevardnadze claimed not to have 
been informed of the deal beforehand (Bekker, 2003). This seems unlikely in the light of 
AES’s longstanding problems. Chubais and Rappoport jus ified the investment, and 
downplayed the commercial significance of the Turkish market (Bekker, 2003). The 
opposition made a point of the deal, criticising the government and forcing the resignation 
of Energy Minister Davit Mirtskhulava (Vignanskii, 2003). After the November Rose 
Revolution, Mirtskhulava was arrested and convicted (Civil.ge, 2004). When Ilya Kutidze, 
RAO UES’s representative in Georgia, was interrogated as well, Rappoport pressured the 
Georgian government to stop interrogations by instituting a sudden blackout (Berger and 
Proskurnina, 2008, p.213-214). 
Inter RAO paid 25 million US$ for the Georgian electricity assets (Siluyanova, 2004a), 
and acquired accumulated non-payments as outstanding debt. AES had recorded a 129 
million US$ net loss in the second quarter of 2003 (Civil.ge, 2003c). The Georgian 
government now committed to a debt payment schedule (Bekker, 2003). Following the 
Rose Revolution, the new government and RAO UES developed normal working relations, 
reflecting the extent of Georgia’s dependence on Inter RAO for electricity. 
Inter RAO and AES concluded the deal through subsidiaries based abroad and Inter RAO 
had used RAO Nordic, which operated in the Nordic electricity market. There was 
therefore no obligation to inform Inter RAO’s Board ahead of the deal. The minority 
shareholder, Rosenergoatom, and RAO UES appear to have disagreed on the need for 




investment vehicle also allowed money earned abroad t  stay abroad, avoiding Russian 
taxation. 
Chubais later complained of a lack of support from the Russian embassy in Tbilisi (Berger 
and Proskurnina, 2008, p.213). Information on its expansion had very likely passed from 
Chubais to Putin in advance, to secure presidential approval (Gotova, 2003; Kornysheva, 
2003; Siluyanova, 2003a). This was necessary for any Russian state-owned company 
branching out into a neighbouring state. It was more important to use informal mechanisms 
of participation in foreign operations, going straight to the president, than to ensure formal 
institutional oversight within RAO UES and the hierarchy of state organisations.  
3.7.5  Armenia 
Far less controversy surrounded Inter RAO’s expansion in Armenia. The Armenian 
electricity sector had a tariff collection rate of 60–80 percent (Kaiser, 2000, p.464; Anex, 
2002, p.404). The Armenian nuclear power station, Metsamor, had incurred debts for 
nuclear fuel supplied after 1995. Russia in 2001 proposed an exchange of Armenia’s 40 
million US$ debt for stakes in Armenia’s nuclear and electricity sectors, and cooperation 
on electricity exports to Iran (Polyanskii, 2001). Armenia swapped surplus electricity from 
Metsamor for Iranian gas on a seasonal basis (Anex, 2002, p.403). 
In early 2003, Russia and Armenia reached a deal, lding to equity transfers beginning in 
July. In the first swap, Inter RAO assumed control of the Hrazdan16 hydropower plants 
(Hakobyan, 2003; Kravchenko, 2003a). In the second swap, Metsamor’s management 
rights were transferred to Inter RAO on a five-year renewable basis. TVEL, Metsamor’s 
creditor, could not own equity outside Russia (Hakobyan, 2003; Kravchenko, 2003a). 
                                                          




According to RAO UES’s management, Inter RAO would not have acquired control of 
Metsamor without having Rosenergoatom as a minority shareholder (Egorova, 2006a). The 
arrangement was extended for five more years in 2008 (WNA, 2010) and ended in 2012 
(ARKA News Agency, 2012b; 2012a). 
RAO UES had been expected to win the privatization tender for the Armenian power grid 
in 2002, but it went to Midland Resources Holding, a British company run by two Russian 
expats (Urikhanyan, 2001). In early 2005, Inter RAO acquired the grid all the same, paying 
Midland 73 million US$ for a 99-year lease (Movsesyan, 2005; Zhelenin, 2005). Ideas of 
expanding the electricity and gas trade with Iran surfaced regularly in Armenia. Inter 
RAO’s acquisitions gave Russia a lever in this relationship. By 2005, Inter RAO controlled 
around 80 percent of Armenia’s electricity sector (Siluyanova, 2005b). The deal between 
Inter RAO and Midland attracted criticism for having been carried out without the 
Armenian government’s approval (Gordienko and Orlova, 2005). The Armenian 
Commission for Regulation of Public Services demanded clarifications from the National 
Grid Company about Inter RAO’s lease, but the matter was later dropped (Gordienko and 
Orlova, 2005). Armenia was politically close to Russia and attracted few alternative 
investors. 
3.7.6  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
In Azerbaijan, Inter RAO had tried several times to acquire a stake in transmission on the 
Absheron peninsula, which included Baku (cf. Mirkadyrov and Gordienko, 2004; Kjærnet, 
2007; Sabonis-Helf, 2007b). In 2005, Russia and Azerbaijan started trading electricity 
(Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Within the framework of the North-South transport corridor, Russia, 




2006. By 2009, plans were in place to expand trilateral cooperation between Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Iran (Inter RAO, 2010b, p.12).  
RAO UES began negotiating with Kazakhstan in 1995 on a restructuring package for 
Kazakhstan’s electricity debt to RAO UES (Stalker, 1995b), which stood at 419 million 
US$ by the end of 1998 (RAO UES, 1999). In January 2000, the prime ministers agreed on 
a debt-for-equity swap in principle (Pulina, 2000). Agreeing on content was more difficult. 
A detailed deal was reached in September 2004, and the swap took place in 2005 (Gleason, 
2004). Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko and President Putin both played an 
important role in finalising the swap to the benefit o  RAO UES (Berger and Proskurnina, 
2008, p.215-217). Under the final deal, Kazakhstan and RAO UES formed a 50/50 joint 
venture (JV) for ownership of the Ekibastuz-2 coal-fired power plant, which was already 
exporting electricity to Russia (Gleason, 2004). The Russian-controlled company Access 
Industries was trusted with the management of Kazakhst n’s share (Aleksandrov and 
Cherkesova, 2007). In 2007, the Kazakhstani corporation for management of government 
property, Samruk-Kazyna, challenged the deal with Access Industries and a number of 
other deals (Bol'shakov and Ishmukhammetov, 2007). Inter RAO’s share of Ekibastuz-2 
seemed to be in danger of takeover, though this did not happen (Aleksandrov and 
Cherkesova, 2007).  
In 2003, negotiations started on a debt-for-equity swap involving Tajikistan’s debts to 
Russia (Inter RAO, 2008b). The final package strengthened Russia’s military and strategic 
presence in Tajikistan, but also included two billion US$ of Russian investments in 




from the Soviet period, was included in the deal, possibly a result of Chubais’s and 
Rappoport’s respective efforts (Gorelov, 2008a).  
By July 2004, RAO UES/Inter RAO was set to receive a 51 percent share of Sangtuda-1 to 
settle 50 million US$ of Tajikistan’s debt, while also undertaking a 50 million US$ 
investment obligation (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.226). From August, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan exported electricity by swaps to Kazakhstan and Russia in anticipation of a 
final agreement. In September, however, Tajikistan’s President Imomali Rakhmon 
declared that Iran was joining Sangtuda-1 with 250 million US$, thereby jeopardising the 
Russian–Tajik deal. The deal was settled in a last-minute call between Rakhmon and Putin 
(Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.226). In the final deal, the Russian side undertook to 
invest 200 million US$ at Sangtuda-1, while the 50 million US$ debt settlement was 
retained (Glumskov and Grib, 2004). The Russian share of Sangtuda-1 was set at 75 
percent (Litvinov, 2004). The Russian government guaranteed Inter RAO’s investments in 
the project, emphasising the state’s involvement in the deal (Libman and Kheifets, 2007, 
p.22). Construction on Sangtuda-1 recommenced in 2005, and the first part of the power 
plant opened in January 2008 (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.218-226).  
3.8  Implementing the ‘liberal empire’ 
Chubais and Rappoport supervised Inter RAO less after 2005, but both remained in close 
contact with the business, particularly Rappoport. He managed some aspects of Inter 
RAO’s operations in direct subordination to Chubais (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, 
p.211-217; 218-222). Electricity exports and import deals remained his responsibility 
(RAO UES, 2003; Grib et al., 2006). The formal institutional framework for cross-border 




to assume day-to-day responsibilities was based on personal trust. This kept 
Rosenergoatom away from cross-border trade. The head of Inter RAO, Dod, managed the 
routine affairs but kept a low profile. He may have b en close to Igor Sechin, but was 
clearly less close to Chubais (The Moscow Times, 2009b). Rappoport, on the other hand, 
was not close to Sechin (Mazneva, 2008b). Chubais wa involved in Inter RAO’s 
expansions and investments and overall business strategy up to 2008. As senior manager, 
he also took charge of the political side of Inter RAO’s business. Chubais’s network 
ensured government support for Inter RAO operations.  
There was little state interference in Inter RAO’s development before late 2006, when 
discussions began on the question of Inter RAO’s ownership after RAO UES reform. 
According to Theresa Sabonis-Helf, Inter RAO was created ‘so that foreign generation 
holdings of RAO-UES will not be affected by the electricity reform currently under way in 
Russia’ (2007b, p.430-431). This was also flagged in the Russian press to explain why 
Inter RAO’s expansion occurred so close to RAO UES’s planned dissolution (Gotova, 
2003; Sikamova and Efimov, 2003; Khrennikov, 2006).17 The purpose of Inter RAO was 
sometimes seen as ensuring that RAO UES’s top management, not least Rappoport, 
retained their lucrative positions in the future. This supposition was not baseless, as I show 
below.  
Inter RAO’s expansion also enabled the Russian state to retain its influence in the post-
Soviet electricity sector. This was profitable (Perovic, 2006, p.96). Chubais and other 
management representatives were always careful to point out that investments were made 
on a commercial, not a political motive. Rappoport at one point denied that Inter RAO’s 
                                                          




Board had even discussed the political implications f the South Caucasus investments 
(Siluyanova, 2004b). According to one source, the qu stion of commercial gains from 
post-Soviet expansion was raised by RAO UES’s board, but brushed aside by the 
chairman, Voloshin (Siluyanova, 2005a). Chubais clearly saw Inter RAO as fulfilling a 
geopolitical mission in its South Caucasus acquisitions, and indicated that the investments 
in Georgia and Armenia were made in cooperation with the Kremlin (Egorova, 2005). 
Using informal contacts to cut across the formal institutional framework was essential to 
preserve Putin’s support. This applied even as RAO UES was formally authorised to make 
the decision. The balance between formal and informal channels of access and 
participation was tilted towards the informal. Representatives of the state repeatedly 
viewed Inter RAO expansion in light of foreign policy. This occasioned worries around the 
question of ‘to whom they will belong after restruct ring, and how much has been paid for 
them’, in the words of one government source in late 2003 (Egorova et al., 2003).  
3.9  The end of the monopoly 
Chubais remained an independent state company leader, and critic of Putin. While Russian 
business leaders generally took Khodorkovskii’s arrest in October 2003 as a signal to keep 
quiet (p.170), Chubais went much further in his criticism than anyone else (Vardul', 2003; 
Kommersant-Vlast', 2005), especially during Putin’s second term (Derbilova and 
Panyushkin, 2007). At this point, RAO UES had become a ‘refuge’ for Yeltsin-era liberals 
(Wengle, 2012, p.449). After Putin’s pre-election speech in Luzhniki stadium in November 
2007, when he invoked the image of domestic and foreign enemies, ‘oligarchs’ in 
particular, Chubais replied by calling Medvedev the b tter choice for president and 
criticised Putin for ‘spitting on his predecessors’ (Latukhina, 2007). After this incident, 




The RAO UES reform progressed as planned, however. Chubais seemed to have an 
informal guarantee of RAO UES’s autonomy and overall support for the reform, giving 
him a carte blanche in implementation. By 2006–7, Putin and Chubais disagreed about 
most things, including electricity reform, though the former was not inclined to interfere 
(Kolesnikov, 2008, p.264). Chubais was supported by the liberals in Putin’s government 
(Wengle, 2012, p.449). Voloshin was another effectiv  advocate of reform (Gazeta, 2003, 
Gorelov, 2003; Smirnov, K., 2004). The reform attrac ed investment, enabling Russia to 
escape an impending power generation capacity shortfall (Derbilova et al., 2012) and 
increasing the sector’s value ahead of privatisation (Wengle, 2012, p.451). It also increased 
the state’s capacity in the sector by establishing fu ctioning market mechanisms (Wengle, 
2012, p.436-437). Stalling the reform would have brought back the old problem of a sector 
beyond state control. The electricity reform, like the reform of Rosatom (ch.4), restored 
state capacity in a previously insulated sector and ma e it governable. But it was different 
from the latter reform, and indeed from the general tendency of state organisations in 
Putin’s first and second presidential periods, in co sisting of the dissolution of a monopoly 
and the privatisation of state property (cf. Vin'kov, 2008). The process undercut the power 
of regional governors, which served Putin’s centralising project well (Wengle, 2012, 
p.451-452).  
RAO UES was dissolved on 19 June 2008. The establishment of a competitive electricity 
market depended on the implementation of key elements in the coming months. With RAO 
UES gone, and Chubais ensconced in another company, the process slowed down 
somewhat (Skyner, 2010; Solanko, 2014). In 2012, one key market participant called the 
reform incomplete (Dokukina, 2012). It seems that Chubais had lost some of his influence 




a consequence of the reform design, which vested th Energy Ministry with considerable 
regulatory power after RAO UES’s dissolution (Derbilova et al., 2012). Chubais then lost 
formal and informal influence over key appointments. Other members of his team also lost 
their positions. The same happened to both Rappoport (Medvedeva, 2007a; Mazneva, 
2008b) and Voloshin (Kommersant, 2008b). Yurii Udaltsov, another key RAO UES 
manager, was relegated to the government’s expert group on electricity reform (Dokukina, 
2012). Crucial new organisations like the Market Council, the state organisation 
responsible for monitoring prices, were headed by people closer to Sechin and the Kremlin 
(Vedomosti, 2008; Skyner, 2010, p.1399-1400). The Market Council later introduced caps 
on wholesale prices. As Chubais commented in 2012, the Energy Ministry was not up to 
the task of putting its regulatory powers to use (Derbilova et al., 2012). The Energy 
Ministry had been strengthened, and formal institutions became more important in 
interactions within the elite, but there were limits. When faced with demands by members 
of the ruling coalition, the Energy Ministry was overruled.  
3.10  Inter RAO comes into its own 
During the electricity reform, state representatives and Inter RAO’s agreed on the priority 
of keeping Inter RAO’s assets in one company and protecting the de facto export-import 
monopoly. To Chubais, it was essential to maintain Inter RAO’s monopoly until 
neighbouring, post-Soviet markets developed to a level where they could reliably predict 
electricity demand (Gaidar and Chubais, 2008, p.141)   
State representatives connected the state ownership of Inter RAO to post-Soviet influence. 
In 2007, a representative of the Industry and Energy Ministry commented on a possible 





It’s a strategic stake. As the company sells electricity abroad, it influences 
the policies of many states, above all in the CIS. (Medvedeva, 2007b)  
 
Another government source called Inter RAO a ‘knife switch’18 and a ‘serious argument in 
dialogues with neighbouring states’ (Egorova, 2006b).  
The legal status of the foreign trade monopoly remained unclear. According to the 
electricity reform legislation, there was no monopoly on foreign trade. It was regulated like 
trade in general (Federal Law No 35, 2003). RAO UES’s trade monopoly was a practical 
consequence of its domestic transmission monopoly. The grid would remain a state 
monopoly post reform. But access to it, and thereby to foreign trade, would be open to 
market participants (Federal Law No 35, 2003, para.30-31). In 2006, the Audit Chamber 
highlighted the absence of a legal basis for the transfer of foreign trade from RAO UES to 
Inter RAO (Gorelov, 2006; Medvedeva, 2006). Rappoport’s dual role in charge of foreign 
trade at RAO UES and as Board Chairman of Inter RAO occasioned doubts on whether 
RAO UES had formally granted Inter RAO a foreign trade monopoly, or simply informally 
allowed it to effectuate such trade. The latter was indirectly confirmed when the 
effectuation of foreign trade upon RAO UES’s dissoluti n automatically passed not to 
Inter RAO, but to the Federal Grid Company (FSK) (Gorelov, 2008c). In 2006 things were 
left as they were. Informal political support for RAO UES’s management preserved the 
monopoly. The state’s increasing control of the energy sector during Putin’s second term 
reinforced this support. To both state representatives and market participants, foreign trade 
was relatively insignificant and based anyway on log-term contracts. After RAO UES’s 
                                                          




dissolution, there was still a lack of detail in formal regulatory framework for cross-border 
electricity trade (Gorelov, 2008c). Inter RAO continued in a monopoly position due to its 
market share. 
By 2006, everyone agreed that Inter RAO would remain in state hands, but the details of 
the ownership structure were subject to intense negotiation. Throughout 2006 and 2007, 
Inter RAO’s pre-reform management, with Chubais’s support, sought the RAO UES 
Board’s approval for a management stock option (Gorelov, 2007b). They first demanded a 
15 percent stake in Inter RAO’s ordinary shares, which would reduce the state’s stake. A 
second demand was for 9.9 percent (Gorelov, 2007b). In the end, the management was 
awarded one-off bonuses and no ownership (Gorelov, 2007b). The struggle revealed the 
hostility of state representatives, especially Rosatom representatives, to the current 
management as future minority owners of Inter RAO.  
In 2006, Chubais preferred a 100 percent sale to Gazprom (Grib and Kornysheva, 2006). 
Rosenergoatom naturally preferred a 100 percent transfer to Rosatom (Grib and 
Kornysheva, 2006). In May 2007, Chubais advised Putin to retain Inter RAO’s pre-reform 
management, but spoke to deaf ears (Gorelov, 2007b). Only in late 2007 was an 
unequivocal decision taken to let Rosatom become a majority shareholder in Inter RAO 
(Medvedeva, 2007a). On Chubais’s advice, Inter RAO was then reorganised as an open-
stock shareholding company, and received some of Russia’s most modern generation 
technology (Gorelov, 2007b; OAO Inter RAO, 2008; Dzaguto, 2010c). The new company 
was transferred to Rosatom.  
As Rosatom’s subsidiary, Inter RAO was subject to mre direct state control. Both the 




RAO for RusGidro, the hydropower company, in Novembr 2009. The new young 
Director General, Boris Kovalchuk, came from Rosatom and had experience from Dmitrii 
Medvedev’s team (Inter RAO, 2009e; The Moscow Times, 2009b). He was also the son of 
the well-known businessman Yurii Kovalchuk, Board Chairman of the Rossiya Bank, and 
a friend of Putin’s. Energy Minister Shmatko was on the Board in 2008–11, though it was 
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Rosneft Board Chairman Sechin (Grishkovets et al., 
2008b). Inter RAO’s Board was no longer small and relatively insignificant. In 2008–11, 
its eleven members represented diverse state, state-con rolled and private interests (Inter 
RAO, 2009d). Sechin used his position as Board Chairman to expand the state’s influence 
in the energy sector (Fialko et al., 2010). The rol, and interests, of minority shareholders 
diminished (Grishkovets, 2008c; 2009).  
3.11  Inter RAO Group 
In 2011, Inter RAO Group, as it was now known, integrated vertically through acquisitions 
in retail electricity supply and power engineering. A leaner RAO UES-like structure was 
the result, with the crucial exception of the electricity grids (Fialko et al., 2010; Ispolatov, 
2010a; 2010b). The acquisitions were financed by a private placement with the Russian 
state, Russian state energy companies and private investors, increasing Inter RAO’s capital 
stock threefold. Rosneft, RusGidro and Norilsk Nikel b came shareholders (Inter RAO, 
2011c). The reduction in direct state ownership opened for ownership by state-owned 
companies and companies that supported the regime (Ispolatov, 2010a; Dzaguto and 
Grishkovets, 2011; Inter RAO, 2011d; 2011a). Inter RAO became the third-largest 
electricity company in Russia, controlling 10 percent of power generation (Solanko, 2014, 
p.135). With Rosatom, RusGidro and GazpromEnergo, the s ate now controlled over half 




In 2011, Sechin and Shmatko left the Board, following President Medvedev’s decree to 
reduce government representation on Russian company boards (Sterkin and Mazneva, 
2011). Sechin, president of Rosneft from 2012, returned as Board Chairman in mid-2013 
(Inter RAO, 2014, p.96). In late 2013, Rosneftegaz, the state’s holding company for the oil 
and gas sector, headed by Sechin, acquired Rosatom’s stake in Inter RAO (Inter RAO, 
2014, p.131). 
Regime control with Inter RAO increased from 2011. Its management participated in 
official delegations to India, and opened offices in Cuba and Abu Dhabi (Inter RAO, 
2011b). There were investments in Laos (Skorlygina and Dzaguto, 2012). A new 
expansion plan for Latin America and Asian states, several of which had notoriously 
unprofitable electricity sectors, indicated that foreign policy considerations weighed more 
than commercial opportunities (Grishkovets, 2008c; Kommersant, 2009; Inter RAO, 
2010c). Electricity exports to China were renewed and considerably expanded 
(Bogomolova, 2009; Dzaguto and Grishkovets, 2009; Inter RAO, 2011d, p.76; 
Vostochnaya energeticheskaya kompaniya, 2014). Inter RAO became an instrument of 
foreign policy outside the post-Soviet region.  
The days of a complete foreign trade monopoly ended (Grishkovets, 2010b). TGK-1, 
owned by Gazprom and Fortum, and ENEL’s electricity subsidiary, Rusenergosbyt, 
pursued a limited cross-border electricity trade in 2011 (TGK-1, 2012, p.33; Vasil'ev, 
2012, p.61), but Inter RAO remained the dominant exporter (TGK-1, 2012, p.33).  
3.12  The post-Soviet region: Ubiquitous Inter RAO 
To fuel further expansion and reap the benefits of a dominant position in foreign trade, 




equal priorities on growth within Russia and without Russia (Inter RAO, 2010b, p.50; 
2011d, p.63). The 2009 business strategy prioritised reliable service in Russia at the 
expense of synchronisation with neighbours (Inter RAO, 2010b, p.50). However, by 2010, 
the goal of integrating electricity markets and open up for transnational trade was back 
(Inter RAO, 2011d, p.64). Foreign operations continued to expand.  
Inter RAO’s expansion in Georgia continued in 2009. The Inguri hydropower plant 
straddled the boundary between the Zugdidi region and Abkhazia, with Abkhazian control 
of operations. Overall management in the 1990s and 2000s was the only point of 
cooperation between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian authorities. Inguri was 
the largest hydropower plant in the South Caucasus, pplying electricity to Georgia, 
Abkhazia, and Sochi in Russia. After the 2008 Russian–Georgian war, the Abkhazian 
authorities took issue with this state of affairs (Kevorkova, 2008; Simonyan, 2008c). They 
planned to privatise the management rights for Inguri in return for modernisation and 
repairs. The Georgian government promptly resumed its plans for the privatisation of 
Inguri and some smaller hydropower plants. Its aim was to encourage the Azerbaijani 
company, Azerenerji, to tender a bid (Simonyan, 2008b). Abkhazia’s authorities 
meanwhile pursued contact with Inter RAO (Kevorkova, 2008; Simonyan, 2008a). To their 
surprise, Inter RAO then agreed with the Georgian government on a joint management 
arrangement for the plant (Grishkovets et al., 2009; Simonyan, 2009). Dod sought 
Abkhazia’s approval of the deal (Gordienko, 2009). The Georgian government saw Inter 
RAO as more reliable than the Abkhazian authorities (Embassy Tbilisi, 2009). The 
agreement was controversial in Georgia. Saakashvili’s government argued Inter RAO’s 
case against considerable opposition (Simonyan, 2009; The Moscow Times, 2009a). Inter 




avoided interruptions during the war (Embassy Tbilisi, 2009). Inter RAO also carefully 
avoided taking excessive political risks, causing it to turn down an offer of Russia’s 50 
percent stake in the company GruzRosEnergo that controlled grids in parts of Russia, 
Georgia and Abkhazia (Dzaguto and Grishkovets, 2011). The stake was eventually 
transferred to FSK. 
Inter RAO’s operations in Armenia changed less, but were used as tools to shape energy 
relations with Iran (pp.272-3). Seventy percent of Armenia’s electricity exports went to 
Iran in 2010 (Oganesyan, L., 2009; Polyakova, 2010). 
Relations with Ukraine stalled. Ukraine’s share of Russian electricity import fell from 27.9 
percent in 2005 to 0.2 percent in 2009 (Inter RAO, 2006; 2010a). By 2008, Ukraine 
received 5 percent of Russia’s exports (Inter RAO, 2009c, p.68). Relations with Belarus 
also deteriorated. In 2010, Belarus tried to increase electricity transit tariffs to pressure 
Russia in the oil transit dispute (p.222) (Grishkovets, 2010a), though the transit volumes 
were too small for the ploy to yield any result. Asthe dispute unfolded and Belarus faced 
liquidity problems, electricity relations worsened. Belarus’s debts accumulated. In 2011, 
Inter RAO disconnected Belarus (Dzaguto et al., 2011). Exports resumed only when 
President Medvedev intervened, in what appeared to be a political signal conveyed by Inter 
RAO (Grishkovets, 2011).  
In July 2008, Inter RAO again consolidated complete control of Moldova GRES in a 63 
million US$ deal with FREECOM, leaving its owners with 125 million US$ for its two-
and-a-half-year-long ownership (Embassy Chisinau, 2008; Grishkovets, 2008a). A 
Hungarian company, EMFESZ, belonging to the Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash, 




2008a; Peretolchina, 2008). From 2009, Moldova again had Moldova GRES supply 
following problems with Ukrainian suppliers (Grishkovets et al., 2008a).  
In Kazakhstan, the package deal between from 2004 also included plans to expand the 
Ekibastuz-2 thermal power plant with two new units. In late 2009, financing for one of 
them was included in the credit line Russia opened for Kazakhstan during the financial 
crisis. The financial package from Vneshekonombank was finalised in 2010 (Inter RAO, 
2009b; Granik, 2010; Gabuev and Konstantinov, 2011) and construction work started in 
2011 (Inter RAO, 2014, p.84). Also in 2010, Inter RAO came close to acquiring 50 percent 
of Ekibastuz-1 (Bol'shakov and Ishmukhammetov, 2007). Instead, however, Kazakhstan 
strengthened state ownership in the electricity sector (Grishkovets and Dzaguto, 2009; 
Mazneva, 2010).  
In Tajikistan, Sangtuda-1 was completed in 2009 and opened by the two presidents (Inter 
RAO, 2009g). The Russian government now owned 83.5 percent of Sangtuda-1: 66.4 
percent directly, 14.9 through FSK, and 2.24 percent through Inter RAO (Dzaguto, 2009a). 
Inter RAO planned a shares issue to take over some of the government shares (Inter RAO, 
2009a), but this did not happen. Tajikistan quickly ran up electricity debts to Sangtuda. 
Exporting to Russia through swaps was proposed as a means of debt recovery (Dzaguto, 
2009b). In August 2011 Sangtuda started exporting to Afghanistan.  
Inter RAO’s success at Sangtuda-1 opened up other possibilities for the company. Rogun, 
a much larger unfinished Soviet project, was also included in the 2004 deal, but with the 
Russian aluminium company RusAl as Russian partner (Ma at, 2010). By 2007, RusAl and 
Tajikistan’s government disagreed over Rogun. Tajikistan abrogated the agreement (Marat, 




Rogun project, implying the participation of RAO UES/Inter RAO (Solov'ev and 
Grishkovets, 2008). This was approved by all parties, yet there was no progress in the 
negotiations. Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Presidential Administration, took part in the 
negotiations (Gorelov, 2008a; Panfilova, 2008b). The ajik government tried to attract Iran 
and Pakistan to join the project, to no avail (Grishkovets, 2008b). The government 
broached other possibilities, such as an internatiol consortium with Russian 
participation. But neither RAO UES/Inter RAO nor the Presidential Administration would 
go along with less than half of Rogun if Russia were to finance the project. A minority 
stake was unacceptable to Tajikistan (Grishkovets and Ravinskii, 2008; Grishkovets and 
Solov'ev, 2008). By now, bilateral relations were complicated further by the economic 
crisis (Gabuev, 2009; Panfilova, 2009a). The Tajik government proceeded without Russian 
participation (Marat, 2008b; 2010).  
In Kyrgyzstan, the 2005 Tulip Revolution delayed the expansion of Kambar-Ata HPP, in 
which Chubais had declared a RAO UES interest the year before. The tender for Kambar-
Ata 1 came in 2007, while Kyrgyzstan would complete Kambar-Ata 2 on its own 
(Panfilova, 2008a). Kazakhstan participated in the Kambar-Ata 1 tender (Zhelenin, 2007b). 
Russia’s bid succeeded, and Inter RAO proceeded jointly with a Kyrgyz counterparty in 
June 2009 (Inter RAO, 2009f). Riots and regime change i  2010 further delayed Kambar-
Ata 1, but also put Kambar-Ata 2 back into the contest. Cost estimates then stood at 1.7–3 
billion US$, to be financed by Russian credits (Gabuev and Karabekov, 2011; Panfilova, 
2011).  
In 2010, Russia was invited to participate in the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-




construct high-voltage lines from Central Asia to Peshawar in Pakistan. Inter RAO 
proposed supplies from Kambar-Ata 1 and Rogun (Dzaguto, 2010d). Russia later offered 
500 million US$ in project funding in return for Inter RAO control of the line (Dzaguto, 
2011d). 
3.13  Conclusions 
The Russian electricity monopoly emerged unreformed from the Soviet period. By 1993, 
RAO UES was a semi-reformed holding company under nomi al state control. It had little 
control of regional power companies, while informal rent streams were siphoned off at 
every level. The Russian state did not have, and appears not to have sought, full regulatory 
access to the electricity system beyond perfunctory f rmal meetings. RAO UES did not 
participate in institutional development and policymaking, and there was little of either. In 
terms of the structure of interaction, the electricity industry had extensive autonomy. 
As the formal channels of access and participation atrophied, the state was left 
incapacitated and fragmented. Informal access and prtici ation dominated state–company 
interaction, the basis of which was an exchange of mutual support and rent sharing 
between regional and industrial elites and the ruling coalition. This preserved elite stability, 
especially in the regions, where elites constituted s lect circles of claimants. Wider rent 
sharing in the form of cheap electricity and non-payments stabilised society. It also 
cultivated dependence on the state, but in particular on Yeltsin’s ruling coalition.  
While the trade in electricity in the post-Soviet rgion waned rapidly, barter, soft payment 
constraints, and informal channels of participation and rent sharing entered post-Soviet 
electricity trade, too. In this way, dependence on Russia was cultivated also among post-




interminably, and customer relations in the post-Soviet states translated into hard 
constraints and real payment terms after the 1998 financial crisis. This was subsequently 
also the case with domestic customers.  
When Chubais took over at RAO UES in 1998, structural reform was long overdue. The 
reform was prepared during Yeltsin’s second president al period and pushed through in the 
early years of Putin’s first. It was a political project aimed at increasing state capacity and 
creating electricity markets. The state gained realgulatory powers and real, formalised 
access to the electricity industry. Regional authori ies and sector insiders were 
marginalised. Arrears and debts were cleared. While formal channels were used to boost 
state capacity in this way, Chubais and his team coplemented them with informal 
channels of access and participation to achieve results. At the highest level, Putin 
supported both reform and foreign operations. On this point, RAO UES as a case differs 
from the other state-owned companies studied here. The state reduced its direct 
engagement in electricity and increased its indirect gulatory powers through market 
institutions. To the extent that the reform gave companies almost free access to electricity 
markets in substantial parts of the country, the state now had far greater capacity to support 
complex economic organisations (p.9). For the state, electricity reform was also a process 
that resulted in an indirect relationship, structured through market regulation, with the 
electricity industry. State organisations became more specialised, with a clearer delineation 
between policymaking and administrative functions. This extended to ownership, which in 
the electricity sector was now more specialised, also mong state companies. But while 
markets and companies were now further removed fromthe state’s reach, the state retained 




While Inter RAO passed to Rosatom in the course of the reform, it also came into the orbit 
of the regime through the involvement of Sechin, and most likely also Kovalchuk. The 
later reform stages, after the dissolution of RAO UES and the foundation of a wholesale 
market for electricity, progressed only slowly and partially. When Chubais in 2012 
commented on the Energy Ministry’s weakness in putting its regulatory powers to use, it 
illustrates precisely the type of regime influence that was exercised through the state-
owned majors in the electricity sector after 2010. The reform enabled the state to exert 
property rights, and thereby empowered the regime. Th re were indications that the post-
reform institutional framework, part of a now more mature social order, came into conflict 
with the privileges of the ruling coalition. 
The electricity switch was used as a tool at an early stage to recover post-Soviet electricity 
debts. With a subsidiary for cross-border electricity trade, Inter RAO, RAO UES’s 
management ensured that foreign operations continued relatively unaffected by reform. 
Inter RAO expanded, partly shielded from formal hierarchies within and without RAO 
UES. Informality and personal trust were at the heart of the company’s operations until 
well into 2006. Informality seems to have enabled a sh ring of electricity rents with host 
country businessmen, most conspicuously in Moldova. When Inter RAO survived intact in 
the post-reform era, it was because it was a tool of the state in the post-Soviet region. 
While RAO UES no longer existed and cultivated dependence on the state at home, Inter 
RAO maintained these functions abroad. It maintained d pendence on Russia in the post-
Soviet electricity sector, by virtue of its ubiquitous role in enabling electricity development 
across the region. Dependence was sometimes used to coerce, with Inter RAO being the 
carrot and enabler to Gazprom’s stick, as I will show in chapter seven. Inter RAO seemed 




direct its rents at foreign policy goals to invest in distant electricity sectors of variable 
commercial merit. It became a tool of a regime-led foreign policy towards Asia and Latin 
America. Institutional changes at home had made it more, not less, accessible to the state 





4. NUCLEAR ENERGY: ROSATOM 
The study of the electricity sector in Chapter 3 showed how informal rent sharing and 
informal institutions in the 1990s continued into the post-Soviet region. Formal rent 
sharing, and formal institutional change towards indirect management by the state in the 
2000s also extended into the post-Soviet region. There, increased Russian state capacity in 
the electricity sector maintained dependence on Russia. In the nuclear energy industry, too, 
the Russian state and companies in the industry interacted over foreign policy and foreign 
operations to the extent that they participated in institutional development at home. 
Crucially for foreign operations, post-Soviet nuclear development remained dependent on 
Russia. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan, nuclear energy industry development depended on 
access to Russian technology and infrastructure. 
Rosatom is a holding company for the Russian nuclear energy industry. Table 4.1 lists 
Rosatom’s predecessors. Rosatom’s civilian side, the nuclear energy industry, comprises 
several companies united under Atomenergoprom, a subsidiary holding company.19 The 
Rosatom subsidiaries relevant to this study are those involved in the nuclear fuel cycle20 
and nuclear power plant (NPP) construction in the post-Soviet region: TVEL, ARMZ, 
Tekhsnabeksport and Atomstroieksport. The fuel company TVEL has 17 percent of the 
world nuclear energy market, producing and selling Russian-produced and designed fuel 
cells to many countries. The uranium holding ARMZ21 is one of the world’s five leading 
uranium mining companies and unites all of Rosatom’s uranium and raw materials assets. 
                                                          
19 Rosatom holds enterprises in the nuclear military complex directly. Nuclear construction was in 2011 
incorporated in the Atomenergomash holding. 
20 The nuclear fuel cycle refers to all the stages from uranium ore mining and extraction, processing into 
U3O8 (yellowcake), conversion to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), enrichment, fuel production and electricity 
generation to spent nuclear fuel which can be reprocessed (closed cycle) or stored as waste (open cycle).  





Tekhsnabeksport22 is the world’s largest exporter of uranium and uranium products, and 
holds a 40 percent share of the global market in enrichment services for fuel purposes 
(Atomstroyeksport, 2011a). Atomstroieksport is a leding supplier of nuclear power 
stations to the world market. In 2010, the nuclear energy industry contributed 78.4 percent 
of Rosatom’s turnover, and nuclear energy exports contributed approximately 29 percent 
(Dzaguto, 2011a). Table 4.3 lists Soviet and Russian-produced reactors in the post-Soviet 
region and beyond.23 
4.1  The break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet legacies 
Until 1986, the Soviet military and civilian nuclear industries belonged to Minsredmash, 
the Ministry for Medium Machine-Building (Cooper, 1991, p.7, 17; Perera, 1997, p.14-16; 
35-40). Following the Chernobyl disaster of May 1986, there were attempts to restructure 
the nuclear industry, but it remained overblown, inefficient, and unsafe (Kudrik et al., 
2004, p.25-26). When foreign trade was reorganised in 1988, the nuclear industry acquired 
control of official foreign trade in nuclear materials, conducted through Tekhsnabeksport 
(Tekhsnabeksport, 2014). In 1992, the Russian segments of the civilian nuclear industry 
were reconstituted by decree as the Nuclear Energy Ministry, Minatom (Decree No 61, 
1992). Minatom had ministerial policymaking, plannig and executive powers, with no 
clear delineation of military and civilian divisions of the nuclear sector (Decree No 61, 
1992; Bukharin, 1995). Minatom had little ability to design specific policies for the 
different parts of the nuclear industry. Enterprises involved in the nuclear fuel cycle 
formed specialised companies directly subordinate to Minatom. There, the personnel 
changed little from the Soviet period to around 2000. For example, the Minister for 
                                                          
22 Tekhsnabeksport operates as Tenex internationally.  
23 An overview of reactor types, including pressurized water reactors like the Russian VVER, is found at the 




Medium Machine-Building for 1986–89, Lev Ryabev, retu ned as first deputy minister in 
1993 and remained there until 2002. 
4.2  Keeping afloat and muddling through  
The new nuclear industry companies, including TVEL, ARMZ, Tekhsnabeksport and 
Atomstroieksport, evaded the disruptive privatisations of the early 1990s. Nuclear power 
plants would also remain in state hands (Palamarchuk et al., 2001, p.53). But from 1993, a 
select number of enterprises subordinate to Minatom c uld be partially privatised, apart 
from sensitive institutes and factories (Decree No 446, 1993). In this process, licensing 
requirements and state stakes or golden shares24 b nefited company directors and industry 
insiders (Kudrik et al., 2004, p.26; Jeppesen, 2006, p.20-25; Pappe and Drankina, 2007). 
TVEL and Atomredmetzoloto, state ‘concerns’ from 199  turned shareholding companies 
in 1992, were ripe for privatisation (Kadosov, 1992b; TVEL, 2014; Uranovyi kholding 
ARMZ, 2014).  
Privatisation could have started a process of differentiation of state and private 
organisations. The reality in the nuclear energy sector became instead a grey zone at the 
state’s fringes, with little access for central state organisations. Private gain and informal 
relations became the norm. Privatisation undermined th  hierarchy of state organisations, 
with the state incapable of establishing institutions to control and support private 
organisations. The boundaries between state and non-state were blurred from the 
beginning. 
                                                          
24 A golden share is a nominal share that gives an owner, often a government, direct influence over company 
development and an opportunity to outvote other owners on specific issues. It is an instrument associated 




In 1995, major banks and investors were allowed to accept shares as collateral for fresh 
loans to the Russian state. The arrangement (‘loans for shares’) allowed major 
businessmen to obtain a share of informal rent streams in state organisations, and later to 
acquire the companies when the state defaulted, as expected, on its debts. On the list of 
companies up for auction, one was a nuclear energy company, Tekhsnabeksport 
(Segodnya, 1995a). It may have been the result of eff rts by Oneksimbank, which 
belonged to Mikhail Prokhorov and Vladimir Potanin. The bank was also seen to be close 
to Chubais (Pelekhova, 1998b). After an auction withou  bidders, possibly due to 
Minatom’s effort to reverse the process (Pelekhova, 1998b), Tekhsnabeksport was placed 
on a list of strategic enterprises and withdrawn from further auctions (Segodnya, 1995b).  
Informal privatisation efforts proved more successful. The former Soviet nuclear energy 
industry minister (1989–91), Vitalii Konovalov, was central to the creation in 1991–2 of 
the company TVEL (Belyaninov, 2001). By 1996 there appeared to be a privately held 
TVEL Concern, duplicating the state-owned TVEL (Belyaninov, 2001). It positioned itself 
as the legal successor to the state-owned TVEL (Prosku yakov and Buran, 1994, p.51). 
TVEL was at this point being reorganised from a Minatom department into a joint-stock 
company (Decree No 166, 1996). It experienced severe cash-flow constraints (Perera, 
1997, p.115). The private company survived, and exported uranium, until Konovalov was 
forced to resign in September 2000 (Proskuryakov and Buran, 1994; Belyaninov, 2001; 
Osetinskaya and Shcherbakova, 2001). The TVEL Concern supplied Ukraine with nuclear 
fuel for several years, and informal rent streams were likely channelled to a diverse group 
of claimants, keeping the sector afloat. According to Konovalov and others, the situation 
arose in an effort to save nuclear fuel production fr m disintegration and foreign takeover 




investigated by the Public Prosecutor in the mid-1990s, but was never charged 
(Belyaninov, 2001). The Security Ministry, too, was unable to ascertain the full extent of 
the illegal trade in uranium in the early 1990s, according to then Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergei Stepashin (Belyaninov, 2001). Konovalov remained important in TVEL and within 
the industry also after his resignation (Belyaninov, 2001).  
The state’s lack of state control of the nuclear energy industry in the 1990s reflected the 
lack of state capacity. Minatom, like Minsredmash before it, was beyond state control and 
ruled by protective industry veterans. It survived on informal rent streams. Several 
subsidiaries, especially TVEL and Tekhsnabeksport, enjoyed considerable autonomy. 
There was a hierarchical relationship between ministry and enterprises, but little formal 
control. This was somewhat mitigated by the presence of company directors, i.e. of TVEL, 
on the Minatom collegium (Government Order No 775, 1992; Government Resolution No 
175, 1992 (1993)).  
The industry’s informal rent streams came from uranium sales. The Soviet Union officially 
entered the international uranium market in 1990. Scientists were then already engaged in 
an informal trade of nuclear material, often bartered in exchange for laboratory equipment. 
In 1991 and 1992, foreign trade relations multiplied, officially through Tekhsnabeksport, 
and unofficially through minor channels (Mikhailin, 1995). Foreign trade companies in the 
nuclear industry started doing deals outside the sector (Zotova, I., 1992; Kravchenko, 
1994). Due to the absolute nature of the non-proliferation regime, a state’s nuclear energy 
relations can come into doubt if there is suspicion of any grey areas in contacts with other 
states. This lack of state control became a foreign policy problem. Contact with Iran, 




hand in 1995, when Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov (1992–8) signed a protocol 
of intent with Teheran on a Russian-built Iranian ce trifuge plant for uranium enrichment 
(Orlov and Vinnikov, 2005, p.52). Neither the president nor the MFA (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) had been consulted. The protocol was quickly cancelled (Orlov and Vinnikov, 
2005, p.52). There followed an uncontrolled proliferation of contacts between the Russian 
nuclear industry under Mikhailov’s successor, Evgenii Adamov (1998–2001), and Iran 
(Stenin, 2005). Similar situations occurred with India, Syria and Libya (Khripunov, 2001, 
p.54).25  
The nuclear energy industry also pursued less risky partnerships with foreign agencies and 
companies, designed to keep the industry afloat (Serov, 1997; Yamshchikov et al., 1998; 
Kudrik et al., 2004). By 1994, non-payments and deferr d salary payments were a regular 
occurrence (Segodnya, 1994; Popov, A., 1995; Alieva, 1998). Foreign partnerships 
addressed nuclear safety and non-proliferation following the end of the Cold War, and 
directed funds towards trained personnel, to keep th m in their jobs and provide them with 
income. Programmes like the US-Russian Megatons to Megawatts26 saved the industry 
from collapse at a time when ‘people weren’t paid their wages’, as Mikhailov remarked 
(Perera, 1997, p.42; Koroleva, 2006). According to Konovalov, nuclear fuel sales abroad 
were the sector’s only source of income and covered ‘less than half’ of its costs (Alieva, 
1998). In 1997, Minatom earned 2.2 billion US$ on its foreign (hard currency) contracts 
(Volchko, 1998). To avoid US anti-dumping procedures, Russia’s foreign trade in nuclear 
materials and uranium often involved middlemen (Kadosov, 1992a; Lavr, 1992). Uranium 
trade therefore undermined state control of the industry. There was ample opportunity for 
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informal rent streams and embezzlement (Pavlov, 1998), also in Tekhsnabeksport (Kats, 
1999). Minatom under Mikhailov refused to put a stop  this, in defiance of government 
orders (Bogatykh, 1999). Minatom’s informal rent streams protected it from central state 
interference, and the state was incapacitated.  
4.3  The trade collapse 
Within the Soviet Union, enrichment and fuel producing enterprises were located on 
Russian territory, and the country had about 80 percent of Minsredmash’s enterprises. The 
rest was now abroad. The most profitable uranium reserves were in Kazakhstan27 and 
Uzbekistan, but there was also some production in Ukraine (Table 4.2). Yellowcake28 and 
fuel pellet29 production took place in Kazakhstan. Trade collapsed after the Soviet break-
up. For Russia, this was, as noted above, complement d by considerable expansion in the 
nuclear energy industry’s contacts beyond the region (Tarasov, 1998).  
Demand for nuclear fuel declined as economies contracted, and planned projects were put 
on hold. Ukraine, Armenia and Lithuania remained dependent on Russia for nuclear fuel 
and heavily dependent on nuclear energy (Tables 1.2 and 4.3). Armenia shut down its 
reactors completely between 1989 and 1993, reopening one in 1993 using Russian fuel. 
The political and economic transition in Central Europe also led to reduced demand for 
Russian nuclear fuel.  
Ukraine closed some reactors in 1992, and fuelled th  rest from stocks (Voskresenskii, 
2000). In 1993–5 Ukraine exchanged its nuclear warheads for Russian fuel. This began as 
a bilateral arrangement, which from 1994 included the US in anticipation of Ukraine’s 
                                                          
27 Orebodies in Kazakhstan are larger and the ore can be more easily extracted than in Russia’s deposits. 
28 Yellowcake (U3O8) results from the processing of natural uranium. In the nuclear fuel cycle, yellowcake is 
converted and then enriched, see fn. 20 above.  




commitment to denuclearise and accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) (Garnett, 1995; WNA, 2014b). In 1995 Ukraine procured fuel 
commercially for 1996 to 2010 from TVEL Concern, which won the tender 
(Voskresenskii, 2000). Ukraine represented up to a hird of the international market for 
Russian nuclear fuel. The TVEL Concern was an attractive supplier to Ukraine due to its 
low prices, but also because it accepted payment in uclear cycle goods (Vaganov, 1999; 
Voskresenskii, 2000). As the TVEL Concern rather than the Minatom subsidiary was the 
Russian counterparty and payment was by barter, the esource streams on the Russian side, 
too, probably went though both formal and informal channels. The arrangement appeared 
under bilateral agreements, but bore some resemblance to payment scams in fuel deliveries 
to Lithuania in 1995 (Perera, 1997, p.86). Ukraine ran up debts for nuclear fuel, and Russia 
withheld part of the supply for 1998 (Vaganov, 1999). In an effort to regulate the debt, in 
1997 the trade was channelled through a multilateral Russian–Ukrainian JV, created for the 
purpose. The founding companies included the Ukrainian state property fund, a Ukrainian 
and a Russian bank, the TVEL Concern and a Ukrainian-Andorran entity (Prime-TASS, 
1997). The payment arrangement benefited the Russian tate less than private companies, 
and it persisted for several years (Vaganov, 1999; Voskresenskii, 2000).  
Ukraine sought to diversify fuel supplies and mainti ed contact with Westinghouse, a 
major US nuclear energy company which had also participa ed in the 1995 tender.30 By 
means of further diversification, Ukraine conducted a tender for the construction of a 
nuclear fuel plant in 1995, narrowly won by TVEL (Zamyatin, 1996). Further development 
of the project was shelved at this point, for unknow  reasons (Vaganov, 1999). 
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To the Russian nuclear energy industry, ties with customers were still easier to maintain 
than those with suppliers. In 1993, post-Soviet urani m producers agreed to develop their 
production under an integrated organisation, with the aim of creating a transnational 
company (Kadosov, 1993). Accessing finance was a fundamental problem. States left with 
minor components of the Minsredmash system, like Kyrgyzstan’s Kara-Balta Mining 
Combine, lacked resources and sought Russian support (WNA, 2011c). Russia lacked the 
resources and also a strategic planning capacity to make use of such opportunities.  
Deciding on priorities was also an obstacle slowing post-Soviet integration. It was 
exacerbated by the demands of the competitive and no -transparent international uranium 
market. Kazakhstan in particular was interested in expanding uranium production and 
looked to Russia for partnership and customers. But Russia had stopped importing uranium 
ore from Kazakhstan when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Uranium processed in 
Kazakhstan at the time was stranded (Koretskii, 1994). Views on the uranium market also 
differed. When Kazakhstan’s experts warned about an impending uranium shortage, 
Russian experts disagreed (e.g. Sidorenko, 1997, p.19). Minatom did not expand its nuclear 
ties with Kazakhstan; it left it to its subsidiaries. Atomredmetzoloto, Russia’s partner for 
an integrated uranium industry in the CIS, saw Kazakhstan only as a competitor on the 
international market. TVEL’s vision for post-Soviet reintegration was to see Russia 
become a dominant partner. It had little understanding of how circumstances had changed, 
however (Alieva, 1998). Atomredmetzoloto and TVEL maintained ties with Ulba, 
Kazakhstan’s only nuclear industry plant, due to the companies’ total inter–dependence. 
The Ulba plant processed uranium ore into yellowcake nd produced fuel pellets from 
uranium enriched in Russia. Fuel pellet production was the only part of the nuclear cycle 




payments, forcing Ulba to diversify its customer base (Perera, 1997, p.150; 153; Shmidke, 
2006). Kazakhstan’s uranium production in 1997 was only 25 percent of what it had been 
in 1991 (WNA, 2011e). 
4.4  Out of the shadows and into the financial crisis 
By the mid-1990s, Minatom and its subsidiaries had weathered the post-breakup crisis. 
International uranium sales generated resources and allowed ministers and company heads 
to retain sector control. Non-payments at nuclear power stations were connected to 
problems in the wider economy. The government, especially Deputy Prime Ministers 
Chubais and Nemtsov, worked from 1997 to widen its control of the nuclear sector 
(Volchko, 1998). Minatom resisted structural reform, its autonomy protected by its 
considerable resources. Informal rent streams shielded it from interference, including 
access and participation within the hierarchy of state organisations. In late 1997, Minatom 
secured government support for an expansion programme in the domestic nuclear energy 
sector, and the reorganisation of nuclear power production into a Minatom holding 
company (Volchko, 1998).  
Mikhailov’s resignation in early March 1998 was a surprise. A major scandal connected to 
the Megatons to megawatts programme was just unravelling, and there was speculation 
that Mikhailov had tried to save the industry by resigning (Pavlov, 1998), or conversely 
that the scandal was used as an excuse to get rid of an independent-minded minister 
(Emel'yanenko, 1998). His first deputy, Aleksandr Belosokhov, also resigned (Pavlov, 
1999). However, at the time several banks were fightin  for the control of Minatom’s 
income streams from abroad (Gotova, 1998; Pelekhova, 1998b). Two banks, Oneksimbank 




Chubais and the prominent businessmen Boris Berezovskii and Roman Abramovich, all of 
whom had connections with the ruling coalition. A third bank, Natsional’nyi rezervnyi, 
was vying for the position of insider bank with the established sector bank, Konversbank 
(Gotova, 1998; Pelekhova, 1998b).  
Mikhailov’s most likely successors in Minatom were Konovalov of TVEL and the 
prominent nuclear scientist Evgenii Adamov. Konoval had proposed in 1991 an 
integration of the nuclear fuel cycle companies into one organisation (Pelekhova, 1998a). 
He now proposed to restructure the industry into a military, a civilian and a scientific 
branch (Pelekhova, 1998a). He was known to have a dismal view of outside influence in 
the sector. In particular, he was hostile to Oneksimbank’s and Menatep’s advances into the 
sector’s financial streams (Pelekhova, 1998b). Adamov was less politically experienced 
but was supported by Abramovich (Gotova, 1998; Pelekhova, 1998b), and was appointed 
in the end (Pelekhova, 1998b; Vaganov, 1998). Following the financial crisis in August, he 
selected Konversbank as Minatom’s overall banker (Gotova, 1998).  
Konovalov continued to push for a reorganisation of the nuclear energy industry divorced 
from the military and science branches (Pelekhova, 1998b). This included a proposal to 
Gazprom, in which he offered Gazprom a prominent role, possibly a stake, in a partially 
privatised nuclear energy industry, in return for financial support for TVEL (Oganesyan, 
T., 1998; Pelekhova, 1998a; Agentstvo ekonomicheskikh novostei, 1999).  
Efforts under Mikhailov (1992–8) and Adamov (1998–2001) to introduce contemporary 
management and financial practices and turn Minatom into a ‘team player’, in short, to 
facilitate state access to the industry, were regularly perceived as attacks on the industry 




within the sector. He followed government orders (Bogatykh, 1999), and had Chubais’s 
and Berezovskii’s support (Gotova, 1998). He would have been well positioned to launch a 
reform. But his efforts to create a market-economy version of Minsredmash met with 
resistance in the military nuclear industry (Khripunov, 2001, p.55). After his resignation in 
2001, he was credited within the nuclear sector for the nuclear revival that followed the 
crisis years (Atomnaya strategiya, 2009). But real structural reform of the sector was 
postponed, with lack of progress at home and a wide variety of foreign activities beyond 
government control. Before March 1998, Minatom had been largely autonomous of other 
state organisations, including of the cabinet ministers directly in charge of its oversight. 
The lack of a channel to central state actors hindered institutional development. 
4.5  A new approach to the post-Soviet region 
The most profitable section of the post-Soviet nuclear industry, uranium mining in 
Kazakhstan, was the first to initiate programmes of renewal and expansion. Kazakhstan 
created a state company in 1997 to manage the nuclear industry, Kazatomprom, ai ing to 
become the world’s leading uranium extractor by 2010 (Grudnitskii, 2006a; 2006b). This 
would be a starting point for a full nuclear fuel cycle. The plans were revealed in 2000, 
when the uranium price was at a historic low point (Graph 4.1). A careful expansion of 
Kazakhstan’s nuclear ties with Western, Japanese, Chinese and Russian companies 
followed. Before 2004, Kazatomprom aimed for maximum reintegration with Russia 
(Grudnitskii, 2006a). Russian companies and Minatom were interested in Kazakhstan’s 
fuel pellet production and future uranium supplies, but did not consider Kazakhstan a 
partner in the nuclear fuel cycle (Grudnitskii, 2006a). Giving Kazakhstan a stake in 




were to remain under Russian control. Kazatomprom’s overtures on cooperation and 
partnership in enrichment found little response in Russia (Grudnitskii, 2006a). 
Instead, Russia from 1996–7 promoted tripartite cooperation with Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
in nuclear fuel production in the JV Ukrtvel, dominated by Russia (Koretskii, 1997). 
Kazakhstan would supply fuel pellets, Ukraine would make zirconium casing for the fuel 
rods, and Russia would enrich the uranium and assemble fuel rods (Koretskii, 1997; 
Voskresenskii, 2000; Shmidke, 2006; Ryasnoi, 2008b). Progress was slow. Ukraine was 
financially constrained and would have preferred a barter-tolling agreement to a JV. 
Ukraine’s decision makers disagreed over a partnership with Russia (Koretskii, 1997). 
Russia took Kazakhstan’s participation for granted, to which Kazakhstan responded with 
very patient negotiation (Koretskii, 1997). The JV was established in 2003 (Starostin, 
2003). Technical difficulties in Ukraine initially slowed production, however (Ryasnoi, 
2008b; Ivzhenko, 2010).  
Ukraine continued to explore diversification in nuclear fuel supply, a factor it made use of 
in negotiations over terms with Russia (Rubtsov, 1999). In 2000, Ukraine and Russia 
agreed to exchange uranium concentrate and zirconium alloy for nuclear fuel, with only 35 
percent of Ukraine fuel paid for in cash (Perera, 1997, p.146-147; Vaganov, 1999; 
Voskresenskii, 2000; WNA, 2011d).  
4.6  The new coalition  
By 2000, progress in Russia’s nuclear energy sector was held back by a lack of mutual 
access and participation, even contact, with state organisations. The state had little access 
to Minatom’s foreign contacts. One of Rosatom’s key r formers, Anna Belova, later 




powers (Belova, 2008; Turanov, 2004). The nuclear energy industry was unable to address 
issues like future uranium supply, decommissioning of old NPPs and safe long-term 
storage of spent nuclear fuel (Kudrik et al., 2004). There was an accumulated lack of 
investment. Considering the failure of Minatom’s lead rs to initiate major changes, reform 
and structural change would obviously also require new leaders.  
Adamov left Minatom in 2001 after a State Duma anti-corruption investigation concluded 
that he had breached the law (RFE/RL, 2001b). He and three subordinates were later 
convicted of fraud, and Adamov was charged with embzzlement in the US (Lenta.ru, 
2008; Sokovnin, 2008; Sergeev and Sokovnin, 2011). Adamov’s successor at Minatom 
was Aleksandr Rumyantsev (2001–5). Putin tasked himwith regaining control over 
Minatom’s considerable cash flows (Leskov, 2006), that is, make its rent streams available 
to the state. However, Rumyantsev was close to Konovalov (Belyaninov, 2001) and did not 
stand up to vested interests in the sector (Leskov, 2006). In spite of declarations to the 
contrary, reform was quietly postponed (Galiev and Khisamov, 2001; Khripunov, 2001, 
p.57).  
The nuclear energy industry and its rent streams reained outside central state control and 
were vulnerable to creeping privatisation in the struggle among elites. In 2003, the 
Russian–Georgian businessman Kakha Bendukidze attempted to gain control over 
Atomstroieksport by taking a stake in the partly privatised company Atomenergoeksport 
(Aleksandrov, Yu., 2004; Pappe and Drankina, 2007). When Putin and Minatom became 
aware of this, Bendukidze was pressured out of busines  in Russia. Gazprombank acquired 
his stakes (Aleksandrov, Yu., 2004; Pappe and Drankin , 2007). In the state’s effort to 




Nuclear Energy early in 2004. It lost policymaking powers and was placed organisationally 
directly under the new Energy and Industry Ministry, established as part of a government 
reform. Some of its powers and its direct participation in policymaking were restored in 
July, but Rosatom, as it was now known, remained a second-tier organisation (Kudrik et 
al., 2004, p.27).  
But with economic growth and growing demand for electricity, it remained a government 
priority to gain access to the nuclear energy industry and restructure it in support of 
expansion. According to forecasters, the rise in demand would continue, and not be easily 
met by oil- and gas-fired thermal plants. Prices in the Russian electricity market were 
regulated, while the export market for gas and oil was now highly profitable. There was 
much to gain from less reliance on gas-fired plants (Nigmatulin and Nigmatulin, 2006). 
Nuclear energy was an attractive alternative (Orlov, V., 2008; Oxenstierna, 2010, p.21; 
37). NPPs already generated 16 percent of Russia’s electricity (Energeticheskaya 
strategiya, 2003, p.96). Existing reactors had their service l v s extended. The Russian 
government also planned to build 26 new reactors before 2020, to cover 23 percent of 
electricity production.31 Uranium demand would almost double (Energeticheskaya 
strategiya, 2003, p.96).  
Domestic expansion would support the export busines, which relied on the home market 
to test innovations. Russian nuclear technology export was already a success in the 
growing international market. TVEL experienced a 20 percent increase in profits from 
international sales from 2003 to 2004 (Siluyanova and Kovalevskii, 2004). Russian nuclear 
fuel exports now accounted for around 17 percent of the world market, but the government 
                                                          




envisioned a 30 percent share by 2020 (Vakhmenin, 2007; Omelchenko, 2008; 
Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.69). In the eyes of Rosatom’s reformers, domestic 
and international concerns drove the reform (Belova, 2008; Orlov, V., 2008). Without 
reform, investment, manpower and uranium shortages would inhibit growth, including 
international growth. The government also found it necessary to control the industry 
through a working ‘power vertical’ (Belova, 2008). The nuclear energy industry could only 
develop on terms that enabled state management and control of the sector (Belova, 2008). 
This was emphasised by the US reactions to the construction of the Bushehr NPP in Iran 
(Kornysheva et al., 2006). By 2005–6, the industry itself acknowledged the urgency for 
reform (Kornysheva et al., 2006). 
4.7  Expansion and renewal? 
Uranium stockpiles and reprocessed Soviet-era warheads and spent fuel cells still made up 
for some of the discrepancy between Russian uranium de and and supply. Imports 
covered the rest. With increasing demand, imports would also have to increase. The post-
Soviet region had good uranium sources close to home (Energeticheskaya strategiya, 
2003, p.53; 58; Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.41) and uranium prices were already 
increasing (Graph 4.1). With several years needed to evelop new uranium fields, and 
rising international demand, the Russian nuclear energy industry found itself in a new 
situation.  
In 2002–3, relations in the nuclear energy field betwe n Russia and Kazakhstan began to 
change. TVEL acquired a ‘golden share’, nominally 32 percent, of the Ulba plant in 2000 
(Voskresenskii, 2000; Stulberg, 2007, p.206-208).32 This was subsequently converted into 
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an ordinary minority stake. It was a first step towards further integration. But according to 
Mukhtar Dzhakishev, head of Kazatomprom, it was still difficult to organise a substantial 
degree of cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan un il 2003–2005, because there was 
no political will in Russia to support a reform agenda (Grudnitskii, 2006a). Kazatomprom 
found Russia’s terms insufficiently advantageous, moreover (cf. Stulberg, 2007, p.177-
209). Russia wanted Ulba to process uranium from Russian stockpiles, while under 
Kazatomprom’s plan Ulba would receive newly mined uranium from the Zarechnoe 
uranium wellfield (Kucherenko, 2000; Shmidke, 2006).33  
Armenia’s debt to TVEL for nuclear fuel in the 1990s had long been subject to negotiation. 
In 2003, the debt was included in the large debt-for-equity swap with Inter RAO (pp.93-4). 
Ukraine, on the other hand, took steps in 2005 to limit its dependence on Russian nuclear 
fuel, and embarked on trials of Westinghouse fuel at the South Ukraine NPP in 2005.  
4.8  Reform and new stability  
When Minatom was downgraded in spring 2004, it marked the beginning of a turbulent 
period in the nuclear energy industry. Presidential A de Sergei Prikhodko, an experienced 
trouble-shooter, was appointed chairman of TVEL’s Board of Directors in October 2004 
(Chereshnev, 2004; Siluyanova and Kovalevskii, 2004). Another sign of impending change 
came in February 2005 when Pyotr Shchedrovitskii, advisor to the presidential envoy to 
the Volga Federal District, Sergei Kirienko, became director of the nuclear management 
institute, TsNIIatominform (Antonov et al., 2005). Kirienko was appointed to head 
Rosatom in November 2005, where reform was clearly under way (Antonov et al., 2005; 
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Tovkailo, 2007). Sergei Sobyanin, appointed head of the Presidential Administration in 
November 2005, was also involved and chaired TVEL’s board from May 2006 to 
November 2007 (Butrin et al., 2006; Melikova, 2006). That position had previously been 
held by a deputy minister in Minatom/Rosatom. In December 2007, Sobyanin became head 
of the Supervisory Board for Rosatom, the state corporation (Tovkailo, 2007).  
Kirienko was the first nuclear sector top manager from outside the industry. He was a loyal 
state manager, and loyal to Putin, but not personally close to the president. Kirienko 
brought his own team to Rosatom (Koroleva, 2006). Kirienko and Sobyanin installed loyal 
managers from outside in crucial positions, apparently to ensure that changes to formal 
institutions would be followed by changes in informal constraints. Kirienko’s former 
deputy, Sergei Obozov, became head of Rosenergoatom before its conversion into a 
shareholding entity (Malkova, 2006a; Nikol'skii, 2006a). Vladimir Travin, Kirienko’s 
deputy at Rosatom and head of Atomenergoprom, had a nuclear sector background, but 
came with Kirienko from Nizhnii Novgorod (Embassy Moscow, 2007c). A few years later, 
Kirienko’s critics were no longer among Rosatom’s top echelons. A key reformer later 
remarked that people and enterprises in the wider industry should have been included 
during the reform (Belova, 2008, p.145), in addition t  the already large team of experts 
from the Presidential Administration and the sector (Bovt, 2007). The wider industry was 
subjected to, not involved in, a reform process. The appointment of Sergei Shmatko as 
Energy Minister in May 2008 may have reassured industry leaders. Shmatko had a 





The nuclear reform was the last reform of Putin’s second term, and it was quick. By 
December 2006, the Duma had passed enabling legislation for a new property structure in 
the nuclear energy industry (Belyakov, 2006b; Federal Law No 13, 2007; Press-tsentr 
atomnoi energetiki i promyshlennosti, n.d.). The Prsident signed the law in February 2007 
(Emel'yanenkov, 2007a; Press-tsentr atomnoi energetiki i promyshlennosti, n.d.). It 
separated the military and civilian parts of the industry, although Rosatom remained the 
common umbrella. At the lower level, the industry became more specialised. The state’s 
shareholding company for the nuclear energy industry, Atomenergoprom, was established 
by decree in April 2007 (Emel'yanenkov, 2007c). This indicated that Putin rather than risk 
a lengthy discussion in the government, threw his ‘most powerful support’ behind the 
reform (Kornysheva, 2007a; Orlov, V., 2008). Final legislation on Rosatom as a state 
corporation passed the Duma quickly, in October–November 2007 (Belyakov and 
Sokolovskaya, 2007; Emel'yanenkov, 2007b; Vakhmenin, 2007). The urgency was 
underlined when the legislation projects were forwarded by the President, not the 
government. By early 2008, most of the new structures were in place, just in time for the 
presidential election.  
Well into the process, key participants expected Rosatom to become a one hundred percent 
state-owned company (Emel'yanenkov, 2006; Malkova, 2006b; Nikol'skii, 2006b; 
Vaganov, 2006). The hierarchy of its subsidiaries was not clear, with three alternative 
hierarchies on the table (Butrin et al., 2006; Proskurnina and Nikol'skii, 2006).  
In September 2007, it was announced that Rosatom would become a state corporation. 
Previously a rare type of organisation, the state corporation was re-invigorated by Putin in 




participation in the economy (Putin, 2007). In the case of Rosatom, the organisational 
outcome of state corporation, which was not a state-owned company, indicated that Putin 
had the final say on this issue. Observers took this as proof that the state would no longer 
take a hands-off, commercial approach to the economy, but act as manager as well as 
owner (Embassy Moscow, 2007a).34 In October 2009, President Medvedev criticised state 
corporations because, he said, they had got out of control; no more state corporations were 
established (Filatova, 2009). By then, Rosatom’s organisational form was secured by stable 
institutions.  
State corporations rested on a different institutional framework from other state companies. 
The organisational type allowed Rosatom to be both a holding company and a government 
body (Orlov, V., 2008). Uniquely among state corporati ns, Rosatom was endowed with 
the right to conclude treaties with foreign states (Butler, 2008, p.310). This institutionalised 
Rosatom’s practice of entering into relationships with other states on nuclear matters 
without the MFA’s knowledge, as happened with Burma in 2007 (Embassy Moscow, 
2007d). Central state control and coordination were undermined also in Rosatom’s new 
institutional framework. 
State corporations were subject to less public oversight, mandatory transparency and 
budgetary control than other state companies. They w re ‘non-state, non-private, 
administrative-commercial entities’ (Krasavin, 2007), with considerable freedom to 
dispose of their means through non-commercial funds. Rosatom’s Supervisory Board 
controlled the state corporation’s primary funds and four reserve funds that were intended 
to function as guarantee and collateral for all Rosat m’s subsidiaries (Malkova and 
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Mazneva, 2007). Resources transferred from the statbudget to state corporations ceased 
to belong to the state and were at the state corporations’ disposal, as were any profits 
(Krasavin, 2007), making them a channel for rents i their own right. The boundaries of 
the state remained blurred, and this benefited Rosatom. The arrangement also enabled 
cross-subsidisation among Rosatom subsidiaries, with profitable activities subsidising loss-
making ones (Cooper, 2013, p.59-60). In effect, soft budget constraints returned to the 
industry, as state corporations could not be bankrupted. Loss-making entities would be 
sustained on rents. 
State corporations were also exempt from many of the usual state enforcement and 
oversight mechanisms and requirements of mandatory disclosure of information (e.g. on 
suspicion of money laundering, etc.) that applied to o her state controlled entities. In 
particular, state corporations were exempt from audits by the Audit Chamber (Krasavin, 
2007), and were only required to report to it annually. Rosatom was overseen by its own 
supervisory board, with members appointed by the president (Federal Law No 317, 2007). 
The supervisory board and the general director had more independence from the state than 
did state-owned shareholding companies. State corporations could attract private investors 
in public–private partnerships. A lack of transparency was now institutionalised.  
The crucial advantage of organising Rosatom as a state corporation seemed to be in 
maintaining management control of Atomenergoprom and preventing it from operating 
autonomously of Rosatom. Rosatom was the first state organisation – apart from the 
Ministry for State Property, Rosimushchestvo – to hold state-controlled companies as state 
property (Kornysheva, 2007a). It gave Rosatom greate  control over subsidiaries. At the 




holding companies, like Atomenergoprom, were protected from privatisation by the new 
strategic sectors law that restricted private, especially foreign, investment in sectors like 
the electricity grid, subsoil companies and the nuclear industry (Federal Law No 57, 2008; 
Heath, 2009). For practical purposes, the dividing li e between Atomenergoprom and 
Rosatom was thin. They were both housed in the old ministry building and responding to 
outside inquiries, also by this author, seemed to function as an integrated entity, at least in 
2009. 
From a government perspective, it was an efficient s tup. With Atomenergoprom a wholly 
state-owned shareholding company, government control further down in the hierarchy was 
secured (Emel'yanenkov, 2007c). As observed by Belova, ne wanted to avoid a situation 
in which  
 
the whole holding company [khozyaistvuyushchii sub”ekt] 
Atomenergoprom would start living a life of its own, and problems 
connected to e.g. nuclear radiation safety, or a lack of unified, coordinated 
management would have negative consequences for the development of all 
parts of the nuclear industry. (Belova, 2008, p.146) 
 
Indeed, Rosatom’s subsidiaries did what they could to retain some autonomy and resist 
change. In November 2006, the long-standing rivals, TVEL and Tekhsnabeksport, formed 
a JV, the Uranium Mining Company (UGRK), intended to become Rosatom’s uranium 
mining subsidiary (Butrin et al., 2006; Kornysheva, 2006b; 2006a). It was a non-starter. 
There were licensing problems, perhaps compounded by unwillingness in Rosatom to 
allow an audit of the involved assets (Yur’eva, 2007). Importantly, UGRK did not fit into 




Tekhsnabeksport ceded gas centrifuge production to TVEL, which incorporated the 
nuclear fuel cycle, while uranium assets were now wholly organised under ARMZ 
(Kiselev, S., 2011). 
According to Kirienko, the ‘legendary Minsredmash was reconstructed, only in the new 
market environment’ (Emel'yanenkov, 2007b). Post-reform Rosatom incorporated several 
direct successors of Minsredmash entities, reorganised them, and added control of foreign 
trade. There were similarities, Kirienko argued, because Minsredmash had proven to be an 
efficient type of organisation in the Soviet Union (Orlov, V., 2008). In the nuclear energy 
industry, the Soviet period was the golden age, and Soviet institutions were adapted to fit 
Russian needs. 
Rosatom’s financial relations with the government appeared unidirectional, especially 
during the financial crisis of 2008–9, when it received additional support from the state 
(Dzaguto, 2009c). This, in turn, reflected the increased capacity of the state to support the 
nuclear energy industry. In contrast to a decade earlier, the state also had the means to 
buoy up the economy through crisis. As Rosatom was now subject to less public scrutiny 
and state oversight than it had been as a federal agency, the channels for rent sharing 
between Rosatom and the state were opaque. There were opportunities for corruption, and 
occasionally, indications in the media that factory-level kickbacks were channelled 
upwards as rent (Kotlyar, 2012). But presidential control and enforcement increased, 
especially relative to other state organisations. Iformal enforcement mechanisms seemed 
an important part of the institutional framework.  
The complexity and vastness of Rosatom and its subsidiaries could potentially counteract 




would replicate the problem of an autonomous sector. However, this was unlikely to 
happen under Kirienko and Sobyanin. They were loyal to Putin and owed their positions to 
this loyalty. They were not just state managers, but P tin’s personal representatives. 
Energy Minister Shmatko was also loyal to Putin, and he was known also to be close to 
Igor Sechin (Embassy Moscow, 2008). The personal side to this loyalty was illustrated 
when Dmitrii Medvedev took over as president in 2008 and Sobyanin followed Putin from 
the Kremlin to the Cabinet. When Sobyanin ceded his place on the Board on becoming 
Mayor of Moscow in October 2010, Igor Shuvalov, a Board representative from the 
Presidential Administration and known to be close to Putin, took over as chairman. While 
the institutional framework had the potential to replicate sectoral autonomy, sector 
managers were loyal to Putin and his regime. The imple entation of formal institutions 
strengthened by reform still depended on informal constraints. 
4.9  The reassertion 
4.9.1  Kazakhstan 
After Rosatom was recreated as a market version of Minsredmash, Russia made it a 
foreign policy priority to revive as much as possible of the old Minsredmash structures 
(Belkina, 2006). Kirienko’s vision was to integrate he nuclear sectors in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine in a vertically integrated holding company (Yermukanov, 2006). 
Kazakhstan was at this point more positive towards Ru sia than was Ukraine.  
A strategic nuclear energy partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan was established in 
2006. Kazakhstan was now an attractive uranium supplier and Russia only one of several 
rivals for partnership (Vinokurov, 2007; Muzalevsky, 2010). Kazakhstan had developed 




and France (Shmidke, 2006; Ibragimova, 2010). In one decade, Kazatomprom had 
acquired stakes in all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (Ibragimova, 2010). Dzhakishev was 
careful to rebuff any suggestions that Kazatomprom co peted with Rosatom (RFE/RL, 
2007a).  
With a strategic partnership established with Russia, Kazatomprom was willing to 
compromise over uranium supplies to Ulba. Production began in 2006 (Yermukanov, 
2006). The same year, Tekhsnabeksport and Kazatomprom began to explore the 
Budenovskoe 1 and 2 wellfields, where production began in 2008 (WNA, 2011e). 
Kazakhstan also planned to develop nuclear power production jointly with 
Atomstroieksport (WNA, 2011e). The project, planned from 2006, failed to take off until 
2009. This was apparently due to funding problems, but possibly also to Russian 
reluctance to share intellectual property rights (WNA, 2011e; Kazatomprom, 2015).  
The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC),35 set up in 2006–7, completed the 
expansion of bilateral nuclear energy ties. Strongly promoted by Putin (Blagov, 2007a), it 
was a JV between Russia and Kazakhstan, but was open t  other states. Initially, the 
cooperation included plans for a joint Tekhsnabeksport–Kazatomprom enrichment facility 
next to the IUEC, but this was later decided to be un conomic (RFE/RL, 2007d; WNA, 
2011e). The IUEC, in particular, targeted Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy (Rykovanova, 
2006; Sindelar, 2006; Loukianova, 2008), but it also served Kazakhstan’s purpose of 
obtaining a stake in uranium enrichment (Ibragimova, 2010, p.82). To Russia, profits also 
mattered (Sindelar, 2006; Torbakov, 2006). Offering a 10 percent stake to new 
participants, a minimum of 51 percent of the IUEC would remain with Tekhsnabeksport 
                                                          
35 The IUEC is not to be confused with the IAEA–Russia not for profit nuclear fuel bank established near 




(Kornysheva, 2007c; Ibragimova, 2010, p.82). The IUEC also held a fuel reserve for 
members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (WNA, 2011f). 
In May 2009, Dzhakishev, long-serving president of Kazatomprom, was unexpectedly 
arrested along with eight of his deputies, on embezzlement charges connected to uranium 
mine JVs with foreign partners.36 He was replaced by Vladimir Shkolnik, former trade and 
industry minister with a history in the nuclear industry (Perera, 1997, p.96-98). Shkolnik 
was assumed to be more pro-Russian than Dzhakishev, but he upheld Kazatomprom’s 
ambitious expansion strategy (Pannier, 2009a; Ibragimova, 2010).37 After the arrest of the 
senior management, the decision process in Kazatomprom slowed down. It was speculated 
that Russia would want to reduce the position of Kazatomprom to that of a minor uranium 
producer instead of a well-positioned competitor to R satom (Embassy Astana, 2009). 
Dzhakishev’s arrest effectively ended the close busines  partnership between 
Kazatomprom and Canada-based Uranium One, mentioned i  the charges against 
Dzhakishev.38 ARMZ subsequently acquired control of Uranium One i  a series of 
acquisitions and equity exchanges from June 2009 to December 2010 (Seccombe, 2009; 
Uranium One, 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Atomredmetzoloto, 2011, p.15-17; 32-33; 36-37). It is 
not possible to say whether Kazatomprom’s weakened i t rnational position in the nuclear 
energy sector after May 2009 had anything to do with Russian influence inside Kazakh 
state organisations.  
                                                          
36 Dzhakishev had been cleared of similar charges in 2007. 
37 Shkolnik was born in Russia, and his son is married to the daughter of Vadim Zhivov, then head of ARMZ 
(now Uranium One) and allegedly responsible for Rosat m’s contacts with Kazatomprom (Kosharnaya, 
2009). 
38 Uranium One shares traded down by a third before being suspended from the Toronto stock exchange 




In 2011, the bilateral strategic partnership reached a second stage, with progress in both 
uranium exploration and nuclear power plant plans. Kazatomprom was expected to acquire 
a share in the enrichment plant at Novouralsk from Russia in 2011 (WNA, 2011e; 2011f).  
4.9.2  Uzbekistan 
On the expiration of the US-German uranium trader Nukem’s contract with Uzbekistan’s 
uranium-producing Navoi Mining & Metallurgy Combine (NMMC) in 2005, Uzbekistan 
aimed to diversify uranium sales (Faizullaev, 2009, p.29). Russia had for several years 
wanted to return to Uzbekistan’s uranium sector andnow capitalised on its support of 
Uzbekistan’s repressive regime (Torbakov, 2006). In2006, Uzbekistan and 
Tekhsnabeksport agreed to develop the Aktau deposit j intly (Faizullaev, 2009, p.30; 
WNA, 2011c). However, Uzbekistan baulked at allowing privatisation or private 
investment in NMMC (Faizullaev, 2009, p.29). 
After ARMZ’s takeover of Uranium One, Uzbekistan’s government also held off from 
closer ties with Russia on nuclear energy (Faizullaev, 2009, p.30; WNA, 2011c), preferring 
instead ties with Japanese companies (Panfilova, 2009b).  
4.9.3  Ukraine 
Russia and Ukraine concluded in 2007 a cooperation pr tocol covering nuclear equipment, 
uranium exploration and fuel production (Angelova, 2008; Davydov, I., 2008). The same 
year, Westinghouse secured a three-year commercial contract for larger fuel deliveries 
from 2009 (Kurdov, 2007; Sergeev, M., 2007b; WNA, 2011d). Deliveries under the 
commercial contract commenced in 2010 (Energoatom, 2010). Some of the fuel was 
supposed to be produced from Ukrainian uranium (Ryasnoi, 2008a; 2010a). 




(Ivanitskaya et al., 2008; Ravinskii, 2008). TVEL’s price was determined in the annual 
Russian–Ukrainian negotiations on all fuel types (Gorelov, 2007c; Kornysheva, 2007b; 
Kornysheva and Chernovalov, 2007). Ukraine depended on fuel storage and reprocessing 
in Russia. Russia’s fees for this service rose considerably between 2005 and 2008. A 
further increase would bring TVEL’s fuel price up to Westinghouse’s level (Embassy 
Kyiv, 2008).  
Ukraine had also developed relations with the Australian uranium company Uran Ltd 
(Ivzhenko, 2009b), and built up a strategic uranium reserve (Ryasnoi, 2010a). In 2009, 
Rosatom made progress on comprehensive cooperation contingent on increased fuel 
deliveries for TVEL (Ivzhenko, 2009b; Kosharnaya, 2009). This had the effect of halting 
progress in projects like the completion of the twofinal reactors at the Khmelnytskyi NPP, 
and its financial package in particular (Ivzhenko, 2009a). Internal Rosatom documents 
leaked to the Ukrainian press in 2009 indicated that Rosatom was pursuing a strategy to 
force Ukraine to abandon the Westinghouse supply option and agree instead to a 
comprehensive cooperation deal with Russia (Kosharnay , 2009). 
After Viktor Yanukovich became Ukraine’s president i  January 2010, relations with 
Russia regarding nuclear energy improved. On a visit to Kyiv in April 2010, Putin 
proposed that the two states integrate their operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear 
machine building and power generation in one holding. This, in effect, would recreate a 
modern Russian–Ukrainian Minsredmash. If the suggestion was ‘too revolutionary’ for 
Ukraine, Putin proposed carrying out the integration ‘in stages’ (Dzaguto, 2010a; 
Ivzhenko, 2010). The projects under discussion had been put on hold by Yushchenko, but a 




Dzaguto, 2011b). Yanukovich was most enthusiastic towards the modernisation of 
Ukraine’s NPPs and developing a Ukrainian nuclear fuel assembly plant in cooperation 
with Russia. It would replace the Ukrtvel JV, according to Energoatom’s president, Yurii 
Nedashkovskii (Ryasnoi, 2008b; Ivzhenko, 2010). Yushchenko had preferred 
Westinghouse, while Yanukovich now preferred to go with TVEL (Emel'yanenkov, 2010). 
Putin also wanted to see cooperation in nuclear machine building and uranium production, 
especially with regard to the Turboatom turbine factory in Kharkov and the 
Novokonstantinovka uranium basin (Emel'yanenkov, 2010).  
Atomstroieksport and Energoatom signed a new agreement on Khmelnytskyi NPP in June 
2010, and the contract was in place by February 2011 (Dzaguto, 2010b; Atomstroyeksport, 
2011c). The project met with resistance in Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, for its 
non-transparency, and for constructing generation capa ity in excess of demand (Ivzhenko, 
2011). Russian state banks would finance a substantial part of construction at 
Khmelnytskyi, up to 85 percent according to Ukrainin sources (Dzaguto, 2010b). 
Nevertheless, effectuation of the financial package was still slow.  
Ukraine joined the IUEC in October 2010 (IUEC, 2014). TVEL was also awarded the 
contract for Ukraine’s complete nuclear fuel supply for the remaining lifespan of all 
reactors, and secured the contract for Ukraine’s fuel assembly plant as agreed by the two 
presidents (Dzaguto, 2011c). The Ukrainian company Yadernoe Toplivo would have 50 
percent plus one share, while TVEL would control the rest (Dzaguto, 2011c). The 
agreement provided for technology transfer, joint iellectual property rights, and a 
financial package from Russia equivalent to 60 percent of the fuel assembly plant’s total 




proved difficult. There was no progress on the feasibility study until the Rosatom institute 
GSPI became subcontractor (UNIAN, 2011) and the parties also disagreed on the terms of 
the financial package (Ryasnoi, 2011). Ukraine had no means of forcing Rosatom to 
implement agreements, so plans and projects materialis d when it suited Rosatom. The 
delays in the fuel assembly plant project in 2010–11 suited TVEL, which had to integrate 
other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle into its company structure before it could maximise 
production based on enrichment capacity and consolidate in Ukraine (Gorbenko, 2010, 
p.22). In October 2011, the project was declared on time, with completion in 2015 
(Shtaltovnyi, 2011). The new factory would cover half of Ukraine’s nuclear fuel demand 
by 2016–17.  
4.9.4  Armenia 
Armenia had planned to close the Metsamor NPP in 2017 and build a new plant. After a 
feasibility study in 2008, financed by the US government (Danielyan, 2009), a tender was 
announced in 2009. Rosatom and Atomstroieksport were in contact with Armenian 
officials over the project from 2007, starting with a visit from Kirienko (Danielyan, 
2007a). Rosatom was the only potential investor with capital to spare. Armenia and 
Atomstroieksport set up the JV Metsamorenergoatom as owner and operator of the plant, 
in December 2009, and Atomstroieksport was designated contractor (Melikova, 2008; 
Danielyan, 2009; WNA, 2014a). Construction of the new, larger NPP was planned to 
commence in 2018 (ARKA News Agency, 2014b). Russia would finance much of the cost 
of the new NPP (Table 4.4) and the extensions to the old NPP’s service life (ARKA News 
Agency, 2014a). The plans were for the new NPP to export power to Georgia, Turkey 
(through Georgia) and, possibly, Iran, in accordance with Inter RAO’s strategic plans 




cooperation in exploring Armenia’s uranium reserves (Table 4.2) (Avoyan, 2008; Kudrin, 
2008). Exploration started in 2009 (Atomredmetzolot, 2010, p.15) and Armenia joined 
the IUEC in March 2012 (IUEC, 2014). 
4.9.5  Belarus 
In the years 2005–8, the Baltic region had copious plans to expand its nuclear energy 
capacity. Russia constructed a new NPP in Kaliningrad (Table 4.3) and Lithuania 
considered building a new plant in collaboration with Estonia, Latvia and Poland to replace 
the Ignalina plant (WNA, 2011b). In 2006, Belarus began drafting separate NPP plans 
(Table 4.4) (Marples, 2006; WNA, 2011a), receiving offers from Atomstroieksport, 
Westinghouse, Areva and the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC). 
Atomstroieksport’s offer was selected (Marples, 2009). For President Lukashenka, the 
NPP was a political project that would be justified despite considerable protests and 
misgivings at home, criticism from Lithuania and financial expense (Marples, 2008; 2010). 
A financial package was negotiated with the Russian government and Russian banks in 
2007–2010. Belarus initially aimed to secure 9 billion US$ from the Russians to cover the 
full cost of construction. Russia offered 6 billion. If Belarus let Inter RAO have a 50 
percent stake in the plant, Russia was prepared to offer more (Emel'yanenkov, 2007d; 
Sandler, 2010). The deteriorating relationship betwe n Russia and Belarus in 2010 delayed 
construction start (Marples, 2010; Atomstroyeksport, 2011b). In 2011, Belarus conditioned 
Gazprom’s takeover of Beltransgaz (p.263) on Russian finance for the NPP (WNA, 
2014d). This facilitated a package deal with a 10 billion US$ loan from Russia, and 




4.10  Conclusions 
Minatom in the 1990s had extensive autonomy vis-à-vis the central state, and this situation 
extended into its foreign operations. The lack of mutual adaptation to facilitate access and 
participation in institutional development in the rlations between the state and Minatom 
inhibited development on both sides. This status quo was sustained by informal rent 
sharing. The extent to which rent was channelled outside Minatom is not known. The 
ruling coalition under Yeltsin was integrated only loosely, and was characterised moreover 
by infighting. The squabble among the banks in 1995 and 1997–8 to acquire a share of the 
rents most likely reflected that Minatom until then retained a considerable share itself, and 
was not channelling its rent towards any one part of the ruling coalition. In the end, the 
outcome of that struggle was that Minatom continued to take care of its own rent streams 
and decide where they were channelled. 
Until 1998, Minatom and the companies in the nuclear fuel cycle were outside state control 
and oversight. Other state organisations were in effect denied access to Minatom’s decision 
making and development. This situation could only continue with the informal support of 
representatives of state organisations and the ruling coalition. Its extensive autonomy 
allowed Minatom to disregard formal institutions and establish a de facto privilege to enter 
into transactions with international parties on behalf of the Russian state. Informality and 
personal ties were accordingly decisive in interactions between the state and Minatom in 
the 1990s. State capacity remained low as a result. 
Thanks to informal rent streams, the industry managed to muddle through in splendid 
isolation. Increasingly however, this inhibited itsdevelopment. The industry became ill 




institutional framework for international cooperation was insufficiently developed to 
support strategic partnerships. The experience of nuclear energy companies in this area led 
them to seek state support for this side of their operations. The lack of state participation in 
their foreign operations inhibited their commercial development. When the oil price boom 
and the electricity reform increased the state’s capa ity to invest, also in nuclear energy, 
the industry was more inclined to give the state access. Expansion was a carrot for the 
industry during reform, and ensured support for reform. 
The nuclear sector reform of 2005–7 modernised the nuclear energy industry and forged a 
higher degree of specialisation among its organisations. Oversight within the industry was 
institutionalised and implemented through Atomenergop om. But at the top level, state 
oversight of Rosatom, conducted through the Superviso y Board, depended in practice on 
personal loyalty in a regime context. At this level, the informal mechanisms of Yeltsin’s 
ruling coalition were adapted to the now more develop d social order, and formalised. On 
paper, oversight of Rosatom was an impersonal arrangement between the president and 
representatives of the state, but informally, personal loyalty mattered when vacancies were 
filled. With time, informal constraints could eventually enable implementation of formal 
institutions (p.42), but this would still be at the president’s discretion. The restoration of 
state capacity in the sector did not progress to a level where it would threaten regime 
stability. Oversight would therefore depend on the regime. Rosatom was no longer an 
autonomous organisation, but it remained less accessibl  and less modern than other state 
organisations.  
The process that formed a new institutional framework f r the nuclear energy industry 




partnerships to Kazakhstan, and make further nuclear ooperation with Ukraine contingent 
on a greater role for Russia. Without the necessary coordination and financial muscle, 
support for Armenia’s and Belarus’s nuclear energy development would have been 
difficult.  
For the state, the reform shaped the expansion of nuclear energy operations abroad in a 
desirable direction, and made nuclear energy companies i tegral to foreign policy. The 
industry became directly accessible as an instrument of foreign policy, which could be 
applied to slow the independent technological development of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, 
and cultivate regional dependence on Russia for nuclear energy. In the 2000s, dependence 
was used as a tool of foreign policy in Kazakhstan, and in Ukraine, financial weakness and 
dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel were used to maximise outcomes in favour of 





5. OIL PRODUCTION: LUKOIL 
The electricity and nuclear energy cases showed how general institutional developments 
influenced state–company interaction with regard to foreign operations and foreign policy. 
Informality in institutions and rent sharing, and a lack of development in the 1990s, were 
followed by more formalised relations, institutional change and international expansion in 
the 2000s. Abroad, both electricity and nuclear energy companies engaged in often 
profitable operations that also served as tools of the state. Lukoil is different. Oil rents have 
undoubtedly flowed through informal channels in Russia. But Lukoil’s relationship with 
the state became characterised by formalised, and increasingly indirect, institutions, and 
private ownership. This indirect relationship continued into the 2000s, even as increased 
state capacity meant a greater capacity for intervention in Lukoil’s domestic and foreign 
operations. Also in this rather different case, state–company interaction concerning foreign 
operations and foreign policy was an aspect of their interaction targeting domestic 
institutional development.  
5.1  The break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet legacies 
Lukoil was founded by then Deputy Minister for Oil and Gas Vagit Alekperov, in 1991. 
Alekperov had spent most of his career in the West Siberian oilfields. He had seen oil 
production decline and the Soviet oil sector disintegrate as perestroika legislation 
empowered enterprises but failed to free prices. In 1990, Alekperov made an effort to keep 
the entire oil industry together in a state-owned concern, much like Viktor Chernomyrdin 
did with the gas industry (pp.231-2). Alekperov and Chernomyrdin knew each other from 
working at the Ministry for Oil and Gas. Remarkably, Alekperov also saw the international 




(NiK, 1999). The initial plan failed: disintegration had progressed too far. Alekperov’s 
second-best strategy was to create a vertically integra ed39 company based on a section of 
the industry (Gustafson, 2012, p.72). Alekperov had been head of the production 
association40 Kogalym in West Siberia. With the consent of his old colleagues, he planned 
a loose organisation consisting of the large and moern production associations Kogalym, 
Langepas and Urai, with their traditional downstream partners, the oil refineries in Perm, 
Volgograd, Ufa and Mažeikiai.41 A Russian government resolution to this effect was 
passed in late 1991 (Government Order No 18, 1991), establishing 
LangepasUraiKogalymNeft, Lukoil’s predecessor. 
The new Russian government was bent on furthering the disintegration of the oil industry 
as part of its market reforms. The formation of LangepasUraiKogalymNeft demonstrated 
the possibility of a vertical integration combined with autonomy from the state as an 
alternative to horizontal and vertical disintegration along with immediate privatisation 
(Gustafson, 2012, p.104-107). By 1992, key members of the government, in particular First 
Deputy Prime Minister (from June Prime Minister) Egor Gaidar and Deputy Prime 
Minister Anatolii Chubais were convinced that further disintegration and privatisation 
would bring chaos to the oil industry (Gustafson, 201 , p.71-72). Alekperov, who left 
government for LangepasUraiKogalymNeft in 1992, and other oil managers remained in 
close contact with the government. The appointment of Chernomyrdin as deputy prime 
                                                          
39 In the petroleum industry, a vertically integrated company has control of its upstream and downstream, 
from oilfield to market, and also holds internal oilfield exploration and production services. ‘Upstream’ 
means exploration and production activities, while ‘downstream’ usually includes refining of crude oil and 
sales and distribution of gas and products derived from crude oil. ‘Midstream’ is sometimes used for storage 
and transport. Here, only the two former terms are used and ‘midstream’ seen as part of downstream 
activities. 
40 Production associations formed the operational level in the Soviet oil industry. A production association 
could be comprised of one or more fields, with often quite substantial production. 
41 Mažeikiu dropped out of the project when it became clear that the Soviet Union would break up, and the 
refinery became Lithuanian property. It did not figure in the government resolution. Ufa did not remain with 




minister with special responsibility for the fuel and energy complex in late May signified a 
priority on reintegration and the creation of viable, vertically integrated structures in the oil 
industry. A November decree institutionalised the emerging structure of the oil industry 
(Decree No 1403, 1992). LUKoil (here Lukoil) and two other vertically integrated 
companies were authorised and would remain at least 45 percent state owned for the 
following three years (Decree No 1403, 1992).42 Disintegration from below became more 
difficult. 
Lukoil appeared as the result of individual agency, especially Alekperov’s. Existing 
constraints on the oil industry crumbled under perestroika. Alekperov was better informed 
than many others, and occupied a central position in Moscow. He and his peers responded 
to uncertainty by acting on self-interest to prevent the industry from disintegrating further. 
The most vital parts of the Soviet industry were moulded into new structures, taking 
Western companies as models. Faced with crisis, Alekperov adapted his goals, used his 
government access for what it was worth, and settled for a concern composed of only parts 
of the industry. Along with other oil managers, he k pt in close contact with the 
government’s young reformers, who had no experience with the oil sector. Alekperov 
insisted on participating in the industry’s institutional development. 
5.2  Keeping afloat: a new beginning 
Alekperov remained head of Lukoil throughout the period under study. He and other 
Lukoil managers maintained close contact with a former Langepas colleague, Yurii 
Shafranik, Fuel and Energy Minister in the first Chernomyrdin government (1992–6). 
Alekperov wielded considerable influence over the oil sector reform of the early 1990s 
                                                          




(Khnychkin, 1992; Alekperov, 2011a). By participating in the development of a formal 
institutional framework for the oil sector, Alekperov made sure that key legislative acts and 
regulations for oil sector development and privatisation were particularly suited to the 
needs of Lukoil, a pioneer in the sector. This applied to privatisation auctions in 1994 
(Gustafson, 2012, p.115), and the decree that allowed oil companies to convert into single 
stock companies (Decree No 327, 1995; NiK, 2011f). Lukoil’s close relations with the 
state went to the highest levels. It secured tax exemptions worth more than one trillion 
rubles by 1995 (OECD, 1995, p.46, quoted in Easter, 2012, p.67 fn.67). In return, 
Alekperov supported Yeltsin against political challengers, and canvassed for him in 
Tyumen, an oil region, in the 1996 presidential election campaign (Davydov, A., 1996; 
RFE/RL, 1996). It was an open secret that the tax exemptions had been granted, in an act 
of discretionary regulation (p.50), in return for support for Yeltsin.  
Institutional development allowed Lukoil and other companies to grow. Private ownership 
proliferated throughout the oil sector. Lukoil was privatised early (1994), with the state 
retaining a minority stake (Table 5.1). Lukoil was the first oil company to convert holdings 
into a single stock (1995–7), expand into international stock markets (1997) and attract a 
foreign shareholder, ARCO. It was also the first Russian company to open its own petrol 
stations. It acquired another vertically integrated oil company, KomiTEK, in 1999, the first 
acquisition of its kind in Russia (NiK, 2004q; 2004l; 2006a). Lukoil was a giant among 
Russian oil companies. Its original production was around 14 percent of Russia’s total 
production and it consolidated ahead of the others. Lukoil’s development went hand in 




5.3  Collapse of the Soviet Union: New opportunities for oil companies 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union had two major c nsequences for the oil industry. 
The loss of Soviet home markets and reliance on transit to reach global markets applied to 
all industries. The impact on the oil industry had  further dimension, since oil was a 
competitive commodity. The 1990s brought fierce competition for market access to the oil 
industry, not paralysis and stagnation. The second consequence came in the form of an 
opportunity – one that Lukoil’s management were quick to grasp. Soviet priorities in 
resource development promoted Russian petroleum producti n while much non-Russian 
hydrocarbon development was put on hold. This no longer applied. At different speeds, 
post-Soviet governments opened new regions to the in ernational oil industry.  
Alekperov knew all the likely producing regions from his time at the Soviet Ministry for 
Oil and Gas (Romanova, L., 1999b). He cultivated ties with post-Soviet presidents 
(Upstream, 1998a) and obtained licences in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Egypt and 
Uzbekistan. Chernomyrdin supported Lukoil’s international expansion. The government 
put its weight behind Lukoil when it mattered, as in Lukoil’s relations with Kazakhstan 
and other post-Soviet states (Burchilina, 1995; Ivanov, A., 1997; Narzikulov, 1997). 
Lukoil did not hesitate to act independently of official Russian foreign policy where its 
economic interests were concerned (Tutushkin, 1996a). This applied in particular to the 
issue of delimitation of the Caspian Sea. 
The MFA’s Caspian policy was to wait for an agreement between all the littoral states and 
then develop the Sea’s resources jointly (Cockburn, 1994; Aleksandrovich, 2000). To 
conform with this policy, Lukoil would have to refrain from competing in Azerbaijan’s and 




rules in the Caspian, leading the way in developing the de facto national zones. 
Government implementation of the official foreign policy line was fragmented. Lukoil had 
support from Chernomyrdin and Shafranik (Cockburn, 1994; Smirnov, A., 1995; 
Tutushkin, 1995; Vardul', 1995; Aleksandrovich, 2000). One industry observer remarked 
that Lukoil and the Fuel and Energy Ministry ‘tried to establish their policy [as regard the 
Caspian shelf] based on economic interests’ at a time when there was little official interest 
in much else, and what there was, was based on ‘abstract geopolitical daydreams’ 
(Aleksandrovich, 2001). Lukoil was among a handful of international Russian businesses. 
The MFA was on the side lines of Russia’s actual engagement in the Caspian Sea. 
Fragmentation of central state organisations and the elite made it difficult for the state to 
influence Lukoil’s post-Soviet operations abroad. The state had little capacity to interfere 
with or influence Lukoil’s foreign operations (Tutushkin, 1999). Lukoil enjoyed a measure 
of independence abroad, with clearly discernible support from parts of the government.  
5.3.1  Lukoil’s upstream43 operations in the post-Soviet region 
Azerbaijan opened its well-explored shelf to foreign nvestment earlier than other Caspian 
states. Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli (ACG), a giant field estimated to hold around 700 million 
tonnes of oil, opened first. In September 1994, a production sharing agreement (PSA) 
awarded ACG to an international, Western-dominated consortium, the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC). It was called ‘the deal of the century’. Lukoil 
was well placed to seize the opportunity. Azerbaijan nitially held 30 percent of ACG, but 
ceded 10 percent to Lukoil early on (Fuller, 1995).  
                                                          




Lukoil entered the project at a time when the MFA was especially negative to Russian 
participation in Caspian development (Cockburn, 1994). The official Russian line on 
transportation of ACG oil to global markets was to get the parties to use Russian routes or 
risk Russia’s participation. Lukoil’s share in AIOC persuaded the consortium to choose a 
Russian route for early oil, which was exported out of Novorossiisk. Alekperov saw this as 
positive for Russia in both economic and geopolitical terms (Tutushkin, 1999). Transit 
through this route (Baku-Novorossiisk) continued at a moderate level of 1.5-2.5 million tpa 
after the opening of ACG’s primary export pipeline, the BTC pipeline from Baku via 
Tbilisi to Ceyhan in Turkey.  
Kazakhstan’s government released licences more slowly than Azerbaijan, but Lukoil was 
again in a good position to participate in the development of the fields. In 1995, Lukoil 
obtained a frame agreement and a 50 percent stake in the Kumkol oil field (Stalker, 
1995a), with considerable support from the Russian government (Vardul', 1995). Strong 
support from the Russian government also resulted in invitations to Lukoil to participate at 
the giant Tengiz field (Burchilina, 1995). Lukoil joined the transport consortium (the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium, CPC) in 1996 and the production consortium 
(TengizChevroil) in 1997. Lukoil’s participation turned the complicated project in Russia’s 
favour (Tutushkin, 1999). Lukoil was among a handful of companies that defined Russia’s 
interests in Kazakhstan (Table 5.4) (Shumilin, 1997). It was also interested in developing 
production in Uzbekistan (Novolodskaya, 2001), but there, foreign companies found it 





5.3.2  Lukoil’s downstream operations in the post-Soviet region 
Russia’s western neighbours were central to Lukoil’s expansion of downstream activities 
and market access. Lukoil’s downstream activities in the post-Soviet region soon included 
petrol stations, refining and petrochemicals.  
Ukraine was a particularly important market and transit state. Alekperov had been 
interested from the beginning in acquiring one of its large oil refineries (Gavrish and 
Lysova, 1999). When Ukraine privatised its refineries n the late 1990s, Russian companies 
were well prepared. They had consolidated production and were developing their 
downstream sectors (Tutushkin, 1999; Balmaceda, 2008, p.60). Lukoil’s position was 
particularly good, given the strong support of the Russian government (Razumovskii, 
1998). Alekperov wielded considerable influence in Ukraine as well. During Leonid 
Kuchma’s presidencies (1994–2005), he was one of the Russian businessmen with closest 
ties to the leading figures in the Ukrainian executive (Moskovskii Komsomolets, 1998; 
Vandenko, 1999; Timoshchenko, 2001; Kommersant, 2004a).  
In 1999, Lukoil acquired 51 percent of the Odesa refinery, Ukraine’s fourth largest, for 
which it paid 7.9 million US$ plus 41.2 million US$ in promised investments and debt 
relief, while  guaranteeing a minimum workload (Gavrish and Lysova, 1999). Not long 
after, the Ukrainian government accused Lukoil of breaching these terms, and raised the 
issue with the Russian government (Shiryaev, 1999). The Russian government could not, 
or would not interfere in the company’s operations i  Ukraine. In 2000, Lukoil acquired 
full control of the refinery (NiK, 2004e).  
While Ukraine was the most important downstream country, Lukoil also exported oil via 




(Naftan and Mozyr). Alekperov’s wish list for the 1990s with regard to Lithuania and 
Latvia included a stake in the Mažeikiu refinery and i  one of the two main oil ports, 
Klaipėda or Ventspils (Kommersant, 1996).  
When Lukoil was founded it enjoyed close ties with the government, and positioned itself 
in the market as a Russian company first and foremost. In the 1990s, Lukoil was the 
flagship of the Russian oil industry abroad (Stolyarov, 1999) and a giant at home. Good 
relations with the Russian government helped the company to develop. This was 
complemented by a considerable effort to stay on good terms with host governments in the 
post-Soviet region. Lukoil’s good relations with the Russian state also shielded it from the 
predictable criticism it received from e.g. Duma politicians for investing abroad while 
industrial capacity in Russia was under-utilised. Investment abroad had become 
synonymous with the exodus of capital, and Russian companies often bought rundown 
plants abroad. Lukoil stood out because it had plans to modernise and expand its foreign 
operations. The company’s institutional framework at home, secured in frequent formal 
and informal interaction with Russian state organistions, shielded it from allegations of 
capital flight and lack of investment in Russia. This was all the more important as there 
were important push-factors in Lukoil’s pursuit of pportunities abroad. As Alekperov 
admitted, in the 1990s international growth also mini sed the negative effects of the 
unpredictable and complicated tax regime in Russia (Tutushkin, 1999).  
5.4  Financial crisis and reform 
The tax system was a brake on economic development. It was at the core of the crisis of 
the Russian state in the 1990s. The patchwork of old and new regulations, often mutually 




and local and regional demands for services over and above the formal tax burden. Most 
companies would have gone bankrupt if they had paidall their taxes, so they therefore 
tended to conceal profits in legal and semi-legal wys. Mutual offsets and negotiations 
over actual tax payments emerged as an informal solution (Easter, 2012, p.114-116). The 
state in the 1990s collected only about half of projected revenue from the sector (Luong 
and Weinthal, 2004, p.140).  
When on 17 August 1998 the Russian government devalu d the ruble and defaulted on its 
debts, oil prices had been falling for a year. In the double crisis of oil prices and state 
capacity, there were several confrontations over oil taxation between the oil companies and 
the governments of Evgenii Primakov (1998–9), Sergei St pashin (1999) and Vladimir 
Putin (1999–2000) (Gustafson, 2012, p.261). The state w s unable to access much of the 
rents from oil production. The oil industry boosted production during the crisis, following 
several years of declining output (Gustafson, 2012, p.188-192). From 1999, oil production 
increased. The devaluated ruble and rising global prices for oil combined to make oil 
export particularly profitable. Russia experienced a genuine oil price boom. 
Alekperov was now one of the sector’s most influential executives. His opinion mattered at 
the highest level of the state (RFE/RL, 1996; Lysova, 1999). Energy Minister Viktor 
Kalyuzhnyi (1999–2000) was particularly close to Lukoil (pp.199-200) (Ivanov, 1999). 
The state’s minority stake institutionalised formal interaction with Lukoil. But the 
management also prioritised participation in economic development. It responded to 
requests for societal stabilisation. When domestic oil prices surged in 1999, Lukoil 
acquiesced to government requests to limit exports (Boiko, 1999; Lysova, 1999). 




to ‘fulfil the tasks that a company should resolve’ (NiK, 1999). Lukoil’s staff and 
shareholders were his other priorities. But his sense of duty went together with a 
preference for indirect relations between the state and oil companies. Alekperov openly 
rejected suggestions of direct state ownership and management of the oil industry 
(Romanova and San'ko, 1999).  
Alekperov responded carefully to demands for greate state control over Lukoil. In autumn 
1999, Putin, recently appointed prime minister, and the Ministry for Federal Property, 
considered establishing a golden share44 in Lukoil and other partially state-owned oil 
companies so as to gain direct influence over management decisions (Vedomosti, 1999a). 
It offered to restore direct state control of Lukoil in a concession-style arrangement (pp.49-
51). Alekperov replied, just ahead of Duma elections, that he was willing to consider the 
proposal, depending on what he was offered in return. An appropriate compensation for 
weaker property rights, he suggested in an interview with the independent Novaya gazeta 
newspaper, was guaranteed standing orders from several large state organisations 
(Stolyarov, 1999). When he was asked for his opinion about state ownership in general, 
Alekperov said he would be interested in managing state shares in smaller oil companies 
(Stolyarov, 1999). In short, Lukoil was willing to have a closer relationship with the state, 
but concessions also had their costs. In the interview Alekperov made his terms public. In 
the event, neither the golden share, nor Lukoil’s pros ected management of state-held 
shares materialised. In the 1999 elections, Alekperov supported Fatherland – All Russia 
(OVR), led by Yurii Luzhkov, Evgenii Primakov and Vladimir Yakovlev. Well ahead of 
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polling day, it appeared a pretty safe bet. Primakov was a better choice than candidates 
with plans to increase the state’s control of the oil sector.  
By 2000, Lukoil was one of the world’s largest private oil companies by reserves and 
production (Tutushkin, 1996a; Lukoil, 2000; 2001, p.10; 2004, p.13). By 2002, it was the 
Russian company with the largest annual turnover irr spective of sector (Lukoil, 2003). It 
emerged from the financial crisis as one of the five most profitable companies in the 
Russian oil and gas sector (Meshcherin, 2011a). Lukoil’s management had always aimed at 
turning it into a truly international company (NGV, 2006a). Now, their aim was to turn it 
into a Russian ExxonMobil (Golubkova et al., 2007). 
5.5  A new approach to the post-Soviet region 
In June 2000, Alekperov published an op-ed in Izvestiya on, among other things (p.161), 
the place of the post-Soviet region and eastern Europe in Russia’s energy strategy 
(Alekperov, 2000). In his view, Russia could, and should, return to these regions only as an 
investor. What Russian energy companies needed to do was to pursue investment 
programmes before the arrival of Western companies. The post-Soviet region was united 
by language, mentality, and a multitude of ties, he maintained. In effect, it was the basis of 
a new economic system that could ‘speak like an equal to other transnational blocs’ 
(Alekperov, 2000). He urged the Russian government to support energy companies like 
Lukoil in the post-Soviet region, just like the US government supported American 
corporations. 
On the question of the status of the Caspian Sea, Lukoil’s line gradually became Russia’s 




Krivorotov, 1998; Sborov, 2000). Russia began to engage Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in a 
process of border delimitation in the Caspian Sea. 
Lukoil’s new projects in Azerbaijan were not a commercial success, like most of the 
projects that followed the ‘deal of the century’. ACG and the giant gas project Shah Deniz 
were exceptions in a region where the geological risks were abundant. Kazakhstan was 
more promising. In 1996, President Nursultan Nazarbaev agreed in principle to reserve 
around 20 percent of operations on the Kazakhstan shelf to Lukoil (Tutushkin, 1996b). 
After Russia’s policy change regarding the Caspian Sea, by 2002 Russia and Kazakhstan 
completed the delimitation of cross-border hydrocarbon fields on the shelf. This released 
several new projects. Lukoil’s projects in Kazakhstan grew from five in 1997 to nine in 
2004, and 13 in 2010 (Table 5.4) (Kravets, M., 2004), even as it lost one licence after the 
border agreement (Upstream, 1998b). Two cross-border fields were awarded to Russia, but 
with joint exploration. Lukoil was designated Russia’  entrusted company; KazMunaiGaz 
was in charge on Kazakhstan’s side (Glumskov and Skorobogat'ko, 2003; NiK, 2011l). 
Uzbekistan introduced new legislation in 2001 to attrac  oil and gas companies (Makarkin, 
2008a). In May, President Islam Karimov met Putin and invited Russian companies to 
participate in developing Uzbekistan’s hydrocarbon sector. Two months later, Lukoil 
signed a joint PSA with the Russian gas company Itera and Uzbekneftegaz to explore and 
develop three large gas fields: Kandym, Khauzak and Shady (NiK, 2002d). Also in this 
case, Lukoil was Russia’s flagship abroad.  
Privatisation programmes in Ukraine opened for substantial Russian ownership in many 
sectors. By 2002, Russian companies controlled three of the six Ukrainian oil refineries, 




(Kommersant, 2002). Lukoil invested in petrochemicals and established Lukor, a JV with 
the Ukrainian government in 2000 (Rybal'chenko, 2001). There was considerable 
uncertainty around the company’s privatisation, and Lukoil’s property rights remained 
weakly protected. However, until the end of Kuchma’s presidency (2004), Alekperov 
could counter attacks by talking to him and promising additional investments. He would 
thus dispel any claims Ukraine might be considering against Lukoil (Gorelov, 2001a; 
Razumovskii, 2001; NiK, 2004e). 
Lukoil remained interested in further expansion and cquiring stakes in the Baltic states 
(NiK, 2002j), either in the Ventspils oil terminal (Pravosudov, 2003) or the Mažeikiu 
refinery (Tutushkin, 1999; Rybal'chenko, 2000). As di cussed on pp.196-197, around 2000 
Russia planned to cut transit volumes through Latvian and Lithuanian ports. Yukos 
acquired Mažeikiu in 2002. Transneft’s policy towards Ventspils deterred Lukoil from 
acquiring a stake there.  
Lukoil received government support abroad, especially in Uzbekistan, and by 2001 also in 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Its engagement in the post-S viet region and position in the 
Caspian Sea had given Lukoil a say in Russian foreign policymaking. This was to its own 
advantage, as well, especially in Kazakhstan. But in return it had to go along with the 
wishes of the state concerning its opportunities for development abroad. The Russian 
government limited Lukoil’s range of export options by sanctioning Transneft’s reduced 
support for export through Baltic ports. The state was now in a better position to regulate 
market access (p.9) for Lukoil. Lukoil chose to take downstream control of other routes, in 
contrast to Yukos, which was not inclined to toe thgovernment’s line. But in and around 




international operations gave it an advantage. After th  change in Russian foreign policy, 
Lukoil was ready to benefit. 
5.6  The new coalition 
Relations between oil companies and the government changed with the ascent of Vladimir 
Putin in 1999–2000. The overtures to establish golden shares in Lukoil and other 
companies indicated a preference for greater state control. In his 2000 presidential election 
campaign, Putin stated his intention to keep all ‘oligarchs’ equally distant from the 
Kremlin. It was a popular policy, in promising to reduce the considerable political 
influence of certain businessmen, in particular Berezovskii (a joint owner of the oil 
company Sibneft), in the years 1995–99 (cf. Fortescu , 2006, p.101-111). Putin’s main 
aim, however, was to make oil companies pay their taxes in full (Gustafson, 2012, p.260-
262). After his inauguration in May, he and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin initiated a 
campaign to recover taxes, in effect, to capture oil rents for the state budget (Gustafson, 
2012, p.260-262). The state would now strengthen its weakest spot, resource extraction 
through taxation. 
Alekperov’s Izvestiya op-ed appeared in June 2000. His views on foreign nergy policy 
concluded a discussion of the relationship between th  state and business, which he found 
far from optimal. He criticised the oligarchs’ influence on the state, but he also chastised a 
common view among state officials, that private interests by their very nature were 
antithetical to state interests (Alekperov, 2000). In particular, he criticised the taxation 
system, which made investment difficult and tax compliance costly. He called for 
structural reforms, encompassing legislation, taxation, banking and land ownership 




personalised relations between state and business representatives. In Alekperov’s view, the 
oligarchs would have less influence if the state carried out structural reform, and opened 
for real dialogue with business leaders. 
But Alekperov was vulnerable, too. Ahead of the annual general meeting in June 2000, the 
government nominated eleven candidates for Lukoil’s eleven-member Board. The state’s 
stake was around 16 percent at the time. Its list of eleven candidates was taken as a 
political signal (Tutushkin, 2000). Alekperov’s Izvestiya article seemed to be part of 
Lukoil’s response. While Lukoil’s management persuaded the government to nominate 
only two candidates (Tutushkin, 2000), at the meeting it also managed to change Lukoil’s 
statutes, making it more difficult to remove the company’s president before his term 
expired. The presidential term was extended from two years to five, and the right to hire 
senior staff transferred from the Board Chairman to Lukoil’s president (Tutushkin, 2000). 
Table 5.3 shows how the Board was reduced from 13 members to eleven, at the expense of 
management representatives. Independent board members, in particular foreigners, were 
important as a cushion against government influence. In 2005, after the state sold its last 
remaining stake in Lukoil, the members of the Board regained their influence over business 
decisions (Vedomosti, 2005).  
A few weeks later, Lukoil, Alekperov personally, and Lukoil’s chief accountant, were 
indicted for tax evasion. It was a warning shot, according to some observes, to dissuade 
Lukoil from taking part in the imminent privatisation of ONAKO, a state-owned company 
with a refinery that would fit Lukoil’s profile. Lukoil and Yukos had just announced joint 
plans to bid for ONAKO (Khartukov, 2000). Whatever the ulterior motives (and Lukoil did 




Lukoil, was above the (tax) law. It also showed that Putin and Kudrin meant business with 
their tax recovery campaign. The allegations against Alekperov were withdrawn after he 
requested, and was granted, an immediate meeting with Putin (Igorev et al., 2000, Jensen, 
D., 2000, Heil, 2008). Most of the charges against Lukoil were later thrown out by the 
court (Kommersant-Vlast', 2002). When major businessmen met Putin in late July at their 
first plenary meeting (‘oligarch meeting’), Putin refused to back down on taxation 
(Germanovich, 2000; Gustafson, 2012, p.262; 564). Regular meetings later improved the 
state–business dialogue somewhat, alleviating fears of re-nationalisation (Smirnov, K., 
2002a). The meetings institutionalised and formalised involvement with the state, but also 
limited contact and business influence. This was precisely what the government had 
intended. Compared to Yeltsin’s frequent meetings with prominent businessmen under 
four eyes, dealings were now less arbitrary and personal. State–business interaction also 
changed at a more fundamental level, as the state prepared to enforce legislation and 
increase its capacity.  
Over the following year, the government drafted a new taxation system for natural 
resources. There was little consultation with oil companies, but the government started 
from a draft proposed by Yukos (Yermakov, 2001, cited in Gustafson, 2012, p.264). The 
legislation passed the Duma, with considerable opposition, in the summer of 2001 
(Lyapunova, 2001; Sidorov, 2001; Gustafson, 2012, p. 63-266). The new system, effective 
from 1 January 2002, introduced a new consolidated pro uction tax (NDPI). It was tied to 
the export price and therefore difficult to manipulate (Gustafson, 2012, p.264). It became 
impossible to make deductions, including deductions for investments, from the tax on 
profit (Konoplyanik, 2001). A commission, chaired by Kudrin, determined rates in 




oil tax, a tax on additional incomes (popularly called super profits), remained under 
elaboration (Konoplyanik, 2001). The new system was simple. It enabled the state to 
access rents from oil production to the extent desired by the government. State 
representatives considered its considerable negative effects on investment and sector 
development to be of secondary importance (Bradshaw, 2012, p.208-209). 
In 2000–2002, Lukoil adopted a studiously neutral, almost passive, position in domestic 
politics. The first sign came in autumn 2000, when Lukoil, as the only major company, 
refused a seat on the new presidium of the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE) (Pravosudov, 2000). Alekperov kept his distance from the political 
elite. His previous political preferences, in particular his ties to Chernomyrdin and support 
for OVR and Primakov, were a liability (Jensen, D., 2000; NiK, 2004l).  
Lukoil also remained at arm’s length from state-owned companies. A strategic partnership 
with Gazprom, started in 1999, naturally included some cooperation, but it was intensified 
only in 2002, by which time Lukoil’s relations with Rosneft had also begun to thaw. 
Alekperov may have wanted to see first how relations between the Yeltsin-era elite, 
influential in Gazprom, and the new Petersburg people in the ascendant at Rosneft, 
developed (NiK, 2003f). By mid-2002, it was clear that the new members of the elite 
would remain. 
On several occasions in Putin’s first term, Lukoil was in conflict with Transneft. The 
company reduced its reliance on Transneft’s pipelines, not least by opening the temporary 
export terminal Varandei on the Barents Sea coast, in 2001. It was served by its own, non-
Transneft, pipeline. Lukoil had another plan for a non-Transneft route, the Murmansk 




pipeline monopoly could be abolished (Alekperov, 2003; Bolshoi biznes, 2003). Lukoil’s 
management was impatient with Transneft’s lack of progress in providing sufficient 
pipeline capacity (Tutushkin, 2003; Zagorodnaya, 2003; Vin'kov et al., 2004; Yakovleva-
Ustinova, 2004). Export through Varandei gradually expanded and Lukoil opened a 
permanent terminal there in 2008 (Lukoil-Trans, 2014). This was in contradiction to 
government policy, which was neatly summed up by First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei 
Ivanov who insisted that Russia had ‘one legal [crude oil] port – Vysotsk’ (Sivakov and 
Vin'kov, 2007). Lukoil established its own export terminal for oil products at Vysotsk. 
Opened in 2004 and supplied by rail, it initially served as a crude oil terminal (NiK, 
2011f). Criticising Transneft and developing an independent export capacity were both 
politically risky ventures. Lukoil was otherwise loyal to the state, but prioritised business 
development whenever possible. It helped that Varandei served fields located far from 
Transneft’s pipeline network.  
There were visible continuities in Lukoil’s relationship with the state in the 1990s and 
2000s. Lukoil was always close to the government and leading state representatives. Under 
Yeltsin, such relations were personal and non-transp rent. Alekperov’s longstanding 
relations with key government figures were an advantage. In the early 2000s, Lukoil had a 
mixed approach to state organisations and preferred to keep its distance, especially from 
state-owned companies. Lukoil’s management modified the terms of access and 
participation that applied to the state to protect he property rights in Lukoil. State–Lukoil 
relations grew more distanced by the state’s new approach under Putin. The state became 
unambiguously more powerful than oil companies, which it now kept at arm’s length, 
especially in taxation. Interaction was now based on formal procedures, compliance and 




companies, transparent rent collection through taxation served also to strengthen their 
property rights. The rising oil price, and increasing rent collection from the oil sector, 
enabled the state to develop capacity and infrastructu al power to provide services to the 
population.  
5.7  A foreign energy strategy 
In 2002, Lukoil started a restructuring programme to increase profits and efficiency. 
Foreign operations played an important part. Explorati n and production outside Lukoil’s 
traditional producing regions, and export to global m rkets, were set to expand. From 2001 
to 2006, the number of international upstream projects increased from seven to 26 (NiK, 
2002i; Lukin, 2007).  
Lukoil had filled in for the absence of a coherent foreign policy towards the post-Soviet 
region in the 1990s. Beginning in 2000, foreign policy gradually became more coherent 
and more targeted towards the post-Soviet region. A new Energy Strategy made it a 
government priority to support Russian energy companies in world markets 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2003, p.41-42). From Alekperov’s point of view, it was a 
step in the right direction. In the 1990s, Lukoil’s management had often invoked the image 
of the company as a pioneer. Under Putin, priorities of Russian foreign policy took 
precedence over Lukoil’s business interests. In return for loyalty, Lukoil enjoyed the 
government’s continued support to expand its internatio al operations, particularly in the 
post-Soviet region. It put Lukoil’s Russianness abro d in a different light. There was no 
difference, Alekperov said on several occasions, betwe n Lukoil’s interests abroad and 
those of the Russian state (Butrin, 2003b). They were not just words. Lukoil’s ‘state-




naturally for a vertically integrated oil company, supported the Russian government’s 
resistance to the EU’s Energy Charter Treaty. ‘State-mindedness’ is also prominent in 
Alekperov’s writings on the Russian oil industry (Alekperov, 2009; 2011a). As far as the 
government stake in Lukoil was concerned, Alekperov stated that it brought a small, but 
tangible advantage to operations in Central Asia and the Middle East (Zagorodnaya, 2003; 
Vedomosti, 2005). 
5.7.1  Azerbaijan 
In Azerbaijan, Russian foreign policy came first. After AIOC’s choice of BTC as the main 
export route from ACG to global markets, Lukoil’s Investor Relations Director, Leonid 
Fedun, stated that Lukoil participation in BTC was a political question, and that oil from 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan should transit via Russia (Interfax, 2001). BTC was the main 
alternative to Russian routes. In 2001–2, as the start of BTC construction drew near, Lukoil 
considered acquiring a 7.5 percent stake in the transport consortium. In late 2001, the 
management tried to obtain government and Transneft approval of an acquisition (Butrin, 
2001a; Upstream, 2001; Useinov, 2002). It would be contrary to Russia’s interests, the 
government responded. The acquisition proposal was ditched by April 2002 (Vedomosti, 
2002b). Politically, ACG was highly important in Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan. 
Without a stake in BTC, the transport for ACG oil through Russia or BTC on third party 
terms, would be costly for Lukoil. Without a BTC stake and in a minority position in 
AIOC, Lukoil could no longer influence the balance b tween export routes in favour of 
Russia. If it wanted to remain loyal to the state, Lukoil could not disregard the 
government’s preferences. In November, Lukoil sold its stake in the ACG field for 1.375 
billion US$, in a highly profitable and timely transaction (Sapozhnikov, 2002; 




explained, was to prioritise exit from projects in which it was not an operator, and to 
concentrate on projects where it had more influence. But ACG was not the only project in 
which Lukoil was not operator. The released capital did not find any new investment 
opportunity soon. For Russia, the result was a shrinking place in Azerbaijan’s energy 
sector.  
What applied to oil did not apply to gas, however. The giant Shah Deniz gas field and its 
export pipeline seemed to have fewer political connotations in Russia. Lukoil, through 
LukAgip, held 5 percent of Shah Deniz, which was planned to export gas to Turkey 
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline. In 2004, Lukoil increased its stake to 10 
percent. Lukoil’s share of the South Caucasus Pipeline Company, which owned the BTE 
pipeline, also increased to 10 percent, and its share of the Azerbaijan Gas Supply Company 
to 8 percent (Sapozhnikov and Khvostik, 2004).  
5.7.2  Kazakhstan 
By 2003, Lukoil was the largest Russian investor in Kazakhstan, and an experienced 
operator (Table 5.4) (Glumskov and Skorobogat'ko, 2003). In the following years, it 
became the fourth largest petroleum producer in the country (Alekperov, 2006; NGV, 
2011a). Lukoil’s connections to Kazakhstan’s leaders were excellent (Kravets, M., 2004; 
Kommersant, 2006).  
5.7.3  Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan’s gas export depended entirely on Russian transit, and Western companies 
were less interested in its gas projects. Russia and Uzbekistan concluded a strategic 
partnership agreement in 2004 (Gotova, 2004; NiK, 2004f). In 2003, Itera was forced out 




to the Uzbek gas grid (Butrin, 2004). Lukoil took over Itera’s shares in Kandym-Khauzak-
Shady (Vinogradova, 2003). By 2004, Lukoil controlled 90 percent of this PSA (Lukin, 
2006; NGV, 2007b). The gas was sold to Gazprom at the Uzbek border (NiK, 2004f) at the 
same price as other Uzbek gas, and much higher than Gazprom’s price for Lukoil’s 
Russian gas.45 Lukoil shared its profits from the PSA with Uzbeknftegaz before having 
recovered costs, exceeding the obligations of the PSA. This was probably expected, 
possibly demanded, by the Uzbek government (Makarkin, 2008a). After Kandym-
Khauzak-Shady, Lukoil entered into a series of exploration projects and advantageous 
PSAs (Table 5.5). 
In 2000, the balance of power between the government and oil companies tilted towards 
the former (Tutushkin, 2000; Kravets, M., 2004; Vedomosti, 2004). The state demanded 
more access to Lukoil’s decision-making. Lukoil refused and would not compromise its 
autonomy in core operations. At the same time, it withdrew from projects aimed at wider 
institutional development. Its independence abroad diminished. There was more ‘state-
mindedness’ in its post-Soviet operations. Often seen as a conformist, Lukoil took the 
written and unwritten rules of Russian foreign policy nto account (Vahtra and Liuhto, 
2004, p.95).  
As oil prices rose, Russia could more easily achieve ts aims in international politics. After 
2001, Kremlin and government support of and interes in Lukoil abroad seemed more 
pronounced than before, according to Alekperov (Drankina and Fadeev, 2001; NiK, 2002a; 
Zagorodnaya, 2003). He was included in the business d legation when Putin travelled to 
countries in which Lukoil operated, or had an interest. When Lukoil signed agreements or 
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opened facilities abroad, members of the Russian government were usually present. 
Lukoil’s dealings with the state on foreign policy issues included advice to policymakers, 
as Lukoil had expertise and knowledge from operations in many countries (Butrin, 2003b). 
It ensured that Lukoil’s interests would be taken into account in Russian foreign policy.  
5.8  The new stability: Loyalty and stagnation 
The state now had greater capacity in the oil sector, but the government was increasingly 
impatient with oil companies’ efforts to minimise tax payments. In 2003, Putin and the 
government clashed with Mikhail Khodorkovskii of Yukos on the subject of oil sector 
regulation. The case included tax optimisation, especially through domestic offshore 
havens, but also the extent to which the state should influence production methods. 
Yukos’s attempts to develop export options with China but without Transneft, and its 
lobbying of the Duma were also issues of contention (Gustafson, 2012, p.294-295). When 
Khodorkovskii was arrested on tax claims in October, the campaign against Yukos, 
underway for some time, moved up a gear into expropriation. The heads of other 
companies kept quiet.  
In the period from October 2003 to the end of 2005, Yukos’s production company, 
Yuganskneftegaz, was sold off and eventually acquired by Rosneft. In the same period, the 
major private oil company Sibneft came under Gazprom’s control. The state undertook an 
extensive control mission of oil industry operations i  West Siberia (Gustafson, 2012, 
p.308-309). The private oil sector seemed under threa  of renationalisation. State 
companies did indeed acquire a series of stakes in the oil and gas sector in the years that 
followed (Bradshaw, 2009, p.6-7). This was less of a coherent, planned campaign than a 




p.5). The division between state-owned and privately held organisations became more 
conditional, less distinct (p.42).  
Lukoil complied with the new informal requirements, and continued to operate. Alekperov 
even more than before was prone to describing Lukoil as ‘state-minded’. There was no 
difference, in principle, he insisted, between the Russian oil companies. They were all 
Russian (e.g. in Tutushkin, 2008c). The subject often came up in the context of licensing 
on the shelf, suspended in 2005 and awarded as a prerogative to Rosneft and Gazprom in 
2008. Lukoil’s management were criticising this arrangement openly by 2012 (Vedomosti, 
2012). Their misgivings notwithstanding, Lukoil’s management had accepted the balance 
of power, it said, between Russia’s largest oil companies as a Kremlin decision. 
Yukos had pursued merger talks with Sibneft, Chevron and ExxonMobil ahead of 
Khodorkovskii’s arrest. It was therefore significant when the state sold its final 7.59 
percent stake in Lukoil to ConocoPhillips a year later (Kommersant, 2004c). Lukoil had 
valued having the state as a shareholder. But it was the Kremlin’s decision to divest the 
state of its remaining stake, against Alekperov’s wi hes and with little prior consultation 
(Tutushkin, 2004; Vedomosti, 2005). The new shareholder, ConocoPhillips, was selected 
on the basis of Lukoil’s strategic priorities. In adv nce of the deal, Alekperov and James 
Mulva of ConocoPhillips sought Putin’s approval. Their meeting covered the terms of the 
deal, including guarantees against political attacks, and future business plans (NiK, 2004a; 
Tutushkin et al., 2004). The final deal reflected Kremlin priorities, especially a restriction 
on direct ConocoPhillips partnerships in projects in ide Russia (Makarkin, 2008b). In 
addition to ConocoPhillips’s stake, Lukoil’s managers increased their ownership control of 




The Yukos case illustrated the importance of political loyalty and adherence to convention 
and regulations to avoid being targeted for selectiv  rule enforcement. In exemplifying the 
selective application of formal rules, the Yukos affair reinforced a system of personal 
privileges (pp.41-2). Alekperov learnt this lesson. Perhaps most importantly, once he 
understood that Putin was promoting state-owned Rosneft, still a rather insignificant 
company, he settled all ongoing disputes with that company (Gustafson, 2012, p.334-335). 
Lukoil quickly eliminated its legal tax optimisation schemes like those employed by Yukos 
(Skorobogat'ko, 2004). In December 2004, when the Kremlin asked the oil companies to 
cut petrol prices, Lukoil was the first to be asked. It complied, and others followed 
(Levinskii, 2004). When prices started rising again in September 2005, Lukoil initiated a 
renewed price freeze (NGV, 2006b). When a new request came in 2008, and Lukoil 
acquiesced, Alekperov approached the matter in the following way:  
 
Do you have any other option? Have you seen anyone else who disagrees 
with the state? What is the point? If it is required to help the state at any 
time, you have to help. (Shevel'kova, 2008)  
 
This highlighted a central lesson to be drawn from the Yukos affair. To Putin, the long 
process of increasing revenue collection in the oil sector, or rather, to force the companies 
to share more of their rents, was not just about accessing rent streams through formal 
taxation. It was also about the state’s right to access informal rent streams and use oil 
companies as tools of the state through direct control. Oil companies could not ignore 
suggestions of regional development in the form of CSR, charity and sports contributions. 
Following up on government plans for a national, oil-driven development policy was now 




by the state (p.11). Informal rent extraction by demanding voluntary contributions became 
a staple of the state’s relations with the oil sector and big business in general (Meshcherin, 
2010a). Lukoil promoted regional museums, supported veterans, invalids, orphanages and 
hospitals, funded university programmes and sponsored a wide variety of regional and 
youth sports, as well as teams and clubs on the national level. The extent of all this 
indicated how Lukoil, in its own way, was substituting for some of the state’s public 
welfare obligations and supplied infrastructural power as well.  
Lukoil’s management followed developments in the Krmlin closely. According to media 
reports, Alekperov was one of the Russian managers to meet Putin most frequently 
(Kommersant, 2004b; 2005). One study claims that Alekperov spent up to 80 percent of his 
time studying changes in the Kremlin’s balance of power (Gorst, 2007, p.3). As Lukoil was 
no longer state owned, this appears partly as compensation, through informal interaction, 
for formal access and participation. It was important to keep abreast of state plans for the 
oil sector, and to pursue closer relations with the state now that property rights in the oil 
sector had less protection (p.11). Alekperov claimed n ver to have been denied access to 
the prime minister or other government members (Butrin, 2003b). Other members of the 
senior management, like Vice President Fedun, did not e joy the same level of access 
(Mazneva et al., 2008). 
Consultations with the president also involved seeking his approval of new upstream 
projects and entry into new downstream markets before acting on the plans. In February 
2006, Alekperov received Putin’s approval to acquire more petrol stations in Europe (NiK, 
2007m; Mazneva, 2008a). Such consultations shielded Lukoil from criticism of, for 




sensitive topic in light of the Yukos affair. Consultations with state officials also opened 
for small-scale participation in, and access to information about, policymaking. State 
organisations regularly asked Alekperov, among other prominent businessmen, to advise 
them on policy and share rents informally in everything from the North Caucasus to 
education. The opportunity to consult with Putin on the sidelines of roundtables and 
conferences held considerable attraction (cf. Nikolaeva and Bekker, 2006).  
Lukoil’s leadership in production output in the Russian sector was overtaken by Yukos in 
2003 (only) and by Rosneft, which acquired Yukos’s production assets, in 2007 (NiK, 
2007c). Lukoil was the second largest exporter of crude oil from Russia in 2001, barely 
surpassed by Yukos at approximately 23 million tonnes. By 2005, both Rosneft and TNK-
BP exported more, and Lukoil’s exports peaked at just above 34 million tonnes. In 2009, 
Lukoil was the fourth largest exporter at just below 25 million tonnes (NGV, 2010b).46 
This was partly explained by Lukoil’s relatively hig  share in domestic refining and oil 
products export, but output had stagnated (NGV, 2010d; NiK, 2011f). The company now 
maximised profits, not output volume (Meshcherin, 2011b). Lukoil maintained its position 
through innovation and modernisation (Mel'nikov, 2011; Vin'kov et al., 2011), and by 
increasing exploitation rates in oil reservoirs (O'Cinneide, 2011). After the Yukos affair, 
this proved another sensitive topic, but in the financial crisis of 2008–9, it also proved 
necessary, by which time Lukoil’s Russian oil reserves were past their peak (NGV, 2011g).  
The reasons for Lukoil’s difficulties in bringing new fields into production were both 
structural and political. Lukoil’s Russian fields were maturing and most of the attractive 
onshore fields were in production. Geological explorati n was expensive. There was a lack 
                                                          




of incentives for new developments. The administrative barriers were high and legislation 
unsatisfactory. This problem was affecting all the major Russian companies by 2010 
(NGV, 2010c; Mandrik, 2011; Meshcherin, 2011c). The oil taxation system of 2001 
exacerbated the problems. Following adjustments in 2004, 80 percent of the profits from 
years of the oil price boom were directed into the federal budget. The taxation system 
discouraged investment, including investment to sustain future production levels 
(Aleksashenko, 2012, p.36 fn. 34; 46; Bradshaw, 2012, p.209). As the problem went from 
chronic to acute with the financial crisis, a federal law allowed companies to apply for 
exemptions, but only as tax breaks for individual fie ds. Some projects were also allowed 
to drop the oil export duty (Ekonomika i zhizn', 2009; Oilcapital.ru, 2010). This initially 
worked to Rosneft’s advantage (Gudkov, 2010). Alekperov later successfully lobbied for 
lower oil export duties for two fields in the Caspian Sea, by speaking with Prime Minister 
Putin directly at the opening of one of them (Meshcherin, 2010a).  
In addition, Lukoil’s participation in auctions of new licences in Russia also declined 
rapidly. These auctions included some for licences which, in light of its business strategy 
and existing assets would otherwise have appeared particularly attractive to Lukoil (NiK, 
2005d). Another outcome of the Yukos affair was that ese attractive new licences were 
awarded to Rosneft and Gazprom. In the case of Rosneft, this had been going on since 
2003. At some point in the years 2005–2008, Lukoil butted against a glass ceiling as far as 
new licences were concerned (NGV, 2006a; Malkova, 2010a). 
Onshore, the rules applied to Russian (as opposed to foreign) companies, were less 
restrictive, officially at least. Informally, as of 2004, Lukoil was excluded from the best 




strategic stakes. This was formalised in the law on Strategic Stakes from 2008 (Heath, 
2009; Golubkova and Ershov, 2010). ConocoPhillips was not allowed into Lukoil’s most 
profitable operations, and it eventually sold its stake in Lukoil in 2010 (Embassy Vilnius, 
2005a; NGV, 2011i, p.56).  
There were also fewer licences to bid for. The major Russian oil provinces were maturing, 
and new ones remained undeveloped. Some licences were ithheld from auction until 
Rosneft and Gazprom could afford them. Yukos’s remaining assets were tacitly reserved 
for the state-controlled companies (NGV, 2006a). Lukoil loyally refrained from 
challenging this situation (Savushkin, 2005; NiK, 2006a), and thereby maintained good 
working relations with Gazprom and Rosneft. It was unfair, said Lukoil’s management, but 
would not ‘recommend anyone to enter into conflict with Gazprom’ (Sivakov and Vin'kov, 
2007; Mel'nikov, 2011). When privately owned Bashneft invited Lukoil in 2010 to join in 
the development of the giant strategic Trebs and Titov f elds, which Lukoil had previously 
contested, it was a major exception to the general rule in the sector (Orekhin, 2010; NGV, 
2012a). The project ran into considerable licensing problems. 
The strictest domestic conditions applied offshore. Lukoil had criticised early drafts of a 
new Subsoil Law, under preparation in 2005–8 (Graife , 2006; Nekrasov, 2007; Sivakov 
and Vin'kov, 2007; Tutushkin et al., 2007). When passed in 2008, the law only allowed 
state companies with a minimum of five years offshore experience in Russia to seek new 
licences on the continental shelf (Federal Law No 2395, 1992; Kommersant, 2008a; 
Malkova, 2010a). Lukoil held a few shelf licences alre dy and would have been a serious 




The changing regulation of the oil and gas sector, which privileged state-owned companies 
over privately owned ones, was promoted and supported by Sechin, who now chaired 
Rosneft’s Board (2004–11) (Meshcherin, 2010a, p.17; 20). Energy Minister Shmatko 
acquiesced. In the view of oil sector figures, he was a weak minister who left difficult 
decisions, especially decisions that affected the state-owned companies’ privileges, to 
Sechin, Medvedev or Putin (Starinskaya et al., 2010). Reportedly, Putin, too, preferred to 
leave sector development to Sechin, and general economic questions to Medvedev 
(Meshcherin, 2010a). By 2012, the lack of sector policy and strategic planning seriously 
hampered the oil industry’s development (NGV, 2012b). The state was no longer able to 
respond to industry demands. Oil company representatives regularly complained about 
micro-legislation and enforced monitoring, sticks with which to reach each company in 
case of non-compliance (Nikitin, 2010; Vinogradova, 2010; Nikitin, 2011). Lukoil was no 
exception (Mel'nikov, 2011). 
Private companies could become Rosneft and Gazprom’s partners or expand abroad 
(Zotova, E., 2008b). Lukoil did both. It renewed and expanded its partnership with 
Gazprom in 2005 (Firsova, 2005; Afanasiev, 2011), and took steps to build a partnership 
with Rosneft (Vinogradova, 2011). Gas production became an important business segment 
(Table 5.2.) (NGV, 2005; Rebrov and Skorlygina, 2006). By 2016 it would account for 
around 30 percent of Lukoil’s overall production.  
That notwithstanding, Alekperov continued to see it as Lukoil’s responsibility to develop 
the Russian oil sector. He even asked, indirectly refer ing to the difficulties foreign 





if companies like Lukoil and Gazprom start orienting themselves on projects 
outside Russia – who would come here if [Russia’s own] companies leave? 
(Rebrov, 2010a)  
 
Alekperov and heads of other private companies remained critical of the preferential 
treatment of state companies (Alekperov, 2011b; Astakhova and Basvain, 2011; Derbilova 
and Mazneva, 2011). Alekperov’s pursuit of greater Lukoil participation (Tutushkin, 
2008c) resulted only in 2011 in an alliance, and a partnership for Russian shelf 
development, with Rosneft (NGV, 2011g; 2011c). A junior role like this was a 
considerable achievement for a private company at the ime. In practice, it proved difficult 
to agree on the working format for the shelf partnership (Interfaks-ANI, 2011). In spring 
2012, when international majors were concluding “shelf alliances” with Rosneft, Russian 
private companies were offered similar terms (Barsukov, 2012; Tovkailo, 2012). 
Lukoil’s loyalty, senior position in the industry and private ownership enabled it to avoid 
unattractive political impositions. In 2006–8, an initiative by Putin led the government, 
Rosneft and Gazprom, to seek to establish a Russian oil exchange. To Lukoil, which did 
not rely on spot markets, it was irrelevant (Tutushkin, 2006; Rebrov and Solov'ev, 2009). 
Lukoil also withheld support of Putin and Medvedev’s initiative to establish ruble-
denominated oil trading.  
Loyalty to the state, to formal and informal rules, became increasingly important under 
Putin. Alekperov’s claim to be ‘state-minded’ was more than an insurance against political 
risk. Already in 2003, a few weeks ahead of Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Alekperov noted that 
any challenge to the current order would have to come from somewhere else (Butrin, 




always voted for United Russia, but otherwise was not ‘a political figure’ (Derbilova and 
Mazneva, 2011). His was the position of an ideal, loya  businessman under Putin 
(Babaeva, 2001; cf., Rachkov, 2001). But relations between Lukoil and the state changed 
after 2003, especially in relation to the 1990s. Lukoil had to adapt to changes wrought by 
the state to the institutional framework, first in the form of informal constraints and then 
formal regulations. The asymmetric power relations between Lukoil and the state were 
visible. Interaction between the state and all oil c mpanies was broadened and formalised 
in 2000, but starting in 2001, the state set new terms that reduced oil companies’ 
opportunities to participate in policymaking. Informal contacts were now of decisive 
importance to private companies in their dealings with the state. Institutional development 
became the preserve of state organisations. State companies had privileges not available to 
a private company like Lukoil. By reducing the influence of private companies in 
policymaking, the state had aggregated greater despotic power to itself (p.54). 
5.9  Expansion? 
Lukoil now developed upstream projects in Egypt, West Africa and Iraq. It established 
petrol stations in the United States and many European countries, and acquired refineries 
by the Black Sea, in Sicily and the Netherlands (Mazneva et al., 2008; Socor, 2009a). In 
2008, Lukoil also considered acquiring a strategic stake in the Spanish oil company, 
Repsol. In this case, it seems that the support of the Russian state was withheld by figures 
at the highest level (Granik and Gabuev, 2009). There was no acquisition. Price 




5.9.1  Upstream 
Relations with the Russian state in connection with operations abroad remained on the 
whole supportive – in exchange for Lukoil’s loyalty at home. In addition, Lukoil was 
occasionally involved in the state-led development of foreign energy ties, when Russian 
energy companies teamed up and pledged participation in bilateral energy deals with 
partner states. This type of involvement became more important in Russian foreign policy 
after 2003. Sometimes, Lukoil engaged in well-targeted CSR activity abroad. This 
happened for example in 2006 when it offered to build a textile factory, supermarket and 
business centre in Dushanbe, with a view to attracting around 1 billion US$ in investments 
to Tajikistan (Petrachkova, 2006). Lukoil here resembled the extended arm of Russian 
foreign policymakers, joining the state-owned companies RAO UES and Gazprom in 
sharing its rents with Tajikistan’s elites ahead of presidential elections there (Blagov, 
2006b). The provision of economic support and help to stabilise Russia-friendly regimes in 
Central Asia was a foreign policy priority.  
There could be a business interest at the heart of these ventures, as in Venezuela. In 2009, 
Lukoil co-founded the National Oil Consortium, whic was headed by Sechin, with TNK-
BP, Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz and Rosneft. The consortium was put together to develop 
fields in Venezuela’s Orinoco belt with the Venezuelan national oil company (NOC) 
PdVSA (RIA Novosti, 2009; Finam, 2010). The PSA with PdVSA was part of a bilateral 
package dealing with military cooperation and Transneft’s participation in oil pipeline 
development in Venezuela. By 2014, the consortium re ained a vehicle of the Russian 
petroleum sector’s engagement in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, where some of the 




In its traditional international upstream around the Caspian Sea, the mid-2000s presented 
Lukoil with a more challenging business environment. Host governments gave foreign 
companies less generous terms in response to fewer operational risks, wider profit margins, 
along with NOCs’ increasing experience and financial strength. China became a significant 
competitor.  
Support from the Russian state regarding Lukoil’s Kazakhstan became increasingly 
conditional on loyalty at home. When Lukoil in 2004 stopped using tax optimisation 
schemes altogether in Russia, it was rewarded with Putin’s presence at the signing of the 
Dostyk agreement (Kravets, M., 2004). The new circumstances also reflected the changing 
power balance in the Russian oil and gas sector, where the priority of state company 
development led to setbacks for other companies. This happened, for example, when 
Kulalinskaya, a long-time Lukoil project, came under Kazakhstan’s jurisdiction following 
the delineation of the Russian-Kazakhstani sea border. The Russian government designated 
Rosneft and Zarubezhneft as its entrusted companies in the field (now Kurmangazy) with a 
25 percent share each (NiK, 2006k). Lukoil also planned, with KazMunaiGaz, to expand 
gas-based petrochemicals and refinery capacity either n Russia or Kazakhstan. In 2005, 
the proposal included resources from two offshore fields, Khvalynskoe and Tsentralnoe 
(NiK, 2006g; 2011a). The Russian government postponed finalisation of Lukoil’s 
involvement in both fields, referring to the 2008 Subsoil Law and its restrictions on 
offshore participation of non-state companies (NiK, 2011l). As Lukoil went ahead with 
plans for a polypropylene factory in Budennovsk, which would process gas from Lukoil’s 
offshore fields on both side of the border, Gazprom withheld guarantees in 2010–11 for 
Lukoil’s access to the Russian gas pipeline system in this particular region (NiK, 2011a). 




2010b). There was some progress in the development of Khvalynskoe after 2011. Plans for 
Tsentralnoe, where Lukoil and Gazprom were partners on the Russian side, were still 
pending. 
But Lukoil did well in Kazakhstan even with less support from the Russian state. It 
sometimes functioned as a counterweight to Chinese companies. This seems to have been 
understood in Lukoil, and appreciated, perhaps also encouraged, by Kazakhstan’s 
government (Skorlygina, 2006). The same thing happened in the case of the large oilfield 
Kumkol, part of which was operated by Turgai Petrolum, of which Lukoil held 50 
percent. The Chinese company CNPC acquired PetroKazakhstan, which owned the other 
half of Turgai Petroleum in 2005 (Suleimenov, 2005; Marten, 2007). Lukoil protested 
against the sale to CNPC, claiming that its right of first refusal to PetroKazakhstan’s share 
had been denied (Skorlygina and Rebrov, 2007, Rebrov and Konstantinov, 2008). After a 
lengthy process involving arbitration and negotiations, Lukoil was compensated in August 
2010 (Today.kz, 2010). However, between 2005 and 2010, Lukoil’s claims towards 
PetroKazakhstan and CNPC also gave Kazakhstan an opportunity to reduce CNPC’s share 
in PetroKazakhstan and award 33 percent to KazMunaiGaz (Suleimenov, 2005; Marten, 
2007). This was undoubtedly appreciated also in Moscow. However, findings here fail to 
confirm whether Lukoil acted as the Russian state’s agent (Marten, 2007, p.35). Also in 
other cases, such as Lukoil’s acquisition of Caspian Investment Resources in 2005 
(Savushkin, 2005; Alekperov, 2006), Kazakhstan’s government clearly treated Lukoil 
preferentially. It closed the deal just when CNPC displayed an interest (Savushkin, 2005; 




After 2005–6, Lukoil and other foreign companies faced a far more assertive Kazakh 
government (Lukin, 2010a; 2010b). This new stance also affected the Karachaganak 
Petroleum Operating consortium, in which Lukoil held 15 percent (Table 5.4) (Mel'nikov, 
2010; Mazneva, 2011). Support of the Russian governm nt made no difference in disputes 
in Kazakhstan.  
Lukoil instead entered into a strategic partnership w th the Chinese company CNPC in 
Central Asia in 2007 (Gorshkova, 2007; Kezik, 2007a). In 2010 the companies signed a 
comprehensive partnership accord during President Medvedev’s visit to Beijing (Grib and 
Mel'nikov, 2010; Upstream, 2010). Good relations with Lukoil’s main international 
competitor in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were now a priority. But it was also important in 
the context of Russia and China’s expanding energy relations. Lukoil offered Rosneft 
competition in the Russian-Chinese energy relationship. This was best done outside the 
immediate bilateral energy relationship, where Rosneft was the Russian state’s designated 
oil supplier and China’s partner. 
Lukoil’s Uzbekistan venture was a major success (Table 5.5). Gas production was 
estimated to represent half the company’s profits from gas in 2010, even as the production 
volume was only around 31 percent of overall gas production in Lukoil (NiK, 2010b). The 
company had the solid support of the Russian governm nt; indeed, Lukoil seemed integral 
to Russia’s policy in Central Asia (NiK, 2007l; 2008a). In 2009, Uzbekistan’s President 
Islam Karimov promised Medvedev that by 2015, all of Uzbekistan’s gas exports would go 
to Russia (NGV, 2009b). However, in 2008–2009 bilater l relations deteriorated. 
Uzbekistan suspended its membership of the Eurasian Eco omic Community.47 Gazprom 
                                                          




scaled down its activities in Uzbekistan (Grib and Mel'nikov, 2010; NiK, 2011a). 
Uzbekistan set stricter terms for foreign oil and gas companies to operate in its petroleum 
sector, and Chinese companies were the quickest to respond (Lukin, 2010a; NiK, 2011c). 
Lukoil, on the other hand, was constrained by Gazprom’s reluctance, as demand decreased, 
to buy gas from other producers (NiK, 2011c). Lukoil’s gas production in Uzbekistan now 
targeted the Chinese market (NiK, 2011a; 2011l; Lukin, 2012, p.19). In Turkmenistan, 
however, Lukoil could not compete with Chinese companies. After Russian-Turkmen 
relations deteriorated in 2008, a situation to which Gazprom contributed greatly (p.271), 
Lukoil’s chances of gaining a foothold disappeared. 
5.9.2  Downstream 
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, the business climate for Russian companies in 
Ukraine worsened (Makarkin, 2005b; Vedomosti, 2005). The influence of Chernomyrdin, 
then Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine (2001–2009), may have compensated a little. During 
Yushchenko’s presidency (2005–10) the Russian state did sometimes force the Russian 
companies to show solidarity with each other, as in 2007, when the Kremlin appears to 
have advised Russian oil companies not to supply crude oil to the Kremenchug refinery, 
where Tatneft had problems with its partners (NiK, 2007a). Lukoil and several other 
Russian companies halted supplies to the refinery. 
There were limits to the Russian government’s readiness to lend its support. In April 2005, 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko accused refinery owners, Lukoil and TNK-BP in particular, 
of creating a Russian-controlled petrol monopoly (NiK, 2005g). Lukoil was threatened 
with the reprivatisation of its holdings in Ukraine (Gavrish, 2005b; Gavrish and 




intervene, to no avail (Orekhin et al., 2005). The situation improved with President 
Yushchenko’s intervention (Gavrish, 2005a; Gavrish and Chernovalov, 2005b; Makarkin, 
2005a), but another crisis followed in 2006 (Gavrish, 2006). In October 2009, Lukoil again 
ran into problems when operations at the Odesa refinery came in the way of the most 
influential business conglomerate in Ukraine, the Privat group (Grivach, 2009a; 
Mordyushenko and Gavrish, 2009; Eremenko, 2011). Odesa later closed for repairs and 
was sold to a Ukrainian company in 2013 (NiK, 2013b). 
In 2010, Ukraine began to release shelf exploration l cences. This was attractive to 
Gazprom and Lukoil for commercial reasons, but obtaining licences could also pre-empt 
competition at an early stage and keep options open lat r when Russian production would 
drop. Lukoil was a likely partner in the Bezymyannyi, Odesa and Subbotinskii blocks 
(Vinogradova, 2011). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 stopped this process. 
Like all major Russian exporters, Lukoil depended partly on transit through Belarus to 
reach the European crude oil market. Lukoil was one f the companies that profited from 
refining crude oil in and exporting oil products from Belarus to avoid domestic bottlenecks 
and export duties (p.197). In 2007, Lukoil supplied around a quarter of all oil delivered to 
Belarus (Rebrov et al., 2006). This volume declined slowly after the 2007 and 2010 oil 
transit crises (pp.221-2). Lukoil also remained interested in stakes in the Naftan and Mozyr 
refineries, in the event of privatisation (NiK, 2003j). Meanwhile, Lukoil and Naftan 
formed a joint venture in oil product additives in 2006 (Rebrov et al., 2006; LLK-Naftan, 
2011). Belarusian authorities repeatedly declared th  privatisations of Naftan and Mozyr 
imminent (Chirko, 2006; Rebrov, 2008a; Belov, 2009), but this seemed unlikely 




In 2005, a new opportunity arose to acquire the Mažeikiu refinery in the sale of Yukos’s 
holdings (Vedomosti, 2005). The Lithuanian governmet clearly preferred non-Russian 
ownership (p.219). Lukoil remained interested, but was disadvantaged by the political 
climate (Embassy Vilnius, 2005b; 2005a). The final signal to refrain from acquiring 
Mažeikiu appears to have come from the Russian governm nt (Embassy Moscow, 2006; 
cf. Embassy Vilnius, 2006). As Transneft phased out non-Russian Baltic ports (p.211; 
220), Mažeikiu ceased to be a commercially viable option for Lukoil.  
In the last few years under study here, Russian foreign policy limited Lukoil’s 
development in the post-Soviet region. In some cases, especially in Kazakhstan and 
Belarus, the business environment offered by the host g vernment seems to have been 
decisive for Lukoil, as it was for other companies. In Ukraine, both governments 
contributed towards a deteriorating bilateral relationship, but Lukoil’s problems had 
mainly to do with the difficult business environment in Ukraine. In relation to Baltic export 
routes, however, Lukoil’s commercial interests came up against new Russian foreign 
policy priorities, carried out by Transneft. Lukoil faced the same problems in 
Turkmenistan with Gazprom. Lukoil’s opportunity to take part in Russian foreign 
policymaking in the post-Soviet region was now limited. 
5.10  Conclusions 
Lukoil started as an insider project, and it participated in, even drove, institutional change 
in the Russian oil industry in the 1990s. Development of state organisations and policies 
and Lukoil as a private company went hand in hand. Lukoil on its side seemed more 
advanced than the Russian state as a state. Its acce s to central state organisations was 




with the state as well as informally. Lukoil had a stake in the development and 
implementation of formal institutions, insofar as it  existence as an organisation depended 
on property rights upheld by the state. Formal rentsharing was negotiated with the state, 
while informal rent sharing tied Lukoil to the ruling coalition and offered further protection 
of property rights. As its foreign operations grew, Lukoil could turn divisions among state 
representatives on the issue of the Caspian Sea to its advantage, shaping foreign policy in 
the process.  
In 2000–3, Lukoil’s relations with the state grew increasingly formal and impersonal. 
Access to senior figures and participation in policy and decision making took place now on 
more generalised terms, embodied in collective oligarch meetings. Putin’s ruling coalition 
now used the state’s coercive infrastructure to increase its despotic power. Rent extraction 
and distribution were increasingly institutionalised as taxation, to give the state a greater 
advantage over oil companies and society. For Lukoil, the beginning of the Putin regime 
meant loss of access to government figures and partici tion in developing policy and the 
institutional framework. But it was also a turn towards greater formality and impersonal 
relations, insofar as oil companies were now treated more equally, on more transparent 
terms. Had this lasted, it might have been the beginning of a stronger protection of 
property rights throughout the oil industry, because informality could have yielded to 
formality in rent sharing and property rights protection.  
Increased state capacity, especially increased despotic ower (p.54), affected Lukoil’s 
foreign operations in Azerbaijan and the Baltic states. But Lukoil did not itself control 
integrated infrastructure that extended into the post-Soviet region, and state–company 




the coercive tool of the state. Khodorkovskii’s arrest represented the highpoint in the 
conflict between the state and the oil industry. ‘State-minded’ Lukoil inevitably accepted 
state regulation in the oil industry. During the forced sale of Yukos’s assets, Lukoil’s 
management watched as the state regulated property rela ions among oil companies, and 
privileged Rosneft and Gazprom over other companies. The oil sector stagnated. In 
Lukoil’s case, there was a glass ceiling in licence a quisitions in Russia.  
Informality returned as the basis of state–company interaction. Informal relations were 
again of the essence for a private company like Lukoil to gain access to the state. Whether 
intended or not, the Yukos affair weakened property rights (p.40) in the oil industry and 
Lukoil’s owners could not afford the luxury of refraining from informal rent sharing in 
return for property rights protection. This was most notably in the form of extensive CSR 
programmes. Among state organisations, some were moi portant than others. Rosneft 
took the lead in sector development, and may well have sidelined the Energy Ministry. 
This indicates that the regime’s interest in staying in power may have been more important 
than considerations of state and societal development. State–company relations became the 
province of an inner circle. In this period, Lukoil stands apart from the other cases in this 
study. Its executive manager remained on the periphry of that circle, and had to 
compensate by paying greater attention to Putin’s every move. Lukoil had a fundamentally 
supportive and loyal role in relation to the regime, but it was further removed and therefore 
also more autonomous than the other cases.  
Support for Lukoil’s foreign operations became, around 2003, conditional on loyalty to the 
state at home. Its fundamentally subordinate and remot  relationship with the state was 




seems to have acted as an instrument of the state, a  home and abroad. For Lukoil, a private 
company, the state had no direct access to company resources, and investment decisions 
surely would have to be negotiated at some level. Informal taxation of Lukoil seems to 
have been above all in the form of recommended CSR and regional development, which 
also supplied the state with infrastructural power. Private ownership may have shielded the 
company from two greater informal taxation drains, a  there seemed to be little mandatory 
and loss-making spending in its core business areas and few artificially inflated staff 
rosters. 
But Lukoil is again different to the other cases here, as it only on a few occasions acted as 
a tool of the Russian state. When it did, it seemed to be a negotiated understanding, or even 
a responsibility accepted voluntarily. It did not maintain or cultivate dependence on Russia 
in the post-Soviet region on a grand scale.  
Clearly, the lower level of access and participation with the state, and the extent to which 
Lukoil had to adapt to the state while losing its influence on state policies after 2003, 
extended to foreign operations as well. Abroad, toohere was greater distance between 






6. OIL PIPELINES: TRANSNEFT 
In the overall institutional development in post-Soviet Russia, some companies stand out 
for having a relationship with the state characterised more by continuity than by change. 
Rosatom and RAO UES belonged here until they were rformed. These companies were 
also used as foreign policy tools in the post-Soviet region. Lukoil, for its part, turned from 
being a driver of foreign policy into a company that exchanged loyalty at home for state 
support abroad, and occasionally, it would take on a task where it seemed to act as a tool of 
the state. In Transneft’s case, too, interaction with the state over institutional development 
included foreign policy and energy operations in the post-Soviet region. In parallel with the 
first two cases, Transneft’s relations with the state were close and remained remarkably 
stable over the period investigated here, but they changed less. Indeed, they changed less 
than in all the other cases in this study, and this extended to Transneft’s interaction with 
the state concerning foreign operations. This chapter shows how Transneft has remained a 
foreign policy tool of the state since the 1990s.   
6.1  The break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet legacies 
Glavtransneft, the Soviet Directorate for Oil Transport and Deliveries, controlled a 
completely integrated 94,000 km pipeline network for crude and oil product transport 
when the Soviet Union broke up (Transneft, 2014b). Glavtransneft owned and sold the oil 
in the pipelines (Gustafson, 2012, p.82). While the Soviet oil sector disintegrated, 
Glavtransneft remained intact. This is less remarkable than it sounds. Pipelines are natural 
monopolies. With a natural monopoly (p.67 fn.11), maintaining the status quo will always 
be the preferred strategy for many actors (p.35). As oil production declined, by 1990 the 




domestic oil prices also increased more slowly than purchase prices. With low demand and 
a selling price below the buying price, Glavtransneft ran up debts. The head of 
Glavtransneft and Deputy Minister for Oil, Valerii Chernyaev, therefore preferred not to 
take control of large-scale oil trading through Transneft. He could have pursued market 
power with Gazprom as a model, but Transneft was too weak (Gustafson, 2012, p.83-84). 
Chernyaev instead stayed out of the battle for control and markets in the oil industry. He 
managed to introduce a standard tariff for Transneft’s services, serving oil producers on a 
neutral basis. Transneft no longer owned the oil in the pipelines. This was finalised in late 
1991, with tariffs in effect from 1992 (Gustafson, 2012, p.84). With the institutional 
framework modified in this way, stability was maintained. The Soviet legacy in oil 
pipeline transport was therefore a state-owned 48,000 km de facto monopoly (Transneft, 
2014b).48  
Transneft was headed by Chernyaev (NiK, 2004g). In November 1992, this loosely 
integrated association of pipeline enterprises was formalised as state property and split off 
from the oil product pipelines, which became part of the wholly state-owned 
Transnefteprodukt (Decree No 1403, 1992). In August 1993, Transneft was reorganised as 
a wholly state-owned shareholding company, and a de f cto monopoly ‘for the duration of 
the prohibition on private oil pipeline transport’ (Government Resolution No 810, 1993). 
This institutionalised Transneft as an exception to the general rule for pipelines. Pipelines 
are most often owned and operated by one (or several) producers who often control in 
addition an integrated chain from production to markets (Dodsworth et al., 2002; Stevens, 
2009, p.18). For Russian oil companies in the 1990s, Transneft’s position was not 
                                                          





necessarily a problem. Its conditions and tariffs were the same for everyone. As oil 
production continued to decrease, there was sufficient capacity.  
6.2  Keeping afloat and muddling through 
Transneft’s services were essential for the Russian oil i dustry. By bringing oil to market, 
it kept companies and the state budget afloat. Tariffs gave Transneft a predictable income. 
There was no need to build pipelines between 1985 and 1999. Instead, pipeline capacity 
was reduced as demand contracted. Older pipelines were repaired. A preference for repairs 
over replacement went hand in hand with the development of an affiliated repair 
organisation, lavishly furnished with excellent, imported equipment. It was controlled by 
Chernyaev’s son and financed by a temporary hard-curency surcharge on tariffs, 
introduced in 1993 (Smirnov, G., 1998; Verezemskii, 1998b). This extracted rent from the 
oil companies, and directed a share of it towards pipeline maintenance. 
Chernyaev senior had succeeded his father in Glavtransneft in 1980. He was a dedicated 
professional. Amidst oil industry restructuring, nobody supported lifting the moratorium on 
private pipelines. Transneft’s position was informally secured by Chernyaev’s personal 
friendship with Chernomyrdin (Verezemskii, 1998b). Internally, Chernyaev demanded and 
enforced complete loyalty throughout regional subsidiar es (Verezemskii, 1998b). The top 
management controlled Transneft’s income from the temporary hard-currency surcharge 
(Verezemskii, 1998b). The surcharge was intended to cover repairs only (Smirnov, G., 
1998). Meanwhile, the basic ruble tariff largely accrued to Transneft’s regional 
subsidiaries. By early 1996, oil company managers were impatient with the no longer very 
temporary surcharge, but refrained from open complaint. Transneft enforced a strict 




Transneft’s wealth (Verezemskii, 1998b). The governme t wanted a greater share of 
Transneft’s rents, since it was a state-owned company. The Fuel and Energy Ministry tried 
to reduce the hard-currency surcharge in order to force Transneft to share rents. It also 
obtained a government order to make Chernyaev choose between his posts as Transneft’s 
Board Chairman and its head (Government Resolution No 1333, 1997). Although 
Chernomyrdin signed the order, he also allowed it to remain dormant to protect Chernyaev 
(Verezemskii, 1998b). With such discretionary regulation (p.50) by the prime minister, 
central state organisations could not implement formal institutions. But when oil prices 
began to fall in early 1997 (Graph 2.1), the revenue shortfall made the state and oil 
companies less inclined to let Transneft continue to accumulate funds.  
While oil pipeline transport was largely unaffected by oil industry privatisation, the latter 
stages affected Transneft and Transnefteprodukt too. In April 1995, the state authorised the 
creation of privileged, non-voting shares in these companies (Decree No 327, 1995). These 
shares would be distributed among employees, and give them a generous share of profits. 
Transneft’s statutes reserved 10 percent of the annual profits for the privileged shares, to 
be paid out before dividends on ordinary, state-held shares (Transneft, 2014a). Failure to 
heed this obligation would convert the privileged shares into ordinary, voting shares, 
thereby diluting state control.  
Many a company management had lost control first over subsidiaries, or a minority of the 
shares, and subsequently over the entire company. State ownership was no guarantee 
against such developments (pp.75-6; 116), as control of a state-owned company increased 




effort to avoid losing insider control in a gradual, hostile privatisation (Verezemskii, 
1998a). In the process, they also maintained their control over Transneft’s rent streams. 
In the summer of 1996, a privileged share package (25 percent of all shares) was 
distributed among Transneft’s employees and pensioners. On management orders, 
shareholder lists remained secret (Verezemskii, 1998a). Then followed a series of secret 
processes, carried out by Transneft’s top 22 managers. There was no consultation with 
central state organisations. Transneft’s subsidiaries first acquired most of the privileged 
shares from employees, possibly under some pressure. This was not very unusual at the 
time. The argument was that share consolidation would prevent a hostile takeover and 
bolster state control (Verezemskii, 1998a). Further consolidation of share packages in the 
head company would, however, be difficult to accomplish within the law. The shares were 
instead consolidated by another affiliate, which in turn sold most of them to a private 
holding company (Verezemskii, 1998a), which Transneft’s managers had established for 
this very purpose and in which Chernyaev appears to have held a significant stake 
(Verezemskii, 1998a). Unusually for the mid-1990s, Chernyaev did not give any 
representative of central organisations a stake in the private company. Such informal rent 
sharing with a patron could have shielded the semi-l gal share consolidation from 
investigation.  
On Chernomyrdin’s dismissal in March 1998, Chernyaev had no more friends in 
government, and there was no informal rent stream that ied Transneft to the ruling 
coalition. By diverting Transneft’s informal rent streams away from the ruling coalition, he 
had breached the informal constraints. When refusing the government access to the 




Transneft’s autonomy. Sergei Kirienko’s government, in place in April, acted resolutely. In 
late May, Chernyaev and another manager were dismissed, and Transneft ordered to 
conduct an audit to international standards (Governm nt Resolution No 512, 1998). 
Chernyaev was replaced by a former colleague of Kirienko’s from Nizhnii Novgorod, 
Dmitrii Savelev (Sokolov, A., 1999). Savelev proceed d to change Transneft’s auditor, 
who had participated in the transfer of privileged shares to the private holding company 
(NiK, 1998; Verezemskii, 1998a). The scandal broke and started a series of lawsuits. In the 
end, Transneft employees could not retrieve their shares, and the state and the new 
Transneft management could not reverse the share consolidation and sale (NiK, 2004b). In 
the absence of a solution in favour of the state, th  next years brought protracted conflict 
over the issue of annual dividends to the privileged shareholders.  
6.3  Trade collapse and system break-up 
Transneft lost control of oil pipelines outside Russia, but the system continued to function 
as an integrated one (Siddiky, 2012, p.72). The difference was that Russia depended on 
transit to reach established markets. The main route was the 4,000 km Druzhba pipeline 
system. It crossed Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania, and extended into Poland, 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, t king 30 percent of Russian oil 
exports to Europe. In contrast, Transnefteprodukt’s sy tem of oil product pipelines 
remained integrated through ownership to a larger extent. This network was developed for 
fuel supplies to Soviet troops at the Union’s western borders (NiK, 2003h). It was far less 
attractive under the new market conditions. The three largest ports for Russian oil, 
Ventspils, Klaipėda and Odesa, were now abroad. Only the fourth largest, Novorossiisk on 
the Black Sea, was in Russia. Russia was in turn a t ansit country for oil from Azerbaijan 




6.3.1  Transit dependence 
Bargaining power now shifted to transit state governments, which had become owners of a 
monopoly (Stevens, 2009, p.2). The transit pipelines w re not regulated according to any 
overarching jurisdiction, and host governments held the key to continued operation. Post-
Soviet host governments negotiated over transit terms, like tariffs, and saw pipelines as 
sources of rent.  
The Russian elite gradually came to see transit dependence as a problem. With relatively 
low oil prices and export volumes, oil companies were reluctant to invest in new export 
pipelines. Established routes are always more cost efficient than new ones. As transit fees 
rose, so did Russian discontent. On some routes, especially the Baltic branch of Druzhba 
and the Lysychansk route, where the pipeline crossed Ukraine en route to Novorossiisk, 
transit fees increased more quickly than in other places. A Lysychansk bypass was 
discussed from 1993 (NiK, 2004r).  
Throughout the 1990s, around 24 percent of Russian se  bound oil export was shipped out 
of Ventspils (Khikmatov, 2001). The idea of a Russian export route, a Baltic Pipeline 
System (BPS), originated around 1994. Different proposals were supported by Transneft, 
Russian companies, international companies (IOCs), and regional authorities (Rutland, 
1999, p.169; Pynnöniemi, 2008, p.196-199; Zimin, 2012, p.224-225). Progress was slowed 
down by different preferences among stakeholders. The IOCs were reluctant to rely on 
Transneft and preferred to wait (Ivanov, N., 1997a; NiK, 2004o). Regional rivalry over 
routes and ports also delayed development (Gustafson, 2012, p.244-245). The project 
moved forward from late 1996 (Azarova, 1997; Governme t Resolution No 1325, 1997), 




situation for Latvia’s Russian population, Latvia increased its oil transit fees. In retaliation, 
the Russian government asked oil companies to reduce their export through Ventspils 
(Sysoev and Gankin, 1998; NiK, 2004n). BPS now became  tool for pressuring Latvia. 
From 1995, transit relations with Belarus were regulated in the Russia–Belarus Customs 
Union. The agreement left many details open to negotiati n. In the Customs Union, 
Belarus was exempt from Russian oil export duties, but obliged to return 85 percent of its 
oil products’ export duty to Russia. This it did not d  (Yafimava, 2011, p.250). Instead, the 
Belarusian refineries (Naftan and Mozyr) imported 19 million tonnes of Russian crude oil 
annually, paying the Russian domestic price and no uties. Their refined oil products were 
then re-exported to Europe (Table 1.2). Most Russian oil producers, including 
Surgutneftegaz, Rosneft, Sibneft, Lukoil and Slavneft, participated in the re-export 
business (Socor, 2007c). They gained access to refine y capacity, in short supply in Russia, 
and they paid the lower Belarusian export duties. These duties supported the Belarusian 
budget. This ‘unique system of sharing of oil rents’ was an informal institution that 
contributed to the decay of the Customs Union (Balmaceda, 2012, p.151). By the 2000s, 
this Russian subsidy annually transferred around four billion US$ to Belarus. Oil products 
from Belarus undercut the price of Russian oil products in the European market.  
6.3.2  Transneft’s transit monopoly 
In transit from the Caspian Basin, Transneft was the monopolist. Preserving this position 
as production there expanded became a goal of Russia’s foreign policy, and of Transneft, 





In relation to Azerbaijan, control would be difficult to achieve. Azerbaijan’s close relations 
with Turkey, its distrust of Russia after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and its openness to 
IOCs, made alternatives to Russian transit realistic and desirable. The BTC pipeline project 
was underway in the mid-1990s. To Russia, any Russian participation in BTC would 
threaten the pursuit of maximum control. Due to Lukoil’s participation in the ACG field, 
some of its early oil did go through the Transneft system from 1997 (p.153) (Segodnya, 
1997). The transit agreement stipulated an annual export of 2.5 million tonnes each by the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and AIOC until 2007. Instability in Chechnya 
regularly disrupted this transit (Romanova et al., 1997; Useinov and Klasson, 1999b; 
Useinov and Tutushkin, 1999). From SOCAR’s point of view, the route was not 
sufficiently reliable. Transneft, on its side, demanded a guaranteed throughput of minimum 
12 million tonnes per annum (tpa) to construct a bypass. AIOC and SOCAR’s combined 
exports stood at around 7.4 million tonnes at the tim (Osetinskaya, 1999). 
Kazakhstan, too, prioritised the development of alternative export routes. Transneft 
responded slowly to Kazakhstan’s need for increased capacity (Nazarbaev, 1997; Embassy 
Astana, 2008), and refused to expand capacity on Kazakhstan’s main export route, Atyrau-
Samara (Babali, 2009). Kazakhstan developed alternatives as production increased. Crude 
was shipped across the Caspian Sea to Iran for swapping,49 or to Baku and by pipeline to 
Supsa on the Black Sea. From 1997, Kazakhstan and China were in contact over a pipeline 
project. 
However, Kazakhstan’s main new export route was to be the Caspian pipeline. Kazakhstan 
and Oman established the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in 1992 to construct a 
                                                          




pipeline from the Tengiz and Kashagan fields to Novor ssiisk. Russia joined the project a 
month later (CPC, 2012). In the initial agreements, Transneft was designated pipeline 
operator. In 1996, several oil companies were invited to join the consortium (Table 6.4) 
(NiK, 2005j). The consortium was soon plagued by inter al divisions. Western IOCs, 
especially Chevron and ExxonMobil, were often on opposite sides of the table from 
Russia, while Kazakhstan took care not to antagonise Russia. 
6.4  Financial crisis and reform 
Savelev was closely associated with Prime Minister Kirienko, and pursued a tough line 
with oil companies. After Kirienko’s dismissal in August 1998, few thought Savelev would 
last long in Transneft. By refusing to compromise with the previous management over the 
matter of privileged shares, Savelev discredited his predecessor sufficiently to remain in 
his position. After his failure to revert the privileged share consolidation, Savelev tried to 
stop, or at least reduce, payments to the privileged shareholders. He minimised profits. But 
this also reduced dividends to the state, and he was accused of denying the state of revenue 
(Vodyanova, 1999). To strengthen his position with the Primakov and Stepashin 
governments, Savelev moved BPS forward to project stage. Strongly against direct oil 
company ownership in BPS, Savelev found it difficult to access finance. Lukoil was 
particularly reluctant to finance BPS without minority ownership, especially as Transneft 
would not consider reduced tariffs for prospective consortium members (Reznik and 
Binchuk, 2000). 
In September 1999, Savelev was abruptly discharged by First Deputy Prime Minister 
Nikolai Aksenenko and Fuel and Energy Minister Viktor Kalyuzhnyi. Prime Minister Putin 




office. The door had to be opened with a circular saw to let the new Transneft president, 
Semyon Vainshtok, in. This reflected a lack of consultation with Putin, which later cost 
Aksenenko his job (Bekker, 1999; Vodyanova, 1999). Savelev was in turn accused of 
economic misconduct (Protsenko, 1998; Chernitskii, 1999; Romanova, L., 1999a; 
Martynov, 2007).  
Vainshtok, an experienced Lukoil manager, got along well with Putin. In case Vainshtok 
remained too much an oil company man (NiK, 2004c), Putin appointed two former 
colleagues, Nikolai Tokarev as Transneft’s vice presid nt and Aleksei Miller as chief of 
the Baltic Pipeline System Corporation responsible for BPS (Government Resolution No 
1325, 1997; Gustafson, 2012, p.269-270). Both were promoted to head other companies 
when Putin became president a few months later (p.216; 48) (Makarkin, 2007b). 
Vainshtok first undertook an inventory of oil in the pipelines, followed by inventories of 
the transport subsidiaries extending back to 1992 (Vremya MN, 1999). Transneft had never 
conducted inventories. For the first time, it was po sible to quantify technical losses in the 
pipeline system (Samoilova, 2000). Oil companies had long been dissatisfied with 
Transneft’s loss volumes, whether the oil was used to keep the system going, or was lost to 
faults or theft. The inventory also provided the state with better access to information about 
Transneft’s infrastructure. Inside Transneft, inventories were a basis for modernising 
management practice and enabling institutional development.  
6.5  A new approach? Transit avoidance 
Oil prices picked up after the financial crisis, and oil production and export increased 
(Graphs 2.1 and 2.2; Table 6.2). The domestic market was flooded with crude, while there 




new export routes, but also to avoid transit and decrease reliance on troublesome routes. 
This would increase Russia’s bargaining power. Transit avoidance was seen to reduce 
transit risks and costs. The government also took regional development into account, and 
would like to capture more of the transport fees for the Russian state. New pipelines 
became an instrument to make Russian oil companies i v t more in Russia, and extract 
more of their resources. Investment costs were of secondary importance. Developing new 
pipelines required considerable state capacity for policymaking and regulation in the oil 
sector. To preserve Transneft’s monopoly, the best solution from the state’s point of view 
would be to keep oil companies from owning pipelines. This would also underpin their 
dependence on Transneft for transport services. Transneft was now a source of 
infrastructural power to the state (p.54). 
The Primakov government in early 1999 proceeded with plans for two oil ports on the Gulf 
of Finland, Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and a pipeline from Kirishi to Primorsk (Delovoi 
Peterburg, 1999b; 1999a; Slyusarenko, 1999; SPB Vedomosti, 1999). Transneft followed 
up with recommendations to reduce transit through post-Soviet states. In a report, 
Transneft estimated that Russian infrastructure would reduce the transit cost by up to ten 
US$/tonne (Strel'tsov, 1999). Oil prices were below 20 US$ a barrel. The estimate 
assumed that post-Soviet transit fees would remain sig ificantly higher than the cost of 
Russian transit. After his appointment in August 1999, Prime Minister Putin became a 
strong supporter of the new oil export routes (Gustafson, 2012, p.268-269; Marochkin, 
2012, p.20). Transneft now embarked on a series of large construction projects (Table 6.3).  
Pipeline transport to the oil terminals at Butinge in Lithuania (opened 1999) and Ventspils 




cost-efficiency mattered most. Ventspils operated to capacity. Transport by rail through 
Estonia and Tallinn port was important, but more expensive. New pipelines would cost the 
oil companies more. 
Putin supervised the BPS project in person. From his first day at Transneft, Vainshtok 
promoted BPS and resolved the deadlock over its financing. In early 2000 the oil 
companies were offered stakes in the BPS Corporation, with Transneft holding the 
majority share (Osetinskaya, 2000; Reznik and Binchuk, 2000; Gustafson, 2012, p.269-
270). However, a few months later, this decision was reversed, and Transneft took direct 
charge of BPS, apparently at Putin’s initiative (Sapozhnikov and Ovchinnikov, 2000).  
Vainshtok obtained government consent to a surcharge on all its tariffs to finance BPS, 
levied on companies regardless of their eventual use of the pipeline (Osetinskaya, 2000; 
IEA, 2002, p.90; 97). Only strong government support c uld neutralise the resistance of oil 
producers. The surcharges were paid. Media outlets c ose to the government condemned 
criticism of BPS and the surcharge, and presented such criticism as counter to Russia’s 
strategic interests (Inozemtsev, 1999). 
Nevertheless, oil companies frequently complained about opaque tariff hikes (Druzenko et 
al., 2002; Oliphant, 2010): the increase in Transneft’s operating costs could not fully 
justify these tariff hikes (IEA, 2002, p.89). Their adjustment to rising tariffs was eased by 
the rising oil prices.  
In relation to Ukraine, Transneft promoted projects that would diminish the oil stream 




preferred route, Druzhba-Adria, was intended for Urals50 export to European and global 
markets (Solov'ev, D., 2000). Ukraine proposed the Od sa-Brody pipeline project to attract 
light Caspian crudes to Odesa for export to Eastern European markets as an alternative to 
Urals. The two projects competed for capacity in Druzhba. The Druzhba-Adria plan later 
failed due to environmental objections in Croatia (T ble 6.3). 
When in 2000 Ukraine withdrew initial approval of the Druzhba-Adria plan, Transneft 
urged the earliest possible construction of the Lysychansk bypass (Table 6.3) (NiK, 2004r). 
Vainshtok now tried to pressure Ukraine over Druzhba-Adria (Dmitriev, 2000; 
Aleksandrov and Orlov, 2001). The Ukrainian governme t refused to budge, and the 
Lysychansk bypass was opened in September 2001. Russian oil transit fell by 43.7 percent 
from 48 million tonnes in 2001 to 27.4 million in 2002 (NiK, 2004r). 
On the oil products side, the main pipelines from Russia into Ukraine51 were transferred to 
Transnefteprodukt in 1993. Russia occasionally ceased deliveries to Ukrainian oil 
refineries to retaliate when Ukraine siphoned off Russian gas in transit to Europe 
(Romanova, L., 2000b). In addition, Ukrainian refinries suffered from 
Transnefteprodukt’s inferior pipeline maintenance. Rail transport was the only alternative 
to get oil products to market. This deflated refinery value during privatisation, and Russian 
companies acquired the refineries on the cheap (Eremenko, 2011). Dependence on Russia 
in Ukraine’s oil products sector increased. 
6.6  A new approach? Transit monopoly 
In the late 1990s it became harder to monopolise Caspian transit. It remained a foreign 
policy priority to control transit routes for Caspian oil, and this became part of a strategy to 
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integrate Eurasia and tie the post-Soviet economies closer to Russia (Zhiznin, 2010). But 
Russia’s pursuit of control pushed post-Soviet state  and IOCs to develop non-Russian 
transit routes. Kazakhstan’s policy was to achieve ‘balance’ in export routes; in practice, 
more non-Russian routes. Azerbaijan avoided Transneft wherever possible. Clearly, 
Transneft was not a suitable means of promoting international cooperation. From 1996 to 
2011, overall pipeline capacity for crude export from the Caspian region increased from 16 
to 115 million tpa. During this expansion phase, Russia retained around 80 percent of 
Kazakhstan’s oil exports (Socor, 2009b). This was in a context in which Kazakhstan’s oil 
production was rising by 10 percent annually (NiK, 2002f).  
The BTC pipeline would enable Azerbaijan to export oil to the Mediterranean and global 
markets. Lukoil would have liked Russia to participate in BTC, but failed to muster 
support for the idea at home (p.167). In 2001, Lukoil then proposed that Transneft could 
develop a connection to BTC as an additional export rou e (Useinov, 2001; 2002). This 
was also ruled out by Transneft and the Russian government (Butrin, 2001a; Upstream, 
2001; Useinov, 2002; Egorova, 2004).  
Transneft’s relations with Azerbaijan had deteriorated due to its refusal to bypass 
Chechnya on the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. Eventually, in 2000, Transneft built the 
bypass (Osetinskaya, 1999), but refused to expand cpacity to meet Azerbaijan’s needs. 
Transneft made expansion contingent on Azerbaijan’s commitment of large volumes to the 
pipeline. Such a guarantee would threaten the viability of the BTC project, and Azerbaijan 
predictably rejected the terms (Sborov, 2000).  
Transit relations continued to deteriorate (Mishin, 2000; Vedomosti, 2000). Azerbaijan 




Buyantseva and Osetinskaya, 2000). To oil producers in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
Transneft’s export routes came with a price discount, because Transneft did not operate a 
‘quality bank’ (Useinov and Klasson, 1999a). A quality bank arrangement sets a 
benchmark quality for oil in the pipeline, and shippers of higher quality oil are 
compensated for reduced oil quality and market price.52 Without such compensation, Azeri 
and Kazakh crude oil improved oil quality in the Transneft system, resulting in an inflated 
market price for other producers. As the price differential was absorbed by Russia, Azeri 
and Kazakh producers were in effect obliged to share their rents with Transneft. Part of the 
Caspian Pipeline’s attraction was that it would operate a quality bank. Transneft’s policy to 
allow equal access to Russian producers also had negativ  consequences for Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan. Russian companies were allocated transport quotas on the basis of their 
domestic production rates, while non-Russian shippers had lower priority. Oil from 
Kazakhstan was therefore discounted by up to 10 percent by the time it had reached 
Europe (Dodsworth et al., 2002, p.10,24).  
In 2000, Kazakhstan still had two main oil export routes. Most was transported through 
Russia, by rail or pipeline, to the Baltic and Black Seas. Transneft’s policy was to remain 
essential to Kazakhstan’s oil export (Ivanitskii and Gavshina, 2008). Kazakhstan could to a 
certain extent develop new routes while maintaining established ones. But in practice, it 
was complicated to access new routes without antagoising Russia. To ensure Russia’s 
goodwill, Kazakhstan delayed development of the China pipeline project as long as 
Yukos’s Angarsk-Daqing pipeline project was on the table in 2000–02 (NiK, 2006b). 
                                                          




The new Caspian pipeline ran into a string of problems. Construction costs soared, and the 
consortium members issued additional loans to CPC. The pipeline opened in 2001 with 
maximum throughput of 20 million tpa. A planned expansion would raise throughput to 67 
million tpa, of which 50 million tonnes would come from Kazakhstan, and 17 from Russia 
(NiK, 2002h). But Russia now made expansion contingent on a tariff increase and reduced 
interest rates on the consortium members’ loans to the consortium. Russia accused oil 
producing CPC members of using low tariffs (paid by themselves as customers) and high 
interest rates (paid to themselves as lenders) to prevent the consortium from accumulating 
taxable profits in Russia (Mazneva, 2007; Surzhenko, 2007). The Russian state lost a 
revenue source.  
Russia had lost control over pipeline tariffs when CPC members decided in 2000 to retain 
joint operatorship and thereby collective command acontrol (NiK, 2002e). Transneft 
remained the operator, but it was a technical functio  (Reznik, 2000a). It had also lost 
control of the CPC terminal’s operations to Lukoil (Reznik, 2000b). Transneft now 
demonstrated the cost of joint operatorship to CPC. The Caspian pipeline was intended to 
connect to Transneft’s system (the Tikhoretsk-Kropotkin leg) to maximise capacity and 
give Russian producers access to the Caspian pipeline. After 2000, Transneft refused to 
finance the connecting leg from its own pocket. In turn, Russian producers refused to pay 
Transneft’s suggested surcharge to fund the connectio . The connection was not built, and 
CPC operated below capacity in the first years of operation (Druzenko et al., 2002). By 





Vainshtok also conducted a campaign against the Caspian pipeline (Chernitskii, 2001; 
Dmitriev, 2002a). If successful, the Caspian pipeline would show that it was possible and 
attractive to develop private pipelines in Russia. The Caspian pipeline also competed with 
Transneft for light Kazakhstani crude (IA FK-Novosti, 2009), just as higher-grade 
producers were moving away from its pipelines (Reznik, 2001). CPC came to be seen by 
the Russian government as a loss-making, unsuccessful venture (NiK, 2004d). It was 
compared with BPS, which finished on time and budget (B kker, 2002). 
By 2000, the expansion of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline had become even more urgent to 
Kazakhstan. Insufficient export capacity would soon slow down development. Additives 
and extra maintenance increased capacity to 15–17 million tpa, but to increase it to 25–30 
million tpa, Atyrau-Samara would need investment and expansion. In 2002, Russia 
preliminarily agreed to this. Transneft then made implementation contingent on 
Kazakhstan’s reserving a corresponding volume for the route (Vainshtok, 2000; Vin'kov 
and Rubanov, 2006). 
6.7  The new coalition 
In Putin’s first presidential period (2000–4), a stronger state drove Transneft’s 
development. Transneft became more important as a tool of the state, and it was used both 
to facilitate national development and keep oil companies under control. It represented 
infrastructural power that compelled oil companies to hare rents, and remain dependent on 
the state. 
The export capacity deficit was affecting Russian oil c mpanies increasingly by 2001–2. 
Transneft was a source of frustration. Its new pipeline projects developed slowly, while oil 




and overall capacity. The allocation of transport volumes to each company was non-
transparent and unpredictable (Tutushkin, 2008b), and the capacity deficit contributed to 
opacity.  
In 2002, Lukoil proposed a new pipeline to the Barents Sea, attracting interest from 
Sibneft, TNK and Yukos (NiK, 2002e). The plan was to bring West Siberian crude to 
Murmansk. Unlike other ports in European Russia, Murmansk could accommodate large 
tankers for direct exports to North America. Transneft’s support was essential to the 
project (NiK, 2002e). Transneft reacted negatively. A private Russian pipeline consortium 
would infringe on its monopoly.53 In Transneft’s view, the Murmansk project would 
undermine its possibility of financing new pipelines through special tariffs imposed 
equally on all customers, because it would provide an example of avoiding the entire 
system. Transneft’s top management also emphasised that all oil companies had equal 
access to its network. This was only guaranteed if all companies participated. A pipeline 
that suited the four largest exporters’ needs therefore undermined the smaller companies. 
By extension, letting the four major oil companies, all private, expand their profits and 
independence could turn them into serious challengers to the current ruling coalition. 
Transneft’s vice president, Sergei Grigorev, accused the participants of attempting to 
‘evade state control’, which would lead to 
 
the disintegration of Transneft, a catastrophe for the country [because] the 
state would inevitably lose control with the oil sector. (NiK, 2003e)  
 
                                                          





Vainshtok was also dismissive: ‘Why would they want  private pipeline?’ (NiK, 2005b). 
The issue was settled. Energy Minister Igor Yusufov requested further project elaboration 
in Transneft, where it was buried (Vin'kov et al., 2004). Russian oil exporters had to use 
BPS and Primorsk.  
The Murmansk project and Yukos’s China pipeline project were the most serious 
challenges to Transneft’s monopoly. In both cases, Transneft promoted alternatives, to 
Primorsk not Murmansk, and Nakhodka instead of Daqing, that maximised pipeline length 
on Russian territory (Sim, 2008, p.70). The management also made a serious effort to 
ensure that these would be the last challenges to its monopoly. Vainshtok and other top 
managers used every occasion to declare that state-own d pipelines guaranteed equal 
access for all, and served the wider interests of the sector. On this, Transneft had the 
government’s support. In 2002–3, Mikhail Kasianov’s government (2000–4) protected 
Transneft as a matter of principle and to an extent not previously seen (Kanevskaya, 2003). 
The continued need for a pipeline monopoly was enshri ed in the new Energy Strategy 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2003, p.43). By maintaining the monopoly, the government 
also protected the privileged extraction of rents through Transneft. 
But the state did not have complete access to Transneft, especially not to its rent streams. 
The most contentious issue remained the dividends on the state-owned ordinary shares 
(Table 6.1). The issue was repeatedly reopened by the conflict over the privileged shares. 
These were sequestrated, partially or wholly, by the General Procurator several times after 
1999. The conflict abated only after most of the privileged shares changed hands in 2001 
from Transneft’s old management to people closer to the ruling coalition (NiK, 2004b). 




increase investment. The Audit Chamber protested (NiK, 2003l; Reznik, 2003). In turn, 
government representatives on Transneft’s Board argued for re-investing as much of the 
profit as possible in the company (NiK, 2003c). Disagreement among state organisations 
prolonged the conflict for several years (Prime-TASS, 2006; Transneft, 2006, p.42-43; 
2007, p.40-41; 2008, p.26-27). 
One informal rent stream now found a more formal channel. Pipeline inventories had 
quantified the volume of technical oil in the system. It appears to have been Transneft’s 
regular practice to sell this oil, which the oil companies counted as lost. Transneft later 
claimed that the income derived from sales of technical oil from 2001 was invested in new 
pipelines (Ivanova et al., 2008). From 2005, it was donated to charity (p.218; Table 6.1).  
Vainshtok took care to emphasise how Transneft was only a loyal instrument of the state, 
in statements like 
 
If we are told tomorrow [by state agencies] that [the public lottery] 
Sportloto will do this [assign export quotas to oil exporters], then it will be 
that way. (Reznik, 2002b) 
 
By placing responsibility for energy policy firmly with the government, he understated 
Transneft’s influence, and emphasised the significance of the formal institutional 
framework. This was supplemented with declarations f personal loyalty to Putin. It 
became difficult for oil company managers to criticise Transneft. 
6.8  A foreign energy strategy 
Beginning in 2001, overall export capacity increased. Transneft retained the bulk of 




and 6.5). This bolstered the monopoly’s legitimacy nd demonstrated its relevance as state-
owned infrastructure. Export through transit states stagnated or ceased altogether. New oil 
terminals appeared in Russia, and opening even more w uld continue to be a priority 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2003, p.42-43). The emphasis on transit avoidance i  
practice made it difficult to achieve the target of Russia’s foreign energy policy, the 
promotion of a single transport infrastructure with non-discriminatory access in the post-
Soviet region (Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2003, p.24).  
Russian government spokespeople often said that BPS and Primorsk terminal were not 
intended to displace existing export routes. But they used every opportunity to mention 
how BPS and Primorsk would increase Russia’s revenue (Vasil'ev and Suchkov, 1999). 
After BPS opened in December 2001, the emphasis shifted. Ventspils and Butinge’s 
owners came under pressure from Transneft to allow Russian control of export 
infrastructure at reduced prices. The government now differentiated among export routes 
according to their share of Russian involvement in ownership (Kravchenko, 2003b). This 
policy was echoed by Transneft’s vice president, Sergei Grigoriev (Dmitriev, 2003).  
The Latvian and Lithuanian Druzhba branches, with a parallel diesel pipeline, were 66 
percent owned by Ventspils Nafta and 34 percent by Transnefteprodukt. Ventspils Nafta 
also owned the Ventspils terminal and a shipping company. After BPS opened, crude 
export through the Baltic ports fell by about 10 percent (NiK, 2002b).  
A year later, Transneft first reduced, then turned off the flow of crude to Ventspils (Nagla, 
2012). Ventspils Nafta’s transshipment of crude oil decreased from 15 million tonnes in 
2001 to approximately 3 million in 2003 (NiK, 2004m). This was first blamed on technical 




Ventspils (NiK, 2003g; 2005c). Ventspils now had to rely on oil products. In the 2000s, 
approximately half of Russia’s oil products export was shipped through the diesel pipeline 
(NiK, 2003n; 2007d). Transneft offered to invest more in the branch pipeline in return for 
50 percent of Ventspils Nafta. The Latvian governmet, which controlled 34 percent of 
Ventspils Nafta, found the offer too low (Dmitriev, 2003; Vedomosti, 2003; NiK, 2006d), 
and in the end rejected it (NiK, 2006h). Russian oil companies like Lukoil, which 
previously had seen Ventspils Nafta as an attractive erminal (p.160), now lost their 
interest in a minority stake (Pravosudov, 2003).54 After the Ventspils route was 
discontinued, more oil was shipped through Butinge, which only had a capacity of ten 
million tpa (NiK, 2004j). Butinge had been established to import North Sea oil to the 
Mažeikiu refinery, but refining and exporting Urals from pipeline was more profitable. 
Lukoil and Yukos were the main suppliers. Yukos obtained a 53.7 percent stake of 
Mažeikiu Nafta in mid-2002 (NiK, 2002c; 2003b).  
BPS capacity expanded from 12 million tpa in 2001 to 75 million in 2009 (Table 6.3). This 
was costly: 460 million US$ was spent on the first and most expensive part of the project 
(NiK, 2002g; 2011j). BPS became a model for transit avoidance also in oil products 
export. Transnefteprodukt embarked on a new export pipeline in 2003, the Sever.55 Opened 
in 2007, it delivered oil products to Primorsk and reduced the flow of oil products to 
Ventspils (NiK, 2003h; 2007d; 2012e). 
BPS could also be used to pressure Belarus. In 2001, Russia withdrew from the bilateral 
free trade agreement and opened negotiations on a new o e. The end of transit to Ventspils 
also reduced the flow to Belarus. This affected exports from Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, 
                                                          





Rosneft and Yukos. In a letter to Prime Minister Kasianov, company heads urged him to 
keep the route open (Nikolaev, N., 2003). This had no effect. Alekperov called the 
abrogation of the free trade agreement ‘mistaken’ (Pravosudov, 2003). However, the free 
trade arrangement for oil, which shared rents betwen Belarus and Russian companies, was 
extended through 2006.  
Ukraine’s Odesa-Brody pipeline was also completed in 2001 (Balmaceda, 2008, p.92). It 
offered a bypass of both Transneft and the Bosporus (NiK, 2004p), but the Ukrainian 
government had departed from standard practice and failed to secure oil supply before it 
opened, and made little effort to divert existing flows (Balmaceda, 2008, p.93). Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan expressed some interest, but did not commit oil (NiK, 2002f; Savushkin, 
2003; NiK, 2004p).  
A planned connection between Brody and Plock in Poland failed to materialise. In 
consequence, the main trunk of the Odesa-Brody line stood empty in 2001–4 (Savushkin, 
2003). Russia suggested in 2003 reversing Odesa-Brody in order to take oil from Druzhba 
at Brody to the Odesa terminal, but the Ukrainian government was against it (Gavrish, 
2003; Ignatova, 2003b). Reversing the pipeline made some sense to Russian oil companies, 
especially TNK-BP. But the high cost of reversal accentuated the political overtones in 
Russia’s machinations (NiK, 2004i). A stalemate ensu d (Butrin and Sapozhnikov, 2004). 
Kazakhstan proceeded to develop non-Russian routes, especially the China pipeline project 
from 2003 (Atasu-Alashankou). KazTransOil asked theRussian oil companies with 
suitable production, Yukos, Lukoil and Rosneft, to join the project (NiK, 2003k). They 




Expansion of the Caspian Pipeline was still an unresolved issue (NiK, 2005j). In Russia, it 
was now often suggested that Transneft manage the government’s stake in the consortium. 
Transneft’s management appeared reluctant, replying on statements like ‘[CPC] would be a 
burden’, but always qualified by the standard assertion that any government decision on 
the issue would be carried out loyally (Derbilova and Bekker, 2006; Vin'kov and Rubanov, 
2006). 
6.9  The new stability 
The Yukos affair strengthened state support for Transneft. Its leverage over oil companies 
increased, especially because they represented less of a challenge to the institutional 
framework. Yukos had been a vocal opponent of the pipeline monopoly, but it was 
dissolved. The monopoly was further strengthened in 2007 when Transnefteprodukt was 
reorganised as a Transneft subsidiary. The merger took place against Vainshtok’s wish 
(NiK, 2008b). Transneft received 16,400 km of oil product trunk pipeline in Russia, and 
pipelines in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Transnefteprodukt, 2009, p.23). As a result, 
Transneft in Russia resembled an updated version of Glavtransneft, and it increased in 
relevance as a foreign policy tool.  
In 2001, the Finance Ministry had made it obligatory for state-owned companies to adopt 
International Financial Reporting Standards by 2005. This contributed to transparency, and 
institutionalisation, of Transneft’s informal rent stream. Transneft began publishing annual 
reports, the first in 2005. The proceeds from the sale of technical oil were donated to 
charity. This went hand in hand with changes to formal rent streams. In 2005, the State 
Property Ministry prevented dividends being paid for 2004 to force an increase over the 




the state. Transneft was left without a functioning Board for over six months as a 
consequence (Fokina, 2006). The Ministry backed down at the last minute to avoid a 
situation in which the privileged shares would be converted into ordinary shares, and dilute 
state control (Fokina, 2006). Transneft now minimised profit by retaining much of it in its 
subsidiaries (Derbilova, 2006; Fokina, 2006). The argument was that the subsidiaries 
owned the pipelines, but the aim was clearly to reduc  dividends (Surzhenko and Reznik, 
2008). This irritated the State Property Ministry, which again found dividends payments to 
the state short of target (NiK, 2004b). Their irritation may have grown when they learned 
that the privileged shares were most likely held by people close to the ruling coalition. 
Transneft was supported by the Ministry for Economic Development and the Industry and 
Energy Ministry. Transneft prevailed, and began in 2006 to channel more of its profits into 
business development (Table 6.1) (Transneft, 2008; 2 09b; 2010; 2011d; Bloomberg/The 
Moscow Times, 2009). 
There was also increasing openness around tariff calculation. Transneft asked the Federal 
Tariff Service (FTS) to approve a transparent formula for price formation (Transneft, 2006, 
p.25; 2007, p.23). It applied only to the base price. The exemption was the cumulative 
surcharges, which appeared frequently and at short notice (Transneft, 2006, p.27; 2007, 
p.25; 2011c; 2011b; 2011a; NiK, 2009a). Quarterly transport schedules improved 
transparency further (Surzhenko and Reznik, 2008). 
Before 2005, Transneft had had the government’s support in its opposition to a quality 
bank system. Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko surprised the oil industry when he 
stated in 2003 that ‘the quality of crude has not deteriorated from being mixed’ (NiK, 




producers of lower-grade crude were mostly state or regionally owned. But in 2005, the 
pressure to adopt a quality system strengthened. Rosneft now owned Yuganskneftegaz, 
which produced higher quality oil. President Putin complained that Urals regularly traded 
at a 4–5 US$ discount compared to Brent blend (Stratfor, 2005). A quality bank in 
Transneft’s system could make the price gap narrower. Vainshtok argued the case against: 
‘if we say we have a unitary state, why should Tatneft and Bashneft (…) suffer?’ (NiK, 
2007e). In the end, there was no quality bank.  
The project of a Russian pipeline to China, first pursued by Yukos, progressed from 2003 
in an altered form as a Transneft project (Bradshaw, 2014, p.200-201). Putin and 
government ministers followed the project closely. Construction was supposed to begin in 
April 2006. Two days before, Putin, spontaneously and in public, ordered the pipeline 
route moved to the north of Lake Baikal, thereby lengthening it by 500 km (Kolesnikov, 
2006). Inevitably, the pipeline’s cost almost doubled, from 6.65 billion US$ to 11.2 billion, 
not least because Vainshtok asserted that the pipeline would still be delivered on schedule. 
Construction proceeded in a rush (Martynov, 2008). Cost estimates continued to rise, to 
14.45 billion US$ by November 2010 (Gavshina and Reznik, 2010). Vainshtok failed to 
get his contract in Transneft renewed in September 2007 (Rebrov, 2009b). Shortly 
afterwards, Vainshtok and his management were accused of misusing funds during ESPO 
construction (Surzhenko and Reznik, 2008; NiK, 2010c).  
In October 2007, Nikolai Tokarev was appointed head of Transneft. He announced early 
on that the ESPO pipeline would be completed a year b hind schedule (NiK, 2008c).  
Tokarev came to Transneft from Zarubezhneft. According to media reports, he had risen to 




office in the 1980s (Shvedko, 2002; Gordeev, 2007; Makarkin, 2007b) and in the 
Presidential Administration in the mid-1990s. After his short period in Transneft in 1999–
2000, Tokarev headed the state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft. He was seen as close to 
First Deputy Prime Minister and Rosneft Board Chairm n Igor Sechin (Makarkin, 2007b). 
Tokarev knew Gennadii Timchenko of the oil trader Gunvor quite well (Surzhenko and 
Reznik, 2008). Timchenko was rumoured to manage Putin’s private business interests in 
oil and gas, but no business link has been substantiated (Bernstein, 2007; Harding, 2007; 
Quiring, 2007; Bernstein, 2008; Kupchinsky, 2009). With Tokarev, a management team 
from Zarubezhneft came to Transneft (Makarkin, 2007b; Transneft, 2008, p.11-14).  
The Audit Chamber began investigations in 2008 of ESPO expenditures (Butrin, 2008). It 
concluded that a substantial part of ESPO contracts had been awarded without tender, but 
the misuse of funds on Transneft’s part was less significant than alleged (Rebrov, 2009b; 
Schetnaya palata, 2009; Bratersky, 2010). The audit di  not lead to charges at first, but its 
full text was not disclosed (NiK, 2010c). In March 2010, the head of the Audit Chamber, 
Sergei Stepashin, reported to the Duma that an unspecified company management had 
been indicted following the ESPO investigation (Stenogramma zasedaniya 24 marta 2010 
g., 2010). In later media leaks, Vainshtok and two current Transneft manager were 
implicated in the case (NiK, 2010c). By now, the transparency campaigner and Transneft 
shareholder Aleksei Navalnyi had published documents on his blog indicating gross 
irregularities in ESPO construction (Naval'nyi, 2010). It is still difficult to calculate how 
much informal rent was extracted through the ESPO project.  
But ESPO’s finance package also improved financial transparency in Transneft. In 2009 it 




totalling 35 billion rubles or 1.1 billion US$ (Bloomberg/The Moscow Times, 2009; NiK, 
2009a). In the investor information package, Transneft detailed its charity donations from 
the sale of technical oil in 2005–8. They were enormous in the Russian context, over a 
billion rubles annually, peaking in 2007 at 7.2 billion (Malkova, 2009). They were also 
larger than the dividends issued to shareholders in the same years (Table 6.1). Transneft 
was Russia’s largest corporate charity donor in 2007 (Kaz'min, 2012). This informal rent 
had been channelled into charities like a fund for veterans of the Federal Guards Service 
(Malkova, 2009). In May 2010, Navalnyi obtained a court order to force the police to 
investigate undisclosed beneficiaries (Malkova, 2010b; Oliphant, 2010). Beginning in 
2011, Transneft disclosed information on charity donations (Transneft, 2011e). 
Calculations by this author show that in 2011, Transneft contributed just above 8.5 billion 
rubles to charity, or around 204 million Euro/264 million US$. Donations went to a wide 
range of organisations and individuals throughout Russia. In effect, Transneft was 
channelling informal rent via a CSR programme and ehancing the state’s infrastructural 
power. Transneft essentially performed a quasi-fiscal service (p.39) for the state, by 
collecting considerable rents through excess transportation costs extracted from oil 
companies, and directing them into selected groups and individuals in the elite and the 
wider population.  
In addition to charity, in 2009 Transneft gave 100 million rubles to the new Continental Ice 
Hockey League (Transneft, 2010, p.39), founded in 2008 by several major companies, 
mostly state owned. Transneft owned a 11.76 percent stake (Dospekhov, 2008; Transneft, 




Tokarev fended off a 2010 government proposal to privatise 25 percent of Transneft 
(Butrin, 2010; Kommersant, 2010; Korytina, 2010; Oliphant, 2010; Tovkailo and 
Biryukov, 2010). There were, however, indications of financial overstretch in Transneft, 
which suggested a JV model for the construction of a new pipeline (Zapolyarye–Purpe) 
(Starinskaya, 2010). In the event, it was easier to agree on a more indirect burden sharing 
model (NiK, 2011e). 
6.10  Expansion? 
In 2009, the new Energy Strategy emphasised transit state dependence as a foreign energy 
policy problem (Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.35). Transit avoidance had priority 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.48). Transneft’s monopoly made customers look for 
alternatives. In Belarus and Ukraine, deprived of a part of Russia’s oil export, Russia’s 
transit avoidance opened excess capacity in the downstream sectors. Their governments 
now sought, and increasingly secured, oil from other suppliers like Venezuela and 
Azerbaijan. 
6.10.1  Transneft control on Baltic routes 
As of 2005, Butinge was the largest foreign terminal for Russian crude export, but the 
volume was only around 5 million tpa (NiK, 2006l). However, Mažeikiu Nafta came up for 
sale again following the Yukos affair. The Lithuani government, which controlled 40.6 
percent of the refinery, used its right of first refusal to take control of Yukos’s share, and 
offered 84.3 percent up for re-privatisation (Rebrov, 2005). There were several offers, of 
which the best came from KazMunaiGaz and the Polish company PKN Orlen, the former’s 
slightly higher than the latter’s (Rebrov, 2005; Shevel'kova, 2005; Rebrov, 2006; 2008b). 




of oil deliveries to the refinery. KazMunaiGaz promised to deliver 12 million tpa in the 
next ten years. As Kazakhstan’s crude export reached a maximum on existing routes in 
autumn 2005, its problem was not supply, but transit capacity (NiK, 2006j). KazMunaiGaz 
had a transit agreement with Transneft for the necessary volumes. Transneft, however, 
quickly and unilaterally abandoned the agreement, possibly on order from the government 
(US Office Almaty, 2006). Transneft now required KazMunaiGaz to secure an amendment 
to the bilateral agreement between Russia and Kazakhst n which guaranteed transit of the 
increased volume through Russia (Rebrov, 2005; Shevel'ko a, 2005; Tutushkin, 2005). 
KazMunaiGaz had to retract its offer, and in consequence it remained completely 
dependent on Transneft’s goodwill on this route. 
PKN Orlen acquired Mažeikiu Nafta in May 2006. Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Yukos (later 
Rosneft), Tatneft and TNK-BP continued to supply crude to the refinery and terminal. But 
in July 2006, one of the two pipes on the Baltic Druzhba branch broke down inside Russia, 
stopping the flow of oil to Butinge (Nagla, 2012). The pipeline was not irreparable, but 
repair was too costly for Transneft. There was a possibility to redirect oil temporarily from 
BPS to Butinge, but Transneft ruled this option out (NiK, 2006h). Energy Minister 
Khristenko also ruled out repairs, advising Russian companies to use Primorsk to supply 
Butinge by ship (NiK, 2007b). This they did.  
In the period around the Druzhba rupture, Sechin may h ve overruled Transneft and 
ordered TNK-BP and Lukoil not to supply Mažeikiu Nafta (Embassy Moscow, 2006). 
Rosneft cancelled supplies to Mažeikiu the month before the accident (Embassy Vilnius, 
2006). Whatever the background, increasing reliance on BPS, instead of reconstructing the 




6.10.2  Belarus and BPS-2 
By 2006, transit relations with Belarus had grown problematic and erupted into full-blown 
crisis when Gazprom in January 2007 increased the gas price to Belarus (p.262). The 
following settlement introduced a Russian export duy on oil to Belarus. In response, 
Belarus introduced a transit duty, which Transneft r used to pay. Belarus then stopped 
around 79,000 tonnes of oil en route to Europe. Russia stopped all exports through Belarus 
in return (Khalip, 2007; Lavrov, 2007; Tomashevskaya et al., 2007). In the next settlement, 
Belarus cancelled the new transit duty and returned th  oil, while Russia granted Belarus a 
discount on the export duty, which would decrease gradually until 2010, when the 
agreement expired (Anishyuk, 2010). Rents were again shared and transit resumed. 
Russia’s reputation as a reliable oil supplier to Europe suffered. 
The crisis accelerated progress on a new Transneft project, rumoured to have Sechin’s 
support. A second pipeline to the Baltic Sea, BPS-2, linking Druzhba to Primorsk, would 
allow export oil to bypass Belarus altogether. The planned throughput was 50 million tpa 
(Savushkin, 2007), and the cost around 4 billion US$ ( ocor, 2012b). BPS-2 could reduce 
transit volumes also through Ukraine. Planning started in February (Gorelov and 
Tomashevskaya, 2007; Kulikov, 2007). Vainshtok indicated an 18-month construction 
period, declaring that Primorsk would be expanded if necessary. While Vainshtok 
preferred Primorsk, regional interests suggested Ust-Luga, to the south of St Petersburg 
(NiK, 2008d). The tide for a while turned against BPS-2 (NiK, 2008d). There were doubts 
about whether the pipeline could be filled. BPS-1, as the ‘old’ BPS was now called, was 
utilised below capacity. In April 2008, the Energy and Industry Ministry said demand for 




In May, shortly after becoming prime minister, Putin declared that BPS-2 would be 
constructed, and terminate at Ust-Luga. The Transport Ministry, the Russian Railways and 
Gunvor, Timchenko’s oil trading company, were reportedly in favour of Ust-Luga (NiK, 
2008d; 2011j). Gunvor seems to have been close to establishing control over Ust-Luga’s 
oil terminal at this point (NiK, 2009b). When the BPS-2 plan was finalised in November 
2008, Ust-Luga was the endpoint, but overall volume projections were revised downwards, 
from 50 million tpa with an option of 75, to 30 million tpa with an option of 50 (NiK, 
2011j). This was closer to actual demand for transport, but still excessive. 
There was a new oil transit crisis in Russian–Belarusi n relations in January 2010. The two 
states again failed to reach a new agreement when the old one expired (Anishyuk, 2010). 
Russia may have pushed to get Russian oil companies to finally take over Belarus’s 
refineries (Gabuev et al., 2010a; Socor, 2010). The settlement in the end reduced Belarus’s 
duty free oil import quota to 6.3 million tonnes for domestic consumption. Extra volumes 
would be subject to full export duties (Bilateral Protocol of the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, 2010, quoted in Dyner, 2010; 
Yafimava, 2011, p.251 fn. 138). This was costly for Belarus, which now sought contracts 
with Venezuela (through swaps) and Azerbaijan (NiK, 2011h).  
BPS-2 opened officially in March 2012 (NiK, 2011j). Due to the difficult seabed 
conditions, Ust-Luga would likely have to undergo a prolonged test regime of several 
months (NiK, 2012d). BPS-2 would therefore operate below maximum for an extended 
period, incurring losses for Transneft (NiK, 2012d). It was alleged that an inexperienced 
subcontractor, affiliated with Timchenko, had failed to address the fraught seabed 




Timchenko (NiK, 2012d). By now, there was considerable excess capacity in export 
pipelines, so overall volumes were unaffected.  
In 2011, on the tenth anniversary of BPS-1’s opening, Transneft’s company magazine 
celebrated it as ‘the route of independence’. Special attention was given to the threat to 
Russia’s economic independence of transit through Latvia and Lithuania. Their ‘monopoly 
position’ had, against the background of their Nato ccession, given these states an 
opportunity to blackmail Russia economically and politically. The article credited Putin for 
his role in moving the project forward (Marochkin, 2012, p.15).  
As it appeared in March 2012, BPS-2 would take volumes from BPS-1, as it added excess 
capacity on export routes. Losses were likely. Primo sk and Ust-Luga competed for crude 
oil and diesel deliveries (NiK, 2012e). The rule of thumb for transit pipelines held true: 
alternative routes can be expensive (Stevens, 2009, p.20). However, most of this expense 
was financed by tariff surcharges and therefore covered by oil companies. Some of these 
resources may have been distributed within the ruling coalition as lucrative construction 
and service contracts. BPS-2 strengthened Russia’s position in negotiations with Belarus 
and Ukraine. Belarus’s opportunities to take a share of Russian oil rent through transit and 
re-export were curtailed. Transit volumes through Belarus and Ukraine decreased in 2011, 
but Druzhba did not become redundant (Table 6.2) (NiK, 2011j). Russian oil exporters still 
relied on Druzhba for export, especially to Central European refineries (NiK, 2011j).  
6.10.3  Ukraine 
Transit through Ukraine declined most. Russian crude transit decreased by about 25 
percent from 2006 to 2007 (Gorelov and Tomashevskaya, 2007), and by another 11.6 




disagreeable for over a decade, especially over the Odesa-Brody pipeline. The pipeline had 
opened in reverse in September 2004, ahead of the Nov mber elections (Ivzhenko, 2004; 
NiK, 2006e). The Ukrainian and Polish governments meanwhile worked to attract oil from 
Kazakhstan. Chevron was the most interested producer (Embassy Warsaw, 2005). While 
Kazakhstan looked for non-Russian transit routes to Europe, neither Kazakhstan nor 
Chevron wanted to antagonise Russia over Odesa-Brody, a route they had not asked for in 
the first place. 
Ukraine also explored the possibility of supplying Czech refineries through the Slovak part 
of Druzhba (Embassy Bratislava, 2006c; 2006b). In 2006–7, Russia piled on the pressure 
to get Slovakia to agree to a Gazprom Neft takeover f Yukos’s 49 percent stake in the 
Slovak pipeline company Transpetrol (Embassy Bratislava, 2006a). Ukraine’s Slovak route 
failed to materialise. But it remains questionable whether Ukraine’s governments in this 
period could commit to a Polish extension, or any outlet option, while the flow direction in 
Odesa-Brody was caught up in a struggle among politicians and their business interests (cf. 
Embassy Warsaw, 2006; Balmaceda, 2008, p.93-95). In 2009, Ukrtransnafta asked 
Transneft to allow a transit pause so that it could conduct a 48 hour trial flow in the 
original direction. Transneft refused. Tokarev called it a ‘risky venture’ (Rebrov, 2009a). 
BPS-2 would in any event redirect oil flows away from Ukraine (Transneft, 2009c; Zuev, 
2009). When the volume of oil transiting out of Russia decreased, Belarusian and 
Ukrainian refineries in 2011 contracted Azeri oil, and Odesa-Brody was put into operation 




6.10.4  Defending Transneft’s share of Caspian transit 
Azerbaijan planned to stop exports through Novorossiisk completely after BTC 
commenced operation in 2005. Baku-Novorossiisk was a reserve pipeline, covered by a 5 
million tpa transit agreement (NiK, 2011b). By 2011 it was operating at a loss to Transneft, 
and Azerbaijan proposed revising the volume downwards to 1.5 million tpa (NiK, 2011b). 
By 2006, Kazakhstan had access to four major export routes: BTC; the China pipeline that 
had just opened; CPC; and Atyrau-Samara (Table 6.6) (NiK, 2006n). Russian companies 
found the China pipeline to be a cost-efficient alternative to rail export to China. Rosneft 
tried to export 1.2 million tonnes oil to China in 2007 through Kazakhstan, and applied to 
Transneft for access to the adjoining Russian pipeline. Transneft declined, citing the lack 
of a regulatory framework (Derbilova, 2007; NiK, 2007e). Rail transit continued (NiK, 
2006b). The Kazakhstan–China pipeline was completed in 2009, with a 10 million tpa 
maximum throughput (NiK, 2009d).  
After BTC opened, Kazakhstan seemed close to approving the trans-Caspian pipeline 
project on several occasions, but was reluctant to make a final decision. However, a trans-
Caspian route did not have to be a pipeline. Kazakhst n and Azerbaijan started in June 
2006 to develop a tanker transport system that tooklight Kazakhstani crude to Baku and 
BTC (Komsomol'skaya Pravda Kazakhstan, 2007). This was operational in October 2008 
(Guliyev and Arkhrarkhodjaeva, 2008, p.16). Kazakhstan also started planning a larger 
Kazakhstan-Caspian Oil Transport System in 2006, with a feeder pipeline in Kazakhstan 
and an expanded fleet (Butyrina, 2007; KazMunaiGaz, 2011; KMG-Transkaspii, 2012). In 
addition, KazTransOil acquired the Batumi oil terminal in Georgia in 2006–8, while 




2007b; 2008; KazMunaiGaz, 2012b). The latter acquisition gave Kazakhstan access to 
considerable refinery capacity and an extensive distribution network.  
But while Kazakhstan developed non-Russian export routes, Transneft remained unwilling 
to expand Kazakhstan’s export capacity through Russia. In addition to Transneft’s denial 
of additional capacity to Butinge, Transneft seemed to delay capacity increases in the 
Atyrau-Samara pipeline until BPS was fully developed (NiK, 2005e). The BPS-2 project 
propelled the expansion process for Atyrau-Samara forward. Following years of little or no 
progress, an agreement on a 25 million tpa expansion was finally reached in May 2008 
(NiK, 2008d; IA FK-Novosti, 2009; Rebrov, 2009a). Atyrau-Samara would feed BPS-2 
(NiK, 2008d; 2009e). However, on the supply side, Atyrau-Samara expansion now 
competed with an expanded Caspian pipeline as well as the China pipeline. It lost out to 
the competition, and the expansion project was therefore shelved in 2009 (NiK, 2009e; 
2011j; 2011b; 2012a).  
Transneft remained reluctant to take on greater responsibility in the CPC. But the Russian 
government changed its policy in 2006 and used the opportunity to let Transneft manage 
its stake to force the other consortium members into compliance (Derbilova and Borisov, 
2006; Skornyakova and Skorlygina, 2006). Russian tax inspections may have been used to 
pile on the pressure further (NiK, 2006c). Then, in April 2007, Transneft was awarded 
management rights to Russia’s share, against Vainshtok’  wish. Transneft did not pay for 
these rights, but it obtained full freedom in their xercise (Mazneva, 2007). The pressure 
on other consortium members to raise tariffs and restructure CPC debts was palpable (NiK, 




route. In response to Russia’s fait accompli, they threatened to increase trans-Caspian 
export.  
At this point, Kazakhstan delayed the development of the trans-Caspian connection to BTC 
somewhat and supported the CPC (Makarkin, 2007a; NiK, 2007g). In September 2007, 
Chevron gave in to Russian demands, and agreed to CPC expansion on Russia’s terms 
(p.206) (Butrin and Rebrov, 2007). Tariffs were increased, interest payments reduced, and 
for the first time CPC ran a profit (Zotova, E., 2008a). Russia suddenly achieved its 
primary objective with CPC, tax extraction. The Russian government seemed unprepared 
for its success. But now the CPC moved expansion forward. Oman left the consortium in 
November 2008, and Russia acquired its 7 percent stake, apparently just ahead of 
Kazakhstan (Zotova, E., 2008a). Russia’s share was now 31 percent, managed by 
Transneft. Expansion now became a desirable prospect for Russia as well. Maximising 
Russia’s share of oil export from Kazakhstan was a more urgent priority now that 
Kazakhstan had an outlet to China. Kazakhstan again proceeded with the integrated trans-
Caspian route (NiK, 2009e). Transneft manoeuvred quickly to force an agreement on 
expansion (Gavshina, 2008), and it finally actually moved forward (Mel'nikov, 2009; NiK, 
2010f; CPC, 2012).  
In 2006, Russia revived an old project from 1994 comprising a pipeline from Burgas in 
Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis in Greece (Reuters News, 1994; RFE/RL, 1997). Initially 
intended to boost exports from Novorossiisk and compete with BTC (NiK, 2007h), it was 
now seized upon as a perfect feeder pipeline for an expanded Caspian pipeline 
(Kupchinsky, 2006; NiK, 2012a). As the CPC expansio materialised, the Russian 




(Gavshina, 2008; Mel'nikov, 2009). However, by 2009 the project had faltered in the face 
of the financial crisis currently hitting Greece and Bulgaria (NiK, 2009e; 2010f; 
Daborowski, 2011; Eastweek, 2011; Gavshina, 2011). From October 2009 Russia 
participated in an alternative project in Turkey, the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (NiK, 2012a).  
6.11  Conclusions 
Transneft came out of the Soviet period as a state-owned company with a monopoly 
transport service which it provided equally to all oi  producers. But it offered little access 
for state organisations. In 1991–7, central state organisations participated less and less in 
Transneft’s development. Informal ties substituted for state access. With Chernomyrdin’s 
informal protection, Transneft developed autonomously of the central state. By 1996, the 
Fuel and Energy Ministry was well aware of Transneft’s policy, and tried to access a 
greater share of Transneft’s informal rent streams, remove Chernyaev, and make Transneft 
follow government instruction and become accessible to the state. With Chernomyrdin out 
of government, this was possible.  
Savelev made Transneft accessible to the state, a process that continued under Vainshtok. 
The privileged shares still constrained Transneft’s rent sharing with the government. The 
resolution of this conflict under Putin very likely involved a modification of rent 
management arrangements to give the ruling coalition a share of Transneft’s dividends.  In 
that case, informal rent sharing continued to tie the Transneft to the regime. 
Transneft was a domestic and foreign policy tool frm the mid-1990s, but only in the 
2000s under Vainshtok was its full potential realised. The state had better access to 
Transneft, and greater capacity to support development. In Transneft’s case, increased state 




for its monopoly status depended on its capacity to deliver infrastructural power to the 
state. This it did, contributing to the restoration f state capacity and thereby also regime 
stability. Transneft gained from this itself, as it was enabled to claim a share of oil 
companies’ rent streams for pipeline construction.  
BPS first showed how Transneft could deliver infrastructural and economic development 
in a way that maximised state capacity and regime power over the economy. BPS delivered 
a new export route, but a commercially suboptimal one for oil companies. With transport 
routes a question of national policy, it was easier for the state to control Russian oil 
companies through Transneft. Concerns of regional development and the bypassing of 
Latvia and Lithuania overruled cost-efficiency concerns. The BPS tariff surcharge, levied 
from all oil producers in Russia, coerced oil companies into spending more of their income 
in Russia. They were now funding the development of regions and industrial sectors 
(concrete, steel, pipe, ports, etc) as it suited th state, with the actual beneficiaries of these 
oil rents selected for their proximity to the regime. Pipeline construction became a source 
of infrastructural power to the state, but it also allowed the ruling coalition to dispense 
patronage and cultivate dependence on itself within t e elite. Transneft’s role as a source 
of authoritarian durability was then strengthened by the state’s protection of Transneft’s 
pipeline monopoly. This ensured that no oil company could grow beyond state control and 
challenge the ruling coalition’s hold on power.  
Transneft seemed closer to the ruling coalition in 2008, in an interesting parallel with the 
1990s. Its monopoly and rent streams had political protection to an extent otherwise only 
observed in Rosatom, and far beyond Gazprom’s. Transneft’s closeness to the regime 




channels of informal rents to the ruling coalition associated with BPS-2 and ESPO 
promoted regime stability, but weakened state control. This also contributed to production 
and spending that was most likely excessive. 
Transneft’s usefulness as a tool of the state and source of authoritarian durability extended 
into the post-Soviet region. Bypass pipeline projects were useful foreign policy tools, and 
sticks in relations with transit state governments. Once in place, bypass pipelines 
maximised Russian control of export routes and simplified interaction with transit states. 
But Transneft was more successful in promoting the avoidance of old transit routes to the 
west than in controlling the Caspian transit route. Russia’s pursuit of maximum control of 
the Caspian transit route closed potential avenues for cooperation with oil producers in 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Transneft could have been a force of bilateral energy 
cooperation. Though never very likely, it was neverth less an option in the 1990s. But 
Russia’s aim to achieve maximum control, interpreted rather narrowly by Transneft, made 
potential partners wary of its routes. Transneft was here a foreign policy tool that 
cultivated dependence on Russia to some extent, but also one that restricted Russia’s 





7. GAS: GAZPROM 
This chapter analyses Gazprom, the Russian state-con rolled company for gas production, 
gas transport by pipeline, gas transmission and export, and its relations with the Russian 
state. As in the previous chapters, their interaction was part of the institutional 
development of the Russian state, and took place both in Russia and abroad. In relation to 
Gazprom, two recurrent topics in the literature have been the extent to which it functioned 
as a state within the Russian state (e.g. in Victor and Sayfer, 2012), and its role as a tool of 
the Russian state abroad (Hill, 2004; Finon and Locatelli, 2008; Sherr, 2013). With the 
framework used here, these two views, which appear to contradict each other, are nuanced, 
and it is argued that they represent the domestic and international sides of Gazprom’s 
interaction with the Russian state over institutional development. In this respect, Gazprom 
is similar to the other cases studied here. When compared to them, what stands out is how 
the Soviet legacy of an integrated pipeline system, and the natural monopoly that gas 
provides for, mattered in making Gazprom both powerful in relation to the state, and a tool 
for the state. 
7.1  The break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet legacies 
Gazprom appeared in 1989 as a ‘concern’ in the Soviet gas industry. This implied some 
autonomy from the state (Kryukov and Moe, 1996, p.7-9)  Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former 
Gas Industry Minister (1985–9), was the main force behind Gazprom, and he aimed to 
channel income from gas exports into the investment-starved production and transport 
sectors (NiK, 2013c). In 1990–91, Chernomyrdin secur d Gazprom control over 
Soyuzgazeksport, the entity responsible for gas exports to Europe (Emel'yanov, 2003; 




autonomy in the final months of the Soviet Union. In 1991, Chernomyrdin and a long-time, 
close associate from the gas industry, Rem Vyakhirev, lobbied through the Supreme 
Soviet’s Order no. 2, which made it possible to establish Gazprom as a company 
(Bilanenko, 2013). The crisis in the wider economy created opportunities for insiders 
(p.35) to consolidate and expand the gas industry under a single umbrella. Gazprom turned 
into an indispensable support for the Russian stateand the ruling coalition. 
During the first wave of privatisation in 1992, First Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar 
(Prime Minister from June) ordered an audit of Gazprom’s foreign accounts (Kirichenko 
and Solov’ev, 1992; Bardin, 1992; Victor and Sayfer, 2012, p.662). Chernomyrdin, shortly 
afterwards appointed Fuel and Energy Minister, reversed this effort to gain access to 
Gazprom by granting it control of foreign exports (Kirichenko and Solov’ev, 1992; Victor 
and Sayfer, 2012, p.662). Gazprom was then exempt from urther reform, in what Gaidar 
most likely saw as a necessary compromise to preserv  stability (Gustafson, 2012, p.71). 
Gazprom’s export monopoly was now connected to its role as a stabilising force in the 
economy. Gazprom was allowed to accumulate tax-exempt stabilisation funds under its 
autonomous control and accumulate export earnings i foreign currency accounts abroad 
(Victor and Sayfer, 2012, p.662), creating an informal channel for rent that could be 
directed towards the state’s needs.  
As a result, the Soviet legacy in the Russian gas industry was an integrated organisation 
with considerable control from production to consumer, especially compared to other post-
Soviet economic sectors.  
With gas, consumption and production are closely connected (Ericson, 2009, p.37; 2012, 




establishing such systems makes them a natural monopoly (p.67 fn.11), once in place 
(Ericson, 2009, p.29). Gazprom’s pipeline system was enormous, consisting of the United 
Gas Supply (UGS) grid, separate regional grids in parts of Russia, and local transmission 
lines (Yafimava, 2015, p.2). All told, it was a 140,0 0 km network that extended from 
some of the world’s largest fields well into the post-Soviet region and Europe. Production 
continued with only a minor slump in demand in 1991–2 (Stern, 1993, p.13).  
7.2  Keeping afloat and muddling through 
Vyakhirev succeeded Chernomyrdin, prime minister from late 1992, at Gazprom. During 
Vyakhirev’s time as Gazprom’s head (1992–2001), the gas monopoly was reinforced and 
extended into other areas, rather than encroached upon (Kryukov and Moe, 1996, p.3). 
Valuable staff moved from the Soviet Ministry to Gazprom in 1989–91. Gazprom assumed 
the strategic, regulatory and operational management of the gas industry from production 
to consumption. This was formalised in a November 1992 decree (Decree No 1333, 1992); 
Gazprom was also entrusted with the management and development of the Single Gas Grid 
(Decree No 538, 1992). Ownership remained with the state, but Gazprom was stronger 
than the new Fuel and Energy Ministry (Kryukov and Moe, 1996, p.7; Victor and Sayfer, 
2012, p.662). Gazprom’s export earnings secured financial autonomy. 
Gazprom’s rent streams stabilised society, the state, and supported the regime. Gas was 
delivered to factories, offices and private homes at till-subsidised prices and in spite of 
chronic non-payments. Gazprom almost controlled the Russian state by propping up the 
budget. As regarded its informal contributions, Gazprom was, in the words of Economy 
Minister Evgenii Yasin (1994–7), ‘like a second Russian [state] budget when the first was 




Yeltsin financially in the conflict with the Suprem Soviet in 1992–3 and the 1996 election 
campaign (Popov, I., 2007). In this way, Gazprom enabled the ruling coalition to maintain 
its power advantage over potential rivals (p.58). 
In return for acting as a stabilising mechanism and maintaining the population’s 
dependence on the state, Gazprom enjoyed extensive autonomy. Vyakhirev set the terms of 
relations with the state as he saw fit. Gazprom functio ed as a classic state within the state 
(Stern, 2005, p.172; Victor and Sayfer, 2012). Its ownership relations with the state 
gradually developed into an informal concession (pp.49-51), with the state’s stake 
managed by the Board and informally controlled by Vyakhirev. Partial privatisation was 
authorised by Decree no 1333, drafted by Chernomyrdin. It also reorganised Gazprom, the 
state ‘concern’, into a shareholding company (Decre No 1333, 1992). The decree enabled 
privatisation of up to 60 percent of Gazprom’s stock within three years, a period 
subsequently extended (Decree No 1333, (1992) 1997). Two clauses further limited state 
participation in Gazprom’s affairs. Clause 7 allowed Gazprom to retain at least 50 percent 
of the dividends on state-held shares to finance maintenance works and other investment in 
the three years following the decree (Decree No 1333, 1992). Clause 8 entrusted the Board 
of Directors with the management of the state’s shares on behalf of the state. The 
government would appoint Board members, but the trustee mechanism restricted the state’s 
access to Gazprom. Accordingly, the Board would have greater autonomy than indicated 
by the state’s formal share (Decree No 1333, 1992). The clause had no time limit. 
Vyakhirev was shortly thereafter appointed Board Chairman, as a concessionaire of sorts. 
The state’s share of Gazprom fluctuated between 35 and 40 percent after partial 




(Decree No 887, 1998). Gazprom’s concessions relations with the state were consolidated 
in 1994. Taking advantage of new legislation on trustee management (Decree No 2296, 
1993), Vyakhirev came to hold a 35 percent share package in trustee management on 
behalf of the state, leaving only 5 percent in actul state control (Nikolaev et al., 1994; 
Stern, 2005, p.172). The agreement was prolonged for three more years in 1996 (Decree 
No 599, 1996), although conditions were revised somewhat in favour of the state in 1997 
(Decree No 478, 1997). Before this revision, Vyakhirev had apparently had the option to 
buy out the state at a price of one ruble per share (Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.46-48). 
After revision, the management had a right to claim nd acquire, at asking price, any stake 
put out for privatisation before 1 January 1999 (Decre  No 529, 1997). The right was never 
exercised (Popov, I., 2007). Other members of Chernomyrdin’s government, and later 
governments, attempted – unsuccessfully – to abrogate the trustee arrangement (Kravets, 
V., 1998; Levin, 2000; Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.44-50). It remained in force to 
expiry (Popov, I., 2007).  
The decision to retain state ownership of Gazprom delayed reform of the company. Gaidar 
government reformers had intended to reform Gazprom at a later stage and open up for 
competition in the gas industry. This did not happen. Vyakhirev and the rest of Gazprom’s 
management resisted reform (NiK, 2004h), and were hostile to any interference from 
market reformers, especially Chubais (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). To Vyakhirev, late 
Soviet practices, including autarchy within Gazprom and autonomy from the state, suited 
Gazprom well also in the 1990s (Bilanenko, 2013). There was considerable support for his 





Gazprom’s management used privatisation of Gazprom’s holdings to preserve insiders’ 
control through ownership. There appeared a conglomerate of companies indirectly 
affiliated with Gazprom or its management. The engineering and construction company 
Stroitransgaz, controlled by Vyakhirev’s and Chernomyrdin’s children, received around 80 
percent of Gazprom’s construction contracts. Stroitransgaz held 4.83 percent of the shares 
in Gazprom (Reznik, 2002a; 2009). 
Vyakhirev was at the peak of insider consolidation. The management was a powerful brake 
on reform, and the Fuel and Energy Ministry was too weak to gain access to Gazprom 
(Kryukov and Moe, 1996, p.16-17; Malkova and Igumenov, 2012; Makarkin, 2013; NiK, 
2013g). Gazprom provided in-house social services for 300,000-plus employees and their 
families (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). Gas rents were thus channelled in a way that 
maintained employee dependence on Gazprom and impeded r form. Gas prices to factories 
and consumers remained regulated, delivered as a subsidy almost as in Soviet times. Any 
government contemplating reform of Gazprom would have to weigh the long-term benefits 
of profitability in Gazprom against short-term considerations of maintaining stability and 
support for the ruling coalition (Ericson, 2012, p.634). This rent sharing protected 
Gazprom’s monopoly in gas distribution, extensive autonomy from the state and discretion 
to regulate the gas sector. 
While Chernomyrdin remained Prime Minister (1992–8), Vyakhirev had a powerful 
political patron. Yeltsin, on at least one occasion in 1997, vetoed changes to Vyakhirev’s 
position (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). There was a limit to this support. Gazprom’s 1996 
tax arrears reached 70 trillion rubles (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). The government 




it overruled informal constraints. Chernomyrdin now supported his ministers. Gazprom 
began to pay its taxes. Other businesses followed suit (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). But 
any government minister wanting to remove Vyakhirev, and embark on Gazprom reform, 
would still have to win over the Prime Minister, President, and Duma members (Bagrov, 
2000).  
The 1997 decree on reform of the natural monopolies (p.79) included Gazprom (Decree No 
426, 1997). First Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov drafted the decree, but the Gazprom 
section was edited by Chernomyrdin (Berger and Proskurnina, 2008, p.43-44). The 
resulting Gazprom reform plan was vague compared to that for electricity. With Vyakhirev 
in charge of Gazprom, the reform process did not star . The government ministers charged 
with decree implementation, not least Nemtsov himself, seem to have realised the 
difficulty of instigating major reforms without the Gazprom management onboard (Ivanov, 
N., 1997b). Without management cooperation, the state h d no access to the organisation. 
Reform without access might damage Gazprom, and the economy. 
A last brake on reform was the lack of professional minority owners. From 1997 to 2005, 
there was a 9 percent limit on foreign ownership. Initially a temporary provision intended 
to remain in force during partial privatisation, it proved difficult to abolish (Decree No 
529, 1997). Over time, it distorted Gazprom’s share p ices (Stern, 2005, p.171-172; 
Gustafson, 2012, p.338-339; NiK, 2013g). One consequence was low capitalisation, which, 
combined with management control, made Gazprom unattractive to active shareholders 




7.3  The trade collapse 
From the moment Gazprom acquired control of Soyuzgazeksport, European markets 
became crucial to Gazprom and Russia. From its profitable gas sales to Europe, 
underpinned by long-term contracts with take-or-pay clauses, Gazprom received a 
predictable income, and the state a revenue source. Europe was the only market where 
Gazprom made a profit, and this seems to have been th  case until 2004 (p.256).  
Gazprom’s de facto monopoly in gas export to Europe rested on two provisions. After 
foreign trade restrictions were abolished in July 1994, Gazprom retained export control 
through an obligation to effectuate all gas export according to bilateral agreements between 
Russia and other states (Decree No 2213, 1994). A lack of spare transit capacity in Ukraine 
completed Gazprom’s control of the ‘single export channel’ to Europe. Inside Russia, 
Gazprom’s management of the gas grid placed it in control of other producers’ transport 
options and customer relationships. With the new Gas Supply Law of 1999, Gazprom 
became the owner of UGS (Yafimava, 2015, p.2). From 1997, it was obliged to give access 
to other producers (third-party access).  
The post-Soviet region was Gazprom’s smallest market by volume and income. Here, gas 
was still delivered as a subsidy, making CIS gas markets ‘[markets] in name only’ 
(Mitrova, 2009, p.26). Gazprom made it a priority to maintain transit to Europe, and 
accepted the transit terms of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Stern, 2005, p.66; Mitrova, 
2009, p.26-28; Pirani, 2009a, p.8). In consequence, transit to Europe was often bartered for 
gas deliveries (Mitrova, 2009, p.14).  
Cheap gas thereby underpinned Gazprom’s relations with post-Soviet customers, and 




Soviet region. Post-Soviet states found it difficult to pay for gas until the 2000s, but most 
remained dependent on cheap and abundant gas from Gazprom (Table 1.2). Debts 
accumulated. Non-payment problems were gradually overcome after 2000, but the political 
and economic distortions of gas dependency and cross-subsidisation persisted, particularly 
in Ukraine.  
Gazprom’s second priority was to retain its own transit monopoly for Central Asian gas 
from old and new sources. This included blocking or obstructing alternative transit projects 
for new gas from the Caspian Basin. Vyakhirev stated in 1997 that to purchase gas from 
Kazakhstan, and, by extension, give Kazakhstan access to the single export channel, would 
constitute ‘a crime against Russia’ (Kravets, V., 1997).  
A third priority emerged in the mid-1990s, when transit relations with Belarus and Ukraine 
became complicated and costly. Transit avoidance on alternative routes was attractive for 
Gazprom, just as it was for Transneft. It meant investing in expensive excess pipeline 
capacity. But it mitigated transit risk and increasd Russia’s leverage over transit states, for 
gas as for oil (Ericson, 2012, p.630). 
7.3.1  Transit avoidance towards Europe 
Transit avoidance was a strategic choice, but transit risk could be mitigated also in other 
ways. Beginning in 1994, Gazprom encouraged other companies to take over gas trade 
with post-Soviet countries. The company Itera acquired a considerable share of Turkmen-
Russian gas trade, and later supplied gas to several states (Table 7.3) (Stern, 2005, p.22; 
24-25; NiK, 2013a). Itera also became an intermediary for Turkmenistan’s gas sales to 




(Balmaceda, 2008, p.49). In this way, from 1994 to 2003, the post-Soviet region became an 
exception to the export monopoly (Stern, 2005, p.68-70).  
This and similar arrangements relieved Gazprom of some of the difficulties associated with 
post-Soviet debt collection. These difficulties partly eflected state pressure. Recovering 
post-Soviet gas debts was difficult enough. The Russian government also used subsidised 
gas and a tolerance for non-payment as rewards to sta es that maintained a pro-Russian 
foreign policy line (Bruce, 2007, p.44). In effect, loser relations with Russia maintained 
dependence on rent streams from cheap gas. Such tolerance, and rent sharing, was not 
extended to states that distanced themselves from Russia, beginning in November 1992 
with the Baltic states (Krasnaya Zvezda, 1992). Debts from the Baltic states were 
recovered through equity acquisitions in national gs rids, first Estonia in 1994 (Gray, 
1995, p.23). It took Gazprom much longer to succeed with this strategy for debt recovery 
in relation to transit states. Post-Soviet gas relations were therefore burdensome, even as 
they served the state. Itera, unlike Gazprom, was not expected to give price discounts 
according to the state of bilateral relations, and Itera’s post-Soviet gas trade was profitable. 
Relations with Ukraine were particularly difficult. In the 1990s, Ukraine transited up to 90 
percent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe. Annual transit capacity was around 175 billion 
cubic metres (bcm). Ukraine also had underground storage capacity of 43 bcm (Pirani, 
2009c, p.109-113). This was essential to Gazprom, which invested little in storage facilities 
in Russia. Storage facilities smooth out seasonal variations and secure supply during 
interruptions.  
Transit and storage fees were low and paid in gas. B rter goods paid the rest of Ukraine’s 




from cutting deliveries when Ukraine accumulated debts, and siphoned off gas not paid for 
(Yafimava, 2007, p.72-73). Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma was too useful an ally for 
Moscow to ‘turn its perennial gas dispute with Kiev into a confrontation’ (Pirani, 2009c, 
p.99). This also reflected Gazprom’s reliance on Europe to make a profit, subsidise the 
home market, and thereby perform a quasi-fiscal service (p.39) to the state. 
 In consequence, Ukraine often appeared to have a genuinely independent political position 
towards Russia (Yafimava, 2011, p.140). But Russian economic interests and gas 
dependence on Russia defined much of Ukraine’s domestic politics (Balmaceda, 2008, 
p.23-32). For fear of Russian dominance, privatisation attempts would be blocked, and 
Ukraine’s dependence on subsidised gas increased further (Balmaceda, 1998, p.263-264). 
Gazprom was blocked from taking control of Ukrainian gas pipelines, while Naftohaz 
Ukrainy, Gazprom’s Ukrainian counterparty after 1998, could not afford necessary grid 
repairs. Gazprom would not upgrade pipelines outside its control (Yafimava, 2007, p.70). 
After Gazprom repeatedly failed to acquire the pipelines, both Gazprom and the Russian 
government made it a priority to scale down their rliance on transit through Ukraine 
(Balmaceda, 1998, p.269). This resulted in three large bypass projects, Yamal (through 
Belarus), Blue Stream (under the Black Sea), and Nord Stream (under the Baltic Sea) 
(Smith, 2012, p.122), although the latter lost momentum and was only revived in the 
2000s. 
In comparison with Ukraine, relations with Belarus were easy. On independence, Belarus 
inherited the modern pipeline system Northern Lights, established for deliveries to Belarus 
and transit to Poland and the Baltic states (Yafimava, 2009, p.139). Belarus relied on 




and other suppliers (Yafimava, 2007, p.52). When Gazprom in 1992 embarked on the 
Yamal project, reliance on Belarus was minimised. Gazprom covered the four billion US$ 
cost and owned the Belarusian section. First deliveries were made in 1999 (Yafimava, 
2009, p.139-141). 
Moldova was the third transit state, en route to Romania and the Balkans. Gas from Russia 
covered more than half of Moldova’s primary energy supply (Table 1.2) (Bruce and 
Yafimava, 2009, p.187-193). Russia from the early 1990s used gas supplies and debts to 
pressure the Moldovan government in negotiations over the status of the secessionist 
region Transnistria (Bruce, 2007). The Transnistrian authorities also incurred debts to 
Gazprom.  
Compared with other CIS member states, Moldova paida high price: 80 US$ per thousand 
cubic metres (mcm) in 1995 (Stern, 2005, p.101-102). This was offset by a high transit 
tariff, more than double Ukraine’s and five times that of Belarus (Stern, 2005, p.101-102; 
Yafimava, 2007, p.58; Bruce and Yafimava, 2009, p.177). By 1995, Moldova’s debt to 
Gazprom stood at 300 million US$ (OMRI, 1995). Gazprom and Moldova agreed on a 
debt-for-equity settlement, in which Gazprom took a share of Moldova’s gas grid 
(Moldovagaz) in return for debt cancellation (OMRI, 1995). 
Blue Stream was the second transit avoidance project in the 1990s, planned to supply up to 
16 bcm annually to Turkey (Logvinenko, 2001). Turkey by 1997 received 6 bcm from 
Russia, transited through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania d Bulgaria. But Blue Stream was 
also essential in Gazprom’s efforts to obstruct non-Russian transport projects from the 
Caspian basin. It would take a share of Azerbaijan’s closest gas market. To Azerbaijan, the 




(BTE), parallel to the BTC oil pipeline. BTE could possibly attract also gas from 
Turkmenistan, and warrant a feeder pipeline across the Caspian Sea (NiK, 2006m). Blue 
Stream offered Turkmenistan an outlet to Turkey through Russia (NiK, 2005f).  
Blue Stream cost 3.2 billion US$ (NiK, 2005f). Gazprom in 1999 lobbied tax and customs 
breaks through the Duma to an estimated value of one billion US$ (NiK, 2003i). The Audit 
Chamber estimated in 2003 that the real value was higher, 130 billion rubles, or just over 
four billion US$ (Lyashenko, 2003). Its investigation concluded that Gazprom had 
exploited legal loopholes to a maximum (NiK, 2003i).  
7.3.2  Control of Caspian transit 
To develop its gas resources, Kazakhstan needed a route to Europe. With transit through 
Russia, Kazakhstan’s gas would be competitively priced (Kravets, V., 1997). But this was 
not in Gazprom’s interest, and Gazprom did not allow it. Kazakhstan’s offers of stakes in 
its oil and gas fields did not change Gazprom’s priorities. 
Kazakhstan’s gas industry was intertwined with Russia’ . The giant Karachaganak gas and 
condensate field supplied pipeline gas to the equally giant Orenburg Gas Processing Plant 
in Russia (NiK, 2006n; NGV, 2011b; Karachaganak Petrol um Operating BV, 2012). 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Karachaganak was owned by Kazakhstan and 
operated by Gazprom, to which it represented unwelcome competition (Brauer, 2002). It 
took little interest in Karachaganak, which sorely needed investment (NGV, 2011b). In 
1997, Kazakhstan attracted an international consortium o Karachaganak (NGV, 2011b). 
Gazprom was offered a stake, quickly ceded to Lukoil (Brauer, 2002), which took a more 




In the Soviet period, Turkmengazprom supplied gas to other union republics in return for 
hard currency, calculated on the basis of a stipulated export ‘quota’ to Europe (Kryukov 
and Moe, 1996; Stern, 2005, p.72). After the break-up, Gazprom first denied Turkmenistan 
access to the single export channel and to other post-S viet markets. Then it opened up for 
cross-border trade, but demanded a high transit fee, making Turkmen gas uncompetitive 
(Savushkin, 2000). In 1995, Gazprom and Turkmenista established Turkmenrosgaz, a JV 
between Gazprom (45%), Turkmenistan (51%) and Itera (4%), that would handle 
Turkmenistan’s gas trade with a transit tariff discount (Smirnov, G., 1997). Turkmenrosgaz 
sold gas mainly to Ukraine (Smirnov, G., 1997). In 1997, Turkmenistan withdrew from 
Turkmenrosgaz due to non-payments by Ukraine and disagreement with its partners 
(Smirnov, G., 1997; Savushkin, 2000). This in effect dissolved Turkmenrosgaz (Smirnov, 
G., 1997). Left without gas outlets to the west, Turkmenistan pursued exports to Iran (NiK, 
2008f; Lukin, 2011, p.87).  
For Gazprom, Georgia and Armenia were small markets without their own gas production. 
Persistent non-payments and debts incurred losses (Serzhantov, 2000), and in 1995 Itera 
began to supply these states (Table 7.3).  
The gas pipeline ended in Armenia, whose internatiol isolation would have been 
alleviated by a gas connection to Iran. Both states lacked the funds (Verezemskii, 1997). 
On the other hand, Armenia could become a route to the Turkish market for Gazprom 
(Verezemskii, 1997). Only 25 percent of Armenia’s network capacity was utilised, and it 
offered underground storage facilities. Transit would require only minor additions and a 
new pipeline from Armenia to Turkey (Verezemskii, 1997). In 1997, a debt-for-equity deal 




Itera (10 percent) and the Armenian government (45 percent) (NiK, 2005k; Stern, 2005, 
p.85). But the fraught relations between Armenia and Turkey stopped the project, and 
Gazprom decided to reach Turkey through Blue Stream (Verezemskii, 1997). Gazprom in 
1999 offered to cover 60 percent of the cost of a new pipeline from Iran (RFE/RL, 1999; 
Vedomosti, 1999b). 
7.4  The financial crisis 
The dismissal of Chernomyrdin’s government in March 1998 left Vyakhirev more exposed 
to demands from the state, especially for greater rent sharing. Improving state finances was 
an urgent task for the new Kirienko government. Gazprom’s non-payment of tax was a 
recurrent source of tension. It was closely related to the issue of non-payment for gas, 
especially by government institutions, and Vyakhirev often made this point (Stern, 2005, 
p.56).  
The Kirienko government also believed it was essential to curb Vyakhirev’s power to 
enable a reform of Gazprom in the longer run (Levin, 2000), and it tried to put an end to 
the trustee agreement (Popov, I., 2007).  It demanded greater access to Gazprom’s rent 
streams in the form of tax payments based on real numbers, no longer averaged out over 
the year (RFE/RL, 1998). Gazprom assets were sequestrated to retrieve taxes (RFE/RL, 
1998; Popov, I., 2007). Gazprom in response mobilised the Duma, where it had widespread 
support and paid many deputies (Popov, I., 2007). The government was chastised, but the 
resulting compromise increased tax extraction from Gazprom (Kravets, V., 1998; RFE/RL, 
1998; Popov, I., 2007). As it turned out, this made  difference when the financial crisis hit 
a few weeks later. Reform was postponed nonetheless (NiK, 2013g). Gazprom contributed 




‘largest foreign currency earning company’, a positi n it held for several years (Stern, 
2005, p.128-129). The government struggled to maintain a power advantage among the 
elite, and Gazprom’s sources of power could be mobilised against the government. It was 
therefore essential to maintain its support of the ruling coalition. 
By now, Vyakhirev’s and Chernomyrdin’s families were well represented in Gazprom 
subsidiaries (Butrin, 2001b; Reznik, 2002c; Emel'yanov, 2003; Rozhkova and Reznik, 
2013). Beginning in 1998, Gazprom also consolidated its ownership stakes in the media, 
notably including the nationwide broadcasters NTV (30 percent) and ORT (3 percent) and 
a long list of regional media. Gazprom’s rent streams dominated the budget, promoted 
political interests in the Duma and the regions, and provided direct channels to voters 
through the media. Control of Gazprom gave access to uperior resources and therefore an 
advantage in any political struggle, and its infrastructure could be used to cultivate 
dependence on the state in the elite and society (p.58). 
7.5  New approaches to the post-Soviet region 
Because Gazprom was being pressured to pay taxes in Russia, it pressured post-Soviet 
customers to repay debts (Balmaceda, 1998; Bruce, 2007). Gas supply cuts were used to 
recover debts from smaller states, like Moldova in 2000 and 2001 (RFE/RL, 2000; 2001d; 
2001c). But the Russian government was against interrupting supplies to other CIS states. 
Converting debts to equity stakes in gas-related infrastructure had already been practised in 
Estonia, Moldova and Armenia. It now became a second-best option also elsewhere. 





The Belarusian government was reluctant to cede a stake in gas pipelines. Belarus 
countered Gazprom’s pressure by buying more gas from Itera. In 1999–2004, Belarus 
consumed at least 16 bcm annually (Table 7.2) (Yafim va, 2007, p.58; 2009, p.134-137). 
Itera accepted barter payment, which covered up to 80 percent of supply (Yafimava, 2007, 
p.52; 58). Belarus promised to implement the 1995 Customs Union Agreement to obtain 
reduced prices. In the end, Belarus paid very little for Russian gas. Transit fees were also 
low (Yafimava, 2007, p.58).  
The Trans-Caspian pipeline project was still on the table. With the BTE pipeline coming 
closer to construction, it was important for Gazprom to reduce the appeal of the Trans-
Caspian pipeline project. Following the discovery of the giant Shah Deniz field in 1999, 
Azerbaijan demanded a 50 percent share of BTE capacity for Azeri gas (Savushkin, 2000). 
This deprived the Trans-Caspian pipeline project, which depended on sufficient capacity in 
BTE to be commercially viable, of its outlet. Under orders from the new prime minister, 
Vladimir Putin, Gazprom bought a considerable volume of gas from Turkmenistan in 
1999, and promised to reserve capacity for Turkmenista  in the Blue Stream pipeline 
(Savushkin, 2000; NiK, 2006m). Turkmenistan then withdrew the promised gas from the 
Trans-Caspian pipeline project (NiK, 2006m). At thesame time, Gazprom had a domestic 
gas deficit, which it covered with Turkmen gas. This prevented Turkmen gas from actually 
reaching Blue Stream when it opened in 2002 (NiK, 2010d).  
The Shah Denis discovery also meant that Azerbaijan would offer Gazprom competition in 
the Turkish market (Serzhantov, 2000). Azerbaijan now maximised this opportunity, by 




7.6  The new coalition 
Upon taking up the presidency, Putin refused to treat Gazprom with the now customary 
deference (Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.84-85; Makarkin, 2013). To Putin, the state’s 
lack of access to Gazprom reduced overall state capacity. He clearly expected Gazprom to 
act as a tool of the state and the regime, particularly by providing media support for his 
own positions (Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.84-85). Putin also preferred to have loyal 
associates in central positions. Vyakhirev’s positin grew increasingly untenable 
(Makarkin, 2013). On expiration of his contract in May 2001, Vyakhirev was replaced by 
Aleksei Miller (Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). Between 1991 and 1996, Miller had worked 
with Putin in St Petersburg, in the Committee for External Relations (Gustafson, 2012, 
p.241). His non-gas industry background and his absolute loyalty to Putin were crucial to 
his appointment (Makarkin, 2013; Rozhkova and Reznik, 2013). 
Miller was tasked with restoring state access to Gazprom, not with reform. The first aim 
was to re-establish majority control, 51 percent, over Gazprom (NiK, 2013g). This was 
accomplished in early 2003, presumably by buying out the former management (Stern, 
2005, p.171; NiK, 2013g). Vyakhirev and people close to him were also bought out from 
Gazprom-affiliated structures (Reznik, 2002a; 2009).  
The second aim was to stop and reverse the erosion f Gazprom’s control of Russian gas 
production and export. Independents, including Itera, had acquired minority stakes and 
lesser fields (Butrin, 2001b; NiK, 2013a). After the management change, Itera’s position in 
Russian gas production was reduced. It was also forced out of the post-Soviet gas trade 
(Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Itera’s gas was partly sourced from Gazprom through barter payments 




terms (Popov, I., 2007). Gazprom’s management under Vyakhirev was widely assumed to 
have benefited personally by letting Itera and affili ted structures take a share of gas sales 
(Butrin, 2001b). Later investigations by the Audit Chamber and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Gazprom’s auditors, into transactions and terms betwe n Itera and Gazprom, and relations 
between Gazprom board members and Itera, found no evidence of wrongdoing (Jack, 
2001, cited in Stern, 2005, p.23 fn. 49). 
The initial tasks were accomplished by 2003 (Popov, I., 2007; Makarkin, 2013). State 
capacity in the gas industry was restored. Barter and non-payment practices were reduced 
to below 5 percent by 2004 (Gazprom, 2003, p.34; 2004a, p.73; 2005, p.44). There was 
now good reason to question whether Gazprom could keep up gas production sufficient to 
meet both export commitments and Russian domestic demand. The company’s three main 
gas fields had peaked, and other major fields were close to peaking (Stern, 2005, ch.1; 
2009). But exports now became even more significant to Gazprom and the state budget, as 
the oil price boom also affected gas prices in Europe. The inflow of rent increased. 
The increasing deficit of domestic gas led the government to urge Gazprom to increase 
efficiency, but in contrast to the electricity industry, radical structural reform and 
ownership unbundling were considered, but not undertak n (Yafimava, 2015, p.3). 
Gazprom became a political tool also of Putin’s now much stronger state. Gazprom’s 
minority stake in the TV channel NTV was instrumental in 2000 in the government’s 
attack on the ‘oligarch’ Vladimir Gusinskii. Gazprom then acquired Gusinskii’s large 
media holding (Victor and Sayfer, 2012, p.684-685). NTV’s broadcasts grew less critical 




7.7  A foreign energy strategy 
The 2003 Energy Strategy envisaged substantial increases in gas export, with demand 
rising in Russia’s traditional markets and in the Asia-Pacific region (Energeticheskaya 
strategiya, 2003, p.32). The post-Soviet share of Gazprom’s gas sales was already growing 
(Table 7.1).  
7.7.1  Downstream 
From 2001, Gazprom began lobbying the government to adopt a different price calculation 
method and price level for CIS (and eventually also domestic) customers, with the aim of 
breaking even. During Putin’s first term, the government refused to consider this (Pirani, 
2009a, p.8). Cheap gas remained a bargaining chip in bilateral relations (Mitrova et al., 
2009, p.411-412). By 2001, Itera covered a large share of CIS gas demand (Tables 7.2 and 
7.3). The exceptions were Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, where transit fees were paid in 
gas (Stern, 2005, p.68-70). 
But there were other signs of a new Gazprom approach. There was more regulation in 
relations with Ukraine (Pirani, 2009c, p.97). An intergovernmental agreement replaced 
barter with partial cash payments in 2001, and a 2002 agreement opened for international 
consortium management of the Ukrainian pipeline network (Yafimava, 2007, p.75). If 
implemented, this would bring relations with Ukraine much closer to Gazprom’s ideal.  
Putin’s initial approach to Belarus was different. He envisaged full political unification of 
Russia and Belarus, but Lukashenko rejected this (Yafimava, 2011, p.221). To Russia, 
economic relations then became more important (Yafim va, 2011, p.222; 224). Gazprom 
was now allowed to pursue its commercial strategy of settling debts, avoiding barter, and 




supply to Belarus at Russian domestic prices contingent on its acquiring a stake in the 
Belarusian pipeline system, Beltransgaz (Yafimava, 2007, p.44; 2011, p.225). The two 
governments reached agreement on a Gazprom stake in B ltransgaz, in April 2002, but it 
was not implemented (RFE/RL, 2004; Yafimava and Stern, 2007). Gazprom then raised 
the gas price to Belarus by 50 percent (Yafimava, 2007, p.52).  
When the intergovernmental level failed to deliver b tter terms for Gazprom in Ukraine 
and Belarus, Gazprom had more to gain from controlling supply. In 2003, Itera was forced 
to give up CIS gas trade and exports (NiK, 2003a; Stern, 2005, p.24-25; Balmaceda, 2008, 
p.60). Gazprom quickly reduced Itera’s access to the Russian grid, and assumed 
responsibility for post-Soviet markets, citing Itera’s lack of transmission capacity (Stern, 
2005, p.25). Turkmen exports to Ukraine continued through opaque intermediaries (Pirani, 
2009c, p.103), but otherwise, Gazprom returned to post-Soviet markets. 
With government support for a more commercially based policy towards post-Soviet 
customers, it was easier to progress on debt settlem nts. Ukraine’s debt for gas deliveries 
in 1997–2000 was settled in August 2004 (Yafimava, 2007, p.74). Impending presidential 
elections in Ukraine eased the negotiation process. The deal gave Gazprom access to 
Ukraine’s underground storage, and renewed the agreement on an international consortium 
for the Ukrainian pipeline network (Yafimava, 2007, p.75). The details were left until after 
elections. 
Reaching a deal on Beltransgaz with Belarus was more difficult. Belarus again rejected 
Gazprom’s price offer in 2003 (Mite, 2003; Yafimava, 2011, p.225). The Russian 
government then allowed Gazprom to increase prices further, insisting on actual payment 




Gazprom and Russia’s side were contingent on, firstly, actual implementation of the 
Customs Union Agreement, and secondly, a finalised d al over Beltransgaz (Yafimava, 
2007, p.90).  
7.7.2  Upstream 
Gazprom’s approach to Central Asia also progressed in 2001–2. Under Putin, Russia was 
more willing to engage with Central Asia. Gazprom also needed to import more gas. The 
aim remained to monopolise exports, but Gazprom would consider expanding import 
capacity, too. Central Asian gas was cheaper than Russian gas. When supplied to the 
Russian market, it freed up Russian gas for Europe. As long as Gazprom controlled transit, 
it could capture the price differential (Milov, 2011, p.92). Gazprom pushed Itera out of 
Central Asian gas trade (Flink, 2002). In the end, some of the Central Asian gas supplied 
Russia, but the bulk was sold to Europe (Stern, 2009, table 2.1). 
In addition to intergovernmental agreements on gas cooperation (RFE/RL, 2001a; 
Gazprom, 2004b; 2012c), Gazprom’s re-engagement with Central Asia involved the 
Central Asian upstream. Gazprom and KazMunaiGaz together established KazRosGaz, 
which managed much of Gazprom’s business in Kazakhst n (KazRosGaz, 2012). When 
Russia in 2001 began taxing Karachaganak gas en route t  Orenburg (Tutushkin, 2001; 
Brauer, 2002), KazRosGaz stepped in as middleman to reduce the Russian tax burden. 
KazRosGaz could also provide an outlet for Karachagan k’s increasing production (Flink, 
2002). The establishment of KazRosGaz delayed Kazakhst n’s plans for a new gas 
processing plant in Kazakhstan (Tutushkin, 2001; Butrin, 2005).  
Turkmenistan and Gazprom reached a first long-term gas trade agreement, valid for 25 




Turkmenistan cancelled dual citizenship arrangements, with grave consequences for 
around 100,000 Russians in Turkmenistan (Dubnov, 2003; Panfilova, 2004). In return, 
Gazprom became the sole buyer of Turkmen gas throug the Central Asia–Centre pipeline 
from 2007 (Butrin, 2003c). This would also deprive Ukraine of its separate contractual gas 
relations with Turkmenistan. Volumes would increase with demand in Russia and Europe 
(NiK, 2005a; 2008f). Gazprom accepted 50/50 cash/barter payment (NiK, 2008f), but at 
advantageous terms that gave it a price discount (Butrin, 2003c; NiK, 2005a).56  
Commercial terms were also introduced for Georgia. Itera in 2002 planned a debt-for-
equity swap with the gas distribution company Tbilgazi, Georgia’s largest (Bakhtadze, 
2002). When Gazprom replaced Itera, it concluded a 25-year strategic cooperation 
agreement with Georgia, just ahead of elections (Civil.ge, 2003b). The agreement 
stipulated that the gas grid would be renovated before Gazprom took over control. As 
argued by US representatives (Gularidze, 2003c; 2003d) and the Georgian opposition 
(Civil.ge, 2003a), it could threaten Georgia’s participation in the BTE pipeline. 
7.8  The new stability 
The Yukos affair also affected Gazprom’s relations with the state. There was now a 
stronger emphasis on the primacy of the state and state ownership. Gazprom would be 
given priority in hydrocarbon development. After 2003, it acquired several stakes in the 
domestic oil and gas industry from less privileged owners (Bradshaw, 2009, p.6-7). Room 
for competition in the oil and gas industries was limited; any wide-ranging structural 
reforms of the gas industry were shelved. Another effect was that Rosneft, in 2003 still a 
                                                          




state-owned oil company of limited significance, became a much stronger challenger to 
Gazprom.  
In Putin’s second term, energy policy was a means to increase state capacity. The 
government, and especially the president, aimed to make the state a driving force in 
societal development, political life, and increasingly, the economy. In the oil and gas 
sectors, the need for a stronger state was understood rather more narrowly to imply a 
stronger state in relation to private Russian companies and IOCs. A stronger state required 
strong NOCs, and Gazprom had a key role.  
Gazprom would become even more important if it acquired Rosneft under a plan 
developed in autumn 2004. To proponents of NOCs, an integrated oil and gas entity based 
on Rosneft and Gazprom was a rational step. It would reduce competition between the two 
state-owned companies. A giant NOC would drive petrol um development. The playing 
field would tilt even further in favour of the state, and the benefits were seen to outweigh 
the drawbacks. A merger would have an added bonus i enabling a relatively easy 
abolishment of Gazprom’s ring fence (Gustafson, 2012, p.339-340). The Gazprom-Rosneft 
merger process stalled, most likely due to resistance from Sergei Bogdanchikov in Rosneft, 
and possibly also Igor Sechin (Gustafson, 2012, p.340)  Then, in November 2004, a plan 
for integration of Yuganskneftegaz into Gazprom appears to have originated in the 
Kremlin (Gustafson, 2012, p.343). Gazprom managers less close to the Kremlin were less 
enthusiastic about preparing to take over an oil company (Gustafson, 2012, p.343). 
When Gazprom later abstained from the Yuganskneftegaz auction, Yuganskneftegaz was 
acquired by the unknown Baikal Finance Group, which turned out to be a proxy for 




the rather small company, became a much larger entity, too large for Gazprom to acquire. 
The plan for a Gazprom-Rosneft merger was called off (Gustafson, 2012, p.350). There 
were now two NOCs of comparable significance to the state.  
Gazprom was not allowed to stay out of oil. After the Yukos affair, Roman Abramovich, 
the main owner of the large oil company Sibneft, was e ger to leave the oil business. 
Sibneft and Yukos were in the latter stages of a merger as the Yukos affair unfolded. 
Abramovich had carefully reversed the process, but Sibneft at one point faced the same 
type of tax claims as Yukos (NiK, 2013f). When Abramovich decided to sell Sibneft and 
leave Russia, his loyalty to the state fetched him a good price (NiK, 2013f). There may 
have been considerable offtakes for insiders, enabling Abramovich to pay his dues 
(Embassy Moscow, 2007b; NiK, 2013f). Gazprom acquired Sibneft, most likely because 
Rosneft could not shoulder the financial responsibility shortly after Yuganskneftegaz (NiK, 
2013f). To Gazprom, the Sibneft acquisition offered f w synergies, but it entered the oil 
business. Importantly for the state, its share of oil production increased further. Sibneft 
became Gazprom Neft in 2006. After the dissolution of RAO UES, Gazprom also entered 
electricity production and became Russia’s largest supplier (Gazprom, 2013c, p.71). 
Gazprom’s restructuring programme increased the importance of formal institutions. It was 
now well on a track to becoming a recognisably commercially oriented organisation, 
although its staff rosters remained inflated. While the state protected Gazprom’s 
dominance and would not subject it to structural reform on the scale of RAO UES’s, it was 
compelled to develop and restructure internally. Inter al restructuring from 2005 enabled it 





Domestic gas prices rose, through gradual, but incomplete deregulation. In 2004, Gazprom 
began to break even on some of its domestic gas sale  (Gazprom, 2004c; Stern, 2005, 
p.173; Mitrova, 2009, p.23). The state was also more responsive to Gazprom’s demands. In 
late 2006, the government approved a new policy, allowing Gazprom to reach equal 
profitability from domestic, CIS and European gas sle  by 2011 (Stern, 2005, p.173-182; 
Mitrova, 2009, p.36; Pirani, 2009a, p.7-8). Gazprom could, and did, participate in the 
partially deregulated wholesale market (NiK, 2013e). The regulated tariff reached break-
even level in 2009 (Gazprom, 2013a). Its obligation t  allow third-party access to UGS 
was now increasingly enforced by the Federal Antimonopoly Service (Yafimava, 2015, 
p.13-17).  
Gazprom remained important in the economy and to the s ate budget. In 2003, 20 percent 
of all federal taxes came from Gazprom, which represented around 5 percent of GDP 
(Stern, 2005, p.56). Gazprom’s share of GDP increased to around 10 percent in the period 
2004–8 (Gazprom, 2008, p.5). A new taxation system for the gas industry, introduced in 
2004, reduced Gazprom’s share of tax payments, and Rosneft became the largest tax payer 
(Stern, 2005, p.57). This was an implicit acknowledg ment of the continued burden of 
informal taxation on Gazprom (Table 7.5). As with Transneft, the level of Gazprom’s 
dividend payments to the state was a source of contention before 2010 (Sapozhkov, 2012). 
When the government introduced a new dividends policy for state-owned companies in 
2010, Gazprom had to pay out more to the state. 
7.9  Expansion? 
The 2009 Energy Strategy identified transit risk as the main obstacle to Russian access to 




integrated Eurasian gas pipeline system with Russia a  the hub would minimise it 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.54). Growing shale gas production and global LNG 
markets were in forecasts seen as having limited consequences for the Russian gas industry 
(Energeticheskaya strategiya, 2009, p.95). The new Strategy emphasised well-establi hed 
aims, including Gazprom’s equal profitability aim established in 2006.  
The US shale gas boom and the economic crisis in Europe reduced demand for Russian 
gas. Gazprom’s future supply was now a less urgent problem than preserving its market 
shares. The dimensions of this change were only slowly grasped in Gazprom and the 
government, as visible in the Energy Strategy. Gazprom’s first reaction to the changing 
circumstances was not to offer European customers prices renegotiation, but abruptly to 
change its approach to gas producers in Central Asi (pp.269-71). 
In late 2005, Gazprom announced a general gas priceincr ase in the post-Soviet region 
from January 2006, aimed to give equal profitability with Europe by 2011. New pricing 
formulae (‘European netback prices’) linked prices for the post-Soviet region to those of 
European markets. Gazprom’s equal profitability policy was in line with the higher priority 
now accorded economic interests in foreign policy (Pirani, 2009a, p.8). One of the lessons 
from the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003–5 was that 
Russia’s attempts at wielding influence had a limited impact. Gazprom would benefit if 
economic interests were prioritised higher in bilater l relations. Possibly, the political 
carrots and sticks would also become more efficient. A d at least in one sense this held 
true. For Gazprom, transit avoidance projects enabled gas price increases in the post-Soviet 
region, and made it much easier to acquire control of transit state pipelines (Pirani, 2009a, 




Gazprom to acquire stakes in gas pipelines, as long as it delayed a price rise by a year or 
two. Gazprom’s position also strengthened as post-Sviet demand increased and peaked in 
2006 (Table 7.2). In 2011, 22.8 percent of Gazprom’s total gas sales income came from the 
post-Soviet region (author’s calculations based on Gazprom, 2012b, p.72; 74; 78). 
Until 2006, Gazprom’s control of the single export channel was a de facto monopoly. It 
served Gazprom well, especially in the European market, where a de jure monopoly would 
make Gazprom-owned marketing companies vulnerable to action under the Energy Charter 
Treaty. But in 2006, Russia introduced a de jure monop ly in a new gas export law (NiK, 
2006f). According to the law, only Gazprom, now theowner of the gas grid, and its 100 
percent-held subsidiaries, could export pipeline and liquefied gas from Russia (Federal 
Law No 117, 2006).57 In the post-Soviet region, this removed the element of price 
competition, however fictitious it had been (Yafimava, 2011, p.232).  
7.9.1  To Europe: Reduced transit, increased prices, more control 
Ukraine 
Gazprom’s reliance on transit through Ukraine decreased to 70–80 percent of the total with 
Yamal (2001) and Blue Stream (2002) in operation (Yafimava, 2007, p.70; Mitrova et al., 
2009, p.419). Gazprom assumed a prominent role in Ukraine’s gas supply. Following 
Itera’s exit, the intermediary company EuralTransGaz supplied Turkmen gas to Ukraine 
(Pirani, 2009c, p.97). In 2004 a new intermediary appeared, RosUkrEnergo. Gazprom 
owned 50 percent and had a share in profits (Balmaceda, 2008, p.112; Pirani, 2009c, 
p.100). Yuliya Tymoshenko, Ukraine’s Prime Minister from February 2005, tried to 
eliminate intermediary companies from gas imports. She failed, but the two sides agreed 
                                                          




on Gazprom Export as the sole supplier of Turkmen gas to Ukraine (Pirani, 2009c, p.100). 
Gazprom’s leverage over Ukraine increased, with much better prospects of turning a profit 
from gas trade. Allowing this was a deliberate decision on Putin’s side. After the Orange 
Revolution (2004), he made a point of ensuring thatPresident Viktor Yushchenko had 
difficult relations with Russia (Pirani, 2009c, p.99).  
In negotiations for 2006, Gazprom aimed to increase gas prices for Ukraine from 50 
US$/mcm to at least 160 (Pirani, 2009a, p.100). A public announcement by Putin of a 230 
US$ price offer escalated a nascent crisis (Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.160; Pirani, 
2009c). In the absence of a deal by 1 January, Gazprom reduced supplies to Ukraine and 
Europe for two days, until agreement was reached (Yafimava, 2011, p.166). The settlement 
appeared advantageous for Gazprom, with a price of 95 US$/mcm. RosUkrEnergo became 
party to the agreement, and had market access in Ukraine through a JV with Naftohaz 
(Pirani, 2009c, p.101; Yafimava, 2011, p.167). This indirect arrangement was not 
transparent. Ukraine again accumulated gas debts, while Gazprom lost control of cash 
flows from gas sales (Yafimava, 2011, p.168). It was unclear where the bulk of gas debts 
accumulated, and it was difficult to establish their size (Yafimava, 2011, p.171).  
When in early 2008 Tymoshenko returned as prime minister, she again attempted to 
introduce direct sales from Gazprom Export to Naftohaz (Pirani, 2009c, p.104). Gazprom’s 
management were now in favour of direct sales too (Yafimava, 2011, p.172). A brief crisis 
in March was solved by replacing RosUkrEnergo with an intermediary owned jointly by 
Gazprom and Naftohaz. A share of the Ukrainian industrial market was also reserved for a 
Gazprom subsidiary. Ukraine now committed to discusing a higher price level (European 




closer to Gazprom’s preferences. Further negotiations f llowed in October, and appeared 
to settle outstanding issues (Yafimava, 2011, p.178)  In a crucial omission, RosUkrEnergo 
was not party to and did not approve of the new agreement. Gazprom controlled only half 
of RosUkrEnergo. The rest was owned by the Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash, who 
did not approve of an agreement that removed his intermediary role (Yafimava, 2011, 
p.180).  
Negotiations broke down in late 2008 with a new crisis emerging in January 2009 
(Yafimava, 2011, p.181). This crisis was unprecedented in the scale and duration of supply 
reductions to Europe. When Gazprom reduced the flow through Ukraine, Naftohaz in turn 
reversed Ukraine’s pipeline network, supplying Ukraine from underground storage. 
Gazprom’s deliveries were stopped at the border (Yafimava, 2011, p.186-187). While 
Russia and Ukraine negotiated over a new agreement, European customers questioned both 
Russia’s and Gazprom’s reliability as a supplier, and Ukraine’s role as a transit state 
(Tomberg, 2009; Yafimava, 2011, p.187-189).  
Russia and Ukraine reached a settlement in late January. It was valid for ten years, had a 
high base price, starting at 360 US$/mcm, and included a take-or-pay clause that obliged 
Ukraine to take at least 80 percent of 52 bcm annually (Yafimava, 2011, p.191-192). The 
new transit agreement did not include a ship-or-pay cl use that obliged Gazprom to ship 
the provisional annual volume, 110 bcm. Later in 2009, presidential candidate Viktor 
Yanukovich used the settlement to discredit Tymoshenko in the presidential election 
campaign. After his accession to the presidency in January 2010, Yanukovich initiated new 
negotiations with Gazprom. Little is known about these negotiations. An April package 




Fleet, based in Sevastopol on Crimea, from 2017, when it was due to expire, to 2042 with 
an option for further extensions (Yafimava, 2011, p. 96-197).  
After the 2009 crisis, Ukraine consumed more coal and nuclear energy (Pirani, 2009c, 
p.93). When Ukraine opened its continental shelf for petroleum exploration in 2010, it was 
unwelcome competition for Gazprom. The most promising f elds could potentially reduce 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas imports by 10 percent. In 2012, Russia denied a 
drilling platform passage along the Russian coast to Crimea (Prostakov, 2012, p.30). 
Subsequently, Gazprom proposed to intensify development of an offshore structure under 
joint development by Gazprom and Naftohaz at the expense of other fields (Prostakov, 
2012, p.31).  
Belarus 
Russian–Belarusian gas relations came to a head in early 2004. Belarus rejected a price of 
50 US$/mcm, and Gazprom cut supplies and let secondary traders supply Belarus 
(Yafimava, 2009, p.154-156). After this arrangement xpired, Belarus lifted gas off the 
supply to Europe (Yafimava, 2009, p.155). Belarus and Gazprom agreed on a 
46.68US$/mcm price in mid-2004 (Yafimava, 2007, p.97). Gazprom now delayed 
completion of Yamal to full capacity from 2005 to 2007 (Yafimava, 2009, p.141; 2011, 
p.220).  
The crisis made plans for the pipeline across the Baltic Sea, Nord Stream, all the more 
attractive to Gazprom. Originally intended by Gazprom to bypass Ukraine, and underway 
before the crisis (Yafimava, 2007, p.83), Nord Stream also bypassed Belarus. In September 
2005, Putin and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced that Gazprom, E.ON and 




p.222-224). When Schröder then lost in the elections, he became Gazprom’s representative 
on the Nord Stream Board of Directors, and Chairman (RFE/RL, 2005b). Miller was not 
informed until just before the announcement (Panyushkin and Zygar', 2007, p.194). The 
decision appears to have been made by Putin. The consortium was led by Putin’s 
acquaintance, the German banker Matthias Warnig (Chazan and Crawford, 2005; 
Crawford, 2005; Crawford and White, 2005). Nord Stream’s first branch opened in June 
2011, the second in April 2012. 
Nord Stream weakened Belarus’s position towards Gazprom, particularly in regard to 
Beltransgaz negotiations. After international valuation in 2006, Gazprom offered to pay 2.5 
billion US$ for 50 percent of Beltransgaz (Yafimava and Stern, 2007; Yafimava, 2011, 
p.230). The transfer would take place in four stages from 2007 to 2010 (Yafimava, 2011, 
p.231). These were the best terms Belarus could hope to achieve, and it was essential to 
finalise the deal before Nord Stream opened. Belarus now accepted a sliding scale towards 
paying the full European gas price by 2011 (Yafimava nd Stern, 2007; Yafimava, 2011, 
p.231).  
But in 2009, Belarus and Russia disagreed over these t rms (Yafimava, 2011, p.236). 
Belarus experienced a severe economic crisis and ran up new gas debts. This escalated to a 
full-blown crisis in summer 2009, affecting bilateral trade in foodstuffs and oil transit 
(Yafimava, 2011, p.237). There was a new crisis in Ju e 2010 (Yafimava, 2010). But when 
Gazprom then reduced gas supplies to Belarus, Belarus tu ned the tables on Gazprom by 
demanding payment of its transit fee debts accumulated from late 2009 (Yafimava, 2010). 
Agreement was reached quickly (Yafimava, 2011, p.245- 6). When Gazprom acquired 




package deal, advantageous for Belarus (Moshes, 2012). The deal also included a gas price 
reduction from 280 to 156 US$/mcm from January 2012, debt restructuring for Belarus, 
and a ten billion US$ loan for a new nuclear power station in Belarus (p.143) (Ioffe, 2011). 
Moldova 
By 2003, Gazprom’s relations with Moldova had deteriorated. Recovering gas debts from 
Transnistria was a particular problem. Gazprom failed n an effort to acquire the Moldova 
GRES power plant in return for Transnistria’s debts (p.89), and then changed strategy. In 
October 2003, Moldovagaz cut supplies to a major power station in Chisinau (RFE/RL, 
2003b). This coincided with conflict resolution negotiations in Transnistria (RFE/RL, 
2003h; 2003b; 2003g). Moldova’s president, Vladimir Voronin, first accepted, and then 
refused to sign, a Russian plan (‘the Kozak plan’) to reintegrate Transnistria while 
retaining a Russian military presence (RFE/RL, 2003f; 2003c; 2003e; 2003a; 2003d; 
Tomiuc, 2003; Tomiuc and Krushelnycky, 2003). Bilater l relations reached a nadir. 
Russia linked gas supply to the secessionist conflict. 
In 2004, Gazprom reduced supplies to Transnistria to recover debts, but the authorities in 
Tiraspol siphoned gas off the transit stream (RFE/RL, 2004; Bruce and Yafimava, 2009, 
p.174-175). In 2005, Gazprom took over management of Tiraspol’s stake in Moldovagaz 
(13.44%) through a debt repayment arrangement (Yafimava, 2011, p.264; 266; 279). But 
more debts accumulated. Gazprom filed legal suits against Moldovagaz at the arbitration 
court in Moscow in an effort to make the Moldovan government responsible for 
Transnistria’s debts. But debt collection was impossible as long as the government did not 
control Transnistria’s territory (Bruce and Yafimava, 2009, p.175-176). Transnistrian 




Gazprom’s management was unable, or unwilling, to ref rm its relations with Transnistria, 
while Russia used the debts to pressure the Moldovan government in the secessionist 
conflict (Heil, 2008; Bruce and Yafimava, 2009, p.176). 
Gazprom wanted the price increased from 80 to 160 US$/mcm ahead of 2006 (RFE/RL, 
2006d). Negotiations failed, and Moldova entered a severe energy crisis (RFE/RL, 2006d). 
New negotiations resulted in a temporary agreement of 110 US$/mcm. Gazprom offered to 
refrain from further increases in return for a greater share of Moldovagaz (RFE/RL, 2006c; 
2006b; Sergeev and Grib, 2006). According to Gazprom, a similar arrangement could also 
cover Moldova’s historical gas debt of 780 million US$. 560 million US$ were non-
payments on Transnistria’s part, the Moldovan government held, and Gazprom should 
instead acquire Tiraspol’s stake (Sergeev and Grib, 2006). No agreement was reached, and 
the gas price rose to 160 US$. 
In December 2006, Moldova and Gazprom agreed on gas deliveries for 2007–2011. The 
2007 price was 170 US$/mcm (NiK, 2011d; Yafimava, 2011, p.280). From 2008, the price 
would gradually increase towards the European level (NiK, 2011i).  
By September 2012, Transnistria’s debts were around 3.5–4.1 billion US$ (Gamova, 2012; 
NiK, 2012b; Socor, 2012a). Following a new policy, Gazprom was represented by the 
Russian government in this round of negotiations (Decree No 1285, 2012). Chisinau 
offered Russia a comprehensive energy partnership within EU’s Third Energy Package, to 
which Moldova had signed up in October 2011 and would implement in 2015 (Gamova, 
2012; NiK, 2012b; Socor, 2012a). Russia’s position was that Moldova should refrain from 
implementing the Third Energy Package in return for a price discount, and assume 




aired the possibility of Moldova obtaining a price discount in return for joining the 
Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Mordyushenko et al., 2012). 
Moldova then requested, and obtained, a four-year dlay from the EU in implementation of 
the Third Energy Package to 2020 (Moldova.ORG, 2012b; NiK, 2012c). Russia granted a 
one-year contract prolongation with an element of price discount (Moldova.ORG, 2012a; 
Parfenova, 2012; Socor, 2012a).  
7.9.2  The Caspian strategy backfires 
Gazprom’s efforts to limit the viability of non-Russian export routes for Caspian gas and 
promote Russian-controlled projects intensified in 2006–7. Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field 
was now close to production start (Serzhantov, 2000; NiK, 2008e). The opening of the 
BTE pipeline could make it easier for gas from Turkmenistan to reach markets. By 
minimising competition from Azerbaijani gas, Gazprom would also close possible export 
routes for Turkmenistan. In early 2006, Azerbaijan rei vigorated plans for a Trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline to feed BTE (NiK, 2006i; 2006m).  
Azerbaijan already delivered gas to Georgia, after three explosions in January had cut its 
supplies (Civil.ge, 2006; Socor, 2006). When BTE opened in the autumn, Georgia’s transit 
agreement included a transit fee levied in gas, with a right to take additional volumes at a 
discounted rate of 63 US$/mcm (NiK, 2006i). Georgia ce sed buying Russian gas (NiK, 
2006i), with the exception of South Ossetia, which in 2006–2008 was included in the 
Russian gas infrastructure development programme, at a loss to Gazprom (NiK, 2007i). 
Gazprom’s increasing gas prices further accelerated Azerbaijan’s gas development (NiK, 
2006i). After the opening of BTE, Azerbaijan pressured the AIOC consortium, in charge of 




oil production (NiK, 2006i). The date for full production at Shah Deniz was also carried 
forward (NiK, 2003m; 2006i). With Iranian gas supplying the domestic market, and fuel 
oil replacing gas in electricity production (Muradova and Abbasov, 2006), Azerbaijan 
became a net gas exporter in 2007 (Ismayilov, 2007; NiK, 2008e).  
Gazprom’s European customers now made progress on a project that would take gas from 
BTE at Erzurum to Europe. Nabucco would threaten Gazprom’s market share in Europe. 
In response, Gazprom and ENI concluded in 2007 the South Stream pipeline project 
agreement, which would bring gas across the Black Sea to southeast Europe. Nabucco 
would thus become superfluous. South Stream was guaranteed supplies by Gazprom, while 
the Nabucco project did not include reserved gas supplies. South Stream was further 
strengthened as Gazprom embarked on construction of the domestic Bovanenkovo-Ukhta 
pipeline in November 2008 (NiK, 2009c). This was a feeder pipeline also for Nord Stream. 
When the Nabucco project progressed in spring 2009, Russia renewed and intensified 
contacts with Turkey over transit (NiK, 2009c). Gazprom also increased import from 
Azerbaijan (NiK, 2009c). This was expensive, as theRussian domestic market now 
flooded over with gas (Afanasiev, 2009b), but it limited the volume of gas available to the 
Nabucco project (Gabuev et al., 2010b; NiK, 2010a).  
The policy of obstructing non-Russian export routes for Caspian gas was now coordinated 
at the top of the Russian state. In August 2009, President Dmitrii Medvedev held a 
conference with the foreign and defence ministers and the heads of Gazprom and Lukoil, 
to discuss the obstruction of pipelines that bypassed Russia in the Caspian region 




Up to 2009, Gazprom had tried to capture as much of Central Asia’s increasing production 
as possible for Russian-controlled routes. But Russian pipeline capacity from Central Asia 
expanded slowly, at a level just sufficient to obstruct the Central Asian states’ pursuit of 
alternative routes to European markets (Yakuba, 2007). In this way, Central Asia’s 
dependence on Russian routes continued, while Central Asian governments found it 
difficult to develop their export, and gas fields, optimally. To Gazprom, retaining as much 
of Kazakhstan’s gas production as possible was crucial, because it would ensure 
Uzbekistan’s and Turkmenistan’s continued dependence o  Russia (NiK, 2006n). Russia’s 
single export channel was indeed a Russian channel, ot a route with reserve capacity for 
Central Asian gas.  
Kazakhstan 
In 2006, Kazakhstan planned to expand gas production fr m 26–27 bcm annually to 
around 53 bcm by 2010. 40 bcm would be exported (NiK, 2006n). Its two main export 
routes, the Central Asia–Centre pipeline system and the Bukhara-Ural pipeline, went to 
Russia (Gazprom, 2012a). A lack of maintenance had reduced capacity from the designed 
75 bcm annually to 60 bcm, and this limit was reachd in 2006 (NiK, 2006n). Russia’s gas 
imports from Central Asia increased from 2002–2003, and further increases were planned 
from 2006. The Central Asia–Centre pipeline was then r paired (Gazprom, 2006; NiK, 
2006n).  
But capacity could be expanded to 100 bcm annually by adding a new leg along the 
Caspian shore: the Caspian Shore Project (NiK, 2006n). Turkmenistan had proposed this in 
2003 (Butrin, 2003a). Gazprom then prioritised upgrading the Central-Asia–Centre 




monopoly was threatened by Nabucco, and by Turkmenista ’s renewed interest in other 
routes. President Putin promoted the Caspian Shore proj ct in May 2007, on a visit to 
Central Asia. This coincided with an energy summit in Krakow about pipeline projects that 
bypassed Russia. Putin’s visit resulted in a joint declaration of intent by the presidents of 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia (NiK, 2006n; 2008f), followed by an inter-
governmental agreement in December. Gazprom, KazMunaiGaz and Turkmengaz finalised 
the project in 2008. It stalled, however, because Turkmenistan preferred to keep its options 
open, and failed to reserve gas for the pipeline (Blagov, 2007b; Daly, 2008). Without this 
essential guarantee, Russia and Kazakhstan shelved the project (NiK, 2010a).  
To the Central Asian states, access to China’s gas market was now a realistic alternative 
(Ericson, 2012, p.642). In March 2006, KazMunaiGaz and CNPC agreed higher annual 
exports from Kazakhstan to China from 2012 through a new pipeline (Atyrau-Alashankou) 
(NiK, 2006n). The pipeline would also receive gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  
Gazprom retained control of Karachaganak. Once more t  pre-empt plans for a gas 
processing plant in Kazakhstan, Gazprom suggested in 2004 that Kazakhstan acquire a 
stake in the Orenburg Plant (NiK, 2006n). KazRosGaz came to supply Orenburg directly, 
and Kazakhstan would later have a stake in the plant (Butrin, 2005; Belyakov, 2006a; 
Sokolov, L., 2007). To Gazprom, joint ownership would secure gas for Orenburg, which 
faced an impending shortage of gas (Verkhoturov, 2006). But when gas supply in Russia 
rose, the plan was shelved (NiK, 2006n; Gavshina, 2007; Zhelenin, 2007a; Belyakov, 
2008).  
Kazakhstan, meanwhile, had tried to reach post-Soviet gas markets independently. Kazakh 




Azerbaijan and Georgia as a Gazprom agent (Vignanskii and Grivach, 2005). Georgia then 
tried to purchase cheaper Kazakh gas, not just Russian gas supplied by KazRosGaz. This 
transit was subject to Gazprom’s approval (Grivach, 2005; Vignanskii and Grivach, 2005; 
RFE/RL, 2006e). Gazprom did not approve (Civil.ge, 2005). In 2006, KazTransGaz, a 
subsidiary of KazMunaiGaz, acquired Tbilgazi (Prokhrov, 2006). As KazTransGaz 
supplied gas from KazRosGaz, it was believed that Kzakhstan could now sell gas to 
Georgia (IAA Trend, 2006). Also in May 2007, KazRosGaz obtained a marketing contract 
for Karachaganak gas (KazRosGaz, 2012). But KazRosGaz’  marketing contracts for 
Georgia were later transferred to Gazprom Export (Givach, 2010). Timur Kulibaev, then 
head of the KazEnergy Association, previously a memb r of KazMunaiGaz’s management, 
and President Nazarbaev’s son-in-law, expressed in September 2008 Kazakhstan’s great 
hopes for a joint pursuit of market outlets with Russia. In a Bloomberg interview Kulibaev 
announced that Kazakhstan would be interested in developing the partnership with 
Gazprom towards joint acquisitions in the European gas market (Belyakov, 2008; 
NEWSru.com, 2008). Gazprom dismissed Kulibaev’s annou cement as ‘Kazakhstan’s 
wish’ (Belyakov, 2008).  
While overall gas imports from Central Asia decreased in 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
Kazakhstan managed to retain most of its share (NiK, 2011k). According to one source, 
Kazakhstan was desperate in 2009 for Gazprom to take the agreed volumes (NiK, 2011k). 
Gazprom’s stake in KazRosGaz made imports from Kazakhst n more profitable to 





Gazprom developed gas production in Uzbekistan from 2002 (Table 7.4). It established a 
business partnership with the Switzerland-based company Zeromax at an early stage. 
Zeromax became a gas trade intermediary for 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s exports to Russia 
(NiK, 2011a). The company was widely assumed to be controlled by Gulnara Karimova, 
President Islam Karimov’s daughter (Embassy Tashkent, 2008a; 2010; NiK, 2011a). 
Gazprom expanded gas purchases from Uzbekistan from 7 bcm in 2004 to 14 bcm in 2008 
(NiK, 2009f). In 2007, Uzbekistan’s government asked for a new price formula based on 
European prices. The alternative was to sell gas to Europe on its own account (NiK, 
2007j). In the following negotiations, Gazprom agreed a price formula based on the 
European price from 2009 (NiK, 2009f). Gazprom now purchased around 85 percent of 
Uzbekistan’s gas exports (NiK, 2009f). When President Medvedev visited Uzbekistan, 
President Karimov declared that Uzbekistan sold gas ‘only to Russia’ (NiK, 2009f). But 
when Gazprom curtailed gas imports in 2009–11, Uzbekistan found it difficult to sustain 
exports. Unlike Turkmenistan, it had no take-or-pay clause, and unlike Kazakhstan, it 
offered no price discount (Lukin, 2012, p.19). In 2009 Tashkent offered 16 bcm and sold 
12 to Russia (NiK, 2010e). In 2010–11, Zeromax came under the control of Uzbekistan’s 
National Security Service (Embassy Tashkent, 2008b; NiK, 2011c). Gazprom limited 
operations in Uzbekistan (NiK, 2011a), while Uzbekistan increased exports to China 
(Lukin, 2012, p.19).  
Turkmenistan 
Between 2008 and 2011, Turkmenistan revised upwards its proven reserves from 2.6 Tcm 




BP, 2012). This placed Turkmenistan fourth on the list of the world’s gas reserves, behind 
only Russia, Iran and Qatar (BP, 2012, p.20). In early 2005, Turkmenistan ceased gas 
deliveries to both Russia and Ukraine in order to obtain a better price and full cash 
payment (NiK, 2005a). In 2008, Gazprom paid 140 US$/mcm (NiK, 2008f). Gazprom then 
imported and re-exported 50 bcm annually, or two-thirds of Turkmenistan’s production 
(Makarkin, 2009). But when European demand contracted, Gazprom was left with too 
much gas (Panfilova, 2009c). For 2009, Gazprom and Turkmenistan had agreed on a price 
around 300–374 US$/mcm (Afanasiev, 2009b; NiK, 2010d; Roberts, 2011, p.182). There 
was no market for gas at this price and volume (Afanasiev, 2009b; Lukin, 2010c). While 
defending the transit monopoly and its rents from the price differential, Gazprom had 
overcommitted (NiK, 2006i; Lukin, 2010c, p.64; NiK, 2013d). Gazprom renegotiated 
prices with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan would not accept a lower price.  
Early in 2009, Gazprom, according to later statements, asked Turkmenistan either to 
reduce the agreed volume by 80 percent, or the price by 40 percent (Grib and Gavrish, 
2009). Turkmenistan refused (Afanasiev, 2009b; NiK, 2010d). In April, the Central Asia–
Centre-4 pipeline exploded, causing considerable damage to Turkmenistan’s pipelines and 
gas fields. Export to Russia fell overnight by more than 90 percent (NiK, 2010d; Roberts, 
2011; 2012). Turkmenistan’s government accused Gazprom Export of reducing its offtake 
without notification and causing the explosion. Gazprom officials blamed Turkmenistan 
for ignoring notifications and failing to reduce input to the pipeline accordingly (Embassy 
Ashgabat, 2009; Embassy Moscow, 2009; Makarkin, 2009; Panfilova, 2009c; Pannier, 
2009b; Roberts, 2011; 2012). Bilateral relations reached a very low point (Grivach, 2009b) 




(Lukin, 2010c; NiK, 2010d). Turkmenistan now expanded exports to China and Iran (NiK, 
2010d; Lukin, 2011, p.87).  
 Armenia
Armenia in 2004 constructed the pipeline from Iran, in the event with Iranian credit (NiK, 
2005k). Import began in 2007 (NiK, 2005k; Stern, 2005, p.85; Socor, 2007a). Armenia 
now had a surplus of gas for electricity production, a d planned to invest in new generation 
for export to Iran. There were two alternatives. Armenia could raise funds on its own and 
construct the necessary domestic leg of the gas pipeline. It would be in control, but locked 
to the Iranian electricity market. Gazprom instead proposed that ArmRosGazprom develop 
the domestic pipeline, while Gazprom would invest in new electricity production at the 
Hrazdan thermal power plant (TPP) (Tatevosyan et al., 2006). The new unit would run on 
Iranian gas, and Inter RAO and/or Gazprom would ownr manage the plant (NiK, 2005k). 
Inter RAO already managed the older parts of Hrazdan TPP.  
Armenia chose to expand energy cooperation with Iran, while Iran tried to secure 
additional gas supply from Georgia and Ukraine (Krashakov, 2006; Tatevosyan et al., 
2006). Under pressure from Gazprom, Armenia in March 2005 denied transit. Gazprom in 
return promised not to increase the gas price for tw  to three years (Danielyan, 2005a; 
2005b; Tatevosyan et al., 2006). The diameter of the domestic Armenian gas pipeline was 
also reduced, allegedly in response to Russian pressur  (Danielyan, 2005c; Ter-Grigoryan, 
2006). 
In late 2005, Gazprom nevertheless included Armenia in the general price increase (Reznik 
and Egorova, 2006a). In negotiations, Armenia managed to postpone the increase from 




ArmRosGazprom would increase to 75 percent, and Gazprom would take over the new 
part of Hrazdan TPP (Reznik and Egorova, 2006a; RFE/ L, 2006a). Gazprom and 
ArmRosGazprom also assumed the positions previously held by the Iranians, including 
control of the pipeline to Iran (Tatevosyan et al.,2006; Danielyan, 2007b). The deal was 
rumoured, quite plausibly, to include arms transfers from Russia to Armenia (Tatevosyan 
and Reutov, 2006).  
Gazprom’s share of ArmRosGazprom gradually increased in 2006–12, and in 2013 it 
assumed full control (Gazprom, 2013b). Gazprom’s poition also translated into political 
office (Kavkaz-Uzel, 2010; Ovanisyan, 2011). With complete Russian dominance of 
Armenia’s energy sector, Russia now also controlled Iran’s energy trade options through 
the country (Reznik and Egorova, 2006b; Ter-Grigoryan, 2006).  
7.10  Conclusions 
While other economic sectors disintegrated in the lat 1980s and early 1990s, Gazprom 
consolidated autonomous control of the gas industry and its access to external markets. 
This enabled Gazprom to stabilise the Russian state. I s informal rent streams, channelled 
through subsidies towards the population coupled with more selective rent sharing with the 
elite, gave the state infrastructural power and maintained regime stability. But this also 
sustained a status quo that inhibited institutional development and growth in state capacity. 
Gazprom’s position as a linchpin of the state slowed the commercial development of the 
company.  
Gazprom in the 1990s controlled sector policy and essentially regulated itself, as did 
Transneft, RAO UES and Minatom. This status quo was upheld by informal constraints, as 




from Gazprom sustained the ruling coalition and wider support in the Duma and the 
regions. These rent streams were considerable.  
State access to Gazprom through formal channels was more restricted, by institutions like 
trustee management, than in the other cases studied her . As long as state capacity was low 
across all sectors, the difference was not so great. But when the government in 1997–8 
attempted to gain access to all state-owned companies, there were more hurdles, secured in 
the formal institutional framework, to overcome to gain access to Gazprom. The balance of 
power had tilted away from the state towards Gazprom t  a greater degree than in other 
cases.  
State capacity increased under Putin’s first president al term, to no little extent as a result 
of improved access to Gazprom. The return of state acc ss to Gazprom was emblematic of 
the period. For Gazprom, restored state control resulted in a more commercially oriented 
organisation, with consequences for the Russian and post-Soviet gas markets. Gazprom 
became a tool of the new regime, conspicuously and early in the case of the media. 
Gazprom had, of course, also been a tool of the regime in the 1990s, but that was 
negotiated access. Putin and the governments of the 2000s insisted on state organisations 
having direct access to Gazprom. Such access extended to the regime. Gazprom was open 
to regime interference in the 2000s because it depended on the state and the ruling 
coalition. With greater specialisation among state organisations, it no longer regulated 
itself. In the 1990s, Rem Vyakhirev could pay Gazprom’s taxes almost at will. In the 
2000s, Gazprom had to give third-party access to UGS and, informally, it could be 




Gazprom was a tool of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet region from its early 
days. There is an economic and political logic to this. Gas producers and consumers are 
always in long-term relationships, and gas pipelines lock the two sides together. Breaking 
out is costly. Pipelines are expensive, but bypass pipelines that offer excess capacity are 
even more expensive. Control of gas transit without an accepted dispute resolution 
mechanism makes a pipeline a political tool. In Russia, Gazprom held that tool. But, as 
Ericson puts it, mutual dependence can be used for cooperative development or 
geopolitical advantage (Ericson, 2012, p.617). Russia u ed its control of gas supply and 
gas transit for geopolitical advantage. Gazprom’s control of post-Soviet states’ access to 
subsidised gas in the 1990s was used to cultivate their dependence on Russian gas, and 
gave Russia influence in domestic economic and political development. This could be used 
coercively, as seen in Moldova and Armenia. The economic cost of dependence increased 
when Gazprom started to demand European netback prices.  
Seen from Russia, Gazprom achieved foreign policy results in the post-Soviet region at 
little cost in the 1990s. As long as there were no pr fits to make there, and transit was 
maintained, there was little loss of revenue. That t e results were often symbolic, or that 
the other side delivered extremely slowly, did not always lead to a top-level Russian 
reaction. The use of gas as a geopolitical, not a cooperative, tool in the region ensured that 
at least Russia’s short term aims could be reached.  
In the 2000s, commercialisation of Gazprom’s deliveries to the post-Soviet region 
strengthened company finances and increased revenue. It also made it a more effective 
foreign policy tool. Bilateral conflict would now result in higher profits, while bilateral 




leverage, often through equity. As gas still was less important than oil to state revenues in 
the years of the oil boom, it remained a less costly foreign policy tool (Ericson, 2012, 
p.629). The mutual dependence between gas seller and buyer made it difficult for post-
Soviet customers to protest or exit the relationship. This reduced the likelihood of negative 






Over the two decades studied here, the development of i eraction between the state and 
energy companies was one essential part of the developm nt of the Russian state. It was 
not the only side to development, but it was the most significant part of the state’s presence 
in, and interaction more generally, with the economy. With a natural resource-dependent 
economy, the institutions that regulate the exploitation of those resources are central to 
political and economic development. Around the central institutions that organise resource 
extraction, there are actors that try to shape them to their advantage. They may see that 
advantage as profit-related, for private, state or developmental goals, or based more 
narrowly in their own professional ethics, or, when faced with disintegration in the state, in 
the preservation of a relative status quo in the short term. All the companies studied here 
appeared and evolved due to efforts to preserve intact some organisations, with some 
power over institutions and implementation. All these strategies also shaped Russia’s 
development.  
The development of foreign policy, and the companies’ operations in the post-Soviet 
region, was part of state–company institutional development at home. At first, Soviet 
institutional legacies placed the companies in charge of operations that extended, directly 
or indirectly, into the post-Soviet region. As the post-Soviet economies became more 
distinctly separate, the dependence of most of the o r states on Russia meant that their 
gas, oil, nuclear and electricity sectors could notc ntinue to function without close 
relations, re-integration with, and/or subsidies extended by the companies studied here. 
Foreign operations proceeded differently in the different industries, but dependence on 




transport and transit infrastructure more than production. Integrated infrastructure was the 
physical legacy of the Soviet state, even more so than in other states.  
To continue to provide the politically and economically significant energy services to their 
populations, post-Soviet leaders were in turn dependent on Russian energy companies to 
varying degrees. But the development of the companies’ foreign operations was also part 
of Russian institutional development. This development was expressed in the drawing of 
clearer borders and increasing specialisation among Russian state organisations and 
companies, defining the limits of company responsibility (also for post-Soviet states), and 
stabilising the state, elites, population, and the wider post-Soviet region in the years 
following the break-up. The companies were tools of the Russian state from the beginning, 
but contingencies influenced the extent to which they could be used. State–company 
interaction over institutional frameworks at home made the companies accessible to 
different degrees according to their ownership structure. State–company interaction also 
set the parameters of companies’ policy relevance to the state, by placing them in control 
of infrastructure, channels of rents or direct rent xtraction, fuel production and markets. 
Lukoil, of course, was privately owned and without infrastructural assets of major 
significance to the state, making it less integral to policy development and therefore 
accessible only through explicit arrangements.  
8.1  The changing relations between the state and the energy companies 
The similarities and differences across the five cases here evolved in parallel fashion, 
emphasising the importance of the state, and the stat ’  capacity to uphold an institutional 
framework and project power, for companies. In all the cases, this capacity increased from 




participation, and with the benefit of hindsight, i is possible to point towards an 
approximate starting point between 1998 and 2005, when the restoration of state capacity 
began for each company. This is indicated below in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, because these years 
are natural turning points. For one company, Minatom/Rosatom, there were false starts 
over considerable time (2001–5) before results were achieved. It is the successful effort 
that matters here.  
It is important to keep in mind that the restoration of state capacity was not irreversible, 
and did not progress to a level where it would threaten regime stability. The limits that 
remained to state capacity in each case were discussed in the case chapters. The state did 
however structure the environment for the companies d fferently before and after state 
capacity increased, even as the ‘after’ in most cases came gradually and considerably later.  
8.1.1  Linkages between institutions, rent sharing and property rights protection 
The companies emerged out of the state during the break-up of the Soviet Union, and they 
were headed by insiders from the final Soviet years. When state degradation proceeded in 
the early 1990s, protection rackets proliferated. The companies here had access to the best 
protection on offer, the central state’s, but they, too, had to rely on informal protection 
from the regime to ensure management control.  So the companies muddled through the 
1990s, surviving on their rent streams. Organisation l continuity was underpinned by rent 
sharing in the context of the ruling coalition. In the case of Gazprom, and to a lesser extent, 
RAO UES, their rent streams stabilised Russian society and the state. Informal rent streams 
channelled through Minatom and Transneft kept their respective industries afloat, with a 
share channelled towards the ruling coalition in return for patronage. Lukoil also shared its 




exemptions. This was also an investment in relationl capital, to ensure protection for its 
managers’ property rights. 
This affected power relations between the state and the companies. The dependence of the 
ruling coalition and societal stability on the companies gave them power in the ruling 
coalition, particularly over how state power was wielded against themselves. Against 
Gazprom, the government found itself with its powers limited not by the state’s 
institutional framework, but by Vyakhirev’s influence inside the ruling coalition and on 
Yeltsin himself. 
Company managers that failed to share a part of company rent streams with the right 
people were vulnerable, especially when governments changed. When Mikhailov (of 
Minatom), Dyakov (RAO UES) and Chernyaev (Transneft) were replaced in 1997 and 
1998, this was related to Yeltsin’s dismissal of Chernomyrdin as prime minister. 
Afterwards, state organisations were no longer informally restrained by the prime minister. 
But the new managers were still chosen on the strength of their personal loyalties, and 
replaced as governments changed again. 
The importance of informality in this period points towards different sets of linkages 
between informality and formality in institutional development. The imperative to uphold 
privileges, especially privileged rent extraction, leads to a preponderance of informality 
and personal relations over formality and impersonal rel tions. This extends to property 
rights protection, which is also selective and dependent on the property owner’s relations 
to the ruling coalition. The situation for each case before the restoration of state capacity is 






Table 8.1 State–company relations, in respect to rent, access to property, regime involvement and foreign 
operations, before restoration of state capacity 




Minatom (2005) Lukoil (2000) Transneft (1999) Gazprom (2001) 





















Property rights: If 
private, weakly or 
strongly protected; if 
state, state access to 
property, or denied? 
State controlled, but 
state denied access 
→1999 
 
State controlled, but 
state denied access 
→2001 
Unsuccessful efforts to 
gain access for state 
2001–5 
 
Increasing share of 
private ownership, 




supplemented by good 
ties to regime →2000 
State controlled, but 
state denied access 
→1998 
 
State and private 
ownership, but state 
denied access →2001 
 
Company proximity to 
state/regime 
Close to regime at 
expense of state 
→1998–9 
 
Sector autonomy with 
some regime 
protection, combined 
with occasional open 
contestation of sector 
control →2003  
Company autonomy 
combined with 
selective ties, set by 
company, with regime 
and state →2000 
 
Close to regime, partly 
at expense of state 
→1998 
Part of regime at 
expense of state, but 




Russian state support 
for post-Soviet 
operations 
Tacit, but little interest 
→2002 
 




Tacit, mostly from 
regime →2000 
 
Strong state support, 
direct access between 
state and company 
→1999 
Strong state support, 
direct access between 
state and company 












taxation, but company 
operated tax 
minimisation →2003 
as result of transit 
monopoly for non-
Russian oil retained 
by Transneft 
differential as result of 
transit monopoly for 
non-Russian gas 
retained by Gazprom; 
(2) equity deals 
opened channel for 
post-Soviet rents to 
Russia 
Rents from post-Soviet 
operations shared in 
post-Soviet states 
Yes, with populations 
through price 
subsidies and arrears, 
possibly also with elite 
from barter trade 
→2002 
 
Unclear Formal through 
taxation 
As little as possible Yes, shared with post-
Soviet populations 
through price 
subsidies and arrears, 











Yes, through pressure 
and maintenance of 
dependence by control 
of fuel and technology 
Only positive 
presence 
Yes, by (threat of) 
depriving post-Soviet 
states of oil transit 
Yes: by (1) (threat of) 
depriving post-Soviet 
states of gas transit; 
(2) by (threat of) debt 
recovery or reduced 
gas supply 
Maintains dependence 
on Russia in post-
Soviet region 
Yes, for electricity 
supply and investment  
Yes, for development 
of nuclear energy 
industry in Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan 
No  Yes, maintained 
Central Asian transit 
dependence on Russia, 
esp. in relation to 
Kazakhstan  
Yes: (1) maintained 
Central Asian transit 
dependence on Russia; 
(2) maintained 
dependence on gas 





As shown in the table, actors from central state organisations struggled to gain access to 
and extract rent from the state-owned companies. There was a lack of differentiation 
between state and private interests in the companies. For state actors, access to state-owned 
property went through the regime. As the regime offered protection for sector and 
company autonomy in return for limited rent sharing, managers of state-owned companies 
could make decisions about state-owned companies in a way that resembled a property 
relationship. Weak property rights protection and a lack of access to state property for state 
actors went hand in hand – both were symptoms of a state that could not uphold basic 
property rights, except through the ruling coalition. 
The table also illustrates how, in the 1990s, a considerable share of rent from state-owned 
companies was channelled through informal channels, to the benefit of a select circle of 
claimants, as opposed to formal channels accessible to state actors, with wider public 
distribution. The state-owned companies more closely ti d to the regime offered the regime 
easier access to rent streams. Minatom, with significa t informal rent streams from 
uranium trade, was less accessible as a source of authoritarian durability. In contrast, RAO 
UES, Transneft and Gazprom could provide societal stability and regime support. Their 
considerable rent streams made them reliable sources of patronage. Formalised and 
informal subsidies channelled through RAO UES and Gazprom stabilised society 
throughout most of Russia’s regions. Select rent sharing with regional elites through the 
companies ensured support for the regime. At the very top, rent streams from Gazprom’s 
European gas sales in particular were indispensable in securing cohesion in the ruling 
coalition, thereby directly underpinning regime stability. Transneft had a somewhat 
different relationship with the regime. It was important for rent extraction from oil sales, 




control and coercion in relations with oil companies. It had a narrower impact in wider 
society than Gazprom or RAO UES, but was still central to the regime’s durability.  
Lukoil, on its side, also engaged in societal and regime stabilisation, but to a more limited 
extent. Its price freezes and voluntary contributions were important, but limited, and 
explicitly agreed. This gave it a visible role in supporting regime stability, while it enjoyed 
a more distanced and partly independent relationship with both the ruling coalition and the 
state. 
Through the state-owned companies, the regime and the state gained access to different 
tools for societal and elite stabilisation. With them came the possibility of buying off 
potential competitors for power, as demonstrated openly in the 1996 presidential election. 
These companies were part of a rent sharing system that also reduced the general societal 
and elite pressure for power sharing and institutional development. Institutional 
development in the state slowed down, at the expense of keeping the regime in power. 
Pressure for company reform came from state actors, and in the 1990s this was staved off 
with reference to the companies’ importance to regim  and societal stability. The slowing 
down of reform in a period of crisis was clearly a consequence of resource abundance, or 
more precisely, abundant resources that the regime could employ relatively easily, and 
through informal means. These resources made it possible for the regime to prioritise to 
maintain the status quo in regard to itself, and any pressures for reform of the state and 
state-owned companies implicitly also challenged the regime. 
8.1.2  Infrastructure as a power mechanism 
Soviet legacies meant that energy companies held th keys to Russia’s staying power in the 




borders from the beginning, and with it, rent sharing and societal stabilisation through 
energy companies included the post-Soviet region. Soviet infrastructure and continued 
energy dependence placed RAO UES, Gazprom and Transneft in charge of tools with 
which to influence political and societal stability, and indirectly, also economic 
development, in post-Soviet states. With continued subsidisation of gas, and acceptance of 
arrears and slow debt recovery amid high inflation, RAO UES, Gazprom and Minatom 
shared their rent streams with post-Soviet populations and governments. Payment and debt 
recovery by barter made it possible to channel rents from energy trade into informal, even 
illicit channels, to select claimants in Russia and abroad. The distinction between state-
owned companies and private interests in the companies eroded also in foreign operations.  
In the early 1990s, this was possible because of state fragility and weakness, but it also 
served to reinforce this weakness. With respect to the post-Soviet region, state 
organisations were not in a position to coordinate, support, or otherwise supervise 
companies’ foreign operations, let alone develop a str tegy for the economic side of 
foreign policy. This applied in particular to Minatom, whose subsidiaries pursued their 
foreign operations rather autonomously of the state and often beneath government radar. 
There was more informal access to Gazprom’s foreign operations, but this again 
strengthened the regime, not the state. With Lukoil, it was a case of stepping into the 
challenge of driving Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region where state 
organisations failed to deliver. 
But the companies were not altogether autonomous of the Russian state when pursuing 
their foreign operations. Because of their importance as providers of energy, rents and 




coerce post-Soviet states into positions favourable to the companies, and to the Russian 
state. By their sheer dominance in the energy sectors of the post-Soviet region, which 
company managements often nurtured with support from the Russian state, these 
companies also maintained dependence on the Russian tate in the region. In this first 
decade after the break-up of the Soviet Union, both the coercion and the maintained 
dependence were seen from Russia as a natural expression of economic and political 
realities. 
8.1.3  The state restored 
Relations between the state and companies changed again, beginning in 1998–9 when state 
actors initiated changes that eventually increased state capacity. State actors made use of 
the structure of interaction in a different way than before, with the aim of acquiring greater 
access to the companies, with a greater share of their rent streams. When doing this, they 
could use the formal mechanisms of state power, and also, to a variable extent, the 
informal mechanisms available to the regime. The formalised structures in the institutional 
framework were employed to reinforce state control over and access to state-owned 
companies, and to exercise state power in the economy, affecting privately owned 
companies. Informal regime mechanisms, for example, personal loyalty between company 
managers and the president, or changes to informal rent streams, had a supporting role in 
the restoration of state capacity. At the same time, th se changes also strengthened the 
regime’s position, its power, within the elite and underlined how the regime was essential 
in managing the state. Where the informal structures in the institutional framework had 
previously partly contradicted, and partly trumped, formal institutions, they now 




formal side of the institutional framework gradually turned decisive, to fully enable the 
state independently of the regime. 
The state now, after approximately 2000, had increased capacity to deliver an institutional 
framework for economic development, as seen in the case of RAO UES, but the process 
proceeded unevenly in the economy. It was one thing to increase the state’s despotic 
power. It was quite another for the regime to change the state as institutional context for 
companies and the patronage networks on which it relied to govern. The regime had no 
real interest in making the state autonomous also of itself. 
With the state in a better position in respect to the companies than before, state despotic 
and infrastructural power reinforced one another in a positive spiral. Better state access to 
state organisations meant that the policymaking potential that was always there could now 
be employed to undertake a wider range of actions without negotiation with society. This 
increased despotic power could again be employed to penetrate the territory and implement 
decisions. This affected the companies under study here. They could now become tools of 
the state for real and not only state-owned companies that served the regime. 
While all the companies were affected by this, Lukoil, as a private company, could 
continue to support the regime while maintaining, and increasing, its distance from the 
state. Even as property rights protection weakened, th  company management could set the 
terms for state access to the company to an extent that is by definition unavailable to state-
owned companies. With a stronger state, this mattered. As seen in Table 8.2 here, the 
differences between Lukoil and the other cases, also vi ible in Table 8.1, became much 





Table 8.2 State–company relations, in respect to rent, access to property, regime involvement and foreign 
operations, after restoration of state capacity 






Lukoil (2000) Transneft (1999) Gazprom (2001) 






More formal than 
before, but somewhat 
opaque. Rosatom also 
rent claimant, 2007– 
Formal and 
increasing, with some 
(increasing) informal 




rent sharing. Also 
used as tool for rent 




taxation and dividends 
and informal through 
price subsidies and 
CSR, formal and 
informal balanced 
against each other 
2001– 
Property rights: If 
private, weakly or 
strongly protected; if 
state, state access to 
property, or denied? 
State access 1999–
2009 
State access restored 
2005– 
Weakening, necessary 
to pursue additional 
protection by good 
relations with regime 
2000– 
State access restored 
1999–2009 
State access restored 
mainly through 
regime 2001– 
Company proximity to 
state/regime 
Close to state, to some 
extent contact with 
regime 2000–2008 
Much closer to the 
state, but at top secured 
by regime, 2005– 
Less close ties with 
regime, closer ties 
with state 2000– 
Close to state while 
loyal to regime 1999– 
Closer to the state, but 
at top secured by 
regime, 2001– 
Russian state support 
for post-Soviet 
operations 
Support and interest, 
considerable 
autonomy in exercise 
2003– 
State support, but with 
considerable Rosatom 
autonomy in exercise 
2007– 
Support and interest 
exchanged for 
negotiated loyalty at 
home 2000– 
Strong state support 
and increasing 
interest, direct access 
between state and 
company 1999– 
Strong state support, 
direct access between 
state and company 
Rents from post-Soviet 
operations channelled 
to Russia 
Equity deals opened 
channel for post-
Soviet rents to Russia 
2003– 
Unclear 2005– As little as possible, 
more limited use of 
tax minimisation 
2003– 
Yes, price differential 
as result of transit 
monopoly for non-
Russian oil retained by 
Transneft 
Yes: (1) price 
differential as result of 
transit monopoly for 
non-Russian gas 
retained by Gazprom; 




opened channel for 
post-Soviet rents to 
Russia; (3) increasing 
gas prices for post-
Soviet states 
channelled formal 
rents to Russia 2006– 
Rents from post-Soviet 
operations shared in 
post-Soviet states 
Yes, through (1) 
formal taxation and 
(2) to some extent 
informally in equity 
deals (not confirmed) 
2003– 
Unclear Through taxation, 
otherwise unclear 
Formal taxation. 
Transneft used as tool 
to reduce post-Soviet 
rent sharing from oil 
transit in general 
Yes, through (1) 
formal taxation and 










Yes: (1) through 
unannounced 
blackouts; (2) through 
pressure through price 
2001–; (3) by 
enabling Gazprom 
pressure 2003– 
Yes, through pressure 
and maintenance of 
dependence by control 
of fuel and technology 
Occasionally Yes, by (threat of) 
depriving post-Soviet 
states of oil transit 
Yes: (1) by (threat of) 
depriving post-Soviet 
states of gas transit; 
(2) by threat of debt 
recovery, rapid price 
increases, or reduced 
gas supply 
Maintains dependence 
on Russia in post-
Soviet region 
Yes, for investment in 
electricity 
Yes, for development 
of nuclear energy 
industry in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, and for 
NPP development in 
Belarus 
No  Yes, maintained 
Central Asian transit 
dependence on Russia, 
esp. in relation to 
Kazakhstan  
Yes: (1) maintained 
Central Asian transit 
dependence on 
Russia; (2) maintained 
dependence on Russia 
in energy sector 
development in 
Armenia and (3) on 






Transneft and Rosatom were closer to the state, and more accessible, than the others. 
Gazprom was also accessible, but it was, additionally, subject to interference by Putin. 
Inter RAO maintained a slightly different position u der Chubais. It would receive state, 
and Putin’s, support, when this was needed, but otherwise it maintained a somewhat 
greater distance from central state organisations. Lukoil, however, was not directly 
accessible. Instead, state support abroad was exchanged for Lukoil’s loyalty at home, and 
while the exchange was most likely agreed only implcitly, interaction with the state seems 
to have consisted of considerable negotiation. Not being state-owned and having a more 
indirect relationship with state organisations, Lukoil nevertheless interacted considerably 
with the state. But there was less interaction over foreign operations and foreign policy. 
For the state-owned companies, increased state capacity meant that they now had to serve 
the state to a greater extent than private interests, at least private interests outside the 
regime. Sector autonomy in return for informal support and limited rent sharing with the 
regime was no longer an option. The state had to have access to the companies as well. 
Crucially, informal rent streams were now slowly but steadily redirected wholly towards 
the regime, resulting in greater stability in the regime, and in the state.  
There were also greater resources to share, as shown in Graph 2.1. This affected both 
formal rent from taxation and dividends, and informal rent streams. The formal rent 
streams were shared more widely with the population and secured support for the status 
quo. The informal rent streams were again shared selectively among the supporters of the 
ruling coalition. With greater resources, rent addiction in Russian society increased and 




State capacity was therefore restored in a specific way. State despotic power over 
companies increased, in a way that subjected the stat  itself to the regime. As under 
Yeltsin, the imperative of remaining in power trumped considerations of strengthening the 
state. 
8.1.4  Energy as a tool of foreign policy 
Greater state capacity meant increased capacity to support company operations in the post-
Soviet region, and to use them as tools of the Russian state there. In Table 8.2 there is a 
more varied and comprehensive energy imprint left by Russian state companies in the post-
Soviet region, than in Table 8.1.  
Energy operations abroad, or control of export pipelines, became tied even more closely to 
the pursuit of foreign policy. The state now aimed to direct companies’ foreign operations 
to a greater extent. And the companies did experience more coordination and support, all in 
all a welcome change. This did not amount to a strategy or great coherence on part of the 
state. Especially wherever Gazprom was concerned, th  concerns of maintaining its control 
of the domestic UGS grids overruled any substantial cooperation with and accommodation 
of other Russian companies, also abroad. This created problems for Lukoil, especially in its 
gas production in Uzbekistan. Gazprom’s handling of as relations towards Turkmenistan 
from 2009 also displayed to what extent it determined Russia’s foreign policy towards that 
country.  
In RAO UES and Gazprom, greater state capacity went ha d in hand with company 
strategies for the post-Soviet region that were based on sound business practice. Where 
these companies before had shared rents with post-Soviet populations through price 




is difficult to know the full extent of this. There were more channels for rent from post-
Soviet operations that directed it to Russia. The Russian state now held stakes in domestic 
energy development in Georgia (Inter RAO), Ukraine (Gazprom, Rosatom and Transneft), 
Kazakhstan (Rosatom, Transneft and Gazprom), Moldova (Gazprom and Inter RAO), 
Belarus (Gazprom and Rosatom), Turkmenistan (Gazprom) and of course Armenia (Inter 
RAO and Gazprom). 
Post-Soviet energy dependence on Russia played a different role when prices increased. 
With gas prices in particular, the prospect of rising prices could also be, and was, used as a 
tool to coerce post-Soviet governments into positions favourable towards Russia. In the 
case of Gazprom, the development of excess pipeline capacity that bypassed Belarus and 
Ukraine placed additional pressure on their governmts in negotiations over transit terms. 
In the case of Transneft, new pipelines on Russian oil were also used, with little success, 
to pressure Latvia and Lithuania. In this way, transit avoidance in oil and gas also turned 
dependence into a potential coercive tool. Where the threat of removing oil and gas 
streams, and post-Soviet rent sharing from these streams, was a stick, maintaining the 
actual streams was a carrot. Some aspects of rent addiction extended beyond Russia and 
into the post-Soviet states.  
More broadly, rising gas prices were also used to apply pressure towards Moldova (over 
conflict resolution in Transnistria), Armenia (on equity deals and energy cooperation with 
Iran) and Ukraine (on comprehensive energy deals). By extension, when maintaining 
energy dependence on Russian companies, Gazprom and in Armenia also Inter RAO could 
now capitalise on this in financial terms, while also offering themselves up as a political 




oil and gas transport from the Caspian Basin to European markets. Here, it is sometimes 
difficult to tell where considerations of defending their domestic monopolies ended, and 
the use of these monopoly positions as tools in relations with Central Asian states 
commenced. By capturing price differentials, they also profited from their monopolies.  
8.1.5  The regime calls the shots 
Table 8.3 below shows how, in the last years under study here, state capacity again 
decreased somewhat, and the regime grew stronger. This affected state relations with the 
companies. While state–company relations remained roughly as before in many respects, 
state access to Inter RAO and Transneft was now – from around 2009 – again to a greater 
extent maintained through the regime. The regime had realised the potential that was 
always there to prey on the state, and this now visibly affected these companies. State 
access to Gazprom had always been secured through informal mechanisms available to the 
regime. However, it was used more openly as a tool of the state from 2009 onwards, and it 
shared less of its rent streams with claimants in the post-Soviet region.  
8.2  The state, resource abundance, and regime durability 
The increase in the state’s capacity to control and develop infrastructure, collect taxes, and 
negotiate from a more superior position of power with the elite, which took place after the 
1998 financial crisis and peaked with the Yukos affair, has here been taken for granted. My 
concern has been more in seeing how state capacity affected state–company interaction and 





Table 8.3 The growing strength of the regime at expense of the state 
 RAO UES/Inter RAO Minatom/Rosatom Lukoil Transneft Gazprom 
Rent sharing in Russia: 
formal/informal 
Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Further formalisation, 
prolonged informal 
rent sharing through 
CSR and construction 
projects, 2005– 
Largely as before 
Property rights: If private, 
weakly or strongly 
protected; if state, state 
access to property, or 
denied? 
State access, but 
some decline 2009– 
Largely as before Largely as before State access mainly 
through regime 2009– 
Largely as before 
Company proximity to 
state/regime 
Somewhat closer to 
regime again at 
some expense of 
state 2009– 
Largely as before Largely as before Somewhat closer to 
regime again at some 
expense of state 
2009– 
Largely as before 
Russian state support for 
post-Soviet operations 
Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before 
Rents from post-Soviet 
operations channelled to 
Russia 
Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before 
Rents from post-Soviet 
operations shared in post-
Soviet states 




towards post-Soviet states 
Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before More openly than 
before 2009– 
Maintains dependence on 
Russia in post-Soviet region 
Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before Largely as before, but 
this policy backfires 




Exogenous changes were central in the process of increasing state capacity. And here, 
resource abundance mattered. Post-crisis recovery growth drove up oil production from 
1999. The state began to extract resources from economic activity to a greater extent, 
especially when tax reform and increased state capacity, also in implementation, led to 
increased tax extraction from oil companies. With the oil and natural resource price boom, 
there was also more to extract across all resource industries, and especially in the oil and 
gas industry.  
8.2.1  Regime cohesion, elite support, and rent addiction 
One central endogenous foundation of increased state capacity was the renegotiated, broad 
and inclusive ruling coalition, a regime. After the 1998 crisis, the entire Russian elite 
understood that it was no longer possible to muddle through in a perpetual status quo, 
because the status quo was not sustainable. This enabled the creation of a new ruling 
coalition, gathered around Vladimir Putin. It was a coalition for state restoration, intended 
to drive state development forward. It had considerable support in the state organisations 
central to implementation and policy development for a stronger state. Putin’s more 
integrated regime increased coherence among state organisations, and facilitated 
policymaking and implementation. It also enabled greater resource extraction and thereby 
released even greater state despotic power. Gradually, as regime cohesion increased, it 
could benefit from the potential that was always there to use state power as a source of 
authoritarian durability. Putin’s regime not only survived, it thrived.  
The massive increase in rent streams from resource extraction between 2002 and mid-
2008, followed by renewed oil price recovery to a high level between 2009 and 2014, 




resources through informal and formal rent streams. At the top of these rent streams, the 
regime could reward loyalty and support in both the elite and the general population. With 
the abundance of resources available, there was enough t  weaken any potential threat to 
the status quo, in the elite and in the general population. Increasing resources also created 
incentives for the wider elite to remain loyal to the regime. Rent addiction, and the threat 
of removal of rent, was an effective tool also inside Russia. It underpinned ruling coalition 
cohesion and wider elite acquiescence. 
8.2.2   Resource abundance and slowed institutional development 
As long as there were sufficient resources available, institutional development need not be 
prioritised. Institutional reform would not only threaten regime cohesion and durability. 
Resource abundance in this period also meant that it was possible to substitute for reform 
and change by ruling through manual control and dispen e selective patronage. So in the 
period of growing state capacity, the pressures from utside the ruling coalition for 
institutional development gradually had less effect in bringing about actual reform. The 
regime restored state capacity up to a certain level, all the while also employing the state 
for enrichment and authoritarian durability. As the state was now more powerful, its 
usefulness as a source of regime stability also increased. But the state could not be 
empowered further, to a level at which it would weaken the regime’s hold on power by 
removing privileges and establishing institutions that distributed informal rents on an 
impersonal basis. In this way, rent addiction, combined with the regime imperative of 
maintaining stability through privilege, shaped Russia’s political landscape and the state. 
All the same, the restoration of state capacity did br ng limited institutional development in 




time, and responsibilities between company and state organisations were defined more 
clearly. Ownership unbundling and market institutions in the electricity sector, reform in 
Rosatom, internal modernisation in Transneft and Gazprom, active state implementation of 
gas and oil industry and legislation, were all processes that led to a clearer separation 
between state and private, economic, policymaking ad implementation organisations. 
While Gazprom in the 2000s participated in policy formation, it no longer regulated itself 
in the manner of the 1990s. Lukoil no longer substituted for a lack of foreign 
policymaking, and Rosatom was subject to more specialised oversight mechanisms. 
Along with changes that included institutional specialisation, development, and increasing 
transparency, there remained a considerable informal component at the top, which secured 
that the state remain dependent on the regime to function. One important difference from 
before was that the informal constraints during Putin’s second presidential period were 
embedded in the state’s formal institutional context. The Sibneft sale to Gazprom was the 
formal property transfer that completed the modification of the ruling coalition, caused by 
Abramovich’s (voluntary) relegation within it. Inter RAO was preserved as one 
organisation after the dissolution of RAO UES in a w y that enabled regime influence and 
rent sharing through the company. The extent of state access to Rosatom hinged on the 
personal loyalty of its central managers to the president. Transneft’s privileged shares 
ceased to be a source of conflict with the state whn t ey changed hands in a way that 
favoured the regime. Even Lukoil’s limited steps to mitigate its loss of participation in 
policymaking took place in an informal context. A weak energy minister had to yield to the 
regime where a stronger one could have stood firm. This was the essence of being a state 
bureaucrat and not a central member of the ruling coalition under Putin. To be strong, you 




8.3  The limitations of this study 
Of course, Russia’s bilateral relations with its post-Soviet neighbours illustrate well how it 
takes two to tango. In each bilateral relationship characterised by dependence, there is a 
non-Russian side that also participates in maintaining, and managing, that dependence. In 
the context of limited popular influence on domestic and foreign policy, the most difficult 
aspects of bilateral relations with Russia are often k pt outside public scrutiny. This is not 
to say that public scrutiny would have made policy decisions related to energy dependence 
and foreign policy any easier. Post-Soviet governments have faced difficult choices where 
considerations of political survival, domestic stability, national development, national 
security and the need, for all these reasons, to preserve a workable bilateral relationship 
with Russia were balanced against the political, human and economic costs of withdrawing 
from dependence on Russia. At best, pros and cons were considered consciously. Although 
this thesis has not discussed the non-Russian side of post-Soviet energy relations, it is safe 
to say that what to some post-Soviet state leaders appeared a narrow range of options for 
national development, to others seemed more like opportunities for personal gain. 
Time is another limitation to the findings here. The investigation was directed towards 
changes in relations between the companies and the stat . But how much can one 
reasonably expect to become manifest within the relativ ly short time span of two 
decades? As time passes, the continuities between the 1990s and the 2000s are bound to 
emerge as more fundamental than it has been possible to convey here. Continuity mixed 
with change is, of course, the essence of institutional dynamism.  
This investigation does not discuss all possible sources of what the literature refers to as 




integrate our understanding of the role of energy in Russia’s political development with 
that of policy in the post-Soviet region, I can conlude that once the Russian state grew 
stronger, foreign energy operations and foreign policy changed and turned more re-
assertive. This included more coercion, and continued Russian dominance and dependence 
on Russia, in the energy sector and individual economies of post-Soviet states. In some 
cases this could be converted to influence over post-S viet governments’ policies. While 
converting oil wealth to influence was not always easy, it did actually happen – at least 
when combined with tools offered by other energy industries.  
But here, I do not really discuss why this happened, and that was not the aim of the 
investigation. It will have to be left to further study. My findings here point towards the 
regime, and its aims, as playing a crucial role. When these combine well with company 
strategy, there emerge powerful shared interests tha  can drive foreign policy relationships. 
8.4  Theoretical insights 
8.4.1  Social orders and foreign policy 
Are states where a limited access order dominates different as regards foreign policy? In 
the theory chapter, I argued that institutions in alimited access order constrain differently 
than those of an open access order, because political leaders have direct access to 
economic resources and can draw on privileges and dispense patronage in the exercise of 
economic and political power. My findings support this argument. But to what extent is it 
possible to say that this direct access to economic resources for Russian political leaders 
spilled over into foreign policy? To some extent, it did, not least in the case of Gazprom. 
Putin’s direct interference gave Gazprom’s actions vis-à-vis post-Soviet states a special 




policy. This came down to a lack of institutional boundaries, a lack of autonomy and 
overlapping responsibilities, between Gazprom and the Russian state. This blurring of 
political and economic organisations at the peak of the state points towards the continued 
use of state-controlled companies as tools of foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether 
such use will become less widespread and negotiated, or more direct and persistent.  
Looking at companies as tools of the state and, in the context of a limited access order, as 
sources of authoritarian durability explains more of the mutual interaction – at home and 
abroad. The ruling coalition needs to interact with companies, because in a limited access 
order, the state does not just extract resources throug  taxation, uphold institutions, and 
develop policy. Its power mechanisms are also used by the ruling coalition to maintain its 
hold on power. This affects some companies across a wide range of operations. Where a 
company’s interaction with the state includes interaction over foreign operations, the 
regime, too, gains access to what would otherwise be ordinary commercial operations.  
The need to keep the ruling coalition together by maintaining informal rent sharing, and 
thereby sustain the regime, means that an authoritarian leader is never truly free of 
constraints in the manner of the typical dictator of the popular imagination, but there can 
be more freedom in the exercise of foreign policy than in domestic affairs. There is a 
parallel to democracies here, where foreign policy choices are rarely decisive for 
incumbent re-election. However, the opaque constraints on leaders in limited access orders 
arguably make foreign policy coordination and formation less of a priority. Where the 
privileges of one group within the ruling coalition are concerned, the imperative of 
maintaining them is likely to trump most other considerations. Considerations of coherence 




Gazprom’s commercial interest in Russia’s relations with Central Asia in the 2000s is an 
instructive example of how a privileged position carried over into foreign policy, to the 
detriment of Russia’s other interests, such as protecti n of its own citizens in 
Turkmenistan, supporting Lukoil’s development, or maintaining Russia’s overall position 
in the region.  
8.4.2  Access and participation 
Access and participation in the context of a process of mutual adaptation are useful 
concepts with which to study the development of relations between organisations, here, 
state organisations and state companies. These concepts apture another dimension of 
inter-organisational interaction than ownership relations. After 1995, ownership relations 
changed relatively little in the cases under study here, but their access and participatory 
relations with central state organisations altered considerably. The concepts have 
explanatory power when studying how actors interact with each other and institutions 
change. This extends beyond what is normally captured in analyses that concern 
themselves mostly with formal rules captured on paper. With access and participation, both 
the formal and informal sides of an institutional fr mework come under scrutiny. 
As institutions in a limited access order work differently from those in open access orders, 
institutional change needs to be observed in a way th t captures informality and privilege. 
Firmly upheld property rights, and other institutions, constrain both state and private actors 
predictably and transparently, but in a limited access order they constrain differently, and 
they are not firmly, impersonally, upheld by the state. Access and participation can then 
capture the variation of other inter-organisational relationships, when, for example, lines 




why nothing happens. Following this over time, one se s how power relations between the 
actors change. 
8.5  Further research 
Although Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union presents scholars with a special 
case displaying some unique features in how it relates to its neighbours, the framework 
applied here has made it possible to pin down the further development of those relations in 
a way applicable also to other states. Perfect analogies do not exist, and if they had there 
would be little room in which to exercise our analytic capacity. Interesting parallels and 
similarities certainly exist. With a conceptual framework based on the development of a 
social order, and within it the interaction and mutual adaptation of a state and organisations 
that depend on it but can also function as its tools, political scientists and economists could 
probably understand better the states in the world that are otherwise lumped into categories 
like ‘emerging markets’ or ‘developing states’. As I have showed, while a social order 
framework can tell us much about state development, it can also guide analyses of relations 
between the state and organisations, and relate their development to the development of the 
state. It would be interesting to look at other post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, both interesting parallels to Russia. Ukraine especially, with its oligarch-based 
pluralism, presents us with a fruitful case for thestudy of interactions between companies, 
state organisations, and members of changing ruling coalitions.  
But do interactions between states and companies extend this frequently into foreign 
operations and foreign policy, as part of institutional development at home? Is Russia not a 
unique case in this regard? Probably not. Even if it were, the findings here merit attention 




policy. But they also point towards how, in limited access orders, economic organisations 
above a certain size cannot be apolitical because they are essential to the ruling coalition. 
Some of the large corporations operating in several countries today will certainly have a 
supporting role in their home country’s ruling coalition and take part in institutional 
development. Economic integration in Asia, with growing interdependence and 
asymmetric dependencies, could be an interesting ground in which to apply a social order 
framework that also includes the international level. China is the obvious case, especially 
as its energy companies, in their search for energy sources, have developed strategies of 










List of abbreviations 
 
ACG Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli fields (oil) 
AIOC Azerbaijan International Operating Company  
ARMZ (formerly) Atomredmetzoloto 
bboe billion barrels of oil equivalents 
bcm billion cubic metres (gas) 
BPS Baltic Pipeline System/Baltiiskaya truboprovodnaya sistema (crude oil) 
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil) pipeline 
BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (gas) pipeline 
CGNPC China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation  
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium (oil) 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ESPO East Siberia–Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline/Nefteprovod Vostochnaya 
Sibir’–Tikhii Okean 
FSK Federal Grid Company/Federal’naya setevaya kompaniya (electricity) 
FTS Federal Tariff Service/Federal'naya sluzhba po tarifam 
GRES Condenser-type thermal power station, initially state regional power 
station/Gosudarstvennaya raionnaya elektrostantsiya, now often hydro-
recycling power station/gidroretsirkulyatsionnaya elektrostantsiya 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IOC international oil company 
IES Integrated Energy System (electricity) 
IUEC International Uranium Enrichment Centre  
JV joint venture 
ktoe thousand tonnes of oil equivalents 
mcm thousand cubic metres (gas) 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Minatom Nuclear Energy Ministry/Ministerstvo po atomnoi energii 
Minsredmash Ministry for Medium Machine-Building/Ministerstvo srednego 
mashinostroeniya (nuclear industry) 
mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalents 
MW Megawatt (1000 kW) 
NDPI consolidated production tax/nalog na dobychu poleznykh iskopaemykh 




NOC national oil company 
NPP nuclear power plant 
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NWW The conceptual framework on social orders develop d by Douglass 
North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OVR Fatherland – All Russia (party)/Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya 
PSA production sharing agreement 
RAO UES Russian Unified Energy System/Rossiiskoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo 
“Edinaya Energeticheskaya Sistema” 
RUIE Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs/Rossiiskii soyuz 
promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei 
SOCAR State Oil Company of Azerbaijan  
Tcm Trillion cubic metres (gas) 
tpa tonnes per annum 
TPES Total primary energy supply 
TPP Thermal power plant 
UES United Energy System (electricity) 











Map 1 Transneft's crude oil pipeline system 





Map 2 Central Asia oil pipeline network 





Map 3 Gas pipelines in Russia, the post-Soviet region and Europe, 2014 





Map 4 Black Sea and Caspian Sea natural gas infrastructure, 2015 





Map 5 Central Asia gas pipeline network, 2015 




Table 1.1  Trade among Soviet republics/CIS countries, 1988–2001 




















1988 98 na 82 na 94 na 75 Na 
1995 48 25 48 19 39 18 34 13 
1997 40 27 34 24 48 23 44 19 
2001 30 18 17 11 10 3 31 11 
Percent of total trade 



















1988 91 Na 79 na 93 na 80 na 
1995 63 44 69 56 63 31 40 12 
1997 73 64 67 54 60 30 36 13 
2001 60 53 70 65 23 13 27 6 
Percent of total trade 



















1988 91 na 83 na 98 na 79 na 
1995 55 45 70 50 73 24 69 27 
1997 46 35 54 46 52 16 61 27 
2001 24 17 51 46 48 15 53 17 
Percent of total trade 



















1988 95 na 82 na 68 na 51 na 
1995 63 48 68 33 19 na 29 na 
1997 70 58 52 29 19 na 27 na 
2001 61 44 38 16 10 na 19 na 
Percent of total trade 
Continued on next page 
 
 























1988 86 na 87 na 91 Na 85 na 
1995 34 13 59 17 49 4 55 7 
1997 34 8 64 15 24 8 57 13 
2001 32 16 78 19 38 3 33 10 
 



















1988 85 na 73 na 85 na 86 na 
1995 49 40 45 38 32 16 41 26 
1997 39 26 58 46 33 18 27 18 
2001 30 23 48 34 33 17 38 20 





Table 1.2  Energy dependence in the post-Soviet region, 1992–2012 
  Share of product in TPES1,2, % (import dependence for product 
supply, %)3 
Country Product  1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 
Armenia Oil4 58 (100)6 8 (100)6 18 (100)6 15 (100)6 14 (100)6 
Gas 36 (100) 63 (100) 47 (100) 58 (100) 65 (100) 
Nuclear7 0 22 (na) 32 (na) 23 (na) 20 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES5 0 -0 -1 0 -4 
Azerbaijan Oil 50 (17) 57 (5) 33 (1) 39 (2) 36 (1) 
Gas 50 (40) 43 (0) 64 (43) 62 (0) 68 (0) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -0 0 1 -0 -0 
Belarus Oil 51 (110) 38 (111) 31 (188) 28 (267) 35 (266) 
Gas 40 (98) 54 (99) 59 (98) 62 (99) 56 (99) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES 1 3 2 1 2 
Estonia Oil 20 (137) 17 (155) 20 (131) 20 (131) 17 (138) 
Gas 11 (100) 11 (100) 13 (100) 14 (100) 10 (100) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -4 -1 -1 -4 -3 
Georgia Oil 38 (104) 42 (109) 22 (104) 30 (99) 28 (99) 
Gas 46 (99) 23 (100) 27 (98) 42 (99) 44 (99) 
Hydro 6 (na) 16 (na) 23 (na) 18 (na) 17 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES 1 .5 2 -0 0 
Kazakhstan Oil 28 (80) 25 (25) 26 (44) 24 (60) 18 (63) 
Gas 19 (77) 18 (35) 18 (97) 27 (30) 31 (16) 
Hydro 1 (na) 1 (na) 2 (na) 1 (na) 1 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES 2 1 0 0 .2 
Kyrgyzstan Oil 38 (100) 18 (90) 15 (106) 36 (136) 43 (100) 
Gas 31 (96) 28 (95) 31 (97) 22 (98) 9 (93) 
Hydro 16 (na) 36 (na) 36 (na) 37 (na) 30 (na) 




Table 1.2. continued 
  Share of product in TPES1,2, % (import dependence for product 
supply, %)3 
Country Product 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 
Latvia Oil 42 (101)6 36 (104)6 35 (100) 39 (108) 37 (132) 
Gas 35 (100) 24 (100) 28 (100) 27 (100) 31 (100) 
Hydro 4 (na) 6 (na) 5 (na) 5 (na) 7 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES 5 4 5 5 3 
Lithuania Oil 37 (125) 37 (196) 27 (276) 30 (231) 36 (392) 
Gas 25 (100) 22 (100) 24 (100) 31 (100) 36 (100) 
Nuclear7 35 (na) 36 (na) 42 (na) 28 (na) 0 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -4 -3 -6 -1 7 
Moldova Oil 42 (100)6 25 (100)6 18 (100)6 20 (99) 23 (101) 
Gas 43 (100) 64 (100) 70 (100) 68 (100) 68 (100) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -1 4 7 8 2 
Tajikistan Oil 23 (100) 15 (99) 15 (99) 19 (99) 26 (99) 
Gas 34 (96) 29 (95) 20 (94) 21 (98) 52 (92) 
Hydro 33 (na) 55 (na) 61 (na) 57 (na) 64 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES 2 4 3 .3 -2 
Turkmenistan Oil 51 (42) 27 (17) 30 (0) 25 (0) 26 (0) 
Gas 53 (0) 77 (0) 73 (0) 78 (0) 77 (0) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -4 -2 -.5 -.8 -1 
Ukraine Oil 18 (105) 13 (85) 11 (134) 12 (99) 10 (86) 
Gas 41 (81) 46 (79) 45 (77) 43 (70) 34 (63) 
Nuclear7 9 (na) 14 (na) 15 (na) 18 (na) 18 (na) 
Electricity, trade as percentage of TPES -.2 -0 -.2 -.6 -1 
Uzbekistan Oil 18 (63) 15 (0) 13 (0) 10 (0) 6 (0) 
Gas 75 (6) 80 (6) 84 (2) 86 (0) 89 (0) 




(Derived from IEA, 2015) 
1 Total primary energy supply, excludes exports. 
2 Indicates the percentage of a country’s total prima y energy supply for which it relies on a given product. Exports are excluded. 
3 Indicates the percentage of supply coming from abro d for the product in question. E.g. Latvia imported 100 percent of its gas supply. A percentage above 100 
indicates that the country imported a product in excess of its domestic needs, e.g. importing crude oil in excess of its needs for re-export, possibly as oil products.  
4 Includes both the category of crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGL) and feedstock, and the oil products category. 
5 Net electricity trade as a share of TPES. A positive number means that the country imported more electricity than it exported, a negative number that it was a net 
exporter. Note that while TPES does not include net export in the supply, this table relates net export (and import) to the country’s overall energy supply. For 
example, in 1992, Tajikistan’s net electricity imports supplied 2 percent of TPES, while in 2012 its net electricity exports were equivalent to 2 percent of i s TPES, 
i.e. a surplus. Also note that the net export/import d es not capture interdependence. In Central Asia, and in the cases of Ukraine and Lithuania, the electricity 
imports and exports are considerable, but they cancel each other out to a large extent and the net flow accordingly does not reflect the aggregate trade flow. 
6 All oil import consisted of oil products. 









Graph 2.1  Brent spot price, 1992–2012 
FOB: Free on board 
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Graph 2.2. Value of total Russian exports, 2000–2010 
Mill. US$ 
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Table 3.1. Synchronisation between UES (Russia) and the Integrated 
Energy System (IES) 
Country Synchronisation with UES/IES 
Kazakhstan 2000 (July)1,2   
Kyrgyzstan 2000 (August)2  
Tajikistan 2000 (August)2 
Uzbekistan 2000 (August)–20092 
Turkmenistan Partial parallel only from 2000 
Azerbaijan 2004 
Georgia 2000 (November) 
Armenia 2004 
Ukraine 2001 (August) 
Belarus 2001 (February) 
Moldova 2001 (August) 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (synchronous 
interconnection) 
2001 (February) 
UES and IES form a wide area synchronous transmission grid 
1 Kazakhstan has no unified electricity grid. Its northern grid is connected to Russia, its southern grid 
to the Central Asian system. 




Table 3.2. Overview of Inter RAO’s investments in CIS member states, 2003– 
Country Acquisition Type of asset Ownership 
period 
Capacity Owned through Market share in 
country 
Georgia Mtkvari energetika/9th & 




2003– 2 x 300 
MW 
RAO Nordic OY 20-30% (combined 
production of 
Tbilisi power plant 
and Khrami power 
plant) Georgia  Khrami GES units no 1 
& 2 










2003– 5658 km RAO Nordic OY 35%  
Armenia Metsamor Nuclear power 
plant 
2003–2012 815 MW Management 
rights 
44% 




2005– 29600 km Interenergo BV 
(99 year lease) 
100% 




2003– 560 MW Management 
rights 
10% 




Table 3.2 continued 
Country Acquisition Type of asset Ownership 
period 
Capacity Owned through Market share in 
country 
Moldova Moldova GRES Thermal power 
plant 
2005– 2520 MW RAO Nordic OY, 
from 2010 direct 
 




2005– 2 x 500 
MW 
Direct 12% 
Tajikistan 75% of Sangtuda-1 
(Combined Russian 
share) 







Table 3.3. RAO UES ownership, 1996–2007 
 Mid- 
1996 
19961  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
The Russian 
state 
60 52,7 52,5 52,55 52,55 52,55 52,55 52,55 52,68 52,68 52,68 52,68 52,68 
Russian 
citizens 
- 8,6 5,5 5,59 5,5 4,96 4,61 4,13 3,44 3,2 2,89 3,2 2,26 
Russian 
organisations2 
18 10,9 11,3 8,26 11,36 42,49 42,84 43,32 43,88 44,12 44,43 44,12 45,06 
Foreign 
organisations3 
22 27,8 30,7 33,6 33,6 - - - - - - - - 
Percent of total shares 
(Derived from Ekspert, 1996, RAO UES, 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2003, p.15; 2004; 2005a, p.26; 2006, p.10; 2007, p.12; 2008, 
p.21) 
1 All numbers are for the end of the year unless otherwise indicated 
2 Indicating both Russian citizens and organisations. 





Table 3.4. Russian electricity export, 1997–2012 
 19971 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (of which 
Inter RAO) 
2003 (of which 
Inter RAO) 
2004 (of which 
Inter RAO) 
Belarus 5,130 4,947 5,809 6,450 6,237 3,728 (0) (3,532) (1,511) 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 9.6 1,087 (0) (50) 1,059 (70) 
Georgia 210 157 74 269 45 350 (100) (866) 798 (730) 
Kazakhstan 2,740 2,639 2,107 1,848 2,461 2,263 (600) 1,793 (1,760) (2,226) 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 440 (0) (879) (918) 
China 59 0 0 103 164 151 (0) (162) (338) 
Mongolia 356 0 0 0 38 104 (0) (40) (40) 
Latvia5 423 81 177 303 298 1,112 (0) 761 (0) (690) 
Finland 4,270 667 804 3,911 7,317 7,609 (130) 10,993 (510) 10,786 (3,260) 
Lithuania5 0 0 0 0 0 (20) 0 0 
Norway 183 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 (0) (182) (188) 
Ukraine 6,070 3,128 0 0 185 231 (0) 214 (0) 25 (0) 
Bulgaria 199 0 0 0 0 0 na Na 
Hungary 100 0 0 0 0 0   
Turkey 93 378 0 0 180 93 (0)   
South Ossetia na na na na 0 0 na  
Poland5    165 593 271 (0)   
Estonia5      71 (0)   
Total volume of 
electricity export, 
million kWh  
19,830 11,997 8,971 13,049 17,898 17,530 (850)  20,700 (7,982) 18,800 (9,971) 




Table 3.4. continued 
 20052 2006 2007 2008 20093 20103 2011 2012 
Belarus 4,680 2,350 2,653  2,902 29 3,173 3,698 
Azerbaijan 1,000 760 250  16 18  56 
Georgia 790 570 280  221 212  517 
Kazakhstan 1,920 1,870 2,168  583 1,377  2,284 
Moldova 800 400 0     0 
China 490 520 0  853 983 1,238 2,630 
Mongolia 170 170 184  189  264 393 
Latvia5 530 1,090 1,417  665   0 
Finland 9,720 11,150 9,871  10,645 5,231 7,3244 3,794 
Lithuania5 610 1,420 1,063  442 5,101  4,780 
Norway 220 220 0     0 
Ukraine   35  16 35  82 
Bulgaria        0 
Hungary        0 
Turkey        0 
South Ossetia     126 124  130 
Poland5         
Estonia5         
Total volume of 
electricity export, 
million kWh  
20,930 20,520 18,140 18,220 15,770 17,650 22,700 18,364 
Million kWh. Numbers are rounded and may add up to more than the total. 
(Derived from RAO UES, 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005a; 2008, p.150; Inter RAO, 2006, p.18; 2007, p.32; 2010b, 





1 For 1997 it is not clear whether the numbers include export effectuated by RAO UES for third parties. After 1997, they do not. 
2 From 2005, Inter RAO effectuated all trade. 
3 For 2009 and 2010 all numbers, except those for export to China and total volume, are author's calcultions based on percentages of total export.  
4 Export to RAO Nordic. 
5 Trade in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland wasfrom 2004 mainly effectuated by Inter RAO Lietuva, and these numbers are not included here. However, while
some Russian export later, too, went to these countries directly, some of the numbers for later years may include trade by Inter RAO Lietuva. The sources are unclear 






Table 3.5. Russian electricity import, 2003–12 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 20081 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Kazakhstan 5,000 7,080 3,860 3,680 3,263  NA NA NA 1,973 
Georgia 90 0 0 0   NA NA NA 369 
Azerbaijan 0 0 280 320   NA NA NA 241 
Belarus 0 0 20 50   NA NA NA 4 
Mongolia 0 0 10 10   NA NA NA 21 
Ukraine 0 250 2,830 500 966  NA NA NA 0 
Latvia 0 210 190 40   NA NA NA 0 
Lithuania 2,390 3,910 2,950 510 446  NA NA NA 0 
Total import volume, 
million kWh  
7,480 11,460 10,140 5,110 5,620  3,023 2,867 3,403 2,608 
Million kWh. Numbers are rounded and may add up to more than the total. 
(Derived from RAO UES, 2008, p.151; Inter RAO, 2007, p.31; 2010b, p.58; 2012, p.28; 2014, p.59) 





Table 3.6. Non-payment and barter in electricity payments in the post-Soviet region, 1998–2001 
































Ukraine 84.4 9 1.1 0 20.5 0.9 0 17.2 0.2 2.6 16.3 1.1 
Kazakhstan 64.1 29.8 17.7 41.35 46.2 18.8 28 27.2 25.8 27.3 31.3 31.3 
Belarus 121 67.3 0 122.27 136.4 0 108.7 126 15.3 84.5 85.5 54.3 
Georgia 4.7 2 2 1.4 0.1 0.1 4.7 4.6 4.6 7.3 5.9 5.9 
Sum 274.2 108.1 20.8 165 203.2 19.7 141.4 175 45.9 121.9 139 92.5 
Million US$, end of year 





Table 3.7. Accumulated electricity debts to Russia, 1998–2000 
Debtor 
state 
1998 1999 2000 
Ukraine 129,4 83,8 54,7 
Kazakhstan 419,1 413,5 414,3 
Belarus 53,6 39,5 22,2 
Georgia 45,6 46,4 46,5 
Total 647,7 583,2 537,7 
Million US$, end of year 





Table 4.1. Organisation of Russian nuclear power industry, 1945–2008 
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Table 4.2. Global known recoverable uranium resources, 2011 
Country Uranium, tonnes1,2 Percentage of world 
resources3 
Australia 1,661,000 31% 
Kazakhstan 629,0004 12% 
Russia 487,200 9% 
Canada 468,700 9% 
Niger 421,000 8% 
South Africa 279,100 5% 
Brazil 276,700 5% 
Namibia 261,000 5% 
USA 207,400 4% 
China 166,100 3% 
Ukraine 119,600 2% 
Uzbekistan 96,200 2% 
Mongolia 55,700 1% 
Jordan 33,800 1% 
Other 164,000 3% 
World total 5,372,200  
(WNA, 2012) 
1 On 1 November 2011 
2 Includes reasonably assured resources and inferred resources of uranium that can be economically 
extracted at a price level of 130 US$/kg. 
3 Fluctuates with price due to differences in the orb dies that give different production costs. 
4 Kazakhstan’s own estimates are higher and place Kazakhstan’s uranium resources in the range of 17 




Table 4.3. Soviet/Russian-built reactors, by country, 2014 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Armenia Armenia-1 (Metsamor) 376 Permanent Shutdown 1977 (1989) 1993 
Armenia Armenia-2 (Metsamor) 375 Operational 1980 1989-93 
Belarus Ostrovets-1   Under Construction     
Belarus Ostrovets-2   Under Construction     
Bulgaria Kozloduy-1 408 Permanent Shutdown 1974   
Bulgaria Kozloduy-2 408 Permanent Shutdown 1975   
Bulgaria Kozloduy-3 408 Permanent Shutdown 1981   
Bulgaria Kozloduy-4 408 Permanent Shutdown 1982   
Bulgaria Kozloduy-5 953 Operational 1988   
Bulgaria Kozloduy-6 953 Operational 1993   
China Tianwan-1 990 Operational 2007   
China Tianwan-2 990 Operational 2007   




China Tianwan-4   Under Construction     
Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Czech Republic Dukovany-11 468 Operational 1985   
Czech Republic Dukovany-21 471 Operational 1986   
Czech Republic Dukovany-31 468 Operational 1986   
Czech Republic Dukovany-41 471 Operational 1987   
Czech Republic Temelin-12 963 Operational 2002   
Czech Republic Temelin-22 963 Operational 2003   
Finland Loviisa-1 496 Operational 1977   
Finland Loviisa-2 496 Operational 1981   
Germany Greifswald-1 408 Permanent Shutdown 1974 1990 
Germany Greifswald-2 408 Permanent Shutdown 1975 1990 
Germany Greifswald-3 408 Permanent Shutdown 1978 1990 
Germany Greifswald-4 408 Permanent Shutdown 1979 1990 




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Germany Greifswald-5 408 Permanent Shutdown 1989 1989 
Germany Rheinsberg KKR 62 Permanent Shutdown 1966 1990 
Hungary Paks-1 470 Operational 1983   
Hungary Paks-2 473 Operational 1984   
Hungary Paks-3 473 Operational 1986   
Hungary Paks-4 473 Operational 1987   
India Kudankulam-1 917 Operational     
India Kudankulam-2 917 Under Construction     
Iran Bushehr-1 915 Operational 2012   
Kazakhstan BN-350 Aktau 
(Shevchenko) 
52 Permanent Shutdown 1973   
Lithuania Ignalina-1 1185 Permanent Shutdown 1985 2004 
Lithuania Ignalina-2 1185 Permanent Shutdown 1987 2009 




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Russia Balakovo-2 950 Operational 1988   
Russia Balakovo-3 950 Operational 1989   
Russia Balakovo-4 950 Operational 1993   
Russia Kola-1 411 Operational 1973   
Russia Kola-2 411 Operational 1975   
Russia Kola-3 411 Operational 1982   








32 Under Construction 2019   






Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Russia Baltic 1 1109 Under Construction 2017   
Russia Beloyarsk-1 102 Permanent Shutdown 1964   
Russia Beloyarsk-2 146 Permanent Shutdown 1969   
Russia Beloyarsk-3 560 Operational 1981   
Russia Beloyarsk-4 789 Under Construction     
Russia Bilibino 1 11 Operational 1974   
Russia Bilibino 2 11 Operational 1975   
Russia Bilibino 3 11 Operational 1976   
Russia Bilibino 4 11 Operational 1977   
Russia Kalinin-1 950 Operational 1985   
Russia Kalinin-2 950 Operational 1987   
Russia Kalinin-3 950 Operational 2005   





Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Russia Kalinin-4 950 Operational 2012   
Russia Kola-1 411 Operational 1973   
Russia Kola-2 411 Operational 1975   
Russia Kola-3 411 Operational 1982   
Russia Kola-4 411 Operational 1984   
Russia Kursk-1 925 Operational 1977   
Russia Kursk-2 925 Operational 1979   
Russia Kursk-3 925 Operational 1984   
Russia Kursk-4 925 Operational 1986   
Russia Leningrad II-1 1085 Under Construction     
Russia Leningrad II-2 1085 Under Construction     
Russia Leningrad-1 925 Operational 1974   
Russia Leningrad-2 925 Operational 1976   




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Russia Leningrad-3 925 Operational 1980   
Russia Leningrad-4 925 Operational 1981   
Russia Novovoronezh II-1 1114 Under Construction 2014   
Russia Novovoronezh II-2 1114 Under Construction     
Russia Novovoronezh-1 197 Permanent Shutdown 1964   
Russia Novovoronezh-2 336 Permanent Shutdown 1970   
Russia Novovoronezh-3 385 Operational 1972   
Russia Novovoronezh-4 385 Operational 1973   
Russia Novovoronezh-5 950 Operational 1981   
Russia Obninsk APS 
(Prototype) 
5 Permanent Shutdown 1954   
Russia Rostov-1 
(Volgodonsk-1) 
950 Operational 2001   
Russia Rostov-2 
(Volgodonsk-2) 




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Russia Rostov-3 
(Volgodonsk-3) 
1011 Under Construction     
Rusla Rostov-4 
(Volgodonsk-4) 
1011 Under Construction     
Russia Smolensk-1 925 Operational 1983   
Russia Smolensk-2 925 Operational 1985   
Russia Smolensk-3 925 Operational 1990   
Slovakia Bohunice A-1 93 Permanent Shutdown 1972 1977 
Slovakia Bohunice A-1 93 Permanent Shutdown 1972 1977 
Slovakia Bohunice-1 408 Permanent Shutdown 1980   
Slovakia Bohunice-2 408 Permanent Shutdown 1981   
Slovakia Bohunice-3 472 Operational 1985   
Slovakia Bohunice-4 472 Operational 1985   
Slovakia Mochovce-1 436 Operational 1998   




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Slovakia Mochovce-2 436 Operational 2000   
Slovakia Mochovce-3 440 Under Construction     
Slovakia Mochovce-4 440 Under Construction 2015   
Ukraine Chernobyl-1 740 Permanent Shutdown 1978  1997 
Ukraine Chernobyl-2 925 Permanent Shutdown 1979  1991 
Ukraine Chernobyl-3 925 Permanent Shutdown 1982  2000 
Ukraine Chernobyl-4 925 Permanent Shutdown 1984  1986 
Ukraine Khmelnitski-1 950 Operational 1988   
Ukraine Khmelnitski-2 950 Operational 2005   
Ukraine Khmelnitski-3 950 Under Construction     
Ukraine Khmelnitski-4 950 Under Construction     
Ukraine Rovno-1 381 Operational 1981   
Ukraine Rovno-2 376 Operational 1982   




Table 4.3 continued 
Location Facility Capacity MWe net Current Status Start Year Shutdown year 
Ukraine Rovno-3 950 Operational 1987   
Ukraine Rovno-4 950 Operational 2006   
Ukraine South Ukraine-1 950 Operational 1983   
Ukraine South Ukraine-2 950 Operational 1985   
Ukraine South Ukraine-3 950 Operational 1989   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-1 950 Operational 1985   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-2 950 Operational 1986   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-3 950 Operational 1987   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-4 950 Operational 1988   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-5 950 Operational 1989   
Ukraine Zaporozhe-6 950 Operational 1996   
 (WNA, 2014e) 
1 Soviet-Czechoslovak (Skoda) cooperation  




Table 4.4. Russian export of nuclear reactors, 1992–2014 
Country Plant Type Est. cost Status/financing 
Ukraine Khmelnitski 2 & Rovno 4 2 x V-320 reactors, 1000 MWe   operating 
Iran Bushehr V-446 reactor, 1000 MWe   operating 
China Tianwan 1&2 2 x AES-911   operating 
India Kudankulam 1&2 2 x AES-92 $3 billion Built, unit 1 operation 2013, unit 2 pending 
China Tianwan 3&4 2 x AES-91 $4 billion Under construc ion from Dec. 2012 
Belarus Ostrovets 1&2 2 x AES-2006 $10 
billion 
Loan organised for 90%, construction 
start 2013 and 2014 
India Kudankulam 3&4 2 x AES-92 $5.8 
million 
Confirmed, loan organised for 85%, 
construction start 2014? 
Bangladesh Rooppur 1&2 2 x AES-92 $4 billion Confirmed, loan organised for 90%, 
construction start 2015 
Turkey Akkuyu 1-4 4 x AES-2006 $25 billion Confirmed, BOO2, construction start 2016 
 





Table 4.4 continued 
Country Plant Type Est. cost Status/financing 
Vietnam Ninh Thuan 1, 1&2 2 x AES-91 $9 billion Confirmed, loan 
organised for 85%, 
construction start 2017 or 
later 
Finland Hanhikivi 1 1 x AES-2006 €6 billion Contracted, Rosatom 
34% equity, construction 
start 2018? 
Armenia Metsamor 3 1 x AES-92 $5 billion Planned, loan for 50%, 
possibly extended up to 
4.5 billion US$ 
China Tianwan 5&6 2 x AES2006?   Planned 
China Tianwan 7&8 2 x AES2006   Planned 
Vietnam Ninh Thuan 1, 3&4 2 x AES-91   Planned 
Hungary Paks 5&6 2 x AES2006 €12.5 billion Planned, loan organised 
for 80% 





Table 4.4 continued 
Country Plant Type Est. cost Status/financing 
Slovakia Bohunice V3 1 x AES2006   Planned, possible 51% 
Rosatom equity 
Jordan   2 x AES-92 $10 billion Planned, BOO, finance 
organised for 49.9% 
India Kudankulam 5&6 2 x AES-92?   Planned 
Bulgaria Belene/ Kozloduy 7 2 x AES-92   cancelled, but may be 
revived 
Ukraine Khmelnitski completion of 2 x V-392 
reactors 
$4.9 million Due to commence 
construction 2015, 85% 
financed by loan 
 
(Derived from WNA, 2014d; 2015; ARKA News Agency, 2012c; 2013; 2014b) 
1 AES-91 & AES-92 have 1000 MWe class reactors, AES-2006 have 1200 MWe class reactors. 





Graph 4.1. World uranium spot prices, 1987–2013 
There is no formal uranium exchange in the internatio l market.  Relations between uranium suppliers and buyers are not usually transparent. Until 
after 2000, up to 90 percent of the world’s uranium changed ownership under long-term contracts, typically for ten years at a time. 




Table 5.1. State ownership of Lukoil, 1995–2009 
Month/year Government-
owned share 




1995 53.2 Privatisation, 7.99% 
stake to ARCO 
 
Ultimo 1995 42.2 Sold to NIKoil  
Ultimo 1999 26.2 Sale ahead of acquisition 
of Komi-TEK 
 
Ultimo 2000 15.5   
Ultimo 2001 13.5   
Ultimo 2002 7.59   
September 
2004 
0 Sold to 
ConocoPhillips 
 
2005   Alekperov’s share 
appr. 13% 
2009   32.6 (of which 
20.6% Alekperov’s) 


















Lukoil’s share of 
total Russian oil 
production, % 
1996 -- 58.5 3.0 -- 
1997 -- 62.3 3.3 -- 
1998 11.0 64.2 3.7 -- 
1999 14.2 75.6 (73.8) 4.7 (1.0) 24.0 
2000 14.9 77.7 (75.6) 5.0 (1.2) 23.4 
2001 16.6 78.3 (76.1) 5.2 (1.1) 22.0 
2002 19.3 79.8 (76.9)  5.1 (1.2) 20.3 
2003 20.1 81.5 (78.6)  5.7 (1.3) 18.4 
2004 20.1 86.2 (82.7) 6.5 (1.8) 18.0 
2005 20.34 105.6 (86.3) 7.5 (2.6) 18.4 
2006 20.4 111.8 (89.6) 13.6 (9.8)5 18.8 
2007 20.4 113.4 (91.1)6 14.0 (9.7) -- 
2008 19.3 111.7 (89.9) 17.0 (12.7) 18.5 
2009 17.5 114.4 (91.9) 14.9 (10.2) 18.7 
2010 17.3 95.9 (89.7) 18.6 (12.7)  17.8 
2011 17.3 90.9 (84.9) 18.6 (12.8) 16.6 
2012 17.3 89.9 (84.2) 19.9 (na) 16.3 
(Derived from Lukoil, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009; 2010; 
2011b; 2012; 2013; Meshcherin, 2010b; NiK, 2006a; NGV, 2007c; 2011h; 2012c; 
2013) 
1 Billion barrels of oil equivalents, includes gas. Proven reserves (categories A, B, C1). 
2 Includes gas condensate. 
3 The total figure includes associated gas (oil gas). Lukoil’s overall utilization of associated gas 
increased from 73.4 percent in 2002 to 79.7 percent in 2004, with the remainder being flared. 
4 Estimated according to international standards from 2005 onwards. 
5 Until 2006, Lukoil measured its gas production as all gas extracted, while from 2006, its gas 
production is measured exclusive of gas utilised by the company itself, pumped back into the fields or 
lost during transport (cf. Lukoil, 2007, p.32). As a result, the numbers up to and including 2005 
overestimate the actual gas production significantly. From 2012, Lukoil distinguished between 
extracted gas and commercially produced gas (tovarnyi gaz), exclusive of gas utilised by the company 
itself, pumped back into the fields or lost during transport. For natural gas, the 2012 Annual report 
gave only the volume of extracted gas (p.27-29) and not the commercial volume. 







Table 5.3. Lukoil’s Board of Directors, 1999–2010 
Year Lukoil management 
and pension fund 
Independent/minority shareholder 
(of which non-Russian) 
Russian 
government 
1999 8 2  3 
2000 7 2 2 
2001 5 4 2 
2002 4 5 (2) 2 
2003 4 6 (2) 1 
2004 4 6 (2) 1 
2005 4 7 (2) - 
2006 4 7 (2) - 
2007 4 7 (2) - 
2008 3 8 (2) - 
2009 3 8 (2) - 
2010 2 9 (2) - 
Lukoil’s AGMs usually take place in June. The year of election to the Board is counted for 
each member. The exit year is not counted for a member unless the exit from the Board took 
place after the AGM. The total number of members is 13 for 1999, later 11.  





Table 5.4. Lukoil’s operations in Kazakhstan, 1995– 
Company and 
field/project 









160.8 mtoe In production 
Uzen 1995  Oil/gas 
Onshore 
 Lukoil performed well repairs 
in 1995–6 
Bozingen  Lukoil (100)    
Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium 











Transport of oil from 
Tengiz and Kashagan to 
Novorossiisk 
 Under exploitation 






1300 mtoe In production 
TengizChevroil: 
Korolevskoe 






190 mtoe In production 





Table 5.4 continued 
Company and 
field/project 






1998 2012– Lukoil (13.5)6 
2012– BG (29.25) joint 
operator 
2012– Eni (29.25) joint 
operator 
2012– Chevron (18) 
2012– KazMunaiGaz (10)6 
Oil and gas 
condensate 
Onshore 
3090 mtoe In production from 1984, 
redeveloped from 2000, 
production and export increased 
from 2004 




--- Exploration prolonged through 
2012 




--- Project closed 2008 after un-
successful exploration 
Buzachi Operating ltd.: 
Severnye Buzachi 
2005 2005–2006 Lukoil (50) 
2006– Lukoil (25) 




164.8 mtoe In production 
Kazakhoil-Aktobe JV: 
Alibekmola 
2005 2005–2006 Lukoil (50) 
2006– Lukoil (25) 




71.2 mtoe In production 
Kazakhoil-Aktobe JV: 
Kozhasai 
2005 2005–2006 Lukoil (50) 
2006– Lukoil (25) 




67.6 mtoe In production 
 





Table 5.4 continued 
Company and 
field/project 





20057 2005–2006 Lukoil (100) 
2006– Lukoil (50) 
2006–10 Mittal (50) 
2010– Sinopec (50) 
Oil 
Onshore 
68.6 mtoe In production 
Arman 2005 2005–2006 Lukoil (50) 
2006– Lukoil (25) 








2005 2005–2006 Lukoil (25) 
2006– Lukoil (12.5) 





 Under exploration 
(Derived from Stalker, 1995a; Lukoil, 2002; 2011; Kravets, M., 2004; NiK, 2004k; 2007k; Skornyakova, 2006; NGV, 2007a; 2011d; 
2011b; 2011e; 2011f ; Tutushkin, 2008a; Lukin, 2010b; Lukoil Overseas, 2010; CNPC, 2011; Mazneva, 2011)  
1 Year when Lukoil acquired a share 
2 Total volume of field. Lukoil’s share (reserve) corresponds to its share in the project and the totalwas calculated by the author on the basis of Lukoil’s reserves. 
3 PetroKazakhstan was owned by Hurricane Hydrocarbons (from 2003 named PetroKazakhstan) until 2005, and acquired by CNPC in October 2005. CNPC was 
forced to sell 33% of the company to KazMunaiGaz in July 2006 and retains 67%, now controlled through PetroChina. 
4 Originally LukArco. From 1997 to 2009, Arco (later BP) held 46 percent of LukArco. 
5 Joint venture between KazMunaiGaz and BP. 
6 KazMunaiGaz in 2011–12 obtained the 10% stake, while t e other participants reduced theirs. 
7 Lukoil acquired 60 percent of Chapparal Resources Inc. through Nelson Resources in 2005, then 40 percent in 2006. 






Table 5.5. Lukoil’s operations in Uzbekistan, 2004– 
Company and 
field/project 











Kungrad 2004 Lukoil 90% (operator) 
Uzbekneftegaz 10% 




Under exploration 2010 





Offshore  Under exploration 2010 




Under development 2010 
Central Ustyurt4 2008 Lukoil 100% Onshore  Under exploration 2010 
(Derived from NiK, 2008a; NGV, 2009a; Lukoil Overseas Holding Ltd., 2011, p.34-36) 
1 Year when Lukoil acquired a share 
2 Total volume of field. Lukoil’s share (reserve) corresponds to its share in the project/company and the total was calculated by the author on the basis of Lukoil’s 
reserves. 
3 Acquired from Soyuzneftegaz in 2008 





Table 6.1. Dividends, taxes and charity donations from Transneft, 2001–2008 
Year1 Dividends on state-held shares Taxes paid by Transneft2 Dividends on privileged shares Charity donations 
2002 1272.417  1396.000  
2003 1300.000  1345.000  
2004 2377.000  1585.000  
2005 250.210  500.374 1600.000 
2006 860.717  460.802 5300.000 
2007 472.200 21.778 350.500 7200.000 
2008 750.045 22.118 401.857 1100.000 
2009 0 29.794 368.163  
2010 584.027 29.248 389.325  
2011    8518.013 
Million rubles 
(Derived from Dmitriev, 2002b; NiK, 2003c; Transneft, 2004; 2005, p.18; 2006, p.43; 2007, p.41; 2008, p.27; 2009b, p.41; 2011d, p.43; 
2011e; Malkova, 2009) 
1 Payment year. Dividends are calculated on the basis of profits for the preceding year, i.e. the dividen s paid out in 2002 constitute a share of 2001 profits. 




Table 6.2. Production, transport and export of crude oil and oil products in Russia, 1998–2011 
Product 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Production of crude oil excluding gas condensate, million tonnes 
Crude oil 303 305 313 337 367 408 443 453 462 473 472 479 486  
 Oil shipments by pipeline in Russia, million tonnes 
Crude oil 282 282 294.6 319.7 359.8 404.3 441.5 454.1 460.8 461.8 456.4 474.4 491.7  
Refined 
products 
20.9 20.9 23.1 24.9 25.7 27.6 27.6 28.2 28.4 28.7 31.6 30.6 33.2  
 Export, million tonnes, including transit oil from other countries 
Crude oil   145  188 223 258 253 248 258 243 247 247  
Refined 
products 
  62.7  75.4 77.7 82.4 97.1 104 111 118 124 133  
 Export by export route, million tonnes 
Baltic Sea: 
Ventspils 




     16.0 13.8 14.7 7.85 0 0 0 0 0 
Baltic Sea: 
Primorsk 
NA NA NA NA - 17.7 44.6 57.4 66.1 74.2 73.9 70.2 71.7 70.1 






Table 6.2. continued 
















  64.9 66.1 62.9 73.9 74.7 75.0 70.7 58.2 53.7 54.9 64.0 77.4 
All export numbers include both near and far abroad destinations unless otherwise indicated. 
(Derived from IEA, 2015; Transneft, 2006, p.31-33; 2009b, p.29; 31; Tutushkin and Reznik, 2006; Rosstat, 2008b; 2009; 2010; NGV, 





Table 6.3. Selected Transneft pipeline projects with terminals, Russia and abroad 













Chechnya bypass Sulak-Trudovaya 312  Dec. 1999 April 2000   
Druzhba-Adria Százhalombatta-
Omisalj 
127 2000 NA NA   
Ukraine bypass Sukhodolnaya-
Rodionovskaya 












June 2000 Dec. 2001 12 mill. 50 mill. (2004)  
67 mill. (2006)  
75 mill. (2009) 






2007–9 June 2009 March 2012 30 mill.  50 mill./12 mill. 
to Kirishi and 38 










1465 2007–8 2010 (2013) 8.7 mill  
Purpe-Samotlor Purpe-Samotlor 429 2008 March 2010 Oct. 2011 25 mill.  




Table 6.3 continued 
Zapolyar’e-Purpe Purpe-Zapolyar’e 490 2010–11 2012 (plan) (3 sections to be 
completed from 























2046 2010 Sept. 2011 (2014) 20+ mill  50 mill.3 
(VSTO-1 





550 2008–12   50 mill.  
Orinoco 
(Venezuela) 






1510 2008–10  2001 for CPC 
(2015 for 
expansion) 










(Derived from Romanova, L., 2000a; Transneft, 2009a; 2009b, p.51-53; 2010, p.35-37; 2012a; 2012c; 2012d; 2012e; 2012f; 2012g; 
NGV, 2010e; Romanycheva, 2011; NiK, 2011j) 
1 Originally planned to go terminate at Primorsk port, Ust-Luga from May 2008. Kirishi branch not realised. 
2 To 2006 planned to terminate at Perevoznaya Bay. 






Table 6.4. Shareholders in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, 1992–
2012 
Owner 1992 1996 2005 2014 
Kazakhstan 25 19 19 19 
Oman 25 7 7 - 
Russia 25 24 24 24 
Chevron  15 15 15 
LukArco  12.5 12.5 12.5 
Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures  7.5 7.5 7.5 
ExxonMobil   7.5  
Agip  2 2  
BG (British Gas)  2 2 2 
MunaiGaz  1.75   
Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures   1.75 1.75 
Oryx  1.75 1.75 1.75 
ENI    2 
Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company      
CPC Company    7 

















Excludes oil of non-Russian origin 
(Derived from Transneft, 2006, p.23; 2007, p.21; 2009b, p.24; 2010, p.21; 2011d, 
p.29; 2012b, p.25; 2013, p.20) 
 
Table 6.6. Kazakhstan’s export routes, 2011 
Route Volume, mill metric tonnes 
(% of total) 
Caspian pipeline (Tengiz-Novorossiisk) 29.9 (45.6) 
Atyrau-Samara 15.4 (23.5) 
Trans-Caspian routes (tankers to BTC and Iran) 9.3 (14.2) 






Table 7.1. Gazprom’s gas production and markets, 1995–2012 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gazprom1  560 561 534 554 546 523 512 522 540 545 - 
Gazprom2 - - - - - - - - - 552.5 555 
supplied to Russian market2,3,4        282.1 283.5 291 305.7 307 
supplied to far abroad 
marketsi, 4,5,6,7,8,9 
      126.9 128.6 132.9 140.5 156.1 
supplied to FSU 
markets4,5,6,7,8,9 
      39.6 42.3 42.6 52.5 76.6 
Total supplies       448.6 454.4 466.5 498.7 539.7 
Russia, percent of total salesii        62.9 62.4 62.4 61.3 56.9 
Far abroad, percent of total 
salesii 
      28.3 28.3 28.5 28.2 28.9 
FSU, percent of total salesii       8.8 9.3 9.1 10.5 14.2 
Billion cubic metres 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gazprom1 - - - - - - - 
Gazprom2  556 548.6 549.7 461.5 508.6 513.2 487 
supplied to Russian market2,3,4  316.3 307 287 262.6 262.1 265.3 249.7 
supplied to far abroad marketsi, 4,5,6,7,8,9  161.5 168.5 167.6 148.3 148.1 156.6 151 
supplied to FSU markets4,5,6,7,8,9 101 100.9 96.5 67.7 70.2 81.7 66.1 
Total supplies 578.8 576.4 551.1 478.6 480.4 503.6 466.8 
Russia, percent of total salesii  54.6 53.3 52.1 54.9 54.6 52.7 53.5 
Far abroad, percent of total salesii  27.9 29.2 30.4 30.9 30.8 31.1 32.3 




Billion cubic metres 
(Derived from (1) Stern, 2005, p.28/Table 1.8; (2) Gazprom, 2013g; (3) Gazprom, 2013h; (4) Gazprom, 2013d, p.7; (5) Gazprom 2011, 
p.9; (6) Gazprom, 2009b, p.10; (7) Gazprom, 2007 p.5; (8) Gazprom, 2005, p.8, (9) Gazprom, 2003 p.35) 
 
i To and including 2006, to European markets 





Table 7.2. Gazprom’s gas sales to post-Soviet states, 2003–10 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Armenia — 0.3 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.4 
Azerbaijan — — 0.8 3.8 4.0 — — — — 
Belarus 10.2 10.2 13.4 19.8 20.5 20.6 21.1 17.6 21.6 
Estonia 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.4 
Georgia — 0.3 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 
Kazakhstan — — 5.1 4 6.5 10 9.6 3.1 3.4 
Latvia 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 1 0.7 1.1 0.7 
Lithuania 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.8 
Moldova 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.7 3 3.2 
Of which right-bank Moldova NA NA NA 1.4 NA 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Ukraine 25.9 26 34.3 37.6 59 54.8 56.2 37.8 36.5 
Total 42.3 44.1 65.7 76.6 101 96.5 96.5 67.7 70.2 
Billion cubic metres. 






Table 7.3. Itera’s sales to post-Soviet states, 2001–3 
 2001 2002 2003 (plan)  
Armenia 1.4 1.2 1.2 
Azerbaijan 3.1 4.0 5.5 
Belarus 5.1 6.2 not given 
Estonia 0.2 0.12 — 
Georgia  1.0 1.06 1.1 
Kazakhstan 2.9 1.2 — 
Latvia 0.4 0.4 — 
Lithuania 0.5 0.38 — 
Moldova 0.6 0.3 — 
Ukraine 34.8 32.66 not given 
Total 50.0 47.6 15.2 
Billion cubic metres.  
(NiK, 2003e, based on data from Itera) 
 
Table 7.4. Gazprom’s upstream projects in Central Asia, 2013 
Country Project Reserves 
  Gas, bcm Oil, mln. Tonnes 
Kazakhstan Imashevskii 129 20 
Kyrgyzstan East Mailisu IV, Kugart 2.1 0.5 
Tajikistan Sarykamysh 60 12 
Uzbekistan Gissarneftegaz 180 20 
 Kokdumalak-Gaz 130 - 
 Shakhpakhty 2.6 - 












RF aggregated tax 
collection, all levels, 
regardless of tax 
calculation year, billion 
rubles1 
Gazprom share of RF 
tax collection, percent 
2006 494.5 5426.9 9.1 
2007 505.2 6950.9 7.3 
2008 685.8 7944.2 8.6 
2009 523.2 6283.9 8.3 
2010 731.3 7659.5 9.5 
2011 967.2 9715.2 9.95 
 (Derived from Federal Tax Service, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; Gazprom, 
2013c) 
1 Sum of cells E15 (Postupilo nalogov, sborov, inykh ob”yazatel’nykh platezhei v dokhody: 
Federal’nogo byudzheta/Nalogovye dokhody) and F15 (Postupilo nalogov, sborov, inykh 
ob”yazatel’nykh platezhei v dokhody: Konsolidirovannogo byudzheta sub’ekta Rossiiskoi 




APPENDIX 2: NOTE ON SOURCES 
The source situation for each case 
Gazprom is the best covered company in existing research. It is often included in scholarly 
analyses of the Russian state, the Russian economy and Russia’s energy sector, and has 
frequently been analysed in the context of Russian foreign policy. The Eurasian gas sector 
is a research topic of its own and analyses of it invariably include Gazprom. There is a 
wealth of information available on Gazprom in trade journals and financial news media, in 
Russia and outside. The company’s own website also offers extensive information, 
especially from the 2000s, and it is well organised. 
There is generally good access to sources on Lukoil. In particular, the Russian and 
international trade journals that report on the Russian oil and gas sectors provided a good 
understanding of Lukoil’s position in the sector. A wide variety of background sources on 
the oil industry exists along with scholarly and industry analyses. They were 
complemented by searches in Russian newspapers, company reports and other information 
made available by the company. Scholarly research on the Russian oil industry, and 
Lukoil, is often included in works on politics in contemporary Russia.  
There is no lack of journalistic coverage of RAO UES between 1998 and 2008, often 
including Inter RAO’s foreign operations. Information on reform progress was also made 
available to the public by the company. Much information from RAO UES is still available 
on its preserved website (http://www.rao-ees.ru/). In contrast, for the first half of the 1990s 
there is little detail on RAO UES in news reports. A  regards scholarly analysis, there is 




extent, this compensated for the lack of an independent Russian trade journal. However, 
there is very little analysis of foreign electricity operations by scholars, with a couple of 
significant exceptions (Sabonis-Helf, 2007b; 2007a; Sherr, 2013).  
A limited number of Russian newspapers, trade journals and journalists report on and 
analyse the Russian nuclear sector. Compared to the ther cases in this thesis, Rosatom and 
the nuclear energy industry interest only a narrow public. The Russian industry’s 
integrated structure and complete state control leave little room for external, let alone 
independent, reporting. Trade journals are in-house journals. This means that within each 
type of source, there are fewer outlets, with fewer riters, than for the other cases. 
Moreover, the structure of the international nuclear nergy industry, with only a few major 
competitors to Rosatom, means there are fewer openly available international trade 
journals that could provide alternative information. There is also less well-researched 
coverage of the industry in mainstream international media. The international non-
proliferation regime on nuclear and fissile material encourages transparency and openness, 
but it does not apply to commercial data like prices or profits. 
Of all the cases in this thesis, Transneft was the least researched and analysed from the 
outset, both in Russia and internationally. It was also the least accessible company. Little 
information was made available to a wider public, although this improved in the latter part 
of the period under study. This dearth of most source types was somewhat remedied by the 






In the course of the investigation, I conducted 16 interviews involving 17 interviewees in 
two rounds of fieldwork in Moscow (February 2009 and September 2012). Eight 
interviews were with scholars or analysts, and eight with representatives of the companies 
studied here. The ratio of failure to success among contacts pursued was approximately 
50/50 for the first round of fieldwork and 60/40 for the second.  
There was a limited time period available for each round of fieldwork, making it essential 
to prioritise potential candidates for interviews. Potential interviewees were approached at 
business and scholarly conferences, through contacts, snowballing, and by phone or email. 
Representatives of state organisations were more difficult to reach, less approachable at 
business conferences, and were generally unavailable while I was in Moscow. Company 
representatives were also somewhat difficult to reach, nd in the case of Transneft, and 
partially Inter RAO, occasionally outright hostile n their (negative) responses. Others were 
more likely to regard an interview as an exercise in public relations. This could be a 
complication during interviews.  
Interviews were all conducted without tape recording aids, but with note-taking during the 
interview. This was based on a judgment that tape recording would lead interviewees to be 
less forthcoming in their answers. It was seen as es ential to build up trust with 
interviewees and not to raise any fears of their being ‘on the record’ for the future when 
political contexts might change. Note-taking may have disturbed the interview process 
somewhat, but it was also expected by the interviewees. Notes were written in longhand 




Russia is a high-context society (Clark and Michailova, 2004, p.9) and it can be difficult 
for a foreigner and outsider to conduct research on many topics. However, being 
Norwegian probably helped, as this provided positive associations (small neighbouring 
country, oil and gas producing country) to many interviewees. They assumed that a 
Norwegian would be familiar with the political signficance of the oil and gas industries.  
As an outsider I tried to be alert to topics that might be sensitive to interviewees, knowing 
that I might not realise the extent to which my questions could present a real threat to 
interviewees (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, quoted in Borochowitz, 2005, p.355). Another 
consideration was to avoid raising groundless suspicions of political bias or even hidden 
agendas due to my employment in the Norwegian defenc  sector. Contentious and critical 
questions were left for the middle and later stages of an interview. Occasionally I placed 
contentious or politicised issues in a frame of naivety or referred to common ground as a 
representative of an oil and gas producing country. Naivety is a risky interview strategy 
and it is not a planned one, but it generates trustand yields results. It comes naturally to an 
outsider who is, of course, uninformed on, or not sensitive to, some of the issues brought 
up during interviews. Being a woman helps, as naivety in many cases just confirmed 
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